R
RoyNeary2001
Guest
Whether communications technology distracts from prayer?
Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica Second Part of the Second Part Question 83 Article 1, under the category of the connected virtue of religion to justice- asked Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power.
Aquinas’s premise is an article of faith from Psalm 38:13, that prayer is spoken reason. Aquinas then proceeds by saying, “Now the speculative and practical reason differ…[Speculative merely apprehends its object. The practical not only apprehends but causes] Now one thing is the cause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause; secondly, imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the cause. Accordingly, [reason has the capacity] to command not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; secondly, by lead up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now, both of these, namely, to command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that men proposes something to be effected by something else…”
Aquinas continued with his speculative apprehension of the particular instance of prayer by going through the origins of the word in Latin signifying speech or mouth, and beseeching or petition, asking of God – concluding that prayer is an act of practical reason.
Thus, the practical reason apprehends along with the power of causation. Prayer as an act of practical reason is not the cause necessitating its effect, because the effect is not subject to a power beyond its own cause. Prayer asks something to be done through an object of apprehension not subject to practical reason.
If, however, practical reason is engaged to effect what is subject to its power (ie economic activity, utilitarian activity, rhetorical persuasion, making and producing tangible goods and services), then spiritual strength and vision is diminished by secular habits of thought and practice.
Western culture is very oriented to functional tasks of production and communication of information. Prayer is weakened by the exercise of practical reason only for secular pursuits. Even when prayer is exercised it becomes an act of commanding rather than petitioning. Texting, email and cell phone use has become an inversion of prayer among equals asking something to be done.
Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica Second Part of the Second Part Question 83 Article 1, under the category of the connected virtue of religion to justice- asked Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power.
Aquinas’s premise is an article of faith from Psalm 38:13, that prayer is spoken reason. Aquinas then proceeds by saying, “Now the speculative and practical reason differ…[Speculative merely apprehends its object. The practical not only apprehends but causes] Now one thing is the cause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause; secondly, imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the cause. Accordingly, [reason has the capacity] to command not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; secondly, by lead up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now, both of these, namely, to command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that men proposes something to be effected by something else…”
Aquinas continued with his speculative apprehension of the particular instance of prayer by going through the origins of the word in Latin signifying speech or mouth, and beseeching or petition, asking of God – concluding that prayer is an act of practical reason.
Thus, the practical reason apprehends along with the power of causation. Prayer as an act of practical reason is not the cause necessitating its effect, because the effect is not subject to a power beyond its own cause. Prayer asks something to be done through an object of apprehension not subject to practical reason.
If, however, practical reason is engaged to effect what is subject to its power (ie economic activity, utilitarian activity, rhetorical persuasion, making and producing tangible goods and services), then spiritual strength and vision is diminished by secular habits of thought and practice.
Western culture is very oriented to functional tasks of production and communication of information. Prayer is weakened by the exercise of practical reason only for secular pursuits. Even when prayer is exercised it becomes an act of commanding rather than petitioning. Texting, email and cell phone use has become an inversion of prayer among equals asking something to be done.