Aquinas Fourth Way and the Others

[Qoeleth]

If we provisionally accept Aquinas’ Five Ways- what necessity is there that the Being proved in the Fourth Way (the argument from degree) is the same as the Unmoved Mover, the non-contingent Being, etc., of the other ways.

Is there an real reason why the Unmoved Mover (of the 1 Way) is the same being as the perfection of Goodness (4th Way)?

I am not much of an Aquinas scholar, so I welcome elucidation from those who are.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

Because the fourth way is speaking about the grades of being or existence in things and demonstrates that in being, there is a maximum of existence or being, one and true. Remember in the second way he demonstrates that it is not the essence of things to exist and in essentially ordered series, there in lies a terminus to a being or thing who’s essence is existence.

 

[Qoeleth]

Because the fourth way is speaking about the grades of being or existence in things and demonstrates that in being, there is a maximum of existence or being, one and true. Remember in the second way he demonstrates that it is not the essence of things to exist and in essentially ordered series, there in lies a terminus to a being or thing who’s essence is existence.

If one accepts the Second Way, and concludes that there must be a Being who exists essentially, what is the basis for assuming that such a Being is the same as the Being who is the perfection of goodness, or power, or any other characteristic?

Is it concievable, according to Aquinas, that the non-contingent being is different from the being who is the perfection of goodness?

According to the Second Way, we might conclude that there is a non-contingent Being, whose essence is existence. Such a being might be totally neutral with regard to goodness.

Then, they may be a being who is the perfection of goodness, who is caused by a happy coincidence of various imperfect things. In the same way that two ‘bad’ parents may produce a ‘good’ child. (This is a bad illustration, but think shows the point).

Why is the Being of the Second Way necessarily the same as the Being of the Fourth Way?

 

[TS_Aquinas]

If one accepts the Second Way, and concludes that there must be a Being who exists essentially, what is the basis for assuming that such a Being is the same as the Being who is the perfection of goodness, or power, or any other characteristic?

Is it concievable, according to Aquinas, that the non-contingent being is different from the being who is the perfection of goodness?

According to the Second Way, we might conclude that there is a non-contingent Being, whose essence is existence. Such a being might be totally neutral with regard to goodness.

Because Aquinas uses Aristotelian definition of being (weird, second time I’m saying this tonight from another thread), where being/existence is identical to good. The second way demonstrates that the essence of the terminus agent of essentially ordered series is identical to it’s existence/being. If this agent is wholly being then it is wholly good (not using an ethical definition.) The fourth way simply demonstrates that in our existence, it varies in grades of perfection/wholeness. If our existence varies, it is participating in being/existence/goodness (all the same in Thomism) of the being who is wholly being and thus wholly good. The second way already demonstrates the agent in question is the perfection/wholeness/maximum of being, fourth way just demonstrates this in detail by observing our existence (making the fourth way a silver bullet against pantheism.)

Ugh, I think Thomists should get together to retranslate the summa for modern use, getting tired of corrolating the scholastic words with modern words. Certainly would makes things a whole lot easier to explain.

 

[prodigalson2011]

Ugh, I think Thomists should get together to retranslate the summa for modern use, getting tired of corrolating the scholastic words with modern words. Certainly would makes things a whole lot easier to explain.

I haven’t yet read the whole thing, but I believe Peter Kreeft’s “Summa of the Summa” kind of does that through footnotes. I thumbed through it in my local bookstore, and though the translation was still pretty literal, the footnotes were quite extensive, sometimes sharing half the page with the original text.

 

[JDaniel]

If we provisionally accept Aquinas’ Five Ways- what necessity is there that the Being proved in the Fourth Way (the argument from degree) is the same as the Unmoved Mover, the non-contingent Being, etc., of the other ways.

Is there an real reason why the Unmoved Mover (of the 1 Way) is the same being as the perfection of Goodness (4th Way)?

I am not much of an Aquinas scholar, so I welcome elucidation from those who are.

Qoeleth:

Yes there is. Farther down in the text of the Fourth Way, Aquinas says,
“Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause of all hot things as is said [by Aristotle].” - Thomas Aquinas I, Great Books (of the Western World) First Part, Q 2, Art. 3. (Emphasis mine)
This proof shows that that-which-we-call-God is the “Cause/First Mover/Necessary Being,” that is shown in ways 1, 2, and 3. We are beings. And that-which-we-call-God is our cause as the maximum in the genus of not only “being,” but also, of “rational being.”

It doesn’t matter if you don’t like the “fire” simile. You can replace “fire” with something else, in more of a modern bent, e.g., the photon.

God bless,
jd

 

[Qoeleth]

Qoeleth:

Yes there is. Farther down in the text of the Fourth Way, Aquinas says,
“Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause of all hot things as is said [by Aristotle].” - Thomas Aquinas I, Great Books (of the Western World) First Part, Q 2, Art. 3. (Emphasis mine)
This proof shows that that-which-we-call-God is the “Cause/First Mover/Necessary Being,” that is shown in ways 1, 2, and 3. We are beings. And that-which-we-call-God is our cause as the maximum in the genus of not only “being,” but also, of “rational being.”

It doesn’t matter if you don’t like the “fire” simile. You can replace “fire” with something else, in more of a modern bent, e.g., the photon.

God bless,
jd

Now that idea -the maximum of an genus is the cause of the genus- is something whose logic I don’t understand.

Aquinas seems to be assuming the something hot must be caused by something at least as hot or hotter. But cold chemicals could produce heat. A beautiful painting might be painted by an ugly painter

And even granting that the Primer Cause of Being was the maximum of ‘Being’ as such- to me that all only shows His existence is fullest. I don’t see how it translates to attributes other-than-being (goodness, etc.).

If that did logically follow, one could also say God is the maximum of all attributes- of greenness, of heat, or density, of anything.

 

[JDaniel]

Now that idea -the maximum of an genus is the cause of the genus- is something whose logic I don’t understand.

Aquinas seems to be assuming the something hot must be caused by something at least as hot or hotter.

Qoeleth:

This argument, like his others, is an a priori argument. In the 13th century, nothing but fire produced heat, except the sun which was a ball of fire.

But cold chemicals could produce heat. A beautiful painting might be painted by an ugly painter

Irrelevant in his time and place. If he were alive today, he would no doubt not use fire-heat analogy. But, don’t forget, it’s just an analogy. St. Thomas also saw fire as a uniform heat, but, as we now know, it isn’t.

And even granting that the Prime Cause of Being was the maximum of ‘Being’ as such- to me that all only shows His existence is fullest. I don’t see how it translates to attributes other-than-being (goodness, etc.).

Why not? (See below!)

If that did logically follow, one could also say God is the maximum of all attributes- of greenness, of heat, or density, of anything.

Yes, we could. You see!

God bless,
jd

 

[TS_Aquinas]

Yes, we could. You see!

God bless,
jd

I’ve always been weary if this was too Platonic or not. Is that the original observation or is it He operates through an intermediary world of abstraction that is not Him but these forms are maximum? I always took it that Aquinas was only concerned with the Form of Being rather then, for example, the form of dog.