Atheism, Burden of Proof, and Plantinga's Modal Ontological Argument

[Fran65]

God, as said before, is not limited by the confines of space. In fact, because God is all being by his very definition and essence, he doesn’t have any accidents (that is, he does not have attributes that are changeable … unlike the attribute of electrons being able to change locations, for it is not intrinsic that an electron has to be in one particular space). Change always implies some negation, some ability to take on new being and discard being. But if something by its very definition/essence is a thing with all being, then there is no negation.

Hence (and this is important!) no two things with all being can exist, because the only two reasons why two things of the same essence can exist is:

• They’re essences are different (but here each has the same essence, so this can’t be the reason)
• They have the same essence but different accidents (but if they have all being in their essence, they would necessarily have no accidents, because accidents by definition are changeable things and change implies negation and thus implies the lack of having all being)

There. I hope that made sense. But I have a feeling it’s unreadable. Oh well.

Not unreadable at all. An excellent outline. Thank you.

 

[gearhead]

Not unreadable at all. An excellent outline. Thank you.

It reads just fine, but I think it conflicts with other ideas.

A completely unchanging God could not be a creator-God. Creation marks a change in state for God, because it denotes a change in God’s actions (going from “not creating” to “creating”, and presumably back to “not creating”). It would also be incapable of cognition - it could not change its mind. Therefore, it would be incapable of omniscience or “perfect goodness”.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

It reads just fine, but I think it conflicts with other ideas.

A completely unchanging God could not be a creator-God. Creation marks a change in state for God, because it denotes a change in God’s actions (going from “not creating” to “creating”, and presumably back to “not creating”). It would also be incapable of cognition - it could not change its mind. Therefore, it would be incapable of omniscience or “perfect goodness”.

all change is included in G-d as the maximal state of being. im not sure that is any more than a semantical problem.

 

[gearhead]

all change is included in G-d as the maximal state of being. im not sure that is any more than a semantical problem.

Wait: “all change” is included in God, but God is unchanging? That doesn’t work.

 

[Areopagite]

That wasn’t what I was claiming but now that I think about it, in terms of forces, Newton’s Third Law says that if you impart a force on a mass, then the mass imparts a force right back.

So … are you saying that now?

Of course, Newton’s Laws were arrived at by induction. There is nothing against logic to say that sometimes they may not apply.

My claim was that anything that affects the material universe is itself material (though maybe “physical” might be a better term to use).

… I’m trying to see why there would be any reason for saying this. I mean, I don’t see why we can’t say then, “Anything that affects rhinoceroses is also a rhinoceros.” Obviously, if A does something to B, I’m not sure why there has to be some necessary likeness of nature between the A and B. God causes changes in the physical/material universe, but I really don’t see why we have to call him material/physical.

IOW, Santa Claus exists, just not “materially”.

Yes. Because if Santa didn’t exist in any way, we couldn’t talk about him. He has to exist in the mind. I’m open to being persecuted for this. And corrected as well.

I think I added in (but now that I look at it didn’t explicitly state) your idea that two beings that share all the same attributes are the same being. If God is “all being”, then no other beings are distinguishable from God… or at least from a component or aspect of God. Therefore, no beings other than God exist, right?

Creatures are distinguishable from God because they do not have all being. There is negation in them. It is in a sense true that every thing we see reflects something about God, but they are not indistinguishable from God because they obviously do not have everything, whereas God does have everything.

Personally, I don’t think that talking about colours and “perfection” really works. Why is it more “perfect” for light to have a wavelength that’s closer to one value than another?

I didn’t necessarily imply that different wavelengths could be better or worse than another in every way. Blue has a certain wavelength and red as another. The two are different. However, they both have something that the other does not. Hence there is negation in both of them. They might be on the same level of being and same level of perfection (I guess), but they have different/diverse perfection.

And I don’t agree that imperfection necessarily implies non-being.

Imperfection can either mean “privation” or simple “negation.” Privation is when a thing lacks something that it should have by nature (e.g. when someone is missing an arm). Negation doesn’t necessary means that but could simply mean that there is something that thing does not have, and the thing’s nature is indifferent to it (e.g. humans don’t have wings). In both cases, imperfection implies non-being.

For example, consider the emotion of anger: in some circumstances, God is described as being justly angry. Does “righteous anger” have being while “irrational anger” does not? If so, why?

Good question. It is very much a problem if we say the God can literally be angry, for it would definitely be a perfection that implies an imperfection. However, in all the theology I’ve ever read about this, no matter how ancient or how recent, the “wrath of God” has been explained as an instance of anthropomorphism. It is used to symbolize that sins are contrary to the will of God and that sinners will receive divine punishment.

I curious to know how Protestant Fundamentalists explain stuff like that in the Bible.

Right. But terms like “maximal greatness” only refer to the level of greatness. If two approaches both acheive the same level of greatness, then they’re equally great regardless of whether they accomplish it in different ways.

Good question. I guess the analogy that can be made (and this might not work) is a feudal structure. The King has all absolute authority and power in the land. Under him, are Dukes, Counts, and Barons, etc, who controls subdivisions of the kingdom. Two dukes, for example, can have the same level of power, but are nonetheless distinguished (e.g. by owning different parts of land … as physical things of the same nature or level of being are distinguished by being in different points in space, for example). Nonetheless, there is one supreme ruler who has all the power. There can only be one, because if there were two kings, they would not be supreme and have everything (and thus would not be analogous to God who has all being).

That is a very limited analogy. But maybe you can see what’s going on. So, the different levels of being is not a linear gradient of being, but a hierarchical one. Hence, you can have many things of less than maximal greatness on the same level of being (and by the way, I’m talking about something like substantial being here … because if two things have the same substantial form and all the same accidents … then they’re the same thing), and yet there can be only one thing on top with everything.

My point was just that the way the original argument is structured, it doesn’t matter whether “maximal greatness” includes “all being”; the argument doesn’t rely on that specific attribute.

Hmm. Perhaps, I’m not sure. I really am confused.

 

[Areopagite]

In one way of approaching the argument, “maximal greatness” is just the label for a set. The members of the set are all attributes, and the argument states that omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness are all members of the set.

Indeed, all things come from God, except their negative aspects. They attain individuality and separateness from God by not having certain being in them.

My point was just that the label for the set doesn’t really matter. We don’t have to worry about what to include in the set or not because this is given in the argument. In the argument, the set “maximal greatness” includes the specified attributes. If you had labelled the set “groundhogs in tutus”, it would still include the specified attributes, because the attributes are explicitly stated in the argument.

I almost think I understood you this time. But I failed again.

However, I think this approach isn’t the only way of looking at the argument. It’s kinda fallen out of the discussion so far… roughly:

Q: What’s “maximal greatness”? The term is vague.
A: It’s defined right here: “maximal greatness” is maximal excellence.
Q: But “maximal excellence” is vague, too. What do you mean by it?
A: That’s in the argument as well: “maximal excellence” necessarily includes omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness.

IOW, there’s two approaches that we can take:

1. Fight over the meaning of the vague terms “greatness” and “excellence” as well as the implications of those meanings.
2. Treat “maximal greatness” and “maximal excellence” as placeholder terms and mentally drop the given meaning into the argument in their places.

Maximal greatness and maximal excellence are synonyms but they are not good definitions of each other. Also, “maximal excellence necessarily includes omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness” is not a definition, but more of a description.

But, yeah, I’m still not quite sure what’s going on here.

• “goodness” exists as an objective measure (maybe there are no objective standards at all by which to measure "goodness).

I believe that I offered an explanation for “goodness” in a previous post. Essentially, in its ontological sense (opposed to its natural or moral sense … or pleasurable or disinterested or … there’s some others …) it is synonymous with being. The more being something has, the more goodness it has.

• a “maximal” value for goodness exists (maybe there’s no upper limit to “goodness”).

It depends what you mean by limit. In some sense there is no limit to goodness because God has infinite being and thus is infinitely good. However, we could say that goodness is limited to “all that can exist” (which only applies to God)

• “excellence in every possible world” is more “good” than excellence in only one world or a finite set of worlds.

… sounds good … I think.

• “maximal excellence” can be be manifest as a “maximally excellent being”.

I believe that is true. I may be wrong.

• “maximal excellence” necessarily implies omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness.

Yeah. Definitely.

Not unreadable at all. An excellent outline. Thank you.

Thanks.

It reads just fine, but I think it conflicts with other ideas.

A completely unchanging God could not be a creator-God. Creation marks a change in state for God, because it denotes a change in God’s actions (going from “not creating” to “creating”, and presumably back to “not creating”).

I’m not sure why there can’t be eternal actions. Creation exists because God has willed it for all of eternity. There was never a time for God when He wasn’t willing it. There was never a time for God when He decided to never have created it. God is outside of time, and He has eternally willed the existence of the universe.

Yeah, that’s confusing. I know. But I really don’t see a contradiction there.

It would also be incapable of cognition - it could not change its mind. Therefore, it would be incapable of omniscience or “perfect goodness”.

Why would God change His mind? That would imply some non-being (as I argued that all change implies non-being). If God is omniscient, then there is no need to change one’s mind. You say the opposite, but that doesn’t make any sense.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Wait: “all change” is included in God, but God is unchanging? That doesn’t work.

sure, all change occurs within existence. it doesnt change with existence itself.

 

[Oreoracle]

its not a momenet to moment situations that define a world, but rather a universe sytem in its entirelty geometrically and temporally.

And if two worlds possess any differences, however small, they are different worlds, correct? I don’t see anything wrong with giving small “moment to moment” examples.

i suppose you can exclude it in any situation that deals with non-empirical data. free will, ontology, etc.

That’s the issue: you don’t truly know if anything is beyond the empirical realm, except perhaps awareness itself.

yet without it, no science would exist, without some training in it a man generally has poor critical thinking skills, without it we wouldnt have government, without it we wouldnt have rights. i suggest you rely on philosophy everyday.

Even some of the animals you compare to Roombas have hierarchal social structures and preconceived instinctual limits (which cause them to refrain from killing one another). We don’t even need a high degree of consciousness to obey a leader or adhere to “rights,” so it’s hard for me to believe we need philosophy for those things.

you are thinking mathematical proofs. like in geometry. needless to say this isnt geometry.

Of course this isn’t geometry…it’s a guy trying to make me sound stupid for not making the assumptions he has made and for not respecting his “evidence.”

if 100% certainty is your level of evidence you simply fall back into solipsism. nothing is real but what you can be certain of, which is only cogito ergo sum.

What percent of certainty would you suggest? Now seriously think about this before you answer. If you were to give a percentage, would that percentage be adequate for all scenarios? Of course not. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. I think I’m perfectly justified in saying that you should be dead certain God exists before you make such outlandish claims, and that this certainty better have been derived from evidence.

And as for your messianic prophecies, I suggest that if you don’t lend any credibility to the run-of-the-mill fortuneteller or media psychic, you should retract this prophetical nonsense. To do otherwise is hypocrisy.

i think so. each way the world could have been is said to be a seperate possible world.

Isn’t that what I said?

 

[Areopagite]

That’s the issue: you don’t truly know if anything is beyond the empirical realm, except perhaps awareness itself.

And thoughts, ideas, knowledge, theories, formulas, etc…

I’m a little unsure what many people mean by the “empirical realm.” There have been many definitions of it, and not all of them get along. Any one want to clear this up for me?

Even some of the animals you compare to Roombas have hierarchal social structures and preconceived instinctual limits (which cause them to refrain from killing one another). We don’t even need a high degree of consciousness to obey a leader or adhere to “rights,” so it’s hard for me to believe we need philosophy for those things.

We need philosophy to understand them and do them well, especially if how to do them well becomes confusing (which is usually caused by bad philosophers … thus requiring good philosophy). And I’m not sure what you mean by “high degree of consciousness.” Does that mean, like, being really … caffeinated?

What percent of certainty would you suggest? Now seriously think about this before you answer. If you were to give a percentage, would that percentage be adequate for all scenarios? Of course not. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. I think I’m perfectly justified in saying that you should be dead certain God exists before you make such outlandish claims, and that this certainty better have been derived from evidence.

Time to define “certainty” and “evidence.” They are magical words that are far too abused in far too many debates.

And as for your messianic prophecies, I suggest that if you don’t lend any credibility to the run-of-the-mill fortuneteller or media psychic, you should retract this prophetical nonsense. To do otherwise is hypocrisy.

I personally am not closed-minded to not lending any credibility to fortunetellers or psychics. If they can predict things well, it’s either because they have a naturally intuitive skill to see what’s likely to happen or be the case (possibly something even parapsychological), or else some supernatural entity informs them (either angels, demons, or God … but apparently, it’s demons a lot of the time … that’s the word on the street).

 

[warpspeedpetey]

And if two worlds possess any differences, however small, they are different worlds, correct? I don’t see anything wrong with giving small “moment to moment” examples.

no they are not different worlds. you may be confusing mmany worlds theory from QM or something. that change means entirely diffeent worlds, both forwards and back. the amount of difference has to do with the closeness of any particular alternate possible world to the actual one.

That’s the issue: you don’t truly know if anything is beyond the empirical realm, except perhaps awareness itself.

sure we do, all those things already mentioned. logic, free will, ontology, cosmogony, etc. they all lay beyond emiricism. to deny them is to deny the PSR. its too choose a certain level of solipsism, a certain level of ignorance. as scientism is a self defeating proposition, even that is not empirical. so how do you know it to be true? it offers itself up fpr no empirical evidence, not experimentation or testing.

Even some of the animals you compare to Roombas have hierarchal social structures and preconceived instinctual limits (which cause them to refrain from killing one another). We don’t even need a high degree of consciousness to obey a leader or adhere to “rights,” so it’s hard for me to believe we need philosophy for those things.

i dont see how youre getting this? maybe im missing soemthing here.

What percent of certainty would you suggest? Now seriously think about this before you answer. If you were to give a percentage, would that percentage be adequate for all scenarios? Of course not. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. I think I’m perfectly justified in saying that you should be dead certain God exists before you make such outlandish claims, and that this certainty better have been derived from evidence.

i dont know, im siply pointing out that your standard of evidence, 100% certainty is applicable solely to cogito ergo sum. an impossibly high standard for anything. a dead end.

And as for your messianic prophecies, I suggest that if you don’t lend any credibility to the run-of-the-mill fortuneteller or media psychic, you should retract this prophetical nonsense. To do otherwise is hypocrisy.

can you tell me a psychic or fortuneteller that has that kind of accuracy? 10^157? please, nowhere near the same. why should i retract mathematical proof? simply because you dont like its existence?

Isn’t that what I said?

that wasnt my impression.

that said, we arent actually talking about anything important anymore, do you have evidence for animal emotions?

 

[punkforchrist]

Almost: it’s more like "why can a maximally great being not possess attributes that do not contribute to its maximal greatness?

Okay.

This makes no sense. Just because some of a beings attributes are necessary doesn’t mean that all of them have to be.

Any attribute that a necessary being possesses will either be necessary or contingent. If it is contingent, then it need not exist in every possible world, in which case it is inapplicable to the modal argument. I’m not sure what your objection is meant to show.

Maybe I can re-phrase: for the moment, let’s assume that there’s some objective standard of “greatness” against which a “maximally great” thing could be measured. Why is there necessarily only one way in which this “maximal greatness” could be acheived?

Well, if there really is an objective standard A as you mention, then ~A is objectively inferior to A.

Look at just the oranges: you have ten of them, and they’re all very similar… nearly identical, in fact. Tweak that scenario a bit so that they’re all exactly identical, and that’s what I’m talking about.

If the oranges are identical, then they’re not any different from one another. You could say that they appear identical, but if they’re composed of different particles, then they are distinct. If they are composed of the same particles, then there is only one orange to begin with.