B
Buber
Guest
I’m wondering how the mental experience at the moment of choosing to sin is supposed to be like. Aquinas says that man’s will tends to happiness by necessity in an analogous way that the intellect grasps the first principles of reason. It is only with regard to the method or means by which to achieve happiness that the will can be free to choose between alternatives.
Yet I find it hard to grasp precisely when the moment of sin occurs or how it is even possible to consciously sin. let’s say you have a supposedly sinful appetite for excessive amount of food. Your intellect either clearly sees that acting on it would turn you away from your ultimate end (which you will by necessity) and so is necessarily repulsed by it, or it doesn’t see it clearly, which means that as the matter stands before the intellect it looks like as if it’s possible that indulging in the appetite is not against your ultimate end/reason/God’s will. But then how can it truly be sinful to allow the appetite to run its course? Don’t you have to know that something you’re about to do is sinful to be guilty? (and I’m not talking about the distinction between vincible and invincible ignorance since we can ask the exact same question about the moment when the will didn’t act on the responsibility to inform the conscience).
A possible response I may think about is that it’s enough for the intellect to grasp that there is a certain amount of (epistemological or subjective) probability that an action would be sinful (and perhaps a much lower probability that avoiding the action would be so) for the will to be culpable. But this seems a little bit artificial.
Yet I find it hard to grasp precisely when the moment of sin occurs or how it is even possible to consciously sin. let’s say you have a supposedly sinful appetite for excessive amount of food. Your intellect either clearly sees that acting on it would turn you away from your ultimate end (which you will by necessity) and so is necessarily repulsed by it, or it doesn’t see it clearly, which means that as the matter stands before the intellect it looks like as if it’s possible that indulging in the appetite is not against your ultimate end/reason/God’s will. But then how can it truly be sinful to allow the appetite to run its course? Don’t you have to know that something you’re about to do is sinful to be guilty? (and I’m not talking about the distinction between vincible and invincible ignorance since we can ask the exact same question about the moment when the will didn’t act on the responsibility to inform the conscience).
A possible response I may think about is that it’s enough for the intellect to grasp that there is a certain amount of (epistemological or subjective) probability that an action would be sinful (and perhaps a much lower probability that avoiding the action would be so) for the will to be culpable. But this seems a little bit artificial.