The idea behind moral distinctions in cooperation is that all sorts of immoral consequences can be foreseen from almost any action. If I sell ski masks, someone could use them to hide their face in a robbery. Is is immoral to see ski masks due to this small possibility? Where do we draw the line? Where to draw that line is what the moral theology of cooperation attempts to answer.
Material cooperation means that a good or neutral action by John is used by Bill to achieve a sinful purpose contrary to the intention of John.
Formal cooperation means that John’s actions not only can be used by Bill for a sinful purpose but the John intends that sinful purpose by Bill.
What this means is that just because a possible sinful outcome can be foreseen from someone’s action does not mean that the individual is morally responsible for that sinful action. If I own a hardware store someone could potentially buy any of the tools in that store to harm another person or cause illegal destruction to property but there is also an infinite number of legitimate purposes for these tools. Thus the selling of hardware tools is a good or neutral action wherein the store owner’s only intention is to sell for legitimate purposes. He is thus not morally responsible if someone uses those tools for a wrong intention. His cooperation is only material.
However, there are situations in which an action cannot be interpreted in any other manner other than fully intending the immoral action. Driving a car is a neutral action, driving the getaway car in a robbery is obviously a formal cooperation in the robbery. Formal cooperation means that the individual is essentially an accomplice.
In discussing material cooperation moral theologians observe that sometimes John’s actions are more essential to the commission of Bill’s immoral action than others. The more essential John’s actions become for Bill’s action the closer they approach being formal cooperation. For example, a tool that could be used to quickly unlock a car when someone didn’t have the key. Someone who sells this tool only to tow companies and businesses with a legitimate purpose for them would acting with moral responsibility and any immoral action would be so far removed from the sale that the action would be considered remote cooperation and thus morally permissible.
However, just putting them on a shelf in a store for anyone to buy would be morally irresponsible since the tool is essential for someone to commit a specific crime. Even though it is a morally neutral action and the seller has no intention of helping people to break into cars, this action could be considered too proximate of cooperation to be considered morally acceptable.
The basic principles for not being morally responsible for cooperation with an immoral action are:
- The action of the person cooperating in a immoral act must be intrinsically good or neutral
- The intention of the cooperator has to be good, not only must he not desire/intend the immoral action of the other but he also must not be seeking any other illicit intention
- There must be a legitimate and proportionate reason for the action
- All willed good intentions cannot result from the immoral action
