K
Kevin12
Guest
I have been recently looking up some articles on the Problem of Evil and have come across some of the writings of Edward Feser, who discusses the concept of “Classical” Theism, which he takes to be the view of the Fathers and Aquinas. As it relates to the Problem of Evil, Feser seems to follow Fr. Brian Davies in claiming that God is not a moral agent in any way similar to the way we are, and that to say he is good is simply to say that he is purely actual. You can read more on it here and a follow-up here. He contrasts this to what he called theistic personalism, which he says, “conceives of God essentially as a person comparable to human persons, only without the limitations we have. The idea is to begin with what we know about human beings and then to abstract away first the body, then our temporal limitations, then our epistemological and volitional confinement to knowing about and having control over only a particular point of space and time, then our moral defects, and to keep going until we arrive at the notion of a being who has power, knowledge, and goodness like ours but to an unlimited degree.” He refers to Alvin Plantagina or as a prominent example of so-called theistic personalism. According to his view, the various attempts at theodicy put forth by thinkers like Richard Swinburne or John Hick are meaningless, because God is good simply because he exists.
The first thing I am not sure of is whether or not Feser and Davies is accurately representing the Fathers and Aquinas. Indeed, I found one review of Davies book that claims Davies seems to ignore Aquinas when he contradicts him. I think it is probably true that the Fathers state that, for example, God owes us nothing, but I think that it is a big leap from there to say He is not a moral agent.
The second thing is, I am not sure of the orthodoxy of at least Davis position, because in rejecting all theodicies (i.e. theories about why a wholly good God permits exists), he seems to reject the theodicy inherent in the doctrine of Original Sin - that, according to the Catholic Encyclopedia, “suffering is the penal consequence of willful disobedience to the law of God.”
I am particularly troubled by Feser and Davies approach, because one of the criticisms I recently read levied against Christianity is that the Fathers took the vibrant, living God of the Bible and fashioned Him into a neutered Platonic ideal - that the God of the Bible and the God of the Philosophers originally had nothing to do with each other. I still don’t believe those charges, but I feel that if Davies at least is correct and “classical theism” is was the view of the Fathers, that criticism seems much more potent.
The first thing I am not sure of is whether or not Feser and Davies is accurately representing the Fathers and Aquinas. Indeed, I found one review of Davies book that claims Davies seems to ignore Aquinas when he contradicts him. I think it is probably true that the Fathers state that, for example, God owes us nothing, but I think that it is a big leap from there to say He is not a moral agent.
The second thing is, I am not sure of the orthodoxy of at least Davis position, because in rejecting all theodicies (i.e. theories about why a wholly good God permits exists), he seems to reject the theodicy inherent in the doctrine of Original Sin - that, according to the Catholic Encyclopedia, “suffering is the penal consequence of willful disobedience to the law of God.”
I am particularly troubled by Feser and Davies approach, because one of the criticisms I recently read levied against Christianity is that the Fathers took the vibrant, living God of the Bible and fashioned Him into a neutered Platonic ideal - that the God of the Bible and the God of the Philosophers originally had nothing to do with each other. I still don’t believe those charges, but I feel that if Davies at least is correct and “classical theism” is was the view of the Fathers, that criticism seems much more potent.