R
Rosalinda
Guest
Truth and Tolerance- Christian Belief and World Religions- by Pope Benedict, published by Ignatius Press in 2004 has a rather surprising answer to this question.
Part 2, chapter 3- Freedom and Truth
"It must have become clear that the crisis in the history of freedom in which we find ourselves arises from an unclarified and one-sided conception of freedom. On the one hand, people have isolated the concept of freedom and have thereby distorted it: freedom is good, but it is only good in association with other good things, with which it constitutes an indissoluble whole. On the other hand, people have narrowed down the concept of freedom to individual rights and freedoms and have thus robbed it of its human verity. I should like to make clear the problem of this understanding of freedom with one concrete example, which can at the same time open up for us the way toward a more appropriate conception of freedom. I mean the question of abortion. In the radical version of the Enlightenment’s individualistic tendency, abortion appears to be one of the rights of freedom: a woman must be able to have total control over herself. She must have the freedom to bring a child into the world or to rid herself of it. She must be able to make decisions concerning herself, and nobody else-- so we are told – can impose upon her, from without, any ultimately binding norm. It is a matter of the right of self-determination. But, in an abortion, is the woman actually making a decision that concerns herself? Is she not in fact making a decision about someone else – deciding that this other person should be allowed no freedom, that the sphere of freedom --his life-- should be taken away from him because it is in competition with her own freedom? And thus we should ask: What kind of a freedom is this that numbers among its rights that of abolishing someone else’s freedom right from the start?"…
Part 2, chapter 3- Freedom and Truth
"It must have become clear that the crisis in the history of freedom in which we find ourselves arises from an unclarified and one-sided conception of freedom. On the one hand, people have isolated the concept of freedom and have thereby distorted it: freedom is good, but it is only good in association with other good things, with which it constitutes an indissoluble whole. On the other hand, people have narrowed down the concept of freedom to individual rights and freedoms and have thus robbed it of its human verity. I should like to make clear the problem of this understanding of freedom with one concrete example, which can at the same time open up for us the way toward a more appropriate conception of freedom. I mean the question of abortion. In the radical version of the Enlightenment’s individualistic tendency, abortion appears to be one of the rights of freedom: a woman must be able to have total control over herself. She must have the freedom to bring a child into the world or to rid herself of it. She must be able to make decisions concerning herself, and nobody else-- so we are told – can impose upon her, from without, any ultimately binding norm. It is a matter of the right of self-determination. But, in an abortion, is the woman actually making a decision that concerns herself? Is she not in fact making a decision about someone else – deciding that this other person should be allowed no freedom, that the sphere of freedom --his life-- should be taken away from him because it is in competition with her own freedom? And thus we should ask: What kind of a freedom is this that numbers among its rights that of abolishing someone else’s freedom right from the start?"…