How can God be omniscint if he can't feel pain?

[Kevin12]

As the question says, it seems that there is an issue with the idea of God being omniscient and at the same time totally impassible, and therefore unable to feel actual pain. If the experience of pain is a kind of knowledge, it means we can say we know something God doesn’t—what it is like to experience pain. This, indeed, seems to be a pretty big problem, because God is supposed to condemn those in Hell to an eternity of sensible pain, something of which he has no knowledge.

Nor does it suffice, I think, to say that God experienced pain in the Incarnation. Most theologians say that while we can attribute the passion to the Person of Christ, who is God and a Man, but not to the Divine Nature nature itself. Furthermore, even if we did say that God experienced pain in the Passion, God would have learned something He didn’t already know, so he wouldn’t have been omniscient until that point.

Nor do I think it will work to say that God knows everything that it is possible for Him to know, as this runs into Plantinga’s “McEar” problem, but with omniscience:

Suppose that it is a necessary truth about a certain being, known as McEar, that the only action he performs is scratching his ear. It follows that, if McEar can scratch his ear, he is omnipotent, despite his inability to do anything else.

By this definition, a “McTime” like being who can necessarily only know what time it is and always does because he wears a watch would be omniscient.

 

[clem456]

God doesn’t experience sin either.

 

[Kevin12]

God doesn’t experience sin either.

I meant pain as a placeholder for any different kind of experiential knowledge that God apparently lacks. I picked pain because it is not something incompatible with God’s goodness—it is not sinful to feel pain—and furthermore, there is a certain sense in which we can say God experienced pain under the Person of Christ, but this seems to imply God learned something He did not know.

 

[clem456]

I meant pain as a placeholder for any different kind of experiential knowledge that God apparently lacks. I picked pain because it is not something incompatible with God’s goodness—it is not sinful to feel pain—and furthermore, there is a certain sense in which we can say God experienced pain under the Person of Christ, but this seems to imply God learned something He did not know.

To say that God learned something implies God is subject to the passing of time.

Is rejection painful? God is the most profoundly rejected being of all.

 

[Usagi]

I meant pain as a placeholder for any different kind of experiential knowledge that God apparently lacks. I picked pain because it is not something incompatible with God’s goodness—it is not sinful to feel pain—and furthermore, there is a certain sense in which we can say God experienced pain under the Person of Christ, but this seems to imply God learned something He did not know.

Do you consider the actual experience to be a different ot greater sort of knowledge than having the knowledge of every creature’s experience of pain?

God knows more about His creatures’ pain than anyone, but He is not subject to pain. To me that is a lack of creaturely limitation, not a lack of knowledge or understanding.

Usagi

 

[Kevin12]

Do you consider the actual experience to be a different ot greater sort of knowledge than having the knowledge of every creature’s experience of pain?

God knows more about His creatures’ pain than anyone, but He is not subject to pain. To me that is a lack of creaturely limitation, not a lack of knowledge or understanding.

Usagi

It’s not a matter of experiencing every individuals experience of pain, but the knowledge of what it is like to feel pain is certainly a different knowledge than a propositional knowledge describing that pain.

Other than that, you’re just twisting words around to avoid the issue. Are you denying that experience is a type of knowledge? By your definition, a doctor knows more about your experience of pain than you do.

You can call it a creaturely limitation if you like, but all it amounts to is that God cannot really understand our pain at all—he can know that we can experience pain, but lacks the ability to experience pain himself— yet created a world in which pain and suffering was possible and condemns those who disobey him to eternal pain.

The Incarnation seems to solve this, but it also means that before the Incarnation, God lacked this knowledge.

 

[clem456]

It’s not a matter of experiencing every individuals experience of pain, but the knowledge of what it is like to feel pain is certainly a different knowledge than a propositional knowledge describing that pain.

Other than that, you’re just twisting words around to avoid the issue. Are you denying that experience is a type of knowledge? By your definition, a doctor knows more about your experience of pain than you do.

You can call it a creaturely limitation if you like, but all it amounts to is that God cannot really understand our pain at all—he can know that we can experience pain, but lacks the ability to experience pain himself— yet created a world in which pain and suffering was possible and condemns those who disobey him to eternal pain.

The Incarnation seems to solve this, but it also means that before the Incarnation, God lacked this knowledge.

There is no “before the incarnation” for God.

 

[Usagi]

I’m not talking solely about propositional knowledge, though. God knows everything we think and feel. If my doctor could get inside my head to share my internal experience of pain rather than relying on my reports, plus had all her academic medical knowledge, she would indeed know more about my pain than I myself do.

And as the previous poster says, it’s not as though there was a period of time during which God had no experience of the Incarnation.

 

[meltzerboy]

I meant pain as a placeholder for any different kind of experiential knowledge that God apparently lacks. I picked pain because it is not something incompatible with God’s goodness—it is not sinful to feel pain—and furthermore, there is a certain sense in which we can say God experienced pain under the Person of Christ, but this seems to imply God learned something He did not know.

Then shame and guilt would also be associated with sin. But how about surprise, gratitude, pleasure (the moral kind); does G-d have any of these human experiences? I think, however, that He can know and feel what we are feeling, including our physical and emotional pain.

 

[Kevin12]

I’m not talking solely about propositional knowledge, though. God knows everything we think and feel. If my doctor could get inside my head to share my internal experience of pain rather than relying on my reports, plus had all her academic medical knowledge, she would indeed know more about my pain than I myself do.

I’m not sure about this, as it would, again, seem to imply passivity if God can directly experience our pain.

And as the previous poster says, it’s not as though there was a period of time during which God had no experience of the Incarnation

This idea sounds more probably, but I’m still not completely sure about it. I imagine there are at least some people who would say that the suffering experienced by Christ had no impact whatsoever on the Divine Nature, or else it would imply some kind of change, so this really wouldn’t work. But I admit it seems to make a certain amount of sense, since Christ’s two natures were united under one person or hypostasis.

 

[Lucretius]

It’s not a matter of experiencing every individuals experience of pain, but the knowledge of what it is like to feel pain is certainly a different knowledge than a propositional knowledge describing that pain.

Other than that, you’re just twisting words around to avoid the issue. Are you denying that experience is a type of knowledge? By your definition, a doctor knows more about your experience of pain than you do.

You can call it a creaturely limitation if you like, but all it amounts to is that God cannot really understand our pain at all—he can know that we can experience pain, but lacks the ability to experience pain himself— yet created a world in which pain and suffering was possible and condemns those who disobey him to eternal pain.

The Incarnation seems to solve this, but it also means that before the Incarnation, God lacked this knowledge.

All knowledge for humans is derived from the senses. Thus, for humans, experimentation is a way to obtain knowledge. However, God doesn’t have a body, and doesn’t need senses or experiences to know things. God certainly knows what pain is, but He doesn’t have to experience pain to know it, because He is the creator of pain.

To put it another way, God didn’t create pain and then knew it, but rather knew it before it was created, in a sense.

You seem to assume that one must experience something in order to know it, which isn’t necessarily true even for humans (I know what a cat is without being one, for example).

However, you are also making a more interesting claim that one cannot be empathetic if one doesn’t experience the same pain. This idea deserves contemplation.

Christi pax,

Lucretius

 

[Lily_Bernans]

I’m not sure about this, as it would, again, seem to imply passivity if God can directly experience our pain.

This idea sounds more probably, but I’m still not completely sure about it. I imagine there are at least some people who would say that the suffering experienced by Christ had no impact whatsoever on the Divine Nature, or else it would imply some kind of change, so this really wouldn’t work. But I admit it seems to make a certain amount of sense, since Christ’s two natures were united under one person or hypostasis.

United, yes, but not mixed in any way. Entirely separate.

 

[clem456]

I’m not sure about this, as it would, again, seem to imply passivity if God can directly experience our pain.

This idea sounds more probably, but I’m still not completely sure about it. I imagine there are at least some people who would say that the suffering experienced by Christ had no impact whatsoever on the Divine Nature, or else it would imply some kind of change, so this really wouldn’t work. But I admit it seems to make a certain amount of sense, since Christ’s two natures were united under one person or hypostasis.

I don’t know how you could apply the idea of any experience to God in his divine nature, because of his timeless nature.
For instance love: can we say that God experiences love? I don’t beleive so. God is love.

 

[Lucretius]

And as the previous poster says, it’s not as though there was a period of time during which God had no experience of the Incarnation.

But God does know our pain, regardless of the Incarnation. The Incarnation isn’t a way for God to understand our pain, but rather a way to, without a doubt, verify to us, with our weak minds, that God does know our pain. God isn’t learning our pain, God is proving that He knows it already.

The book of Job teaches something similar: God already knows that Job will prevail in the tests Satan burdens him with, but God, in part, allows Satan to go through with them anyway, because God wants Job himself to know whether Job truly trusts God or if his trust is tied to the comforts and earthly gifts he was given. Is my faith real, says C. S. Lewis, or is my faith reducable to full belly and dry clothes? In the same way, God already knows our pain, and has told us that he does, but we dont trust him; in the Incarnation, however, we humans now have empirical evidence that, when God says He understands our suffering, He means it.

Christi pax,

Lucretius

 

[Kevin12]

United, yes, but not mixed in any way. Entirely separate.

They are not entirely separate, otherwise they would not be called united at all, which is Nestorianism. I have read Eleonore Stump’s book on Aquinas, and she notes that ultimately there is no comparison possible for the union of the two natures in his mind, but the closest analogy one can get is the union between the body and the soul (or maybe the form of the soul, or something to that effect, it was a library book I don’t have anymore so I can’t check it), which is by no means “separate” (though, as you say, without implying mixing)

But God does know our pain, regardless of the Incarnation. The Incarnation isn’t a way for God to understand our pain, but rather a way to, without a doubt, verify to us, with our weak minds, that God does know our pain. God isn’t learning our pain, God is proving that He knows it already.

The book of Job teaches something similar: God already knows that Job will prevail in the tests Satan burdens him with, but God, in part, allows Satan to go through with them anyway, because God wants Job himself to know whether Job truly trusts God or if his trust is tied to the comforts and earthly gifts he was given. Is my faith real, says C. S. Lewis, or is my faith reducable to full belly and dry clothes? In the same way, God already knows our pain, and has told us that he does, but we dont trust him; in the Incarnation, however, we humans now have empirical evidence that, when God says He understands our suffering, He means it.

Christi pax,

Lucretius

The question is, does he know it as propositional knowledge or experiential knowledge? Some would say He can’t know the experience of pain because it would imply passibility. The Incarnation gets around this because of the hypostatic union of God to a human soul and body, but that was only in the case of one man, not every man.

 

[Usagi]

Really, your question doesn’t have to go so far as suffering and pain. Does God (outside the Incarnation) know what it is like to have arms and legs, or a stomach? I would say He does by knowing everything there is to know about us, much as I said about pain, but as He is a pure spirit He obviously does not have those parts inherently.

Heck, does Gof have the experience of having forgotten something He once knew, as often happens to us? Clearly not, as that contradicts omniscience – yet again I would consider that a lack of a lack, rather than a lack of some actual quality. God possesses all perfections, not all imperfections.

Usagi

 

[Lucretius]

The question is, does he know it as propositional knowledge or experiential knowledge?

Neither.

Some would say He can’t know the experience of pain because it would imply passibility. The Incarnation gets around this because of the hypostatic union of God to a human soul and body, but that was only in the case of one man, not every man.

The Incarnation doesn’t answer the question, because any qualia would do. If God is all-knowing, how does he know what it is to be a bat.

The question is flawed ultimately because creatures are reflections of their Creator, and so God doesn’t need to be a creature to understand it, because the creature’s purpose is fullfiled most fully in Him. God doesn’t need to be a bat to understand it because all that it is to be a bat is a reflection of God Himself. God doesn’t need to feel pain to know it because pain was modeled off His glory. God understands our pain more than we do.

Christi pax,

Lucretius

 

[Kevin12]

Really, your question doesn’t have to go so far as suffering and pain. Does God (outside the Incarnation) know what it is like to have arms and legs, or a stomach? I would say He does by knowing everything there is to know about us, much as I said about pain, but as He is a pure spirit He obviously does not have those parts inherently.

Heck, does Gof have the experience of having forgotten something He once knew, as often happens to us? Clearly not, as that contradicts omniscience – yet again I would consider that a lack of a lack, rather than a lack of some actual quality. God possesses all perfections, not all imperfections.

Usagi

I’m trying my best to exclude absurdities here. However, I think there is some experiential knowledge that would not contradict God’s goodness. Is the capacity to empathize with a created being by knowing what it is like to experience pain an imperfection? I think, on the contrary, the Christian perspective is that it is a perfection, not an imperfection.

 

[Kevin12]

Neither.

The Incarnation doesn’t answer the question, because any qualia would do. If God is all-knowing, how does he know what it is to be a bat.

The question is flawed ultimately because creatures are reflections of their Creator, and so God doesn’t need to be a creature to understand it, because the creature’s purpose is fullfiled most fully in Him. God doesn’t need to be a bat to understand it because all that it is to be a bat is a reflection of God Himself. God doesn’t need to feel pain to know it because pain was modeled off His glory. God understands our pain more than we do.

Christi pax,

Lucretius

I’m not even implying qualia exist in the absolute sense of each individual having some incommunicable and individual experience of every sensation—and I think even if qualia do exist, a bat is not self aware, so there is no such thing as “What its like to be a bat”, whatever Nagel says.

Nevertheless, I think you are just avoiding the issue.

“and so God doesn’t need to be a creature to understand it, because the creature’s purpose is fullfiled most fully in Him.”

How does the teleology of a created being have anything to do with understanding its experiences.

“God doesn’t need to feel pain to know it because pain was modeled off His glory. God understands our pain more than we do.”

I don’t think this is accurate. In the first place, the existence of pain is a subversion of his plan, as are sin and death. Secondly, if God doesn’t feel pain, it doesn’t matter if it is modeled off his glory or not, he lacks the knowledge of what it is like to experience pain, and if He understands it, he only understands it as propositional knowledge rather than experiential knowledge, unless we say that He is indeed capable of experiencing pain (which I think is problematic outside of the Incarnation).

 

[Lucretius]

I’m not even implying qualia exist in the absolute sense of each individual having some incommunicable and individual experience of every sensation—and I think even if qualia do exist, a bat is not self aware, so there is no such thing as “What its like to be a bat”, whatever Nagel says.

I used qualia in a broad sense, and referenced Dr. Nagel because I wanted to see if someone would get the reference.

How does the teleology of a created being have anything to do with understanding its experiences.

It’s experience and its causes are part of the same thing.

I don’t think this is accurate. In the first place, the existence of pain is a subversion of his plan, as are sin and death.

Pain wasn’t meant for man, but theologians are divided on whether pain full stop was not a part of Creation before original sin. Some Fathers, like St. John Damascene thought that animals didn’t suffer before original sin, but the more scientific minded, like St. Thomas, argued that since the final cause of certain animals involved eating other ones, suffering must have existed before original sin.

Pain is a good thing per accidens though, like when it motivates you to move your hand off the hot stove. Suffering can be a great good when it is for the sake of witnessing the Gospel and living with faith without compromise (Martyrdom).

Secondly, if God doesn’t feel pain, it doesn’t matter if it is modeled off his glory or not, he lacks the knowledge of what it is like to experience pain, and if He understands it, he only understands it as propositional knowledge rather than experiential knowledge, unless we say that He is indeed capable of experiencing pain (which I think is problematic outside of the Incarnation).

God created everything from nothing, so He has intimate knowledge of all things in which we can not contemplate (and this is also because these creations have their basis in Him). The type of knowledge is thus transcendent of both propositional and experimental knowledge.

God created everything from nothing, and dwells within things that are not Himself. We don’t have such an experience and knowledge, and so it is easy to see why we would have problems seeing how could God understand our pain without having a body.

I’m pretty tired, so what I just wrote might be rough and confusing. I’ll look at your post again when I’m rested.

Christi pax,

Lucretius