Aquinas, Synderesis, Deliberate Evil

[Burning_Sapling]

Hi all,

I’m really stuck trying to understand Aquinas’ conception of Synderesis. I haven’t had chance to read too extensively on this topic because I’m very busy, but it would be very helpful for a current project I’m working on to better understand it. So I’m hoping I can get some help from you all. Any help will be much appreciated.

As I understand it, Aquinas held that Synderesis is an infallible grasp of the general precepts of morality. As I also understand it, he also held that each action is guided by Synderesis, or in other words, that Synderesis provides the first principles of every action. Here is my question. Does this mean that Aquinas held that each action constitutes a pursuit of an objectively good end, and that the only way to commit evil is to choose poor means to the realization of a good end?

Otherwise, maybe the only role that Synderesis plays of necessity in each action is in providing it with the first principle, “The good is what is to be done and evil is what is to be avoided.” If that is the case, then it needn’t be true that each action constitutes a pursuit of an objectively good end, and all that would follow would be that each action constitutes a pursuit of something the agent takes to be good.

But I have gotten the impression from various sources, perhaps mistakenly, that Synderesis informs the practical reasoning behind (or involved in) each action in a more robust way than that- namely, by providing said practical reasoning with first principles concerning what good and evil consist in at a general level. But if that is right, and Synderesis constitutes an “infallible” grasp on the principles of morality, then it would seem to be the case not only that each human action constitutes a pursuit of what the agent takes to be good, but further that each action constitutes a pursuit of some kind of end that is in fact good. And that is a strong conclusion.

Any help? Thank you!

 

[John_Martin]

Synderesis is a “habit”, since reasoning is a kind of “movement”. This is a habit that can be made use of when reasoning. Since it is used in the soul, you will not notice it unless there is a desire in the will that it also be manifested in your conscious rational thoughts or other bodily movements.

Here is a quote from Thomas ( ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q79_A12.html ):

man’s act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things—namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle—and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called “the understanding of principles,” as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call “synderesis.” Whence “synderesis” is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that “synderesis” is not a power, but a natural habit.

So it is a habit that is like a cheerleader, encouraging what is judged by the reason as “good”, and jeering in a way at what is judged as “not good”. Its goal, or purpose as a habit is to promote love in the will of what is good, and to dissuade the will from loving what is actually evil (sometimes we “love” or desire what is not good before we reason about it).

That was from Article 12 of question 79 of the Summa, First Part. You may want to read all of Question 79 and also, if you can take the time, questions 75 - 89. (table of contents button on upper left of page, by the “prev” button) Why? Most people think they are dealing with what they experience in their waking physical thought when they think of “reason” and “intellect” and “will”, etc. But your waking conscious thought is a product of your “sensitive powers”, moved rather than mover. It is a “sign”, or “the tracks” of your soul, including Synderesis, rather than their actual reality.

Merry Christmas! And one way to take time, even when busy, to read Thomas (Summa) is to read a question every night in bed before falling asleep. It took me 3 1/2 years this way, but now I know my own soul (I can follow its tracks, its trail).
All the best in your project.

 

[lmelahn]

Hi all,

I’m really stuck trying to understand Aquinas’ conception of Synderesis. I haven’t had chance to read too extensively on this topic because I’m very busy, but it would be very helpful for a current project I’m working on to better understand it. So I’m hoping I can get some help from you all. Any help will be much appreciated.

As I understand it, Aquinas held that Synderesis is an infallible grasp of the general precepts of morality. As I also understand it, he also held that each action is guided by Synderesis, or in other words, that Synderesis provides the first principles of every action. Here is my question. Does this mean that Aquinas held that each action constitutes a pursuit of an objectively good end, and that the only way to commit evil is to choose poor means to the realization of a good end?

Otherwise, maybe the only role that Synderesis plays of necessity in each action is in providing it with the first principle, “The good is what is to be done and evil is what is to be avoided.” If that is the case, then it needn’t be true that each action constitutes a pursuit of an objectively good end, and all that would follow would be that each action constitutes a pursuit of something the agent takes to be good.

But I have gotten the impression from various sources, perhaps mistakenly, that Synderesis informs the practical reasoning behind (or involved in) each action in a more robust way than that- namely, by providing said practical reasoning with first principles concerning what good and evil consist in at a general level. But if that is right, and Synderesis constitutes an “infallible” grasp on the principles of morality, then it would seem to be the case not only that each human action constitutes a pursuit of what the agent takes to be good, but further that each action constitutes a pursuit of some kind of end that is in fact good. And that is a strong conclusion.

Any help? Thank you!

To add to John Martin’s excellent answer, the idea is the following:

Aquinas holds that because of the way our intellects work, we have infallible knowledge of certain basic truths. That knowledge may not be explicit or very detailed, but it is there, and this forms the backdrop for all our other knowledge.

For example, suppose I am in the dark and I trip over something. I may not have a clear knowledge of what it is I tripped over, but I know that I tripped over something: some being. (Aquinas considers “being” to be the most basic, primitive notion.) There are certain principles that we come to know immediately, whenever we use our intellects: for example, the principle of non-contradiction (whatever made me trip must have been there; it cannot have not been there at the same moment) and the principle of causality (it was that something, whatever it was, that made me trip).

When the knowledge in question is purely speculative in nature (that is, when it regards how things are), Aquinas calls our knowledge of the principles the intellectus (not to be confused with the faculty that has the same name).

However, when the knowledge is practical (when it regards what we need to do; that is, morality), the name he gives is synderesis.

The synderesis, therefore, just means our knowledge of the most fundamental moral principles. The very most basic one is that we are to do good actions and avoid evil ones (bonum faciendum, malum vitandum). However, Aquinas argues that we all know the most basic moral precepts: for example, that it is immoral to murder, to commit adultery, and so on, because we can easily see that a grave injustice is committed in these cases. As moral principles become more derived and more concrete, they become more difficult to grasp, and for that we need to form our consciences. (For example, is this act a murder, or self-defense? Under what conditions am I free to remarry, so as to avoid adultery? And so on.)

Basically, you are correct about the good. Our will, according to Aquinas, is a kind of “appetite,” or faculty that is capable of desiring. Only something good (at least in appearance) can motivate it to act. Evil simply does not attract it at all.

What sin consists in, therefore, is a refusal to act when it is called for. For example, suppose that a person is being tempted to commit an immoral act (say adultery). What is happening? The intellect immediately perceives the pleasurable good that would arise from completing the act (and this particular pleasure is rather strong). On the other hand, it also knows (thanks to the synderesis) that committing the act would cause a grave injustice, not to mention all kinds of harm to the person committing it. Therefore, the intellect, so to speak, tells the will, “you need to do something right now to stop going through with this adultery.”

If the will consents, as it should, then the situation is under control. If it refuses, saying, “no actually, I would rather sacrifice justice for the sake of pleasure,” then the person commits a sin (perhaps not yet adultery, but it means that he has already begun to contemplate the adultery).

In sum: no one ever chooses evil as such. When he sins, he is simply failing to choose the good that he ought (and then, by default, he chooses an apparent good over the authentic good).

 

[Burning_Sapling]

Hi John and LMelahn,

Thank you very much for your very helpful replies. As I understand it, the answer to my question is that while every action is pursued “under the guise” that it is a good action, it is nonetheless not the case that every action constitutes a pursuit of a kind of end that is in fact morally good. Synderesis does not cause us of necessity to pursue ends that are in fact morally good in every action, but merely encourages or “cheerleads” us to do so. We have the freedom to decline to do what Synderesis encourages us to do (at least at the level of penultimate ends that it encourages us to pursue), and to act otherwise. That seems like a much more sensible view to me. Do I have it right that this is your answer?

Thanks again!

• Sapling

P.S. Merry Christmas season!

 

[lmelahn]

Hi John and LMelahn,

Thank you very much for your very helpful replies. As I understand it, the answer to my question is that while every action is pursued “under the guise” that it is a good action, it is nonetheless not the case that every action constitutes a pursuit of a kind of end that is in fact morally good. Synderesis does not cause us of necessity to pursue ends that are in fact morally good in every action, but merely encourages or “cheerleads” us to do so. We have the freedom to decline to do what Synderesis encourages us to do (at least at the level of penultimate ends that it encourages us to pursue), and to act otherwise. That seems like a much more sensible view to me. Do I have it right that this is your answer?

Thanks again!

• Sapling

P.S. Merry Christmas season!

The bottom line is that synderesis is simply a kind of knowledge. By it we know right from wrong, in its fundamentals. (Synderesis, however, is not sufficient for moral living. We also need to be constantly forming what Aquinas calls “moral science;” that is, more detailed knowledge of right and wrong that we acquire through experience, consulting with others, by learning from the Church, and so on.)

Whether we act based on that knowledge, or decline to do so, is governed by the will.

So it is not exactly the function of the synderesis to “encourage” us to do anything. It is an intellectual habit that simply lays the cards out on the table, so to speak. It says, “this action is good; that other action is evil,” but only through the will can we make a decision. It is through the will (which Aquinas conceives of as a kind of intellectual appetite) that we are inclined to do the good.

 

[fhansen]

If the will consents, as it should, then the situation is under control. If it refuses, saying, “no actually, I would rather sacrifice justice for the sake of pleasure,” then the person commits a sin (perhaps not yet adultery, but it means that he has already begun to contemplate the adultery).

In sum: no one ever chooses evil as such. When he sins, he is simply failing to choose the good that he ought (and then, by default, he chooses an apparent good over the authentic good).

But isn’t there a fine line here-a possible contradiction between “I would rather sacrifice justice…”, and “no one ever chooses evil”? It seems that ignorance is involved in choosing a lesser good over a greater one, and yet knowledge and deliberate consent are necessarily involved in being willing to sacrifice justice, which is what makes us morally accountable beings.

 

[Burning_Sapling]

But isn’t there a fine line here-a possible contradiction between “I would rather sacrifice justice…”, and “no one ever chooses evil”? It seems that ignorance is involved in choosing a lesser good over a greater one, and yet knowledge and deliberate consent are necessarily involved in being willing to sacrifice justice, which is what makes us morally accountable beings.

Thank you, all. Yes, fhansen, this is exactly what I am puzzled by!

 

[John_Martin]

Your sensitive appetite, which is like that of the brutes (non-rational animals) is saying that sexual satisfaction is good, and even your intellect agrees that it is good, simply.

You see someone to unite with is sexual union. Your sensitive appetite desires this good thing without question of who or what (whether it is morally good), but only satisfaction of appetite for satisfaction.

You also have rational thoughts when you see that someone - “it is my neighbor’s wife”. In a totally separate set of reasoning Synderesis may be used by your reasoning, when your will wonders “is this good or bad to unite with this woman?”

Meanwhile in its own set of reasonings, your sensitive appetite is asking reason for means of uniting with this person, visualizing approach, visualizing words, visualizing actions leading to satisfaction. This visualizing happens without consultation to the intellect; it is just a non-judging habit of reason to evaluate methods likely to satisfy an appetite.

And, if your will is not accustomed to choosing all your actions, but bows to the instinctual appetites, then you have abandoned the choice between justice and appetitive satisfaction, and made the choice that appetite for pleasure is the ultimate good.

 

[tonyrey]

Your sensitive appetite, which is like that of the brutes (non-rational animals) is saying that sexual satisfaction is good, and even your intellect agrees that it is good, simply.

You see someone to unite with is sexual union. Your sensitive appetite desires this good thing without question of who or what (whether it is morally good), but only satisfaction of appetite for satisfaction.

You also have rational thoughts when you see that someone - “it is my neighbor’s wife”. In a totally separate set of reasoning Synderesis may be used by your reasoning, when your will wonders “is this good or bad to unite with this woman?”

Meanwhile in its own set of reasonings, your sensitive appetite is asking reason for means of uniting with this person, visualizing approach, visualizing words, visualizing actions leading to satisfaction. This visualizing happens without consultation to the intellect; it is just a non-judging habit of reason to evaluate methods likely to satisfy an appetite.

And, if your will is not accustomed to choosing all your actions, but bows to the instinctual appetites, then you have abandoned the choice between justice and appetitive satisfaction, and made the choice that appetite for pleasure is the ultimate good.

Plus the satisfaction of that appetite. Otherwise masochism would be the ultimate good! The choice of constantly frustrated desire would amount to torture.