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Consider the example of blood-letting.
Before a belief is established as the consensus view, it may be the view of a small minority. Before it becomes the consensus view, can it be a delusion? If we could somehow know that it would become the consensus view, then would we be prohibited from calling it a “delusion”, even if we knew that it would eventually be discredited?
When he heard about Clerselier’s illness in November 1646, Descartes expressed a general scepticism about physicians and specific concerns about blood-letting. ‘I fear only that the doctors’ ignorance will cause them to make mistakes that will injure him. They were right to bleed him at the beginning … but because they are great supporters of blood-letting at Paris, I am afraid that when they notice that the blood-letting helped him they may continue with the same therapy and that will greatly weaken the brain without improving his bodily health.’ Descartes to Mersenne, 23 November 1646 (iv. 565).
If the only information provided to you about the physician treating Clerselier was that the physician had a “delusional belief” in the positive value of blood-letting, then would you consider yourself to have been misled if you later discovered that the belief was the consensus view among physicians at the time?Pages 476 to 477, Note 10
Descartes: A Biography
By Desmond M. Clarke
Before a belief is established as the consensus view, it may be the view of a small minority. Before it becomes the consensus view, can it be a delusion? If we could somehow know that it would become the consensus view, then would we be prohibited from calling it a “delusion”, even if we knew that it would eventually be discredited?