S
Sagefrakrobatik
Guest
My friend said that it meant things we know with out having any expirence of it. Its suppose to run contrary to empiricism. 
You are using an out of date browser. It may not display this or other websites correctly.
You should upgrade or use an alternative browser.
You should upgrade or use an alternative browser.
- Status
- Not open for further replies.
F
FrankSchnabel
Guest
Hi Sage,
Sure. There are some things we can know without empirical data. That this must be so is shown by the inherent contradiction in empiricism itself. Empiricism says that no statement is to be believed without empirical support. What is the empirical support for that belief?
So it must be true that some priori statements are true and are to believed apart from experience and observation. Such statements are of necessity highly abstract and general (i.e. metaphysical).
Sure. There are some things we can know without empirical data. That this must be so is shown by the inherent contradiction in empiricism itself. Empiricism says that no statement is to be believed without empirical support. What is the empirical support for that belief?
So it must be true that some priori statements are true and are to believed apart from experience and observation. Such statements are of necessity highly abstract and general (i.e. metaphysical).
S
Sagefrakrobatik
Guest
Can you provide an example of something we may know Apriori but not empirically?
A
aquinothomas
Guest
No, I don’t believe that we know anything “a priori”, although we have intellectual powers “a priori” which enable us to know everything that we do know. What we know, we know via sense and the operation or our intellect based on sense powers. Contrary to the empiricists, though, we can know “universals” through our intellectual power of abstraction. The view I’m giving is what I think is called “moderate realism”.
E
East_and_West
Guest
Haha. I was just reading about moderate realism today. It also includes the idea that there are both such things as universals and individuals.No, I don’t believe that we know anything “a priori”, although we have intellectual powers “a priori” which enable us to know everything that we do know. What we know, we know via sense and the operation or our intellect based on sense powers. Contrary to the empiricists, though, we can know “universals” through our intellectual power of abstraction. The view I’m giving is what I think is called “moderate realism”.
A
aquinothomas
Guest
Right, that’s consistent with moderate realism.Haha. I was just reading about moderate realism today. It also includes the idea that there are both such things as universals and individuals.
S
Sagefrakrobatik
Guest
Someone once told me that religion/God is known apriori.
F
FrankSchnabel
Guest
The Ontological Argument for God’s existence is the prime example of an a priori proof. God’s necessary existence is embedded in reason itself and not something that we gain from experience.
J
john_doran
Guest
all math and logic consists of a priori knowledge.
A
aquinothomas
Guest
The ontological argument would be an example of a priori knowledge of God if it were a valid argument. It seems to fail because it never escapes the realm of thought into actual existence. God is the most perfect being we can conceive, and thus if absolutely perfect must be conceived of as existing, and therefore God must be thought of as existing, but it doesn’t follow that such a being must actually exist. St. Anslem unintentionally made a jump from thinking to being…an existential jump that doesn’t follow from a purely logical argument. Descartes, Leibniz and other rationalists have used the same argument (the Cartesian argument being the most obviously fallacious IMHO). All of the concepts used in the ontological argument were gained from experience, not reason prior to experience (unless the one making the argument is either a Cartesian or a Kantian, God forbid).
A
aquinothomas
Guest
How do we know that all math and logic are a priori concepts? Is there any way to prove that we didn’t abstract those concepts from experience (for example, from the ontological category of “quantity” which is inherent in all being)?all math and logic consists of a priori knowledge.
J
john_doran
Guest
you’re confusing the epistemological category of a priori knowledge with the principle: nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu, which means “there is nothing in the understanding that was not first in the senses”.How do we know that all math and logic are a priori concepts? Is there any way to prove that we didn’t abstract those concepts from experience (for example, from the ontological category of “quantity” which is inherent in all being)?
a priori knowledge is knowledge that can be had independently of experience. for example, the pythogorean theorm cannot be disconfirmed by experience (say, by going around and measuring the sides of every right-angled triangle we find). the same goes for modus ponens, transfinite math, set theory, number theory, etc…
of course we require sense experience to be able to possess the requisite conceptual infrastructure and resources to think and speak about things like numbers and logical theorems, but the mathematical and logical*** knowledge*** we have, we have without recourse to, for example, the scientific method.
A
aquinothomas
Guest
This is the classical empiricist position, which Locke adopted and was held by the scholastics before him, contra the rationalists that advocated “a priori” knowledge.nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu
I hear what you’re saying, but what you’re giving isn’t the typical definition of a priori knowledge, which is usually defined as knowledge before experience (both chronologically and logically).a priori knowledge is knowledge that can be had independently of experience. for example, the pythogorean theorm cannot be disconfirmed by experience (say, by going around and measuring the sides of every right-angled triangle we find). the same goes for modus ponens, transfinite math, set theory, number theory, etc…
Again, I hear what you’re saying and this is right on as far as it goes (e.g. - no need for induction to prove mathematical theorems), but my understanding of “a priori” is that it is both independent of experience and logically prior to experience. This is going all the way back to Plato who taught the theory of “recollection” - the theory that states that our knowledge comes from a remembrance of pre-existence and not in any way from experience. The example he gave in the Meno was the Pythagorean theorem, I think. What I’m saying is that I don’t think we possess any knowledge that is truly and completely independent of experience.of course we require sense experience to be able to possess the requisite conceptual infrastructure and resources to think and speak about things like numbers and logical theorems, but the mathematical and logical*** knowledge*** we have, we have without recourse to, for example, the scientific method.
There are many things that we know through deductive reasoning as long as the arguments are valid (this includes pure logic and mathematics), and that deductive reasoning process is not of itself “experience”, but the ideas we use in the deductive process are derived from experience, and that seems to contradict the definition of “a priori”.
J
john_doran
Guest
the terninology of a priori as it is used in modern analytic philosophy just means knowledge of propositions that is independent of experiential confirmation of those specific propositions. for example, i know the proposition “17 is a prime number”, despite having no experiential acquintaince with the number 17, and despite my not having conducted experiments to verify the indivisibility of 17 by any other integers other than 1 and itself.I hear what you’re saying, but what you’re giving isn’t the typical definition of a priori knowledge, which is usually defined as knowledge before experience (both chronologically and logically).
i know that aleph-null is the first transfinite number without having any experince of aleph-null, and without going out and counting members of collections of objects.
***that’s ***the sense of “independent of experience” that matters, as far as i can see.
but if all you want to assert is that we don’t have innate knowledge, then fair enough: i’m not contesting that supposition.
A
aquinothomas
Guest
The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy defines “a priori” as being prior to or independent of experience, so in contemporary philosophy it could be defined either way. In the second sense, as you point out, it’s clear that we can know certain facts apart from experience.the terninology of a priori as it is used in modern analytic philosophy just means knowledge of propositions that is independent of experiential confirmation of those specific propositions. for example, i know the proposition “17 is a prime number”, despite having no experiential acquintaince with the number 17, and despite my not having conducted experiments to verify the indivisibility of 17 by any other integers other than 1 and itself. ***that’s ***the sense of “independent of experience” that matters, as far as i can see.
I was assuming a certain definition of “a priori”. But I’m also trying to make the point that even for facts such as 17 being a prime number (“prime” being a definition built on mathematical postulates), our knowledge is ultimately derived from experience. Without the ontological category of quantity, which we know from our experience of the world, we couldn’t think of the number 17 let alone its definition of being a prime number. Even prior to that, without our concept of unity (a transcendental of being), we wouldn’t know about quantity because to have more than one you need to have at least one of something. We know about unity from our experience; we weren’t born with that knowledge. Our knowledge of prime numbers (and numbers in general) is derivative of previous experience (not inductive experience - but experience of universals the knowledge of which we abstract from reality).but if all you want to assert is that we don’t have innate knowledge, then fair enough: i’m not contesting that supposition.
F
FrankSchnabel
Guest
Hi aquinotom:
I agree that Anselm goofed in his initial formulation of the argument in Proslogion I, but the modal version implied in Proslogion III stands, IMHO.The ontological argument would be an example of a priori knowledge of God if it were a valid argument. It seems to fail because it never escapes the realm of thought into actual existence. God is the most perfect being we can conceive, and thus if absolutely perfect must be conceived of as existing, and therefore God must be thought of as existing, but it doesn’t follow that such a being must actually exist. St. Anslem unintentionally made a jump from thinking to being…an existential jump that doesn’t follow from a purely logical argument. Descartes, Leibniz and other rationalists have used the same argument (the Cartesian argument being the most obviously fallacious IMHO). All of the concepts used in the ontological argument were gained from experience, not reason prior to experience (unless the one making the argument is either a Cartesian or a Kantian, God forbid).
R
ribozyme
Guest
Cogito ergo sum… we can at least be sure of our own existence.
F
freesoulhope
Guest
Yes, but what the hell are We!!!Cogito ergo sum… we can at least be sure of our own existence.
E
Evan
Guest
If you take a course on the basis of numbers, it begins with the a priori assumption that there exists the possibility that you can come up with a collection that has nothing in it. That is, there exists an empty set.I was assuming a certain definition of “a priori”. But I’m also trying to make the point that even for facts such as 17 being a prime number (“prime” being a definition built on mathematical postulates), our knowledge is ultimately derived from experience. Without the ontological category of quantity, which we know from our experience of the world, we couldn’t think of the number 17 let alone its definition of being a prime number.
Using such a set, and the rules of logic, the counting numbers, integers, real numbers, and complex numbers are built along with operations such as addition, multiplication, and exponentiation.
Prime numbers satisfy a rule in multiplication, derived from a definition of multiple additions, derived from a rule of successor numbers, formed from a rule of make a set.
So… is the assumption of the existence of an empty set, a priori? Or is a collection of nothing based on experience. Can you conceive of not having something with having experienced nothing?
V
Verbum
Guest
Hi All,
Cogito ergo sum is a fallacy. It lacks but implies a second premise Sed si cogito, sum, which is a gratuitous assumption
Modern scholasticism, typified by Jacques Maritain, puts ontology before epistemology. The foundation of our knowledge is the intuition of being, the perception of ens ut ens. No other system works. Contrary to most “modern” systems (beginning with Descartes), it is rooted in reality and leaves no room for idealism.
So the answer to the title question is: NO, we have no innate knowledge. Apologies to Wordworth and the freshness of his dream.
Verbum
Cogito ergo sum is a fallacy. It lacks but implies a second premise Sed si cogito, sum, which is a gratuitous assumption
Modern scholasticism, typified by Jacques Maritain, puts ontology before epistemology. The foundation of our knowledge is the intuition of being, the perception of ens ut ens. No other system works. Contrary to most “modern” systems (beginning with Descartes), it is rooted in reality and leaves no room for idealism.
So the answer to the title question is: NO, we have no innate knowledge. Apologies to Wordworth and the freshness of his dream.
Verbum
- Status
- Not open for further replies.