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freesoulhope
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The belief that only “matter” (the universe) exists, is not reasonably supported by the scientific evidence and everyday experience. Can you prove me wrong?
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Benedictus
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I don’t think I need to. After all, you are the one making the assertion. What scientific evidence is there that something other than the matter and energy in our universe exists? True, there are theories about multiple universes, but I’m not sure that helps your case any.
P.S., I do think atheism is illogical.
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andzy
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I don’t believe atheism is illogical. In fact, it makes some sense, but only for a while. It seems to me that it takes a lot of faith to believe in it, when seriously considering its arguments. I don’t have that much faith, and have found that it makes more sense to accept Christianity.
But yes Freesoulhope, you should try proving atheism wrong and present some arguments for your case first.
But yes Freesoulhope, you should try proving atheism wrong and present some arguments for your case first.
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Mirdath
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You don’t have to. The burden of proof is on freesoulhope.
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jman507
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How does that make Christianity any more logical with the same givens?
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zemi
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We will never arrive at Christianity without some other external data i.e. Christ. Christianity is about Christ.
We could be in awe how the universe in arranged, and that in must have needed some first cause but no looking at the universe (and alse let’s say the presence of suffering) we could never arrive at "Oh! Now I’ve got it! God loves us! Hi is the Trinitarian love to which communion we are called to!!
"I think it’s very reasonable to conclude theism and not only deism based on the observance of the universe (and now due to Big-bang cosmology as well)
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CatholicSamurai
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I just want to say thank you for this post!
Also a little comment: They say God does not exist because evil exists and that God being benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent means there shouldn’t be evil. How do they know that there’s evil… doesn’t it mean that there’s also good? Look, I’m not a super genius who can argue logic but I believe what is mentioned in post # 1.
Also a little comment: They say God does not exist because evil exists and that God being benevolent, omniscient and omnipotent means there shouldn’t be evil. How do they know that there’s evil… doesn’t it mean that there’s also good? Look, I’m not a super genius who can argue logic but I believe what is mentioned in post # 1.
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zemi
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Listen to this debate when you have time. William Lane Craig’s debate with C. Dayton about this. Great debate!
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Benedictus
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No. Believers often argue that evil is merely the privation of good. Why can’t good be the privation of evil? In other words–using this line of reasoning–the existence of one doesn’t imply the existence of the other.
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jman507
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I agree with what you said. That though is not addressing entirely the OP. Science itself can never address the God question, atleast given our vast ignorance of the natural world. Granted we do understand a lot, but I pretty much assume there is still much ignorance about topics that we could never even possiblely dream up that are true.We will never arrive at Christianity without some other external data i.e. Christ. Christianity is about Christ.
We could be in awe how the universe in arranged, and that in must have needed some first cause but no looking at the universe (and alse let’s say the presence of suffering) we could never arrive at "Oh! Now I’ve got it! God loves us! Hi is the Trinitarian love to which communion we are called to!!
I think it’s very reasonable to conclude theism and not only deism based on the observance of the universe (and now due to Big-bang cosmology as well)
As far as what we can say about the metaphysics, such as which is right when it comes to materialism, spiritualism, or a mix between the two, I do not think we can logically come to any certainty on the topic. We can make assumptions, and run on those. I myself have done that, especially as a Catholic, but as far as reasonably excluding the other possiblities, I don’t think I can do that. I could see how materialism could be plausable, given our knowledge. So while I think Atheism is wrong, I do not see that I can fully reasonably exclude it as a possiblity.
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nobeerinheaven
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When philosophers say a view is “illogical” the charge typically amounts to the view’s being incoherent or self-contradictory. To substantiate the claim that atheism is illogical in this proper sense, one would need to show the inconsistency; e.g. atheists are committed to x, x entails y, y entails z, and z entails not-x. Since you don’t do that, it’s difficult to “prove you wrong” - you haven’t made a case, yet, to criticize.
One prima facie reason to think atheism is coherent is that it is minimally committed to only one thing, a denial that God exists, and there are virtually infinite claims with a similar structure. Dawkins’ favorite example is “the flying spaghetti monster”; we are all atheists with respect to it. Yet, there is no logical contradiction involved in such a denial, which means the attitude of atheism there is coherent (and, thus, “logical” in the broad sense). We needn’t limit the case to the FSM, though. We are atheists with respect to Martians, unicorns, etc. Since those claims can be made coherently, you must show why the denial of God is unique such that it implies a logical contradiction. So far, you haven’t.
One prima facie reason to think atheism is coherent is that it is minimally committed to only one thing, a denial that God exists, and there are virtually infinite claims with a similar structure. Dawkins’ favorite example is “the flying spaghetti monster”; we are all atheists with respect to it. Yet, there is no logical contradiction involved in such a denial, which means the attitude of atheism there is coherent (and, thus, “logical” in the broad sense). We needn’t limit the case to the FSM, though. We are atheists with respect to Martians, unicorns, etc. Since those claims can be made coherently, you must show why the denial of God is unique such that it implies a logical contradiction. So far, you haven’t.
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cpayne
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According to Anselm, the “attitude of atheism” *is *coherent and logical in all cases except the case of a maximally perfect being (note: not a perfect “thing,” as in the case of the FSM, Martian, unicorn, etc.). He spells this out in his “Reply to Gaunilo.”
According to Anselm, this is the reason for Psalm 14:1; those who deny God’s existence are intrinsically illogical.
In the contemporary updates of Anselm’s argument, I don’t think this case is as strongly pressed. Speaking for myself, I don’t think the ontological argument absolutely “proves” God’s existence. I do think, however, that it does make the case that the atheist must not just argue that God does not exist, but must argue that it is *impossible *for God to exist. The only other option is that it is *necessary *for God to exist.
I don’t think the atheist’s case can be made, logically. But I agree with the quoted post that this position is not exactly the same as saying that atheists are inherently illogical. After all, they may make the case that God’s existence is intrinsically impossible (Jean-Paul Sartre came the closest that I know of to this). But I don’t think they will.
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Sideline
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Excellent points, in my opinion. I would add one more point. The original post suggests that the inability of a person to prove the contrary of a proposition, proves the proposition. This doesn’t follow.
My inability to prove that God doesn’t exist doesn’t prove that God exists any more than my inability to prove that God exists proves that God doesn’t exist. My ability or inability to prove something doesn’t actually prove or disprove anything. For instance, my girlfriend believes that there is no such thing as a “largest prime number”. There is no way that she would be able to prove it to you, but that doesn’t mean that her belief in that is wrong, or even illogical. She has a very good reason for believing it: I told her, and I don’t usually lie about stuff as important as prime numbers.
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Sideline
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Every description of a “maximally perfect being” I’ve heard seems self-contradictory. Like a “largest integer” or an “uncoditional condition”, it seems to imply something that it can not be.
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cpayne
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Sideline
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It was supposed to be “unconditional condition”, but I have a feeling it wasn’t the typo that threw you. So let me try it another way.
I don’t think a maximally perfect being exists. Think of the most loving being that could exist, now think of one that loves even more, now even more, now even more, now even more…
You always imagine more, you can always imagine bigger, longer, faster, more loving, smarter, etc.
Of course, I’ve met people who believe this very thing. That God is in constant state of becoming more. But I don’t get the impression that Anselm was one of them.
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john_doran
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well, this isn’t really the self-contradiction that you originally suggested was involved in the concept of a maximally perfect being, is it?
since the lynchpin of the modal ontological argument is that god is either necessary or impossible, you’d have to demonstrate a bonafide logical contradiction in the concept of “maximal perfection” in order to make your case. and it seems that you haven’t done that here.
i mean, by definition, a maximally loving being cannot possess any greater degree of love, or be exceeded in the possession of love by any other being, so you can’t imagine what you say you imagine.
but that is as may be; putative examples of imagined counterexamples are in any case not logically probative: you need to show a logical defeater for the concept of maximal perfection. can you show that “maximal perfection” entails (A&~A)?
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Sideline
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Really? How did my position change? I suggested in my first post that a “maximally perfect being” was like a “largest possible integer”. Then I went on to say that a “most loving being” could always be more loving. Where did I change my position?
Perhaps I am misusing the word “inconsitent” what would you call the statement “largest possible integer” or “most circular circle”? Whatever you would call that, is how I see the term “MPB”.
I never tried to. First off, I thought I was discussing Anselm, not the modal ontological argument as a group. Secondly, I didn’t try to bring down the whole argument, I mearly pointed out where I find fault with the term MPB.
If I were to start talking about the “greatest infinity” you would challenge me on that right? I couldn’t get away with just saying “by definition” there are no greater infinities. Why should I believe that there is some supposed ceiling on love? Or greatness?
On another point, how is anything more perfect than something else? As far as I can tell, perfection is binary.
I never set out to defeat the ontological argument. I just said that an MPB doesn’t seem consitent.
If you want to argue in favour of an MPB I’d love to hear it. If you are arguing that I already understand it, I would be intrigued as to why you think so. But at the moment, I’m not sure what we are arguing.
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john_doran
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it’s not that you changed your position, it’s that your position was that the description of an MPB “seems self-contradictory”; but saying that, for any degree of love possessed by some being, you can always imagine possessing a greater degree of love, doesn’t involve a logical contradiction.
in other words, your example is not evidence for your position.
i would say that concept of a largest possible integer can be shown to be inconsistent using mathematical logic applied to the relevant mathematical concepts and axioms; the inconsistency - if it is to be logical in nature - must be more than a putative ability always to imagine a larger integer.
it would depend on the context: what are the definitions and assumptions you’re using and making when you’re talking about “infinity”? for example, in set theory there are inifinities of differing sizes - the set of integers is a smaller infinity than the set of real numbers (aleph-0 and aleph-1, respectively).
in the same way, if you make the claim that “maximal perfection” is self-contradictory, you need to provide a demonstration of the illogic of the concept - saying that it “seems” self-contradictory isn’t enough, since it doesn’t seem that way to others (like me).
you don’t have to, but that’s beside the point: you’re saying a ceiling is impossible, and that’s a horse of an entirely different color.
the argument is just that an MPB is either necessary or impossible; it’s not impossible; therefore it’s necessary. which means it exists in this and every other possible world.
i’m not arguing for an MPB in any way other than to point out that i can see no logical contradiction in the concept. you demur - i am asking only for more evidence than your imagined, unlimited incremental increase of lovingness in some being…
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Sideline
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I see your point that I didn’t prove a logical inconsistency in the notion of an MPB.
I think that you think I made a much stronger claim than I actually made. I didn’t think I offered proof that it was self-contradictory. I am well aware that my impressions aren’t facts, and all I offered was my impressions, which have now been altered.
To be fair, there are any number of beings that are logically necessary according to this logic. I can see the possibility of a number of “Gods” being necessary in this manner. It seems possible to posit Gods which are internally non-contradictory, but conflict with each other.
Just a caveat, I am just throwing the idea out there. I don’t think it constitutes a proof in any way. However, I don’t see on the surface of it any obvious flaws either. That’s what other people are for.
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