M
However the different schools of thought are not unified among the members.
The theory of predestination post prævisa merita
This theory defended by the earlier Scholastics (Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus), as well as by the majority of the Molinists, and warmly recommended by St. Francis de Sales “as the truer and more attractive opinion”, has this as its chief distinction, that it is free from the logical necessity of upholding negative reprobation. It differs from predestination ante prævisa merita in two points: first, it rejects the absolute decree and assumes a hypothetical predestination to glory; secondly, it does not reverse the succession of grace and glory in the two orders of eternal intention and of execution in time, but makes glory depend on merit in eternity as well as in the order of time. This hypothetical decree reads as follows: Just as in time eternal happiness depends on merit as a condition, so I intended heaven from all eternity only for foreseen merit. — It is only by reason of the infallible foreknowledge of these merits that the hypothetical decree is changed into an absolute: These and no others shall be saved.
This view not only safeguards the universality and sincerity of God’s salvific will, but coincides admirably with the teachings of St. Paul (cf. 2 Timothy 4:8), who knows that there “is laid up” (reposita est, apokeitai) in heaven “a crown of justice”, which “the just judge will render” (reddet, apodosei) to him on the day of judgment.
Pohle, J. (1911). Predestination. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. : http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12378a.htmOwing to the infallible decisions laid down by the Church, every orthodox theory on predestination and reprobation must keep within the limits marked out by the following theses: a) At least in the order of execution in time (in ordine executionis) the meritorious works of the predestined are the partial cause of their eternal happiness; b) hell cannot even in the order of intention (in ordine intentionis) have been positively decreed to the damned, even though it is inflicted on them in time as the just punishment of their misdeeds; c) there is absolutely no predestination to sin as a means to eternal damnation.
And Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, Ludwig Ott, page 246 has:
Catechism of the Catholic ChurchThe Human Will remains free under the influence of efficacious grace, which is not irresistible. (De fide.)
The Council of Trent declared against the Reformers: If anyone says that man’s free will, moved and awakened by God, does in no manner co-operate when it assents to God, Who excites and calls it, thereby disposing and preparing itself to receive the grace of justification; and (if anyone says) that it cannot dissent if it wishes, but that, like some inanimate thing, it does nothing whatever, and only remains passive, let him be anathema. D 814.
1037 God predestines no one to go to hell; 620 for this, a willful turning away from God (a mortal sin) is necessary, and persistence in it until the end. In the Eucharistic liturgy and in the daily prayers of her faithful, the Church implores the mercy of God, who does not want “any to perish, but all to come to repentance”: 621
620 Cf. Council of Orange II (529): DS 397; Council of Trent (1547):1567.Father, accept this offering
from your whole family.
Grant us your peace in this life,
save us from final damnation,
and count us among those you have chosen. 622
621 2 Pet 3:9.
622 Roman Missal, EP I (Roman Canon) 88.
As Ludwig Ott states in Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, Ludwig Ott, p. 246Is that efficacious grace if it isn’t irresistible? That is a weird part of Ott I don’t get, but I need to research Augustinianism more, to see what the Catholic doctrines of grace are. I wonder if he is mistaken in saying this is de fide.
The dogma is from the Council of Trent (Denzinger):“there are graces which have as a consequence the salutary effect intended by God, i.e., efficacious graces (gratiae efficaces), and graces, which do not have this effect, i.e., merely sufficient graces (gratiae mere sufficientes).”
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“The Reformers and the Jansenists sought to solve this difficult question radically by denying the freedom of the will.”
http://www.patristica.net/denzinger/#n800814 Can. 4. If anyone shall say that man’s free will moved and aroused by God does not cooperate by assenting to God who rouses and calls, whereby it disposes and prepares itself to obtain the grace of justification, and that it cannot dissent, if it wishes, but that like something inanimate it does nothing at all and is merely in a passive state: let him be anathema [cf. n. 797].
Yes it is resistible but NO ONE RESIST IT because:The Human Will remains free under the influence of efficacious grace, which is not irresistible. (De fide.)
The needed grace is given and is called two different things based upon the free will non-cooperation or free will cooperation of the individual, respectively, (merely) sufficient or efficacious. Notice what is required per the dogmas:Vico:
Yes it is resistible but NO ONE RESIST IT because:The Human Will remains free under the influence of efficacious grace, which is not irresistible. (De fide.)
…
Owing to the infallible decisions laid down by the Church, every orthodox theory on predestination and reprobation must keep within the limits marked out by the following theses:
a) At least in the order of execution in time ( in ordine executionis ) the meritorious works of the predestined are the partial cause of their eternal happiness;
b) hell cannot even in the order of intention ( in ordine intentionis ) have been positively decreed to the damned, even though it is inflicted on them in time as the just punishment of their misdeeds;
c) there is absolutely no predestination to sin as a means to eternal damnation.
Re: those that lack faith until their death:What do we make of people who lack faith until their death? Thomism makes a lot more sense when we look at the big picture — humanity in total, but Molinism makes a lot more sense if we look at the individual in relationship to God.
9 When therefore they were come, that came about the eleventh hour, they received every man a penny. 10 But when the first also came, they thought that they should receive more: and they also received every man a penny. … 15 Or, is it not lawful for me to do what I will? is thy eye evil, because I am good? 16 So shall the last be first, and the first last. For many are called, but few chosen.
While I like Thomism’s take on predestination to glory, I find its take on reprobation lacking, and I see little functional difference between Thomism and Calvinism (yes, the Thomists just take it as non-election, but again, I’m not able to see how it’s not functionally equivalent). For this reason, I lean more towards Molinism.
Yes, reprobation is a thing. What I’m saying is that I don’t like the Thomist explanation for it. For me, the Molinist explanation makes more sense as I find it balances God’s sovereignty and man’s free response to grace. Thomism, while it affirms reprobation is still post praevisa demerita, I still cannot see how it’s not effectively equivalent to Calvinist double-predestination, since Thomism posits election ante praevisa merita.There is passive reprobation I believe, where God simply doesn’t give the grace although it is possible for them to get it and be saved. There is a weird paradox and mystery there. It is distinct from predestination to hell, as God doesn’t do that. Augustine said that if someone is saved it is due to kercy, if they are damned it is due to their own sin.
A plausible response may be that if free will is real, then there is no feasible world where all are saved. Or, there may be no feasible fallen world where all are saved, but God creates the world and permits the fall anyway to save some, since it is better that one soul is glorified than not exist at all. Of course that means that potentially billions of souls are damned.“Why didn’t God lay out an economy of grace wherein all would be saved?”
That was only a theoretical question I posted as an example of the difficulties of Molinism, to clarify that while I lean towards Molinism, I’m not oblivious to its own shortcomings, i.e. it’s not a perfect school of thought either. I was not expecting or requiring an answer.porthos11:
A plausible response may be that if free will is real, then there is no feasible world where all are saved. Or, there may be no feasible fallen world where all are saved, but God creates the world and permits the fall anyway to save some, since it is better that one soul is glorified than not exist at all.“Why didn’t God lay out an economy of grace wherein all would be saved?”