Aquinas's First Way

[Triflelfirt]

I’m having trouble accepting Aquinas’s First Way. I understand that the premise that “everything that is moved (from potency to act) is moved by something else”, and how that implies the necessity of an external mover to every movement (because, since movement concerns change from potency to act, and only what is already actual can move anything, then that which is specifically being moved must be potency — otherwise it wouldn’t be being moved in the first place —, from which entails that something other than the potency — that which is undergoing movement — must be moving it, and that of course must be in act).

Rather, my problem is with the premise that an infinite chain of movers is impossible. I don’t accept it, or at least I’m having trouble accepting it, and I’ll explain why.

First, keep in mind that I am well aware of the difference between an essentially ordered series of movement and an accidentally ordered series of movement. I know that, without a first mover, an essentially ordered series of movement would simply not be in movement. Thus, if we take, for instance, the example of a hand pushing a stick that lifts a stone, I’m aware that the hand is the primary mover in such a series. The stick is only an instrumental cause, and has no causal power on its own; if the hand is removed, the stick won’t be moved anymore, and then the stone won’t be lifted anymore — hence why the hand must be moving the stick at all times for the stone to remain lifted.

Of course, the hand wouldn’t really be the first mover, because the movement of the hand, in itself, requires the actual movement (right now) of the flexing of the muscles in the arm, and the flexing of muscles requires the firing of motor neurons, and the firing of the motor neurons require yet another mover, and so on. And of course it would lead us to a being who is Pure Act, that isn’t actualized by anything else, and that keeps every other mover (instrumental movers) in act. Hence the mere existence of an essentially ordered series of movement entails the existence of a first mover who is, of course, Pure Act (and from that we can extract the subsequent “characteristics” of God).

The problem is I don’t think the first mover in an essentially ordered series has to be pure act. For it seems to me that what is required is simply a first mover that is itself in act, that is moving all other movers (instrumental movers) in the series. So we do need a first mover that is moving every other mover in the series, and that first mover must be actual, but it doesn’t have to be pure act, i.e. it doesn’t have to not have any potency whatsoever. In fact, the way I see it, the first mover in such a series could very well be the product of an infinite series of accidentally ordered movers. It could be that every fundamental law of nature that allows anything in the physical universe to exist (in act) right now are themselves kept in act by an angel. That angel is NOT pure act, but has no passive potency other than that of ceasing to exist, for example. Such an angel was brought to existence by another angel, and that angel was brought to existence by another angel, and so on. The angels don’t depend on each other for their continued existence (much like a son doesn’t continually depend on his father, who begot him, to continue to exist, as Aquinas would grant). And since Aquinas accepted the possibility of an accidentally ordered series of movers/causes being infinite, I see no problems with that.

I think one could answer that by saying that any accidentally ordered series necessarily depends on an essentially ordered series. But I don’t see how, at least not right now, and even if that were the case, I still don’t see how it would fix the problem. We could posit that the angel simply always existed, but still isn’t pure act since he has a passive potency (maybe one could answer that by saying that the angel doesn’t have existence as its essence, but it seems to me that that would require the Second Way, thus showing that the First Way fails as an independent argument; and I also don’t see how something that doesn’t have existence as its essence must have its existence conjoined with its essence at all times. If someone could explain that too, I’d be grateful).

So, to summarize it: from the necessity of a first mover in an essentially ordered series, it doesn’t follow that the first mover has to be Pure Act. It just has to be something actual that isn’t being actualized (or “kept in act”) by anything else at the moment that it is keeping the essentially ordered series in motion. Therefore, I don’t see how the First Way would work.

I’d be grateful if someone could refute my objection. At the moment, I tend to prefer the Third and Fifth ways because of that problem I have with the First way.

(By the way, English is not my first language, so excuse me if I made any bizarre grammatical errors in this text.)

 

[Triflelfirt]

While reading a commentary by fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, I came across the following statement:

“Motion is not self-existent; we instinctively ask for the source, the moving agent. If motion is not self-explanatory, then nothing else that is in motion is self-explanatory. Hence the proper cause of motion is something that is not in motion, an unmoved mover, the source of all movement, of all change, local, quantitative, qualitative, vital, intellectual, voluntary, a mover which is its own uncaused and unreceived activity.”

If that is the case, then the First Way does work. I’d also add that David Oderberg wrote a paper that seems to deal with the same type of objection I made (the paper is called “Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else’: A Reappraisal of Premise One of the First Way”).

The way I understand it, souls (or an angel, or any type of mover that isn’t pure act, for that matter) are constantly being moved so long as they’re moving something else; for instance, the soul would be moved towards its object of desire (the idea of the good), just like our intentions (or brain functions, for the sorry materialist) are in motion whenever we’re doing/moving something. And the very idea of the good changes. So a soul or an angel (or anything that isn’t in pure act, for apparently that would imply that the thing IS in motion whenever it is moving something else, and is thus being moved by something else at that very moment) just won’t count as first movers. Therefore, an unmoved mover that is pure act (God) is required.

However, I’m still interested in seeing what replies anyone here can give me. The question still seems a bit difficult to me, so help would be much appreciated. But I am now granting that the first way (just like the second way) does work.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

While reading a commentary by fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, I came across the following statement:

“Motion is not self-existent; we instinctively ask for the source, the moving agent. If motion is not self-explanatory, then nothing else that is in motion is self-explanatory. Hence the proper cause of motion is something that is not in motion, an unmoved mover, the source of all movement, of all change, local, quantitative, qualitative, vital, intellectual, voluntary, a mover which is its own uncaused and unreceived activity.”

If that is the case, then the First Way does work. I’d also add that David Oderberg wrote a paper that seems to deal with the same type of objection I made (the paper is called “Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else’: A Reappraisal of Premise One of the First Way”).

The way I understand it, souls (or an angel, or any type of mover that isn’t pure act, for that matter) are constantly being moved so long as they’re moving something else; for instance, the soul would be moved towards its object of desire (the idea of the good), just like our intentions (or brain functions, for the sorry materialist) are in motion whenever we’re doing/moving something. And the very idea of the good changes. So a soul or an angel (or anything that isn’t in pure act, for apparently that would imply that the thing IS in motion whenever it is moving something else, and is thus being moved by something else at that very moment) just won’t count as first movers. Therefore, an unmoved mover that is pure act (God) is required.

However, I’m still interested in seeing what replies anyone here can give me. The question still seems a bit difficult to me, so help would be much appreciated. But I am now granting that the first way (just like the second way) does work.

You have to give credit for covering all the bases, which you wouldn’t know unless you have read ( and studied! ) most of S.T., Part 1, at least those dealing with the existence and nature of God, creation, providence, angels.

The fact is Thomas discusses the question of angels creating, which he proves impossible. He also explains that angels are not pure act, they are form limited by the act they receive. And since they are in potency to the act they receive, they in turn depend on another which must be pure act, God. So in a per se ordered series Thomas has aready excluded angels as the Unmoved Mover. It is just that he doesn’t discuss it specifically in the argument for the First Way. That would have made the argument unnecessarily cumbersom.
dhspriory.org/thomas/

And as far as an accidental infinite series of movers like father begets son, grandfather begets father, etc., he acknowledges the possibility. However, in any such series, the parent only supplies the matter, not the soul. Also, where did the matter ultimately come from. And how is the existence of each member accounted for, for none of the members can cause existence. All each member can do is account for the coming into being, it cannot cause the act of existence itself. Only the Unmoved Mover can do that.

Pax
LInus2nd

 

[Bahman]

I’m having trouble accepting Aquinas’s First Way. I understand that the premise that “everything that is moved (from potency to act) is moved by something else”, and how that implies the necessity of an external mover to every movement (because, since movement concerns change from potency to act, and only what is already actual can move anything, then that which is specifically being moved must be potency — otherwise it wouldn’t be being moved in the first place —, from which entails that something other than the potency — that which is undergoing movement — must be moving it, and that of course must be in act).

Rather, my problem is with the premise that an infinite chain of movers is impossible. I don’t accept it, or at least I’m having trouble accepting it, and I’ll explain why.

First, keep in mind that I am well aware of the difference between an essentially ordered series of movement and an accidentally ordered series of movement. I know that, without a first mover, an essentially ordered series of movement would simply not be in movement. Thus, if we take, for instance, the example of a hand pushing a stick that lifts a stone, I’m aware that the hand is the primary mover in such a series. The stick is only an instrumental cause, and has no causal power on its own; if the hand is removed, the stick won’t be moved anymore, and then the stone won’t be lifted anymore — hence why the hand must be moving the stick at all times for the stone to remain lifted.

Of course, the hand wouldn’t really be the first mover, because the movement of the hand, in itself, requires the actual movement (right now) of the flexing of the muscles in the arm, and the flexing of muscles requires the firing of motor neurons, and the firing of the motor neurons require yet another mover, and so on. And of course it would lead us to a being who is Pure Act, that isn’t actualized by anything else, and that keeps every other mover (instrumental movers) in act. Hence the mere existence of an essentially ordered series of movement entails the existence of a first mover who is, of course, Pure Act (and from that we can extract the subsequent “characteristics” of God).

The problem is I don’t think the first mover in an essentially ordered series has to be pure act. For it seems to me that what is required is simply a first mover that is itself in act, that is moving all other movers (instrumental movers) in the series. So we do need a first mover that is moving every other mover in the series, and that first mover must be actual, but it doesn’t have to be pure act, i.e. it doesn’t have to not have any potency whatsoever. In fact, the way I see it, the first mover in such a series could very well be the product of an infinite series of accidentally ordered movers. It could be that every fundamental law of nature that allows anything in the physical universe to exist (in act) right now are themselves kept in act by an angel. That angel is NOT pure act, but has no passive potency other than that of ceasing to exist, for example. Such an angel was brought to existence by another angel, and that angel was brought to existence by another angel, and so on. The angels don’t depend on each other for their continued existence (much like a son doesn’t continually depend on his father, who begot him, to continue to exist, as Aquinas would grant). And since Aquinas accepted the possibility of an accidentally ordered series of movers/causes being infinite, I see no problems with that.

I think one could answer that by saying that any accidentally ordered series necessarily depends on an essentially ordered series. But I don’t see how, at least not right now, and even if that were the case, I still don’t see how it would fix the problem. We could posit that the angel simply always existed, but still isn’t pure act since he has a passive potency (maybe one could answer that by saying that the angel doesn’t have existence as its essence, but it seems to me that that would require the Second Way, thus showing that the First Way fails as an independent argument; and I also don’t see how something that doesn’t have existence as its essence must have its existence conjoined with its essence at all times. If someone could explain that too, I’d be grateful).

So, to summarize it: from the necessity of a first mover in an essentially ordered series, it doesn’t follow that the first mover has to be Pure Act. It just has to be something actual that isn’t being actualized (or “kept in act”) by anything else at the moment that it is keeping the essentially ordered series in motion. Therefore, I don’t see how the First Way would work.

I’d be grateful if someone could refute my objection. At the moment, I tend to prefer the Third and Fifth ways because of that problem I have with the First way.

(By the way, English is not my first language, so excuse me if I made any bizarre grammatical errors in this text.)

Oh, this is so long. Can you please shorten it so I can engage? To me there is no problem with infinite regress if the beginning is singular.

 

[thinkandmull]

The Second Way is founded on the First. It doesn’t prove by itself that there is an efficient cause. And the First is founded on the Third. The problem is that the Third is a probable argument, not definite. Now the first would work is the kalam cosmological argument was true. But Aquinas doesn’t believe that. He thinks a metronome could have existed from all eternity, going back and forth, without there being a first position. If that’s true, it can be argued that the metronome simply exists, instead of HAVING existence. The argument for God falls apart then. Motion is founded on energy. Energy only changes shape, thus each motion would be cause by a previous energy, all going around the eternal circle.

 

[Triflelfirt]

The Second Way is founded on the First. It doesn’t prove by itself that there is an efficient cause. And the First is founded on the Third. The problem is that the Third is a probable argument, not definite. Now the first would work is the kalam cosmological argument was true. But Aquinas doesn’t believe that. He thinks a metronome could have existed from all eternity, going back and forth, without there being a first position. If that’s true, it can be argued that the metronome simply exists, instead of HAVING existence. The argument for God falls apart then. Motion is founded on energy. Energy only changes shape, thus each motion would be cause by a previous energy, all going around the eternal circle.

No, the Second Way is not founded on the First. The premises are different; from the fact that things don’t have existence as their essence we must conclude that they ought to be kept in existence by a being who just is existence. Neither is the First founded on the Third – that idea of the First way being a “parasitic argument” is quite bizarre, not only because the First way suffices on its own, but also because if it were the case that the First depends on the Third, then Aquinas wouldn’t’ve presented the First way as the only proof for God’s existence in the Compendium, and would’ve added at least the third one --, and the Kalam has nothing to do with either. Also, the Third way isn’t a probabilistic argument; it doesn’t rely on induction.

And it can’t be argued that the metronome “simply exists”. What would “simply exist” mean? If the metronome’s essence is distinct from its existence, and therefore its existence isn’t essential to it, then it must’ve been caused. It would fall prey to the Second way. Moreover, something would have to explain the movement of the metronome. It doesn’t matter if the metronome has been working for an hour or a thousand of years or if it’s been working since eternity.

Motion is not founded on energy. Where did you get that? There is motion in purely spiritual beings, like angels, pure forms, etc. Moreover, if energy is not pure act (since it has passive potency), then it must be kept in act. Also, don’t most cosmologists now hold that energy had a beginning in the Big Bang?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

While reading a commentary by fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, I came across the following statement:

“Motion is not self-existent; we instinctively ask for the source, the moving agent. If motion is not self-explanatory, then nothing else that is in motion is self-explanatory. Hence the proper cause of motion is something that is not in motion, an unmoved mover, the source of all movement, of all change, local, quantitative, qualitative, vital, intellectual, voluntary, a mover which is its own uncaused and unreceived activity.”

If that is the case, then the First Way does work. I’d also add that David Oderberg wrote a paper that seems to deal with the same type of objection I made (the paper is called “Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else’: A Reappraisal of Premise One of the First Way”).

The way I understand it, souls (or an angel, or any type of mover that isn’t pure act, for that matter) are constantly being moved so long as they’re moving something else; for instance, the soul would be moved towards its object of desire (the idea of the good), just like our intentions (or brain functions, for the sorry materialist) are in motion whenever we’re doing/moving something. And the very idea of the good changes. So a soul or an angel (or anything that isn’t in pure act, for apparently that would imply that the thing IS in motion whenever it is moving something else, and is thus being moved by something else at that very moment) just won’t count as first movers. Therefore, an unmoved mover that is pure act (God) is required.

However, I’m still interested in seeing what replies anyone here can give me. The question still seems a bit difficult to me, so help would be much appreciated. But I am now granting that the first way (just like the second way) does work.

Dear Triflelfirt:

Yes, that is the case! You can go to the Metaphysics by Aristotle to look for his definition of movement (as a relation between potency and act). You surely know that for St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle was the reference. Wherever you read the word “movement” in St. Thomas, you need to think on the transit from passive potency to act. That is why Garrigou-Lagrange mentioned not only “local movement” but also to any other kind of “change”.

Your first reflection was very interesting.

Kind regards!
JuanFlorencio

 

[thinkandmull]

No, the Second Way is not founded on the First. The premises are different; from the fact that things don’t have existence as their essence we must conclude that they ought to be kept in existence by a being who just is existence. Neither is the First founded on the Third – that idea of the First way being a “parasitic argument” is quite bizarre, not only because the First way suffices on its own, but also because if it were the case that the First depends on the Third, then Aquinas wouldn’t’ve presented the First way as the only proof for God’s existence in the Compendium, and would’ve added at least the third one --, and the Kalam has nothing to do with either. Also, the Third way isn’t a probabilistic argument; it doesn’t rely on induction.

And it can’t be argued that the metronome “simply exists”. What would “simply exist” mean? If the metronome’s essence is distinct from its existence, and therefore its existence isn’t essential to it, then it must’ve been caused. It would fall prey to the Second way. Moreover, something would have to explain the movement of the metronome. It doesn’t matter if the metronome has been working for an hour or a thousand of years or if it’s been working since eternity.

Motion is not founded on energy. Where did you get that? There is motion in purely spiritual beings, like angels, pure forms, etc. Moreover, if energy is not pure act (since it has passive potency), then it must be kept in act. Also, don’t most cosmologists now hold that energy had a beginning in the Big Bang?

How do you know the metronome isn’t necessary, having an internal enduring power? What is the necessary conclusions that what is necessary must be simple? Motion must be caused by a force, hence energy. God is NOT one of the motions of the supposed infinite series of causes and effects. In fact, everything in that cause would be a cause and an effect, but that is besides the point. The First Way says that there must be a cause of the infinite series, although the wording would seem to say that there must be a first mover in the series. And what is the reason there must be an eternal sustainer of this series? Enter the Third Way. How do we know that there aren’t one efficient cause after another, all necessary, one on top of the other, each more necessary than the last? Enter the Second Way. Its really strange that Aquinas put those Three as if they were all sufficient, as if you could count the proofs on one hand. Oh well, he sure wasn’t perfect

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The First Way says that there must be a cause of the infinite series, although the wording would seem to say that there must be a first mover in the series.

Nicely put.
The First argument, in its wording and starting example, appears to primarily base the arguments on changes in local motion.

Yet Aristotle holds that the heavenly spheres could have been in local motion for all eternity and Aquinas agrees with the possibility as I understand.

So to make the First Way truly work one must abstract from changes of local motion, ultimately, to other types of change (under the catchall umbrella of potency and act) so we can talk about changes in the act of being.

But
(i) this goes beyond the alleged basis of the First Way which is supposed to be based on only that change we call local motion.
(ii) can we tightly prove the broader principle of potency and act simply from accidental changes of matter (ie local motion). Or is it just an argument by analogy or congruency - after all “creation” is not actually like the “change” we see in the sensible world.

Change strictly speaking seems to require a continuously existing substratum from start to finish upon which changes (whether substantial or accidental) play out.

The sort of change required to connect the effect of “local motion” with a First Cause in pure act who ultimately works at the level of “being” seems to eventually involve creation.

Creation from nothing does not seem to be encompassed by the concept of change we infer from sensible experience. For in creation we see no underlying pre-existing substratum that links the terminus a quo to the terminus ad quem. We could postulate the eternal “existence” of Prime Matter (which doesn’t quite exist by itself) to solve this problem but I don’t think Aquinas agreed with that anyway.

So I think the First Way cannot make its case by starting simply with the observed effect of local motion. It needs to call in the metaphysical principle of potency and act.
But I cannot see how that much wider principle can be convincingly proven just from the change we call local motion.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Nicely put.
The First argument, in its wording and starting example, appears to primarily base the arguments on changes in local motion.

Yet Aristotle holds that the heavenly spheres could have been in local motion for all eternity and Aquinas agrees with the possibility as I understand.

Dear All:

Aren’t you talking about this argument from the Summa (Part I, Question 2. Article 1, first answer)?
*
“The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.”*

Does it really seem to you that it is based exclusively on “local motion”?

On the other hand, it is true that Aristotle thought about the eternity of the cosmos in movement. Still, it was the same Aristotle who designed the first version of the “first way” to demonstrate the necessity of a first mover. You can go to the Metaphysics, Book XII, Chapters 6 and 7 and read it.

Best regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[thinkandmull]

Eternal motion implies that there is physically motion that goes on forever, therefore the motion has a certain effectiveness. Why must there be a first Mover involved in it at all? What other reason can there be than the Third Way: contingency vs necessity?? It seems probable to me that the purely simply is necessary instead of matter, but I don’t see any definite light on the issue. How would it be proven that this Being behind the contingency is Personal, instead of Impersonal like Eastern philosophers think? As for the Second Way, are the motions in the eternal world the efficient causes? Then the First and Second Way are exactly the same. If the simple is the efficient cause, than the Second is saying they could not go to infinite with one being necessary for the next. But the fact that there is an efficient cause based on the First, which is based on the Third. The other two Ways are the design argument and the argument from good-perfections. The design argument is based on the Third Ways assumption that the “Behind” is personal. All debates on the existence of God MUST deal with whether He is Personal. That is the nexis of the debate. The argument from limited perfections to Infinite Perfections is basically the Ontological Argument, which is also based on the Third Way because it is an argument about degree. What number do we put on the goodness of humans? Well, by assuming a greater perfection, we call it finite. But if man can receive the beatific vision into his soul, he has some infinity in him. Therefore if one cannot find proof for God, could man be considered a priceless good? Understanding of God comes from an intuition it would seem then. The Five Ways are not any stronger than Descartes argument: that ideas must have entities to which they correspond. We have the idea of God, therefore there must be a perfect God, unless we are God. That’s Descartes best argument

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Eternal motion implies that there is physically motion that goes on forever, therefore the motion has a certain effectiveness. Why must there be a first Mover involved in it at all? What other reason can there be than the Third Way: contingency vs necessity?? It seems probable to me that the purely simply is necessary instead of matter, but I don’t see any definite light on the issue. How would it be proven that this Being behind the contingency is Personal, instead of Impersonal like Eastern philosophers think? As for the Second Way, are the motions in the eternal world the efficient causes? Then the First and Second Way are exactly the same. If the simple is the efficient cause, than the Second is saying they could not go to infinite with one being necessary for the next. But the fact that there is an efficient cause based on the First, which is based on the Third. The other two Ways are the design argument and the argument from good-perfections. The design argument is based on the Third Ways assumption that the “Behind” is personal. All debates on the existence of God MUST deal with whether He is Personal. That is the nexis of the debate. The argument from limited perfections to Infinite Perfections is basically the Ontological Argument, which is also based on the Third Way because it is an argument about degree. What number do we put on the goodness of humans? Well, by assuming a greater perfection, we call it finite. But if man can receive the beatific vision into his soul, he has some infinity in him. Therefore if one cannot find proof for God, could man be considered a priceless good? Understanding of God comes from an intuition it would seem then. The Five Ways are not any stronger than Descartes argument: that ideas must have entities to which they correspond. We have the idea of God, therefore there must be a perfect God, unless we are God. That’s Descartes best argument

:dts:

Linus2nd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

“The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and** evident to our senses**, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another…”

Does it really seem to you that it is based exclusively on “local motion”?

That is how the argument purportedly starts out. And it is pretty clear from history and other contemp cross refs of the time that the primary example in mind is the movement of the celestial spheres.

Sure “motion” has a much wider ambit in the writings of both Aristotle and Aquinas, no denying that.

But I believe there are problems with the slight of hand that quickly takes us from sensible changes and the principles derived from that…and then applying that principle to non-sensible changes…and eventually to changes in “being”.

As I opine below, Aristotle’s philosophy of causality and change are interwoven and all derive from observation of sensible change and his theory of hylomorphism. It doesn’t tightly stack up when applied to acts of creation/being because that is really an extrapolation of the principles derived from sensible observation. It may or may not apply to acts of creation/being.

Another problem is how to reconcile Aristotle’s Eternity of the World (and hence its eternal movement) with the necessity of an unmoved-mover.
It seems we can only do this by demanding a quantum-leap in this possibly eternal sensible chain of movement to an immaterial one based on causal acts of being.

But, as I suggest above, how are principles of sensible change provably known to apply in this realm in the same way (ie potency/act).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Eternal motion implies that there is physically motion that goes on forever, therefore the motion has a certain effectiveness. Why must there be a first Mover involved in it at all? What other reason can there be than the Third Way: contingency vs necessity?? It seems probable to me that the purely simply is necessary instead of matter, but I don’t see any definite light on the issue. How would it be proven that this Being behind the contingency is Personal, instead of Impersonal like Eastern philosophers think? As for the Second Way, are the motions in the eternal world the efficient causes? Then the First and Second Way are exactly the same. If the simple is the efficient cause, than the Second is saying they could not go to infinite with one being necessary for the next. But the fact that there is an efficient cause based on the First, which is based on the Third. The other two Ways are the design argument and the argument from good-perfections. The design argument is based on the Third Ways assumption that the “Behind” is personal. All debates on the existence of God MUST deal with whether He is Personal. That is the nexis of the debate. The argument from limited perfections to Infinite Perfections is basically the Ontological Argument, which is also based on the Third Way because it is an argument about degree. What number do we put on the goodness of humans? Well, by assuming a greater perfection, we call it finite. But if man can receive the beatific vision into his soul, he has some infinity in him. Therefore if one cannot find proof for God, could man be considered a priceless good? Understanding of God comes from an intuition it would seem then. The Five Ways are not any stronger than Descartes argument: that ideas must have entities to which they correspond. We have the idea of God, therefore there must be a perfect God, unless we are God. That’s Descartes best argument

Dear Thinkandmull:

The so called “ontological argument” is an “a priori” reasoning. The “five ways” are “a posteriori” arguments. A priori arguments start from a definition (God is the most perfect…). A posteriori arguments start from an experience (there is movement, there is…).

I would suggest you to visit “newadvent.org” and read St. Thomas’ Summa there. It will help you. In particular, have a look at the way he builds his arguments. He was a master!

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

 

[JuanFlorencio]

That is how the argument purportedly starts out. And it is pretty clear from history and other contemp cross refs of the time that the primary example in mind is the movement of the celestial spheres.

Dear Blue Horizon:

Yes, that is how the argument starts out. But (I am sorry, I think I need to do this)… Like any other argument, it uses words; and the word that says everything has not been invented yet. We still need many words to convey our thoughts.

So, this is how the argument goes on a few lines below: “For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality”.

And the first example to illustrate what it means is this: “Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.”

Therefore: The argument is not based exclusively on local motion.

Sure “motion” has a much wider ambit in the writings of both Aristotle and Aquinas, no denying that.

Absolutely!, and not only in other writings, but in this very same argument, as I have explained above.

But I believe there are problems with the slight of hand that quickly takes us from sensible changes and the principles derived from that…and then applying that principle to non-sensible changes…and eventually to changes in “being”.

That is quite another thing, Blue Horizon. The argument concludes with the existence of a first mover and that is it.

As I opine below, Aristotle’s philosophy of causality and change are interwoven and all derive from observation of sensible change and his theory of hylomorphism. It doesn’t tightly stack up when applied to acts of creation/being because that is really an extrapolation of the principles derived from sensible observation. It may or may not apply to acts of creation/being.

Well, the origin of the aristotelian theory concerning movement (change) was a metaphysical problem (what is reality?), and an epistemological problem (Is it possible to do science from things that are subject to change?). Then, of course, all the concepts that Aristotle develop to solve them were interwoven, as it has to be in any theory.

Another problem is how to reconcile Aristotle’s Eternity of the World (and hence its eternal movement) with the necessity of an unmoved-mover.
It seems we can only do this by demanding a quantum-leap in this possibly eternal sensible chain of movement to an immaterial one based on causal acts of being.

Aristotle thought of the universe as eternal. Having this in mind he developed the first version of the “first way”. Please, tell me if you have read his argument and have found an inconsistency in it. It sounds interesting, I would like to know.

But, as I suggest above, how are principles of sensible change provably known to apply in this realm in the same way (ie potency/act).

I think that a more fundamental question would be: “How did the aristotelians use the concepts of movement, potency, act, etc….?”.

What do you think?, I don’t know…

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

 

[Bahman]

I think that a more fundamental question would be: “How did the aristotelians use the concepts of movement, potency, act, etc….?”.

What do you think?, I don’t know…

Best regards!
JuanFlorencio

I already explained that. Potency is awareness which reside in consciousness and decision can manifest itself as an act when is executed by intellect. This applies to other being like a falling rock as well. This is our heritage from nature.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I already explained that. Potency is awareness which reside in consciousness and decision can manifest itself as an act when is executed by intellect. This applies to other being like a falling rock as well. This is our heritage from nature.

Dear Bahman:

I am sorry, but I don’t think you know aristotelian philosophy at all. I did not say that we should study Bahman’s notion of potency, but how the aristotelians use this and other technical words. Please, excuse me.

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

 

[Linusthe2nd]

While reading a commentary by fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, I came across the following statement:

“Motion is not self-existent; we instinctively ask for the source, the moving agent. If motion is not self-explanatory, then nothing else that is in motion is self-explanatory. Hence the proper cause of motion is something that is not in motion, an unmoved mover, the source of all movement, of all change, local, quantitative, qualitative, vital, intellectual, voluntary, a mover which is its own uncaused and unreceived activity.”

If that is the case, then the First Way does work. I’d also add that David Oderberg wrote a paper that seems to deal with the same type of objection I made (the paper is called “Whatever is Changing is Being Changed by Something Else’: A Reappraisal of Premise One of the First Way”).

The way I understand it, souls (or an angel, or any type of mover that isn’t pure act, for that matter) are constantly being moved so long as they’re moving something else; for instance, the soul would be moved towards its object of desire (the idea of the good), just like our intentions (or brain functions, for the sorry materialist) are in motion whenever we’re doing/moving something. And the very idea of the good changes. So a soul or an angel (or anything that isn’t in pure act, for apparently that would imply that the thing IS in motion whenever it is moving something else, and is thus being moved by something else at that very moment) just won’t count as first movers. Therefore, an unmoved mover that is pure act (God) is required.

However, I’m still interested in seeing what replies anyone here can give me. The question still seems a bit difficult to me, so help would be much appreciated. But I am now granting that the first way (just like the second way) does work.

Are you satisfied that the First Way works now? It is important to realize that the First Mover does not have to be moving itself in order to move secondary movers. It is enough that it has the power to move something else. Another thing, the First Mover can mover either as an efficient mover or a final mover, or both, and or as a creator moves by creating. The question now becomes just which of these did Thomas intend. My answer is that it doesn’t really matter since any of them will work. Thomas himself did not say. Except that in the Summa Contra Gentiles he did seem to be following Aristotle and that is why his argument there is so difficult to follow. So I prefer to say that he had no particular way in mind in the Summa Theologiae. That way we can say that the First Mover moves by all the ways I mentioned. And the important thing is that we make it work.And since Thomas uses all these ways later in parts 1, 2, and 3 of this work, I think that is legitimate.

Linus2nd

Linus2nd

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Dear Blue Horizon:

So, this is how the argument goes on a few lines below: “For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality”.

Can this principle of all types of change be derived from simply studying change of place (ie movement)?
I am not convinced.

And the first example to illustrate what it means is this: “Thus that which is actually hot …makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.”

This seems to say that something not actually hot cannot do the same…which doesn’t seem to be right.

Aristotle thought of the universe as eternal. Having this in mind he developed the first version of the “first way”. Please, tell me if you have read his argument and have found an inconsistency in it. It sounds interesting, I would like to know.

As mentioned below I have yet to come across someone who can convincingly reconcile a sensible world of eternal physical movement with the necessity of an insensible Unmoved Mover - without using principles that derive from more than local motion.

BTW what English version of the “whatever moves is moved by another” principle do you hold to as best respresenting what Aristotle actually meant?

 

[Bahman]

Dear Bahman:

I am sorry, but I don’t think you know aristotelian philosophy at all. I did not say that we should study Bahman’s notion of potency, but how the aristotelians use this and other technical words. Please, excuse me.

Kind regards
JuanFlorencio

I am sorry. But there is no other interpretation.