An arguement for the Transcendence of Self knowledge

[MindOverMatter2]

What do you mean by “fully explained”? I have no idea how you would determine a “full explanation” from a “non-full explanation”.-TS

This isn’t just a mater of limited knowledge; Its a matter of necessity. When a person moves a cog which in turn moves another cog, we have a fully functional explanation of why the last cog in the series of movers was turned. It is because an intelligent being moved it; and thus there is sufficient reason why it happened. However, In terms of existence, H2O is a new quality of being which did not exist in the cause. There is certainly a correlation between physical events prior to the existence of H2O and the actual existence of H20, and there is even rules or conditions that evidently must be met before the actualisation of H2O occurs; but the quality that we call wetness cannot be essentially reduced to its cause, since wetness is absent in the cause. Thus there is no physical explanation for why there is such a thing as wetness. The only explanation that physics can provide is that something happens when substances interact. But this does not change the fact that out of nothing comes nothing; thus the cause must either be categorically greater than the effect or it must have the same properties as the effect. The effect cannot be greater than the cause or have something qualitatively or quantitatively different to what is found in the cause, as this would amount to saying that nothing and something is qualitatively identical.

In my understanding, an explanation succeeds as far as it combines explanatory power with novel and accurate predictions, and might be somehow falsified. -TS

This is the criteria for a scientific explanation. Scientific explanations are not full explanations of objective phenomena. It is a description of physical phenomena. The method of explanation is necessarily limited to its descriptive nature.

How could that be? It appears you are supposing that a framework that doesn’t provide full and ultimate knowledge is irrational. Is that what you are thinking?-TS

I am not supposing any such thing. Reason forces me to hold to the rational principle that a thing either has the full reason for its existence in itself/its intrinsic nature, or in the existence of some other nature outside of itself.

 

[The_Exodus]

Well, as I keep pointing out, hydrogen atoms don’t have “wetness” either. But if you combine a couple of them with an oxygen atom, you get “wetness”?

Yeah, right, sure! Okie dokie…

-TS

So wetness is objectively real, independent of any mind conceiving it? This runs counter to your position regarding “sweetness.”

Why is “wetness” independent of mind, and “sweetness” isn’t?

 

[The_Exodus]

1. Pure Energy does not have self knowledge.

2.Therefore to have knowledge of the self is to transcend the nature of physical reality.

What say ye?

Premise 1 does not seem verifiable. It seems intuitive, but it is certainly not demonstrative. Or at least it is not demonstratively shown here. Also, on a materialist world view, many would simply say that, while “self knowledge” exists in a person, there is nothing immaterial or special about it. It is simply a phenomena resulting from the arrangement of matter which is the brain. Of course, this doesn’t explain how matter can act of matter and “receive it” (in knowing) without actually becoming it, but that is another post.

Any argument which starts with self-knowledge, or a priori ontology, is doomed to fail, particularly in this day and age which is so materialistic.

An interesting argument I would like to see, however, and one I’ve sort of put forward in my thread “Hawking’s Theory and Traditional Thomism” is how a materialist goes about proving gravity exists, since it is immaterial and unable to be detected by the five senses.

 

[Touchstone]

This isn’t just a mater of limited knowledge; Its a matter of necessity. When a person moves a cog which in turn moves another cog, we have a fully functional explanation of why the last cog in the series of movers was turned. It is because an intelligent being moved it; and thus there is sufficient reason why it happened. However, In terms of existence, H2O is a new quality of being which did not exist in the cause.

It’s two atoms of H and one of O. That’s what water is, right? The combination is new in the sense that those three atoms weren’t combined in that configuration before, and it takes energy to both create the chemical bonds, and break them (and water is particularly strong in its bonding), but there’s nothing new there, physically. It’s configuration of atoms via chemical processes. The “wetness” (not the sensation humans have in their brains, but the viscosity and friction dynamics that causes that sense) is the result of the combinatory properties of the hydrogen and oxygen atoms – “latent” properties in the sense that this dynamic does not obtain from oxygen or hydrogen itself. (and also, this “wetness” is a function of lots of water molecules interacting, not just one molecule being “wet” itself).

Maybe an even simpler way to look at this concept is mixing red paint and blue paint. If you mix red and blue paint, how is it that you now have “purple paint”? Where’d the purple come from? Is it supernatural? Paint pixies at work? No, the combination changes the primary wavelengths absorbed by the paint. There’s no new physical material there, but the way light interacts with it is changed just do to the reconfiguration of the substances.

The quality is “latent” in that sense, each color paint having primary absorption colors on the spectrum that when combined produce a predictable “new” wavelength absorption.

There is certainly a correlation between physical events prior to the existence of H2O and the actual existence of H20, and there is even rules or conditions that evidently must be met before the actualisation of H2O occurs; but the quality that we call wetness cannot be essentially reduced to its cause, since wetness is absent in the cause.

Is “purple” latent in the unmixed red and blue paint, then, in your view? Is “purpleness” a physically determined feature of a mixture of those, or not?

Thus there is no physical explanation for why there is such a thing as wetness.

Now it’s not clear at all what you would accept as a “physical explanation”. Is “purple” physically explainable from the combination of red and blue paint? What’s the criterion you’re applying?

The only explanation that physics can provide is that something happens when substances interact. But this does not change the fact that out of nothing comes nothing;

In none of these cases is it supposed that something comes from nothing (assuming for the moment that that is the case), but rather in all three, lower-level elements combine in ways to produce complex and for us hard to predict (to some degree or another, depending on our level of progress) and explain interactions. Purple paint as the mixture of blue and red paint isn’t the mystery it was in Thales’ time, right?

thus the cause must either be categorically greater than the effect or it must have the same properties as the effect.

This is abstract (degrading into metaphysics here!). What is your metric for “greater”?

Is “purple” greater than “red” or “blue”. “Wetness” greater than “non-wet”?

The effect cannot be greater than the cause or have something qualitatively or quantitatively different to what is found in the cause, as this would amount to saying that nothing and something is qualitatively identical.

Give me an example you can quantify, and that will help me understand your principle here. It sounds like nonsense, but it may be I just am not understanding your principle of measurement. How would we agree that some observed pattern resulting from interaction is “greater” or not, in violation of your putative metaphysics?

This is the criteria for a scientific explanation. Scientific explanations are not full explanations of objective phenomena. It is a description of physical phenomena. The method of explanation is necessarily limited to its descriptive nature.

OK, back to that difficulty on your end, then. What constitutes a “full explanation”?

I am not supposing any such thing. Reason forces me to hold to the rational principle that a thing either has the full reason for its existence in itself/its intrinsic nature, or in the existence of some other nature outside of itself.

I have no idea what would qualify as a “full reason”, here. An example would be good.

-TS

 

[Touchstone]

So wetness is objectively real, independent of any mind conceiving it? This runs counter to your position regarding “sweetness.”

Why is “wetness” independent of mind, and “sweetness” isn’t?

I’m pointing at the underlying physics, is all, not our sensory perception of it. Not talking in terms of qualia, in other words, but viscosity, friction, surface tension, the properties that make water behave in terms of sliding, slipping, sticking, etc. that obtain whether any humans are involved or not (say water interacting with the surface of a rock, for example).

-TS

 

[The_Exodus]

I’m pointing at the underlying physics, is all, not our sensory perception of it. Not talking in terms of qualia, in other words, but viscosity, friction, surface tension, the properties that make water behave in terms of sliding, slipping, sticking, etc. that obtain whether any humans are involved or not (say water interacting with the surface of a rock, for example).

-TS

But you are just arbitrarily choosing here what obtains, “whether any humans are involved or not.” What is your criteria, and why is it valid, for saying “sweetness” only obtains when humans are involved? Is it not, however you slice it, merely an assertion?

Furthermore, “viscosity, friction, surface tension, etc.” are all themselves concepts, just as “sweetness” is a concept. Granted, they are concepts we use to deal with reality, but, according to your view, “perhaps we are not hard-wired to understand reality as it really is.”

What, then, is your criteria for what we can understand about reality, and what is merely relatively conceptual, or “sweet”?

Again, on the one hand, you use empricism when it suits your purposes. Then again, when it points to a necessary cause of the universe - when sense experience shows that everything which changes is changed by another - you draw back and say that perhaps things just come into being for no reason at all.

Why are you justified in assuming sense experience leads to truth on some occasions, and at other times stating that sense experience fails, because, when faced with the “brute fact” of reality, it is helpless to lead to knowledge? I’m failing to see how this distinction is not merely your subjective, arbitrary opinion. Could you please demonstrate the validity of your reasoning/thought process here?

 

[Touchstone]

But you are just arbitrarily choosing here what obtains, “whether any humans are involved or not.” What is your criteria, and why is it valid, for saying “sweetness” only obtains when humans are involved? Is it not, however you slice it, merely an assertion?

Here’s a “map”

Wetness1: the underlying physics, objective properties of water that obtain in the same way, no matter what labels are used for it. (the territory)

Wetness2: the human concept we use to label Wetness1, the “map entry” that points at the territory

Applying this to “sweetness”:

Sweetness1: the underlying physics, objective properties of water that obtain in the same way, no matter what labels are used for it. (the territory)

Sweetness2: the human concept we use to label Sweetness, the “map entry” that points at the territory.

In the discussion of “sweetness”, Dennett’s (and my, and evolutionary science’s point) is that Sweetness2 doesn’t point to Sweetness1 because of any intrinsic “sweet” (i.e. pleasing) feature of Sweetness1, but points there because it’s beneficial for evolutionary reasons (it’s high-energy density fuel).

Qualia are not the physics. The map is not the territory. For “wetness”, the emergent properties (Wetness1) emerge as they do, no matter what you call it, but nevertheless have properties that are not (trivially) derived from hydrogen and oxygen atoms. Dennett was focusing on qualia. I’m focusing on the underlying physics, regardless of labels or subjective assessments. We are wondering where those physical properties come from, not the labels or human concepts.

Furthermore, “viscosity, friction, surface tension, etc.” are all themselves concepts, just as “sweetness” is a concept. Granted, they are concepts we use to deal with reality, but, according to your view, “perhaps we are not hard-wired to understand reality as it really is.”

Perhaps not. The degree of understanding is established in the model performance.

What, then, is your criteria for what we can understand about reality, and what is merely relatively conceptual, or “sweet”?

Beyond what is axiomatic (“I am conscious”, for example), what we can understand about reality are those propositions which which perform as (components of) models for that reality, where “performance” means empirical alignment, prediction, and liability to falsification. There is no “pre-known” limit or a priori perimeter. We work form the inside out, from ignorance to knowledge, and and our knowledge extends just as far as we can demonstrate that knowledge to be knowledge.

Again, on the one hand, you use empricism when it suits your purposes. Then again, when it points to a necessary cause of the universe - when sense experience shows that everything which changes is changed by another - you draw back and say that perhaps things just come into being for no reason at all.

We have no empirical knowledge of what happens “beyond” this universe, or even an inkling if that term (or any substitute you could name) is even meaningful. None. We notice, locally, that a kind of symmetry and isotropy obtains: gravity appears to apply consistently here and any other place we’d care (or are able) to test it. But we understand that those dynamics obtain in a physical context (STEM), and beyond that, we don’t and can’t know what, if any of that, applies. Not probabilistically, not intuitively, not no how can we establish properties or dynamics beyond our local physical context.

Gravity may not be symmetric and isotropic as we think it is. We just don’t have any evidence that contradicts that principle in our various tests and means of measurement (and some of them are very large scale). We haven’t and can’t test it everywhere, so it an inductive conclusion, going from the specific to the general. In terms of cosmologies, we have zero specifics to begin with in going to the general, religious intuitions or dogma notwithstanding.

Why are you justified in assuming sense experience leads to truth on some occasions, and at other times stating that sense experience fails, because, when faced with the “brute fact” of reality, it is helpless to lead to knowledge? I’m failing to see how this distinction is not merely your subjective, arbitrary opinion. Could you please demonstrate the validity of your reasoning/thought process here?

The metaphysical gambit is that our extra-mental reality is intelligible to some degree. It’s unjustified (if hardwired into our biology), and may be a failed hunch, but that gamble is predicated on the performance of any models we might develop as the index of “intelligible”. It’s totally subjective to suppose that “reality is real” (even if, again, it’s hardwired in our biology), but once you accept the idea that objective reality obtains outside the mind (subjectively), the performance of models can serve as your “scorekeeping”.

Given that, in contexts where we don’t have access to evidence or empirical feedback from extra-mental reality – say, for example, in wondering ‘what made the universe?’ – we understand that such knowledge is unattainable, not just in practice, but in principle. That’s subjective at the root, but once one makes that first leap in accepting the reality of an objective extra-mental reality, all of this proceeds by principle and evidence.

-TS

 

[tonyrey]

But does the argument work?

Your argument works if the following assumptions are accepted:

1. Physical energy is impersonal.
2. Physical energy cannot become personal.
3. Physical energy is unaware of itself.
4. Physical energy cannot become aware of itself…

Since these assumptions seem self-evident the onus is on the materialist to explain why they are false.

 

[The_Exodus]

Qualia are not the physics. The map is not the territory. For “wetness”, the emergent properties (Wetness1) emerge as they do, no matter what you call it, but nevertheless have properties that are not (trivially) derived from hydrogen and oxygen atoms. Dennett was focusing on qualia. I’m focusing on the underlying physics, regardless of labels or subjective assessments. We are wondering where those physical properties come from, not the labels or human concepts.

And yet you can only detect wetness by feeling it, and sweetness by tasting it. You cannot get wetness from physics/observation of chemical reactions alone. Thus, on your view, how does one get the property of wetness, unless that property, like sweetness, is detected in the object itself which is sensed?

Again, how is wetness independent of mind - i.e. how is it soley understood from “physics”?

touchstone:

We have no empirical knowledge of what happens “beyond” this universe, or even an inkling if that term (or any substitute you could name) is even meaningful. None. We notice, locally, that a kind of symmetry and isotropy obtains: gravity appears to apply consistently here and any other place we’d care (or are able) to test it.

I would never dispute that we can have rational knowledge of what is “beyond” this universe. You trying to pin such a claim is more evidence that you do not understand the traditional a posteriori proofs for an uncaused cause - i.e. a completely actual agent.

How do you know that gravity exists? It is completely immaterial, so why are we reasonable in thinking it exists, yet not reasonable in thinking an uncaused cause exists?
Furthermore, I think, conceptually speaking, gravity can be equated with the Prime Mover of Aristotle. See my post "Hawking’s Theory and Traditional Thomism for more if interested.

The metaphysical gambit is that our extra-mental reality is intelligible to some degree.

If the universe came from nothing, by nothing, for no reason or cause, and with no end in mind, it is not possibly objectively intelligible. Truth is mere illusion, subjective gurglings of the gray matter of our brain; atoms reacting determinately in the only way they possibly can. “I think” becomes “it thinks,” as all serious atheistic philosophers have understood.
touchtone:

It’s totally subjective to suppose that “reality is real” (even if, again, it’s hardwired in our biology), but once you accept the idea that objective reality obtains outside the mind (subjectively), the performance of models can serve as your “scorekeeping”.

Granting that “reality is knowable” you can also show that God exists.

touchstone:

Given that, in contexts where we don’t have access to evidence or empirical feedback from extra-mental reality – say, for example, in wondering ‘what made the universe?’ – we understand that such knowledge is unattainable, not just in practice, but in principle. That’s subjective at the root, but once one makes that first leap in accepting the reality of an objective extra-mental reality, all of this proceeds by principle and evidence.

-TS

“That reality is real” is an entirely different statement than “wondering what made the universe is, in principle, uknowable”. In order to make the second statement you need another subjective “leap” by arbitrarily placing limits on what it is we can know. Why should I or anyone else accept this epistemic limit you have given?

It is only thusly - subjectively, arbitrarily, unfalsifiably, “nakedly” - that you conclude that “what made the universe” is unattainable in principle. You ought to realize then, that you are unjustified in saying that “God did not create nor could not have created the universe” since such a statement requires a knowledge which you say you do not have. Agnosticism is not equivalent, intellectually (though it may be in practice) to atheism. You cannot claim x does not exist if you do not think it possible to know whether or not x exists in the first place, since the “what it is” of a thing follows after the question of “if it is.”

You are an agnostic, trying to impose your subjective ontology to argue against the existence of God, and by doing so contradict yourself, because you do not think it possible to know if God exists or not in the first place. Any of your statements about God can have no more meaning than what you fundamentally assert about his knowability.