Brain/mind - hardware/software

[ateista]

This question came up a few times: how can a materialist accept the concept of free will, or how can a materialist contend the existence of non-material thoughts generated by a physical brain.

One of the arguments was that the neuro-chemical activity of the brain (which is called the mind) is purely physical, and therefore its acitivity is reducible to either deterministic physical laws, or stochastic ones. If it is reduced to deterministic laws, then it is not free in any sense of the word, if it is reduced to stochastic ones, then it is some chaotic activity, which cannot be called a desicion making process.

These arguments look quite plausible, yet they are incorrect.

Let’s look at a computer hardware. Its physical functioning is purely electronic and deterministic. If some hardware problem comes up, then its functioning will be chaotic, unpredictable. The progams, that run on the computer are just electronic impulses. Nevertheless, what the program does, is something totally different.

It is not a physical world, it is a virtual world. It is not governed by physical laws, or even mathematical or logical ones, and its working cannot be reduced to these laws. A computer program may sometimes “refuse” to add even numbers, but may willingly add up odd ones. It may sometimes say that 1 + 1 = 3. It can create a multi-dimensional world. It can suspend gravity… within its own virtual world. It can do anything.

The program is an emergent attribute, its working is not subject to any limitation, except what the programmer decided. This may seem to expose another possible line of “attack”. After all if the program is simply carrying out its instructions, then its working can be explained or reduced to the programmer’s intent.

The answer: only in some very simple cases. There are evolving, learning programs, which remember previous questions and answers. It will not answer the same question twice with the same answer. It can modify its internal structure. Its working is not predictable by anyone, not even its original programmer.

The physical activity of the brain is just a bunch of electro-chemical impulses, also reducible to physical laws. But what the mind does is not. It is also a virtual world. Its working is not determined by physical or mathematical or logical constraints.

The analogy between the computer program and the mind is very strong. Both are virtual worlds, their activity cannot be reduced to physical laws. The “only” difference is that the brain is much more complicated than the computer.

Now mind you, I have no idea how free will emerges in the mind. No one does. This is not a constructive argument, which allows to replicate the nuts and bolts of free will in a computer. It is simply an existential argument, which shows that the physical operation of the brain / computer does not predict or limit the working of the mind / software.

 

[IvanKaramozov]

[Edited by Moderator]

Well, I know a computer scientist and cognitive scientist who I think, while holding vastly different world views, would chastise this as grossly simplyfing complex issues, and making claims that the data just dosen’t bear out, like that we know what the mind is.

It’s not somthing I am at all educated in, or even really interested in, so I’m not going to argue with you, however I would suggust you cite your claims.

 

[tdgesq]

ateista,

Do computer programs have free will?

 

[ribozyme]

ateista,

Do computer programs have free will?

Not yet…

All we need to do is wait… and wait… and wait…and wait for the year 2029 to see one that does.

Maybe robot rights would be popular in the future.

I do think the argument from non-materialistic consciousness are arguments from ignorance. For example, we are currently unable to run a simulation of the human brain due to a lack of processing power in supercomputers. Maybe the law of accelerating returns will endow the ability to do this.

I do agree with the monist interpretation of consciousness. Many accounts of alzheimer’s disease involve the tragic depiction of a person becoming an empty shell. They cannot say cogito ergo sum; they become unaware of their own existence. It seems that when the brain disintegrates, it’s over.

 

[ateista]

Do computer programs have free will?

Ribozyme gave the answer.

But we must ask: “how do we know if something has free will?”. The only practical answer is that we observe its behavior and draw consequences based upon the observation. If the behavior of an entity is unpredictable, then we must assume that is has some kind of a freedom of action.

Does a computer program exhibit free will, if it sometimes “refuses” to perform an operation, and other times it does not? Or is it simply “buggy”? How do we know the difference? In theory we can go into “debug” mode and examine the working of the program.

At least we can do it today, because the prorgams are quite simple. Of course to debug a code which is a “mere” few million lines long is quite an undertaking, even if we have the original code. But if the program is an evolving, learning kind (which type exists today) and there is no “blueprint” of it (cannot be, since the program modifies itself), then it is pretty much impossible to debug it.

But the point of the OP was something different. It only establishes that a virtual world (mind or software) is not constrained by, or reducible to the physical or logical laws of existence - despite the fact that the underlying “hardware” is. And I think that was your question.

 

[john_doran]

The physical activity of the brain is just a bunch of electro-chemical impulses, also reducible to physical laws. But what the mind does is not.

even if this is true, it doesn’t get you where you need to be: the (alleged) ultimate irreducibility of the laws governing mind to the laws governing brain, in no way entails that mind isn’t physical. you might as well argue that the brain isn’t physical because neurological laws aren’t reducible to quantum mechanical laws…

see what i’m saying? you can’t legitimately proceed from the irreducibility of two sets of physical laws to the non-physicality of one of the domains geverned by those laws. or, if you can, then it follows that both domains are non-physical.

look, it comes down to this: do brains that share all of their physical properties also share all of their mental properties? if so, then mind is ultimately physical (in the way that two bodies that share all of their physical properties also share all of their locomotive properties - i.e. if two bodies are physically identical, and one is running, then the other will be running also).

if not, and there are mental properties that differ between token-identical brains, then what you have is my position, namely that mind is ultimately non-physical. but then you’ve also abandoned naturalism…

ateista:

It is also a virtual world. Its working is not determined by physical or mathematical or logical constraints.

this is just not true…

no computer program fails to be self-identical, or to produce results that fail to be self-identical; no computer program both does and does not exist at the same time and in the same manner, nor does it produce results that both are and are not results; statements produced by computer programs are all either true, false, or neither. and so on.

in simpler terms, a program that didn’t act according to any recognizable logic (mathematical, formal, modal, or otherwise), would not be recognizable as actually doing anything intelligent or guided - it’s actions would be indistinguishable from arbitrary garbage output.

anything that can be understood as acting intelligibly or rationally in some way, must be acting according to some kind of logic.

ateista:

Now mind you, I have no idea how free will emerges in the mind. No one does. This is not a constructive argument, which allows to replicate the nuts and bolts of free will in a computer. It is simply an existential argument, which shows that the physical operation of the brain / computer does not predict or limit the working of the mind / software.

same thing goes here: if two physically identical brains (and brain-environments) ***nonetheless ***choose differently, then the choice isn’t physical in the robust sense of “existing outside of the natural world”.

and “unpredictable” isn’t the same thing as “free” - just because we don’t know how to articulate psychophysical laws doesn’t mean that they do not govern the interaction between mental and physical events as exhaustively and deterministically as, say, gravity governs all physical bodies in the universe.

 

[crowonsnow]

This question came up a few times: how can a materialist accept the concept of free will, or how can a materialist contend the existence of non-material thoughts generated by a physical brain.

ateista,

I may have something to add to the discussion, but it depends on your definition of free will. Are you in fact differentiating between “will” and “free will?” If you are, please explain.

 

[ateista]

ateista,

I may have something to add to the discussion, but it depends on your definition of free will. Are you in fact differentiating between “will” and “free will?” If you are, please explain.

No, I don’t. The adjective “free” is totally superfluous. I mean that the entity who is “free” is a primary causative agent, whose decisions are not determined by outside causes - though they may exert some influence on them.

 

[ateista]

even if this is true, it doesn’t get you where you need to be: the (alleged) ultimate irreducibility of the laws governing mind to the laws governing brain, in no way entails that mind isn’t physical. you might as well argue that the brain isn’t physical because neurological laws aren’t reducible to quantum mechanical laws…

Very good observation. I will think about it.

no computer program fails to be self-identical, or to produce results that fail to be self-identical; no computer program both does and does not exist at the same time and in the same manner, nor does it produce results that both are and are not results; statements produced by computer programs are all either true, false, or neither. and so on.

Yes, this is true, but not what I meant. A computer program can have its own rules, where “1 + 1 = 3” or where “true and true makes false”. The rules of a virtual world cannot be derived from the rules of the physical world. If a programmer chooses to create an 8-dimensional world, all he has to do is create a vector “a” with 8 elements, and there it is: a world with 8 “spatial” dimensions.

in simpler terms, a program that didn’t act according to any recognizable logic (mathematical, formal, modal, or otherwise), would not be recognizable as actually doing anything intelligent or guided - it’s actions would be indistinguishable from arbitrary garbage output.

Well, it might just mean that we do not understand it… There is no objective “meaning”, only the inadequacy of the receiver of the information.

and “unpredictable” isn’t the same thing as “free” - just because we don’t know how to articulate psychophysical laws doesn’t mean that they do not govern the interaction between mental and physical events as exhaustively and deterministically as, say, gravity governs all physical bodies in the universe.

I don’t disagree, but I then how do you wish to make a judgment about the question that an entity is “free” or not? A purely existential definition is just insufficient, we need a constructive one.

 

[john_doran]

Yes, this is true, but not what I meant. A computer program can have its own rules, where “1 + 1 = 3” or where “true and true makes false”. The rules of a virtual world cannot be derived from the rules of the physical world. If a programmer chooses to create an 8-dimensional world, all he has to do is create a vector “a” with 8 elements, and there it is: a world with 8 “spatial” dimensions.

gotcha. but those rules are still subject to certain more fundamental logical rules…

ateista:

Well, it might just mean that we do not understand it… There is no objective “meaning”, only the inadequacy of the receiver of the information.

granted, the being producing what appears to be random outputs may in fact be rational in some way (and the outputs similarly rational but unintelligible to us) but there would still be no reason for us to believe that being to be rational. (just like there’s no reason for us to think that, say, stars or rocks or lakes are rational).

ateista:

I don’t disagree, but I then how do you wish to make a judgment about the question that an entity is “free” or not? A purely existential definition is just insufficient, we need a constructive one.

as a first approximation, i’d say that an entity is free if it is rational.

 

[freesoulhope]

The analogy between the computer program and the mind is very strong. Both are virtual worlds, their activity cannot be reduced to physical laws. The “only” difference is that the brain is much more complicated than the computer.

The difference is, a human is personal; a computor is not. And who says that both are virtual worlds?

Now mind you, I have no idea how free will emerges in the mind. No one does.

Thats because the idea of a personal being immerging “ultimately” out of impersonal objects; makes no rational sense.

If a human person is reduced to impersonal forces and chemical reactions, then there can be no freewill. But if a human being has a personal immaterial soul which is transcendent and dominant over its object; then one can see the potential for free-will; for a person can command his body, because an immaterial entity has no “physical part” that can be “naturally caused”, and therefore is potentially free from Natural Laws.

Why should a collection of atoms, which, by themselves, show no obvious potential for sentience(and are not sentient), actualise a state of mind that would think and have an opinon about moral law, or that life was a beautiful thing? One can reasonably imagine a random series of events bringing about a non-sentient, non-personal organism, which works and develops according to cuase, effect, and other natural laws, becuase this is reflective of an impersonal universe with blind forces; but its an illogical leap from a sophisticated robot, to a collection of atoms becoming personal and free.

To not see the contradiction, is to simply take life for granted. We tend to over-estimate the causual powers of the natural universe. If we remove the concept of an immaterial soul, the natural world loses its rational order.

When we say that something is wrong, we usually mean “Objectively”; we natural feel that this is true of the real world. We are not talking about which flavor of ice cream we like best. When we do wrong, its usually the case that we feel guilty. Why would a collection of atoms feel guilty? We feel guilty because we are “personal beings”, not just a collection of atoms (we are more then matter), and it is wrong to hurt personal beings. It is not wrong to hurt objects. But it is wrong to inflict suffering out of spite.

“Moral choice” is one of the few freedoms we have; what is it about being a “personal being”, that we should feel bound by an objective moral standard? What is it about being a “personal being”, that is wholly different from the fact that we are also a complex collection of non-personal atoms in a vast chain of cause and effect? Could it be that a human being is in fact a unification of an “immaterial personal soul” and an “Object”?

If an Objective standard of beauty doesn’t exist, then why has a collection of impersonal atoms, decided to think up the concept in the first place? Why do we regognise that a thing is beautiful? It really doesn’t matter if people have different tastes; what is crucial to my point, is that, there is in fact, a concept of “bueaty” in the first place.

Why should an organism have free will, if the foundation of an organism, is the impersonal cold forces of nature? Though these questions are far from empirical proofs, i think they show that a world with out God and objective standards, just doesn’t add up.

 

[ateista]

gotcha. but those rules are still subject to certain more fundamental logical rules…

I wonder what do you mean? The rules are arbitrary, and moreover, they are subject to change. My point is that the programs are not based (necessarily) on the real world, they can create a totally virtual environment (role playing games come to mind as an example) where the rules are decided by the designers. Those rules may change.

Still we are talking about very simple programs here, albeit they can be millions of lines of code. There are decision making algorithms, which evolve, which remember, which modify their own internal structures.

granted, the being producing what appears to be random outputs may in fact be rational in some way (and the outputs similarly rational but unintelligible to us) but there would still be no reason for us to believe that being to be rational. (just like there’s no reason for us to think that, say, stars or rocks or lakes are rational).

I certainly agree with this analysis.

as a first approximation, i’d say that an entity is free if it is rational.

Hmmm. I am not so sure. Higher animals display a rudimentary “freedom”, but then maybe it is due to a rudimentary “rationality”. The question is: how do we recognize rationality? I know of no other way than to observe their behavior, and draw conclusions from there.

 

[ateista]

The difference is, a human is personal; a computor is not. And who says that both are virtual worlds?

A virtual world is something that is not physical. Neither the mind nor a computer program is physical, though they both utilize the physical “hardware” to “run on”.

Thats because the idea of a personal being immerging “ultimately” out of impersonal objects; makes no rational sense.

It sure does. First the dividing line between “living” and “non-living” comes from an arbitrary decision. Generally speaking we talk about “life” when an entity changes, grows, reproduces, shows some form of “thinking”, etc… in other words, when it exhibits complex behavior. Some scientists consider viruses “alive”, others do not. It is simply a matter of taste.

For the rest of your post, I would like to remind you of the concept of emerging attributes, which cannot be explained solely by the underlying physical layer, but whose explanation is nevertheless natural.

It is also a well known truth that mere quantitative changes can bring forth a qualitative change. As a very rudimentary example, observe that accumulating identical uranium atoms (quantitative change) will result in an explosion (qualitative change) when the critical mass is reached.

So if you wish to criticize the naturaistic view, you have to bring forth more convincing arguments.

If a human person is reduced to impersonal forces and chemical reactions, then there can be no freewill. But if a human being has a personal immaterial soul which is transcendent and dominant over its object; then one can see the potential for free-will; for a person can command his body, because an immaterial entity has no “physical part” that can be “naturally caused”, and therefore is potentially free from Natural Laws.

Please give me a constructive definition of “free will”, something that can be measured and evaluated.

 

[crowonsnow]

A virtual world is something that is not physical. Neither the mind nor a computer program is physical, though they both utilize the physical “hardware” to “run on”.

As in the OP, isn’t this just semantics, in effect attempting to differentiate speed from a speeding object?

How is a virtual world not a material world, except in definition only?

 

[ateista]

As in the OP, isn’t this just semantics, in effect attempting to differentiate speed from a speeding object?

How is a virtual world not a material world, except in definition only?

A material world (the hardware of a computer) is constrained by and reducible to the laws of nature, governing the electronical pulses.

A virtual world (the program running on the computer) is free from these limitations. Its working is limited by the axioms defined by the programmer.

Example: In the pysical world we have an absolute limitaton for speed, the speed of light. There is no teleportation. Time flows in one direction only. In a virtual world these limitations simply do not exist.

Another example could be a book and its story. Its hardware (the letters and symbols on the paper) is constrained by rules of grammar. The story, however is a virtual world, its “working” is only limited by the author’s decision.

Now, the physical world exists in and by itself, whether there is someone observing it, or not. The virtual world does not exist apart from the mind of an “observer”. It does not exist in a physical manner. An operating tape player left in a forest still creates vibrations in the air, but there is no music without a listener.

 

[crowonsnow]

Now, the physical world exists in and by itself, whether there is someone observing it, or not. The virtual world does not exist apart from the mind of an “observer”. It does not exist in a physical manner.

Well, we can just call this virtual invention “virtuality.” That way we can differentiate it from reality, which we do not invent. But it seems to me a distinction without a difference. You’re asserting that non-reality can arrive from reality. Okay. So much for an assertion. As a materialist I’d insist that something that is not real cannot exist. Now what?

An operating tape player left in a forest still creates vibrations in the air, but there is no music without a listener.

Isn’t that just more semantics. Isn’t one man’s music another man’s noise?

Maybe I’m just so much of a materialist that your point is flying right past me.

 

[ateista]

Well, we can just call this virtual invention “virtuality.” That way we can differentiate it from reality, which we do not invent. But it seems to me a distinction without a difference. You’re asserting that non-reality can arrive from reality. Okay. So much for an assertion. As a materialist I’d insist that something that is not real cannot exist. Now what?

My friend, I am a materialist, empiricist, atheist heathen. The virtual reality exists as concepts, mind-states, which can be translated into brain-states - which are material. Since we have so little knowledge about the working of the brain, I am trying to establish that the non-physical existence of concepts does not mean anything supernatural. After all the working of a computer program does not assume the existence of a “soul” - therefore the working of the brain (the mind) does need the assumption of a soul either.

The brain is a finite cellular computer. It has a huge number (but finite) cells, which can assume a finite number of states, and which interact with each other. It can be mathematically proven that any processing that can be done in a cellular computer can also be done on a traditional, sequential computer (with one CPU, memory, etc… - in other words, the brain is a Turing machine). The fact that in the brain there is a distributed processing unit and distributed memory is of no theoretical consequence.

As to what you said: “As a materialist I’d insist that something that is not real cannot exist.” - I contend that there are two levels of existence: material and conceptual. Material existence we all know about, conceptual existence is what we “make of” the physical reality. It may represent the reality correctly, and it may not (like a mirage that is misinterpreted to be a lake in the distance). Theists assert a third type of existence, neither physical, nor conceptual - and they call it “god”. I am arguing against this third type of existence.

Isn’t that just more semantics. Isn’t one man’s music another man’s noise?

That is not the point. Music is information. Information is only perceived by an intellect, which is able to understand it. However, the physical characteristics, which make the information possible are objectively existent.

Maybe I’m just so much of a materialist that your point is flying right past me.

What I said above might help. At least I hope so. If you have other questions, please let me know. I will be happy to answer them.

 

[crowonsnow]

What I said above might help. At least I hope so. If you have other questions, please let me know. I will be happy to answer them.

You’re a sweetheart. Thanks.

 

[crowonsnow]

ateista:

I contend that there are two levels of existence: material and conceptual. Material existence we all know about, conceptual existence is what we “make of” the physical reality. It may represent the reality correctly, and it may not (like a mirage that is misinterpreted to be a lake in the distance). Theists assert a third type of existence, neither physical, nor conceptual - and they call it “god”. I am arguing against this third type of existence.

Thanks for that clarification. That’s where you were confusing me. See, these exchanges can be quite productive!

As for conceptual reality, I personally cut it a bit finer, insisting that conceptual reality isn’t reality, but just more semantics, because there is ultimately a physical basis for all these human concepts. To not appreciate those physical conceptual beginnings causes great confusion in humans imho.

 

[ateista]

Thanks for that clarification. That’s where you were confusing me. See, these exchanges can be quite productive!

They sure can. I have learned a lot through these conversations. When I see a different view, it makes me rethink my own, which would never happen if I did not participate in these conversations.

As for conceptual reality, I personally cut it a bit finer, insisting that conceptual reality isn’t reality, but just more semantics, because there is ultimately a physical basis for all these human concepts.

It could be semantics. And definitely there is a physical basis for all of our concepts. The concepts may not reflect reality correctly, but they originated in reality (like the mirage).

I like the distinction of physical reality and the abstractions of this reality. The abstractions are definitely not physical (in the sense that they cannot be “touched”) but very useful in making predictions of reality, specifically in science.

To not appreciate those physical conceptual beginnings causes great confusion in humans imho.

Oh, yes.