Can a Catholic not believe in qualia

  • Thread starter Thread starter wittgenstein
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
W

wittgenstein

Guest
Qualia are defined as subjective experiences. What pain feels like or what anything (love,hate, sour,sweet,red,green…) feels like.
 
Can you define “not believe”? Do you mean disagreeing about the nature of pain, for example? Or are you suggesting that a Catholic is free to believe that others don’t experience pain?
 
If a Catholic believes something that she is not allowed to, what is the consequence?
 
Can a Catholic believe that pain does not hurt (feel like something) and still be a Catholic?
What would happen in hell if pain did not hurt?
Seriously, many materialistic philosophers do not believe in qualia!!!
 
Can a Catholic believe that pain does not hurt (feel like something) and still be a Catholic?
What would happen in hell if pain did not hurt?
Seriously, many materialistic philosophers do not believe in qualia!!!
Well, it would appear that would involve denying the suffering of Christ. Which would make it difficult to hold to the central tenets of Catholicism.
 
Can a Catholic believe that pain does not hurt (feel like something) and still be a Catholic?
What would happen in hell if pain did not hurt?
Seriously, many materialistic philosophers do not believe in qualia!!!
Materialistic philosophers also don’t tend to believe in the soul, which would make their philosophies pretty irrelevant to someone who does believe in immaterial realities.

As for the question, pain is pain, regardless of how you experience it. Pain is a word used to describe a specific type of unpleasant experience. Even if how we experienced pain differed, it would still be unpleasant to the person, otherwise they wouldn’t call it pain. So in that sense, you cannot rationally believe that pain doesn’t hurt. If it doesn’t hurt, it isn’t pain, it’s some other sensory experience. Since you cannot rationally believe in pain that doesn’t hurt, and since as Catholics we believe that God is rational and that he promotes rationality; then no, I’d argue that you cannot be a logically-consistent Catholic while believing that pain doesn’t hurt.
 
Pax Christi.

Of course there is pain. Of course there are subjective experiences. Of course we should pray for materialists.

God bless.
 
Can a Catholic believe that pain does not hurt (feel like something) and still be a Catholic?
What would happen in hell if pain did not hurt?
Seriously, many materialistic philosophers do not believe in qualia!!!
If we could bring an end to all suffering in the world simply by not believing in qualia then that would be magic.

But I think materialist philosophers don’t deny there is suffering, and they experience toothache just like everyone else. They just believe that the pain of toothache can be explained in terms of neurological processes alone.

The other main position is dualism, the belief that toothache exists separately from the physical. Descartes, for instance, believed the mind is an immaterial substance.

I think 99.999999% of the world’s Catholics neither know nor care about such philosophical speculations, and it’s not something St Peter will ask them about at the pearly gates. 🙂
 
Hmm… could’ve sworn I responded to this, but I don’t see it here…
Can a Catholic believe that pain does not hurt (feel like something) and still be a Catholic?
Your questions need a whole lot of fleshing out (as others have also mentioned).

What does “believe that pain does not hurt” mean? That one does not have a subjective experience? That one’s body has some deficiency, such that the nerve endings do not pick up what the body encounters? Or, that having picked up the encounter, the nerves are unable to transmit the message to the brain? Or, perhaps, that the brain does not receive the message? Or that, having received the message, the brain does not react to it in ways that we might expect?

There’s lots to be defined here. Perhaps you might be a bit more specific?
What would happen in hell if pain did not hurt?
Lots of questions here, too. Are you talking about physical pain? Or, perhaps, mental anguish? Or, are you making a distinction between the ability of a (imperfect) human body to feel pain… and asking whether a glorified eternal body would likewise have these deficiencies?
Seriously, many materialistic philosophers do not believe in qualia!!!
True. But, since they’re materialists, they wouldn’t be making assertions about heaven and hell, now, would they? 😉
 
“If pain did not hurt”? What is that supposed to mean?

The real Wittgenstein would have been more careful in his use of language.
Actually, an eliminative materialist has to say (if he is consistent) that pain does not hurt. (which shows how silly their position is *) They believe that pain is and only is C fibers firing.
Witt believed in precise definitions and not the semantics played by eliminative materialists.
It is precise to say that eliminative materialists believe that pain does not hurt.
 
Eliminative materialists do not believe in any kind of pain, physical (like what it feels like when you stub your toe ) and mental anguish.
Yes, a materialist cannot believe in hell because he believes that pain does not exist. He plays word games. He will say that he believes in pain. He just defines it as c fibers firing and not a sensation.
Seriously, that is how absurd their position is!!! And many of them are highly educated (Dennett, the Churchlands etc)!!!
 
Actually, an eliminative materialist has to say (if he is consistent) that pain does not hurt. (which shows how silly their position is *) They believe that pain is and only is C fibers firing.
Witt believed in precise definitions and not the semantics played by eliminative materialists.
It is precise to say that eliminative materialists believe that pain does not hurt.
Nope. Eliminative materialism does not say that toothache doesn’t hurt, that would be silly indeed. Whenever you think a belief is silly, it’s worth checking to see whether you misunderstand the belief. It this case, you misunderstand the belief.

All materialists believe that the mind can be explained by neurological processes alone. Some say that the way we currently categorize mental states is fine, and won’t be found wrong as we learn more. Others, the elimativists, believe that our current understanding is so vague and folksy that our categories will be found wanting and eliminated in future.

As an analogy, all materialists eliminate demonic possession. Which doesn’t mean they pretend there is no mental illness, but rather that they believe demonic possession is a failed and discredited theory for explaining mental disorders.
 
The treatment of qualia here is reductionist. Qualia are more than “subjective experiences”. I’m at loss to understand what qualia could possibly have to do, or not, with Catholicism.
 
Nope. Eliminative materialism does not say that toothache doesn’t hurt, that would be silly indeed. Whenever you think a belief is silly, it’s worth checking to see whether you misunderstand the belief. It this case, you misunderstand the belief.

All materialists believe that the mind can be explained by neurological processes alone. Some say that the way we currently categorize mental states is fine, and won’t be found wrong as we learn more. Others, the elimativists, believe that our current understanding is so vague and folksy that our categories will be found wanting and eliminated in future.

As an analogy, all materialists eliminate demonic possession. Which doesn’t mean they pretend there is no mental illness, but rather that they believe demonic possession is a failed and discredited theory for explaining mental disorders.
Actually, an eliminative materialist must say (if he is consistent) that pain does not hurt. He believes that pain is and only is c fibers firing. See the beginning of Dennett’s “Quining qualia”, it is on the Internet.
 
The treatment of qualia here is reductionist. Qualia are more than “subjective experiences”. I’m at loss to understand what qualia could possibly have to do, or not, with Catholicism.
Qualia are subjective experiences. My position is that Catholicism is impossible without personal experience.
 
Eliminative materialists do not believe in qualia. Qualia is defined as subjective experiences. In other words since there is a difference between my knowing that you are in pain and your experience of that pain,your experience is private. Materialists reject private experience.
My seminar paper at university took on Dennett’s “quining qualia”. The profs agreed that Dennett denies that consciousness exists.That his book “Consciousness explained” would be better titled “consciousness denied”. (See Searle, Chalmers)
Dennett is disingenuous. He knows that denying the existence of pain is silly. He therefore redefines pain as “c-fibers” firing. He then says that he believes in pain because he believes that c fibers fire. That is like an atheist claiming that he believes in God because he redefines “God” as the ocean and he believes that the ocean exists.
 
Eliminative materialists do not believe in any kind of pain, physical (like what it feels like when you stub your toe ) and mental anguish.
Yes, a materialist cannot believe in hell because he believes that pain does not exist. He plays word games. He will say that he believes in pain. He just defines it as c fibers firing and not a sensation.
Seriously, that is how absurd their position is!!! And many of them are highly educated (Dennett, the Churchlands etc)!!!
I think pain moves us towards God. Whether it is physical , psychological or whatever- it hurts! We turn to God for relief: " Please Help me God, I cannot transcend this without You."
 
Actually, an eliminative materialist must say (if he is consistent) that pain does not hurt. He believes that pain is and only is c fibers firing. See the beginning of Dennett’s “Quining qualia”, it is on the Internet.
You and he mean different things by the word qualia. You’ve defined it exceptionally broadly as subjective experiences. This SEP article (by Michael Tye, “one of the world’s leading philosophers of mind”) defines it more narrowly as the something it is like for a subject to undergo subjective experiences. Tye writes that Dennett defines it even more narrowly (see 1(4) in the article) and that other philosophers of the mind use yet more definitions.

So I think you’ve ended up believing Dennett denies even the subjective experience itself, even though he never said pain doesn’t hurt, because he means something much more restricted than you. The vast majority of people, of course, don’t even know the word qualia, let alone which definition we’re supposed to use.

btw You might be interested in watching the following. Sheila Nirenberg is trying to help the blind see using a prosthetic device. It’s an amazing piece of work. But the interesting thing here is that researchers have already proven that the only information going from the eyes into the brain is a stream of bits, so everything you “see” in your head must be created in the brain from those bits. Apparently the same is known to be the case with hearing and other senses, and the same happens in other mammals, which is partly how Nirenberg was able to decode the firing patterns.

at TEDMED - ted.com/talks/sheila_nirenberg_a_prosthetic_eye_to_treat_blindness?language=en
MacArthur video - youtube.com/watch?v=GDEbsrpnntY
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top