You keep talking about self-causation being impossible. It makes sense to me that something cannot cause itself because for it to do that it would have to exist prior to existing. However, we do not know whether something can be uncaused. All of our experience and laws are within the context of our universe, and we don’t know whether things can be uncaused in other contexts, and there is some evidence of uncaused things within our own universe.
here is something i ran across on the internet that explains it in less time than it would take me to type it. lol.
The atheist may argue that things may not begin to exist uncaused in our universal experience now , but they could begin to exist uncaused at the beginning of the universe where conditions were different .** But we must note that the term “uncaused” means not linked to any prior conditions . So even if conditions at the beginning of the universe were different from our universal experience , that wouldn’t have favored the occurence of uncaused events such that they could happen at the beginning of the universe but not in our universal experience .** Indeed , if something can begin to exist uncaused , then it **should be expected to occur in any sort of universal experience **, unconstrained by any conditions whatsoever . As Dr William Lane Craig wrote :
" Consider, nonetheless, Jonathan Edwards’s argument on behalf of the causal principle:** if something can come into being uncaused out of nothing, then it is
inexplicable why anything and everything does not do so.** Oppy says that any and everything does not come into being uncaused out of nothing because some things
have actual causes. Of course, they do; but what is the explanation for that fact and for the fact that people, televisions, and Eskimo villages do not pop
into being uncaused out of nothing, if this is, as Oppy proceeds to assert, possible? He seems to answer that “. . . our universe is governed by
certain conservation laws which ensure that such things do not actually happen.” But this explanation is inadequate because insofar as natural
laws are inductive generalizations, they are merely descriptions of what does or does not happen in the universe; and insofar as they are invested with nomic
necessity, such necessity derives solely from the causal powers and dispositions of things that actually exist.
In neither case is any sort of
constraint placed on things’ springing uncaused out of nothingness into being. After all, there is nothing there to be constrained. So does it not strike one as peculiar that it is only the universe which comes magically into being out of nothing rather than all sorts of other
things as well? " (From Graham Oppy on the Kalam Cosmological Argument)
