A question on moral absolutism

[FuzzyBunny116]

I’m sorry for the necromancy, but this question has been eating at me; I thought I had it down, but I don’t think so anymore.

I simply cannot grasp the concept that God would rather us choose to, say, be tortured to death rather than blaspheme, and I cannot, for the life of me, come to grasp with the idea that killing one innocent person to save a thousand is somehow wrong.

 

[fix]

I’m sorry for the necromancy, but this question has been eating at me; I thought I had it down, but I don’t think so anymore.

I simply cannot grasp the concept that God would rather us choose to, say, be tortured to death rather than blaspheme, and I cannot, for the life of me, come to grasp with the idea that killing one innocent person to save a thousand is somehow wrong.

You may want to read this:

… If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. They remain “irremediably” evil acts; *per se *and in themselves they are not capable of being ordered to God and to the good of the person. “As for acts which are themselves sins (cum iam opera ipsa peccata sunt), Saint Augustine writes, like theft, fornication, blasphemy, who would dare affirm that, by doing them for good motives (causis bonis), they would no longer be sins, or, what is even more absurd, that they would be sins that are justified?”.134
Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act “subjectively” good or defensible as a choice…

vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html

 

[antimon]

If, then, someone lied to hide Jews from the Nazis, they fail number 1, because lieing is wrong.

you call it lying, I call it saving a life… If I had hidden some Jews and a nazi death squad asked me “are you hiding any Jews?” and I lied (not some half-truth, but a straight lie) to them that I wasn’t, would my action be wrong? (also consider that I would never regret such lie, would I be damned then?)

 

[mlchance]

Numbered questions for clarity’s sake:

1. If I had hidden some Jews and a nazi death squad asked me “are you hiding any Jews?” and I lied (not some half-truth, but a straight lie) to them that I wasn’t, would my action be wrong?
2. (also consider that I would never regret such lie, would I be damned then?)

1. A deliberate lie is always wrong.
2. No. A coerced lie is still a lie and, therefore, a violation of God’s law, but no grave moral culpability could be laid at the feet of the liar.

– Mark L. Chance.

 

[Scottgun]

you call it lying, I call it saving a life… If I had hidden some Jews and a nazi death squad asked me “are you hiding any Jews?” and I lied (not some half-truth, but a straight lie) to them that I wasn’t, would my action be wrong? (also consider that I would never regret such lie, would I be damned then?)

I, like most, would probably lie given the duress of the situation, but in moral reasoning there ain’t two ways about it: lying is objectively wrong, meaning no circumstance or subjective intent can make it right. In such a scenario, we would not be damned due to reduced culpability.

Scott

 

[mlchance]

I, like most, would probably lie given the duress of the situation, but in moral reasoning there ain’t two ways about it: lying is objectively wrong, meaning no circumstance or subjective intent can make it right. In such a scenario, we would not be damned due to reduced culpability.

For an action to be objectively good, the action itself, the intent behind the action, and the end (or goal) of the action must all be moral. If anyone of the three (action, intent, or end) is immoral, the entire action is immoral.

For grave moral culpability to result, the action itself must be gravely wrong, the actor must know what he is doing is gravely wrong, and the actor must freely choose to perform the action.

In the so-called “lying to save the Jews from the Nazis” dilemma, the lie itself remains immoral, but, because of the circumstances, grave moral culpability would not result.

– Mark L. Chance.