Objective Teleology

[Bubba_Switzler]

Objective teleology, the explanation of phenomena by the purpose they serve rather than by postulated causes, is teleology as discovered from a vantage point outside the observed process.

Of course, we experience subjective purpose (though some might assert this is an illusion). We say I turned on the light so that I could see.

And we infer purpose by purposful creatures. We say that another person turns on the lights to see or that a dog digs under a fence to escape the yard or even that a plant extends its roots in order to find water.

But can we infer purpose in nature in general? Can we say, for example, that the purpose of sex is to create children or the purpose of man is to learn and know? Can we infer purpose in nature in view of evolution?

Of course, the most famous proponent of objective teleology is Saint Thomas Aquinas but he did not invent the idea, Aristotle did. And although Aquinas portrayed God as the agent of design and purpose, Aristotle’s prime mover is much simpler in its role.

But Aristotle simply treated nature as intentional and purposeful, much as people today talk about evolution. Final cause is, for Aristotle, a fundamental feature of the natural world. Final causes are just there like the prime mover.

All Aquinas does is identify the agent involved.

 

[Rhubarb]

I don’t believe so, and strongly disagree with every teleology I’ve encountered. I’ve thought about this from many angles and situations. I don’t see how anything in nature can have ‘a’ purpose without introducing some normative premise or qualification.

What is the purpose of my hands? Is it to feed myself? Or to defend myself? Or use a keyboard or mouse or pen to discuss philosophy? To create or destroy with tools? Perhaps the best we can say is “to facilitate my well-being”? But that seems exceptionally overbroad and unspecific. My wellbeing then needs to be defined, and how to facilitate it.

Or, how about a chair? Am I using a chair ‘wrong’ if I use it as a stool, or a table, or a flower-pot-holder?

As far as sex goes, I’ve never been sure how “it makes babies” translates to “its purpose is to make babies as per the natural law.” Sex has a variety of ‘uses’ for human beings. I suppose because it’s the only way to make babies… But. My nose is the only way to smell, so is its purpose specifically to smell? I use it to breathe, too, but not exclusively - other parts of me can breathe too. It seems to me the analogy is that I should only breathe through my nose if said breathing is open to smelling, as per the natural law. But that sounds wrong. My nose has an exclusive ‘use’ and several ‘other uses’, just like sex. It seems to me that the logical implications should be equal between noses and sex. But to insist the nose has “a” purpose seems absurd.

Though I guess the analogy isn’t perfect, as a nose is a bodily structure while sex is a process. But I think I can re-tool the analogy to eliminate this worry.

 

[Bubba_Switzler]

Suffice it to note that there are at least five approaches one could take to the question of whether teleology is (or is not) real, and at least five levels in nature at which one might (or might not) identify a distinct sort of teleology.

edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/03/conjuring-teleology.html

epsociety.org/userfiles/art-Feser%20(Teleology)(1).pdf

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Objective teleology, the explanation of phenomena by the purpose they serve rather than by postulated causes, is teleology as discovered from a vantage point outside the observed process.

Of course, we experience subjective purpose (though some might assert this is an illusion). We say I turned on the light so that I could see.

And we infer purpose by purposful creatures. We say that another person turns on the lights to see or that a dog digs under a fence to escape the yard or even that a plant extends its roots in order to find water.

But can we infer purpose in nature in general? Can we say, for example, that the purpose of sex is to create children or the purpose of man is to learn and know? Can we infer purpose in nature in view of evolution?

Of course, the most famous proponent of objective teleology is Saint Thomas Aquinas but he did not invent the idea, Aristotle did. And although Aquinas portrayed God as the agent of design and purpose, Aristotle’s prime mover is much simpler in its role.

But Aristotle simply treated nature as intentional and purposeful, much as people today talk about evolution. Final cause is, for Aristotle, a fundamental feature of the natural world. Final causes are just there like the prime mover.

All Aquinas does is identify the agent involved.

Please define “purpose” and “intention”?

I suspect once you do that and anthropomorphisms, if any, are identified you will be able to satisfactorily answer the question convincingly for yourself.

 

[Bubba_Switzler]

Please define “purpose” and “intention”?

I suspect once you do that and anthropomorphisms, if any, are identified you will be able to satisfactorily answer the question convincingly for yourself.

“And the end or goal towards which a thing naturally points is its final cause [purpose].”

Teleology is seldom used according to its etymological meaning to denote the branch of philosophy which deals with ends or final causes. It means the doctrine that there is design, purpose, or finality in the world, that effects are in some manner intentional, and that no complete account of the universe is possible without reference to final causes (for the notion of final cause, see CAUSE).

newadvent.org/cathen/14474a.htm

According to St. Thomas, the natural law is “nothing else than the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law” (I-II.94). The eternal law is God’s wisdom, inasmuch as it is the directive norm of all movement and action. When God willed to give existence to creatures, He willed to ordain and direct them to an end. In the case of inanimate things, this Divine direction is provided for in the nature which God has given to each; in them determinism reigns. Like all the rest of creation, man is destined by God to an end, and receives from Him a direction towards this end.

newadvent.org/cathen/09076a.htm

I am particuarly interested in the objective discovery of teleology (purpose) through observation and reason and not by reference to revelation.

How, for example, do you convince an atheist that homosexuality is wrong without first converting him to be a Christian?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

“And the end or goal towards which a thing naturally points is its final cause [purpose].”

newadvent.org/cathen/14474a.htm

newadvent.org/cathen/09076a.htm

I am particuarly interested in the objective discovery of teleology (purpose) through observation and reason and not by reference to revelation.

How, for example, do you convince an atheist that homosexuality is wrong without first converting him to be a Christian?

Just for my reference Bubba: have you found an objective way to discover the efficient cause of something; one that can convince guys like David Hume, without having to convert them first into, let’s say, aristotelians?

 

[Bubba_Switzler]

Just for my reference Bubba: have you found an objective way to discover the efficient cause of something; one that can convince guys like David Hume, without having to convert them first into, let’s say, aristotelians?

I can’t speak for Hume but with respect to “efficient cause” I’d say that any model that allows one to predict the behavior of phenomenon is sufficient for that purpose. Now is that an aristotelian “efficient cause”? I don’t know. But it’s good enough for science and it’s applications. So, for example, the orbits of the plants are easly calculated based on causal theories of gravitation and momentum.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I can’t speak for Hume but with respect to “efficient cause” I’d say that any model that allows one to predict the behavior of phenomenon is sufficient for that purpose. Now is that an aristotelian “efficient cause”? I don’t know. But it’s good enough for science and it’s applications. So, for example, the orbits of the plants are easly calculated based on causal theories of gravitation and momentum.

I remember I discussed this topic with another person in this forum… Nor gravitation nor momentum are causes, but… By the way, did you know that Leibniz formulated the principle of conservation of momentum (because this guy was a theoretical physicist too) using the idea of final causes?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

“And the end or goal towards which a thing naturally points is its final cause [purpose].”

Well this is not well labelled as “purpose” at all then in modern English use of that word which is confined to intelligent agency.

As for “final cause” - that seems only to be a “cause” in the eye or the hand of an external intelligent beholder and does not essentially belong to the thing itself “naturally”.
In which case it seems to be more of an efficient cause setting the passive “thing” in intelligent motion such as an arrow to its target.
But then again that allegedly intelligent motion may be purely random (a blind folded archer) and 1 time in a million hit the target.

Was it Einstein who said order is but one example of general disorder.

How, for example, do you convince an atheist that homosexuality is wrong without first converting him to be a Christian?

I have never considered Christianity to have learnt that from revelation myself.
Its just pragmatics, if you want your community to thrive and flourish you need to reproduce. If you want someone to look after you in your dotage you make sure you have lots of kids, feed them well and teach them to respect the family.

Its more about what works and what doesn’t work I think. Right and wrong are higher level concepts that come after that perhaps.

 

[Wesrock]

Science assumes formal and final causes in practice, otherwise it would make no sense. If there were no formal causes, then any experiment would be pointless, as such an experiment could tell you only about the sample, and nothing of anything else.

Likewise, science would be just as pointless if there were no final causes. Yes, so this sample of Drug A is effective against Virus Z. But why should I assume all samples of Drug A have this “power” against Virus Z? Why does it not instead poof into a bunny rabbit? It sounds absurd, but these are the types of things those who “refuted” final causation centuries ago claimed were possible. A bowling ball could appear on the table for no reason! And let me be clear, by no reason, they literally mean no reason. Wormholes, teleportation, matter reconstruction, quantum fluctuations are all reasons, and (so the people who claimed to refute final causes said) such things were completely unnecessary for a bowling ball to appear from nothing. No causes. Neither could we properly anticipate any effects! Oh, we might see something happen more often amd say X produces Y out of convenience, but that has nothing to do with anything intrinsic to what we’re studying. Yet it’s Aristotlean-Thomism that doesn’t jive with the sciences? /endrant

Back on topic… Scientific experiments are designed to remove as many external influences as possible precisely because they are intended to measure the “powers” of a particular sample, and this is expected to to be consistent across all samples, and if we get different results it’s not because the “powers” of Drug A have changed, but because there are external influences (causes) impacting the end result. We’d never assume it happened for no reason at all. That is, there is such thing as inorganic teleology, though people often mistake such talk as implying an intent or consciousness or ultimate purpose to inorganics. Teleology on such a level isn’t about finding the ultimate cosmic purpose of a brick, or opium, or any such thing.

 

[Bubba_Switzler]

Well this is not well labelled as “purpose” at all then in modern English use of that word which is confined to intelligent agency.

Terminology can be tricky across languages, cultures, and milinia. The traditional Christian view was that God created what we see more or less as they appear. Introducing evolution seperates the Creator from His creation making it hard to see the intelligent agency involved. And materialistic atheists prefer to do away with intelligent agency altogether and teleology with it. So is it an accident of language or just the nature of modern metaphysics?

If teleology were obvious from observation and reason one might be able to infer not only purpose but, ultimately, an intelligent agency, i.e. God. Even if atheists resisted that conclusion it would be sufficient for those who see this agency at work to produce more reliable explanations of the world to show the superiority of the idea.

But I am unclear how one goes about discovering teleology from observation and reason.

As for “final cause” - that seems only to be a “cause” in the eye or the hand of an external intelligent beholder and does not essentially belong to the thing itself “naturally”.
In which case it seems to be more of an efficient cause setting the passive “thing” in intelligent motion such as an arrow to its target.
But then again that allegedly intelligent motion may be purely random (a blind folded archer) and 1 time in a million hit the target.

Was it Einstein who said order is but one example of general disorder.

I’m not sure precisely what you mean here but let’s look at sexuality. Can we infer from observation of and reason about sexuality that it’s purpose is procreation?

I have never considered Christianity to have learnt that from revelation myself.
Its just pragmatics, if you want your community to thrive and flourish you need to reproduce. If you want someone to look after you in your dotage you make sure you have lots of kids, feed them well and teach them to respect the family.

Its more about what works and what doesn’t work I think. Right and wrong are higher level concepts that come after that perhaps.

While I sympathize with your logic, the challenge for Aquinas was to find a way to justify abstinence but not homosexuality. Both are an impediment to reproduction. But one is a virtue and the other a sin.

 

[Bubba_Switzler]

Science assumes formal and final causes in practice, otherwise it would make no sense. If there were no formal causes, then any experiment would be pointless, as such an experiment could tell you only about the sample, and nothing of anything else.

Likewise, science would be just as pointless if there were no final causes. Yes, so this sample of Drug A is effective against Virus Z. But why should I assume all samples of Drug A have this “power” against Virus Z? Why does it not instead poof into a bunny rabbit? It sounds absurd, but these are the types of things those who “refuted” final causation centuries ago claimed were possible. A bowling ball could appear on the table for no reason! And let me be clear, by no reason, they literally mean no reason. Wormholes, teleportation, matter reconstruction, quantum fluctuations are all reasons, and (so the people who claimed to refute final causes said) such things were completely unnecessary for a bowling ball to appear from nothing. No causes. Neither could we properly anticipate any effects! Oh, we might see something happen more often amd say X produces Y out of convenience, but that has nothing to do with anything intrinsic to what we’re studying. Yet it’s Aristotlean-Thomism that doesn’t jive with the sciences? /endrant

Back on topic… Scientific experiments are designed to remove as many external influences as possible precisely because they are intended to measure the “powers” of a particular sample, and this is expected to to be consistent across all samples, and if we get different results it’s not because the “powers” of Drug A have changed, but because there are external influences (causes) impacting the end result. We’d never assume it happened for no reason at all. That is, there is such thing as inorganic teleology, though people often mistake such talk as implying an intent or consciousness or ultimate purpose to inorganics. Teleology on such a level isn’t about finding the ultimate cosmic purpose of a brick, or opium, or any such thing.

I fear you are going off on a tangent.

Let’s agree that there are certain philosophical foundations for science. And let’s also agree that modern science developed out of medieval scholasticism. It doesn’t follow that modern science relies on teleology or “powers” of samples. The most popular view is that the universe is governed by “laws” and science is the art of discovering those laws. Whatever role the concept of teleology might have played in the interim, it is out of the picture now as far as I can tell.

 

[Bubba_Switzler]

From Edward Feser:

• Teleological realism: teleology is a real and irreducible feature of the natural world
• Platonic teleological realism: the irreducible teleology manifest in nature is extrinsic, entirely derivative from an outside source
• Aristotelian teleological realism: teleology or final causality is intrinsic to natural substances, and does not derive from any divine source
• Scholastic teleological realism: final causes are immanent within or intrinsic to natural substances but are ultimately explained in terms of the divine intellect
• Teleological reductionism: there is a sense in which teleology exists in nature, but that it is entirely reducible to nonteleological phenomena
• Teleological eliminativism: there is no genuine teleology at all in the natural world

The whole point of the Aristotelian view is to insist that goal-directedness does not require a mind which consciously intends the goal.

Cause and effect as sort of proto-teleology of inanimate objects.

 

[Bubba_Switzler]

Science assumes formal and final causes in practice, otherwise it would make no sense. If there were no formal causes, then any experiment would be pointless, as such an experiment could tell you only about the sample, and nothing of anything else.

Looking more closely it seems like neo-Scholastics have identified causality with teleology.

Here, for example:

As Spaemann goes on to note, however, human beings and even the biological realm in general are by no means the only loci of irreducible natural teleology, since (as I also discuss at length both in TLS and in Aquinas, and have touched on in earlier posts) “the connection of causa finalis and causa efficiens is unrelinquishable. The concept of cause, in general, falls together with the concept of finality.” (p. 293) In other words, wherever A is the efficient cause of some effect or range of effects B, that can only be because generating B is the final cause of A. Otherwise there is no reason why A should generate B specifically rather than C, D, or no effect at all, and efficient causation becomes unintelligible – as indeed it did in modern philosophy, as the puzzles raised by David Hume make evident. (Again, see the works cited above for the full story.)

edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/02/spaemann-on-teleology.html

I suspect you were saying that or something like it in your post.

That seems peculiar to me but not absurd.

I don’t think anyone here would argue against teleology in human beings. Most would grant some sort of teleology in lower animals, and I am in that camp. One could even admit teleology in plant life.

The neo-Thomists seem to be arguing that even in non-animate physical matter we should think of causality in terms of both efficient and final.

Well, ok. But that’s a very truncated sort of telelogy.

If teleology in inanimate matter is simply what we otherwise think of as cause and effect then I don’t see how you get from there to moral conclusions like homoexuality or artificial contraceptives are unnatural and therefore immoral.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

When Fesser says this:

The concept of cause, in general, falls together with the concept of finality.” (p. 293) In other words, wherever A is the efficient cause of some effect or range of effects B, that can only be because generating B is the final cause of A. Otherwise there is no reason why A should generate B specifically rather than C, D, or no effect at all, and efficient causation becomes unintelligible – as indeed it did in modern philosophy, as the puzzles raised by David Hume make evident. (Again, see the works cited above for the full story.)

It seems to me that he is somewhat trivializing the final cause. Typically it seems to me that the final cause is understood in terms of purpose or intent, but there is none of that here. Instead we seem to be doing the following. We want to describe a change, represented by this arrow:

A → B

According to my reading of Fesser, the arrow’s efficient cause is A, and the final cause is B. In Fesser’s explanation, we seem to have reduced the terms “efficient cause” and “final cause” with simply “cause” and “effect.” In other words, what we need to explain a change from A to B is… A and B. Naturally, there is nothing objectionable about this, other than it seems to void the traditional understanding of what the final cause is.

 

[cfauster]

I think Fr. Ernan McMullin’s perspective is interesting. He writes:

“Our notions of teleology, of purpose, of plan, are conditioned by the temporality of our world, in which plans gradually unfold and processes regularly come to term. In such a world, purpose depends on foreknowledge, and foreknowledge in turn depends on the predictability of the processes involved. Lacking such predictability, there cannot be reliable foreknowledge, and without foreknowledge purpose is ineffective. But a Creator who brings everything to be in a single action from which the entirety of temporal process issues, does not rely on the regularity of process to know the future condition of the creature or to attain ends. The notion of “purpose” must itself be reinterpreted in such a case. God’s knowledge of how a situation will develop over time is not discursive; God does not infer from a prior knowledge of how situations of the sort ordinarily work out. … Terms like “plan” and “purpose” obviously shift meaning when the element of time is absent. For God to plan is for the outcome to occur. There is no interval between decision and completion. Thus the character of the process that, from our perspective, separates initiation and accomplishment is of no relevance to whether or not a plan or purpose on the part of the Creator is involved.”

I doubt McMullin would claim that the purpose he’s talking about is completely “objective” because in his essay he also writes:

“Asserting the reality of cosmic purpose in this context takes for granted that we already believe that the universe depends for its existence on an omniscient Creator whose action is sufficiently like ours to allow us to call it purposive, in an admittedly analogical sense. It does not mean that we are privy to that purpose, though the traditions of the Torah, the Bible, and the Koran would imply a recognition of at least a part of it. Only to the extent that such a prior recognition were possible could one allow cosmic purpose to constitute a special form of teleology (recalling that “teleology” refers to a specific mode of explanation). When in the Confessions Augustine looks back over his life and finally recognizes a Providence at work through all the contingency, it is to teleology of this sort that he is appealing.”

 

[fisherman_carl]

Objective teleology, the explanation of phenomena by the purpose they serve rather than by postulated causes, is teleology as discovered from a vantage point outside the observed process.

Of course, we experience subjective purpose (though some might assert this is an illusion). We say I turned on the light so that I could see.

And we infer purpose by purposful creatures. We say that another person turns on the lights to see or that a dog digs under a fence to escape the yard or even that a plant extends its roots in order to find water.

But can we infer purpose in nature in general? Can we say, for example, that the purpose of sex is to create children or the purpose of man is to learn and know? Can we infer purpose in nature in view of evolution?

Of course, the most famous proponent of objective teleology is Saint Thomas Aquinas but he did not invent the idea, Aristotle did. And although Aquinas portrayed God as the agent of design and purpose, Aristotle’s prime mover is much simpler in its role.
.

I would say that we could only know the purpose for something for sure if we know what the intention of the original desiger was. Without knowing this we could be wrong about the purpose of something. For example, if you see a machine that has wheels and cogs, but the wheels fall of you can not say for sure that this machine is faulty, because it could have been designed to work that way. Perhaps, it was designed to have its wheels fall off. Thus, just looking at the physical processes alone can not necessarily give us its true function without knowing the intention of its designer.

Now, as far as human sensuality is concerned, one could look at what it does, and how children result and from that infer that it’s purpose is to have children with a reasonable assuredness that, that is its function. And observing that this is how it works and has also worked you can be fairly certain that this is how it is supposed to work. However, if you know that God created human sexuality for the purpose of being fruitful and multiplying, then you simply know for sure that is its purpose, since God is the designer of it. And if anyone knows how it is supposed to work it would be its designer.

 

[fisherman_carl]

I don’t believe so, and strongly disagree with every teleology I’ve encountered. I’ve thought about this from many angles and situations. I don’t see how anything in nature can have ‘a’ purpose without introducing some normative premise or qualification.

What is the purpose of my hands? Is it to feed myself? Or to defend myself? Or use a keyboard or mouse or pen to discuss philosophy? To create or destroy with tools? Perhaps the best we can say is “to facilitate my well-being”? But that seems exceptionally overbroad and unspecific. My wellbeing then needs to be defined, and how to facilitate it.

Or, how about a chair? Am I using a chair ‘wrong’ if I use it as a stool, or a table, or a flower-pot-holder?

As far as sex goes, I’ve never been sure how “it makes babies” translates to “its purpose is to make babies as per the natural law.” Sex has a variety of ‘uses’ for human beings. I suppose because it’s the only way to make babies… But. My nose is the only way to smell, so is its purpose specifically to smell? I use it to breathe, too, but not exclusively - other parts of me can breathe too. It seems to me the analogy is that I should only breathe through my nose if said breathing is open to smelling, as per the natural law. But that sounds wrong. My nose has an exclusive ‘use’ and several ‘other uses’, just like sex. It seems to me that the logical implications should be equal between noses and sex. But to insist the nose has “a” purpose seems absurd.

Though I guess the analogy isn’t perfect, as a nose is a bodily structure while sex is a process. But I think I can re-tool the analogy to eliminate this worry.

Something can have more than one purpose. For instance, the sexual organs are not only used to make babies, but can also be used to eliminate waste from the body. The only way to be absolutely sure what something’s purpose is, is to know the intentions of the designer. Although, you can be reasonably sure what the purpose of an organ like the sexual organ is in your body just by looking at its function in the body. However, it would be difficult to know what something’s final end is apart from a designer, who may have a greater purpose for it then what we realize. As soon as you say there is no designer then you are left with your position, not being able to be sure about what the purpose of anything is. Because the physical facts and processes do not explain themselves. It takes a mind that can rationalize what they are. Or to philosophize about them. But, you don’t have the certainty about them that would if there was a designer who could tell you what they are for.

Yet, even without a designer in mind one could at least come to the conclusion that things have purposes. You couldn’t for instance do medicine if you for instance didn’t know what the function of the heart or the liver was. If you could not say what the hearts purpose was to pump blood or to play the tuba. Which would be bad for patients!

You could also known that for instance the natural end of an egg is to become a chicken. Or the natural end of a fetus is to grow into an adult. These things can be observed in nature without even knowing there is a designer.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Terminology can be tricky across languages, cultures, and milinia.

I don’t believe vocab and principles are separable. Changes meanings mean changed principles. A coherent system needs both and they are intimately related.
The fact that the modern word “purpose” is used to explain miedieval teleology is a strong pointer that the principle itself is suspect OR the principle is being given more meaning and import than it originally possessed.

But I am unclear how one goes about discovering teleology from observation and reason.

As were the captains of the Enlightenment.

I think we have to begin by recognising equivocal uses. For example it makes more sense when dealing with living creatures, but less sense with inanimate objects (planetary motion, arrows allegedly purposed to a target).

I’m not sure precisely what you mean here but let’s look at sexuality. Can we infer from observation of and reason about sexuality that it’s purpose is procreation?

As above, it makes best sense here it seems. But “sexuality” is pretty vague.
Even nature is pretty “blind” and “unpurposed” in this regard. Giraffe males regularly have sex with males as well. The sexual drive obviously does reproduce the species but its hardly a “purposed” activity, but more like an (Aristotelian) proper accident that was kept only because individuals that randomly had that accident lived to pass it on. Is that intelligent design? Well what is intelligence? Species arise and go extinct. Its certainly a potential that arises from the random changes of nature. Its probably unavoidable that 0.000001% of random changes end up causing a reproductive lifeform that endures for a time. That’s probably an inherent principle/potential of matter and its impossible for matter not to sometimes behave like this.

But why would we call it intelligent or somehow the individual actively seeking a reproductive goal for its species sake? Its simply that some causes give rise to a predictable on going chain of effects when a “critical mass” as it were is reached, like a nuclear explosion.

While I sympathize with your logic, the challenge for Aquinas was to find a way to justify abstinence but not homosexuality. Both are an impediment to reproduction. But one is a virtue and the other a sin.

Where is this coming from?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

From Edward Feser:

The whole point of the Aristotelian view is to insist that goal-directedness does not require a mind which consciously intends the goal.

Cause and effect as sort of proto-teleology of inanimate objects.

Yeah, this says much more clearly what I was attempting below!