Thomistic cosmological argument - why does causal efficacy need to be given?

Apologetics Philosophy
#1

Okay, so I think I’m starting to truly understand the Thomistic cosmological argument, with the help of great philosophers such as Edward Feser.

So, am I right in saying that the argument, unlike the kalam variant, does not rest on temporal regress but causal regress? So even if we have a line of causes that is infinite in both directions, or meet each other in a causal loop, there must still be something sustaining all of them, giving them their ‘causal efficacy’?

A quote from Feser from his blog.
“…He seems to think that what Aquinas was concerned to show is that if you lay out a series of causes ordered per se in a straight line, the line will necessarily have a beginning. But that is not what he was concerned to show. As Thomists sometimes point out, it wouldn’t change things in the least if we granted for the sake of argument that a series of causes ordered per se might loop around back on itself in a circle, or even that it might extend forward and backward infinitely. For the point is that as long as the members of such a circular or infinite chain of causes have no independent causal power of their own, there will have to be something outside the series which imparts to them their causal efficacy. (As the Thomist A. D. Sertillanges once put it, a paint brush can’t move itself even if it has a very long handle. And it still couldn’t move itself even if it had an infinitely long handle.) Moreover, if that which imparts causal power to the members of the circular or infinitely long series itself had no independent causal power, then it too would of necessity also require a principal cause of its own, relative to which it is an instrument. This explanatory regress cannot possibly terminate in anything other than something which has absolutely independent causal power, which can cause or “actualize” without itself having to be actualized in any way, and only what is purely actual can fit the bill.”

The issue I’m still struggling with and trying to get to the bottom of is though; why must there be ‘something outside the series which imparts to them their causal efficacy’? Is ‘causal efficacy’ some metaphysical property that needs to be given? Isn’t it merely an illustration of how we are perceiving the world around us? What is this ‘causal power’ that is spoken of, as if it is a real thing that must be given to all things in order for them to function? How can this all be proven as a real necessity?

#2

FYI, please find another way to begin your comments.

Your metaphor of " circular " causality is not good. An infinite series into the past or future is not circular.

If you imagine a line of freight cars infinitely into the past and future, it will not be moving because it has no motive power, it requires a locomotive to make it move. If the cars begin to move, then you know that either a locomotive has been added by an efficient cause or, if not, an efficient agent cause has started the cars moving. And if a locomotive has been added, some efficient agent cause had to add the locomotive. Either way, we ultimately require a First Efficient Cause which is itself Uncaused, God. And if a locomotive has been added, we no longer have infinite regress horizontically…

You have to envision efficient causality vertically not horizontically.

I like the example of a boy throwing a ball. The ball keeps moving after having been thrown because the boy has imparted impetus to the ball. The boy has modified the passivity of the ball’s form, he has caused the accident of impetus to be educed from the ball’s matter. So the ball now continues moving naturally under the motive power of impetus.

The boy, as the locomotive in the first example, is an instrumental, efficient/agent cause who has received his power to propel the ball and to impart the accident of impetus to it. The ball, on the other hand, has a form with a passive matter capable of receiving the accidental power of impetus. But the ball did not cause its own form.

Now, the boy is not the cause of the power he has. Nor is the ball the cause of its form, which has a passivity capable of receiving the accidental power of impetus. Ultimately, both the boy’s causal power and the receptive form of the ball’s matter are caused by a First Efficient Cause, Itself Uncaused, God.

Yes, impetus was actually proposed by Thomas. However, it is possible that God has given all ponderable, material things the property of potential impetus when he created their forms. Either way the ball will move naturally under the power of impetus, it will need no " accompanying " motive cause, it will need no [Imotor coniectus,*." it will move under its own power. No different than digestion taking place naturally in an animal.

I love this example because it shows that Newton’s Laws of Motion are no threat to the First Way, even restricting it to local motion.

Watch for the howls of protest.

Linus2nd

#3

Oh, okay. Did I say something wrong?

Your metaphor of " circular " causality is not good. An infinite series into the past or future is not circular.

My metaphor, or Edward Feser’s?

If you imagine a line of freight cars infinitely into the past and future, it will not be moving because it has no motive power, it requires a locomotive to make it move. If the cars begin to move, then you know that either a locomotive has been added by an efficient cause or, if not, an efficient agent cause has started the cars moving. And if a locomotive has been added, some efficient agent cause had to add the locomotive. Either way, we ultimately require a First Efficient Cause which is itself Uncaused, God. And if a locomotive has been added, we no longer have infinite regress horizontally…

I understand the analogy concerning the freight cars, but why is this a valid analogy for all causes? Why must they act in the same way?

Secondly, how do we know we aren’t observing two or more lines of freight trains and have two or more locomotives? Why reduce to just one uncaused cause? Occam’s razor?

You have to envision efficient causality vertically not horizontically.

I like the example of a boy throwing a ball. The ball keeps moving after having been thrown because the boy has imparted impetus to the ball. The boy has modified the passivity of the ball’s form, he has caused the accident of impetus to be educed from the ball’s matter. So the ball now continues moving naturally under the motive power of impetus.

The boy, as the locomotive in the first example, is an instrumental, efficient/agent cause who has received his power to propel the ball and to impart the accident of impetus to it. The ball, on the other hand, has a form with a passive matter capable of receiving the accidental power of impetus. But the ball did not cause its own form.

Now, the boy is not the cause of the power he has. Nor is the ball the cause of its form, which has a passivity capable of receiving the accidental power of impetus. Ultimately, both the boy’s causal power and the receptive form of the ball’s matter are caused by a First Efficient Cause, Itself Uncaused, God.

Yes, impetus was actually proposed by Thomas. However, it is possible that God has given all ponderable, material things the property of potential impetus when he created their forms. Either way the ball will move naturally under the power of impetus, it will need no " accompanying " motive cause, it will need no [Imotor coniectus,*." it will move under its own power. No different than digestion taking place naturally in an animal.

I love this example because it shows that Newton’s Laws of Motion are no threat to the First Way, even restricting it to local motion.

Watch for the howls of protest.

Linus2nd

Thanks for the response, was very helpful! As an added question, does the Thomistic cosmological argument require that “everything with a beginning as a cause”, or is the observation/existence of “some things having a cause” sufficient?

#4

Hi…I’ve subscribed to the thread because I’m interested in the responses you might get.

But, in case you don’t find what you’re seeking, I would suggesting asking Trent Horn (who wrote Answering Atheism). He’ll be on the Catholic Answers Live radio show on January 27th for the full two hours. The two hours will most likely be dedicated to Atheists (not sure what background you’re coming from), but if it is one of Atheism or agnosticism, you would qualify to call in that day.

Just wanted to throw that out there! Trent Horn has discussed the cosmological argument on the radio before, and I believe he does in his book as well. I would be eager to hear what he has to say in response to your question.

#5

OK. Here is one. It is not my idea, but similar to objections raised by some non-believers.
Here on earth, which is an extremely tiny part of the universe, we look for causes and in most cases, we do find causes. However, in the quantum world, the description of events is in many cases a non-causal description, indicating that causes are not the appropriate mechanism for describing quantal events. So, on the quantum scale, we, on earth, find an exception to the idea that everything must have a cause.
Our universe did perhaps have a cause if we assume that through some physical process it was seeded as a child bubble universe from the parent multiverse. However, where is the proof that the multiverse had to have a cause? Or that it had to have a beginning? Is it possible that the multiverse was always there?

#6

Regarding your initial questions, a helpful metaphor is a series of mirrors. Suppose you see an image in a mirror. You check where the reflection leads to find another mirror, in which the image is also reflected. You continue on and on, but keep finding mirrors with images rather than the actual thing. But at some point the actual thing has to be there to produce the image in the first place. In short, a regress is either vicious, or it is not. A vicious regress, if it continues to infinity, is ungrounded. (One could also have a vicious circularity.) Aquinas’s First and Second Ways essentially claim that causation generates vicious regresses, necessitating a first mover or uncaused cause.

Uniqueness of the uncaused cause is posterior to the demonstration. The Thomist arguments purport to show that there exists at least one purely actual uncaused cause. Suppose there exists another purely actual uncaused cause. Then, in order to be distinct, it must have some property that the other does not have (or the other has some property that it does not have). But neither can have any potentiality relative to the other, so they must be the same.

It could start from any singular instance of change (or any substance that has an efficient cause, or what have you). But in order to argue for the necessity of an unmoved mover or uncaused cause, you would have to sustain the claim that each subsequent change has a cause/each efficient cause itself has an efficient cause. Otherwise, you would not necessarily generate a vicious regress.

#7

I found these two articles by Edward Feser helpful concerning quantum mechanics and causality:

edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/oerter-on-universals-and-causality.html

edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/oerter-contra-principle-of-causality.html

#8

In the sciences there is not really such a thing as “the description of events.” To say that an event is uncaused under a particular description does not say anything conclusive about the event. Compare: Kepler’s laws are scientific, noncausal descriptions of the orbits of planets. It does not follow that the orbits of planets have no cause. (And note that this is true even if the orbits of the planets did in fact have no cause. From the existence of a noncausal description, the lack of a cause is not a valid inference.)

One can also postulate consistent interpretations of quantum mechanics. Alex Pruss provides a couple in his book on the principle of sufficient reason. One could forgo the speed of light as the “speed limit” of the universe, which would allow for one causal interpretation of quantum mechanics. One could also postulate that each particle that behaves (to our eyes) indeterministically in fact has a “preordained” set of actions intrinsic to it.

Mind you, neither of these are intended as plausible physical descriptions of quantum mechanics. The point is that there exist consistent causal interpretations of quantum mechanics, which precludes its being used as a counterexample to an otherwise general principle (which one might argue for on separate metaphysical grounds). (Note in this dialectical situation, the defender of a causal principle just needs to provide a consistent defense for the counterexample not to hold.)

A 1999 poll of 90 physicists at Cambridge University recorded 4 supporting the Copenhagen interpretation, 30 supporting a many worlds approach, and 50 undecided, so it is a stretch to say that there is a decisive consensus against a causal interpretation.

Interesting points, but Aquinas assumed for the sake of argument (following Aristotle) that the universe had an infinite past.

#9

I don’t know that this necessarily solves any of the problems associated with the origin of this universe. Let’s grant that the multiverse exists, it caused this universe, and that it is eternal. It still doesn’t follow that the multiverse is uncaused; it just is not constrained by time. If the multiverse truly was uncaused, then you would have arrived at the same conclusion as Aquinas. If not, then you would kick it up one more level until you eventually get to a reality whose existence is unconditional, so the conclusion of a first (causal first not temporal first) cause is seemingly inevitable. The next step for theists would be to analyze the nature of unlimited existence which leads to things like omnipotence, absolute simplicity, omniscience, omnibenevolence, etc.

#10

According to Max Born, “From the standpoint of our quantum mechanics there is no quantity which in any individual case causally fixes the consequence of the collision; but also experimentally we have so far no reason to believe that there are some inner properties of the atom which conditions a definite outcome for the collision.” And: “On the question of the ‘validity of the law of causality’ we have this opinion: as long as one takes into account only experiments that lie in the domain of our currently acquired physical and quantum mechanical experience, the assumption of indeterminism in principle, here taken as fundamental, agrees with experience.”
Some scientists, such as Einstein disagreed, and have proposed a hidden variables theory which would restore the position of causality.
However, the acceptance of hidden variables in QM is untenable according to Bell’s theorem, which, in one formulation, says that if there is an objective reality, no hiddenvariables theory could give the same results as quantum mechanics in all situations.

#11

Omnibenevolence has been questioned because of the terrible suffering endured by some children. Unless there is a limitation of some sort on omnipotence, it is difficult to understand the horrific suffering and pain endured by innocent children in some parts of the world.

#12

Once again, I understand the analogy, however I don’t understand why it is necessarily a sound analogy in regard to causality. Why should the same rules apply to a chain of causes? Why should there be something constantly providing some ‘causal efficacy/power’? Why should that be a thing in itself at all?

Uniqueness of the uncaused cause is posterior to the demonstration. The Thomist arguments purport to show that there exists at least one purely actual uncaused cause. Suppose there exists another purely actual uncaused cause. Then, in order to be distinct, it must have some property that the other does not have (or the other has some property that it does not have). But neither can have any potentiality relative to the other, so they must be the same.

So if one cause has a property that the other does not have, it necessarily follows that it has potentiality relative to the other? Why?

It could start from any singular instance of change (or any substance that has an efficient cause, or what have you). But in order to argue for the necessity of an unmoved mover or uncaused cause, you would have to sustain the claim that each subsequent change has a cause/each efficient cause itself has an efficient cause. Otherwise, you would not necessarily generate a vicious regress.

And how would you prove the claim that each efficient cause itself has an efficient cause?

#13

Theology tells us that God is uncaused, and there is no contradiction in saying so.
Where would be the contradiction in assuming that the multiverse is uncaused?

#14

Well sure there’s objections to those qualities but it seems that the basis of this thread is establishing a necessary entity. Once you get there then it’s just a matter of coming to understand a lot of the implications of necessary existence. That’s the only point I was trying to make. There seem to be numerous threads around here reconciling omnibenevolence with the evidential problem of evil.

#15

There’s no contradiction, it’s just that we’re now playing a game of semantics because we’re talking about the same thing. Are we going to call it “God” or the “multiverse?” I’m not sure what exactly you have in mind when you are talking about the multiverse, so maybe I’m not understanding what specifically you are imagining, but if it is not absolutely simple then it cannot be uncaused. I would think that a multiverse would have some level of complexity.

#16

The reason is that it is the case with contingent beings that they do not have their causal efficacy in themselves. C moves D because it was moved by B. But B only moves C because it was move by A. And so on. “Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again.” The regress is vicious at the level of observation (so the argument goes).

Sorry, I was not clear. I am saying for them to be distinct, one must have a potentiality relative to the other. But since they are both pure act ex hypothesi, they cannot have any potentialities relative to another, so they must be identical.

One would have to make some argument to the effect that everything that began to exist has a cause. Aquinas argues that nothing that begins to exist could be its own efficient cause, “There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.” For a thing to cause itself it would have to exist (in the mode supposed) and not exist (in order to be caused to be).

#17

But Max Born and I are not talking about the same thing. He is saying that experimentally it is consistent to suppose that quantum mechanics is indeterministic. I didn’t deny that. But I said that there were consistent causal interpretations as well, which is all I need to do to show that quantum mechanics does not meet the standard of a counterexample to a causal principle.

There is disagreement over the implications of Bell’s theorem (hence the small number of physicists currently supporting the Copenhagen interpretation). In any case, though, this doesn’t really meet what I said, which is that there are consistent causal interpretations of quantum mechanics. Bell’s inequality applies to hidden variable theories which attempt preserve the principle of locality, but as I said, one can postulate an interpretation on which the speed of light as speed limit is not a metaphysical principle, so Bell’s theorem wouldn’t apply. (Alex Pruss’s other “monad” proposal in which each particle is preordained also gets around this issue.)

#18

Several problems with this scenario. It has not been proven that some quantum effects are without cause. The very fact that we have to perform experiments to detect these events seems to argue for a cause. However, once we have proven the existence of God or know from faith that he exists, we know for certain that nothing escapes his causality and providence.

Our universe did perhaps have a cause if we assume that through some physical process it was seeded as a child bubble universe from the parent multiverse. However, where is the proof that the multiverse had to have a cause? Or that it had to have a beginning? Is it possible that the multiverse was always there?

Well, there is absolutly reason to suppose anything like this ever happened or could happen.

Linus2nd

#19

Not wrong. It just grates on the nerves. Try different, normal introductions.

My metaphor, or Edward Feser’s?

Either way

I understand the analogy concerning the freight cars, but why is this a valid analogy for all causes? Why must they act in the same way?

This is the reasoning of Aristotle and Thomas. Nothing happens without a cause. Nothing causes itself. Did you cause yourself?

Secondly, how do we know we aren’t observing two or more lines of freight trains and have two or more locomotives?

Because I only put one freight train on the tracks:D.

Why reduce to just one uncaused cause? Occam’s razor?

Has nothing to do with Occam’s Razor, it has to do with logical reasoning.

Thanks for the response, was very helpful! As an added question, does the Thomistic cosmological argument require that “everything with a beginning as a cause”

Every beginning must have a cause and every change or motion must have a cause.

or is the observation/existence of “some things having a cause” sufficient?

We only have to show it in a couple of instants to prove the existence of God. Then we see that all events must have a sufficient cause.

Linus2nd

#20

Why is that? Quantum events are uncaused according to some descriptions and they are not all that simple.