Consciousness and matter

[STT]

An hallucination isn’t an indication of consciousness; rather, an hallucination is a false visual perception. Therefore, deep brain stimulation shows the interface between sense organ and brain, not brain and consciousness.

An hallucination is a conscious mode. The very fact that we can make a person to have an hallucination by changing physical process indicates that consciousness is a physical state. Physical process defines state of matter.

Science is about proof, not correlation. Perhaps you’re using ‘correlation’ in a rather casual sense?

No. We only observe a correlation in motion of things and then suggest a theory in which it describe the motion. There is no proof here.

That’s why your claims are rather weak. If you’re going to make an assertion, you need proof, not mere correlation.

We know that the reality is about correlation between things. We don’t need to prove that.

Hearing – that is, a physical process – does not cause ‘happiness’.

So you deny that the cause when you lough at a joke is due to hearing the joke?

Again: ‘happiness’ (that is, an emotion, which does not have physical extension) does not cause facial muscle contraction (or any other physical manifestation).

It does. Do you want me to prove that too.

Then you’re not a very good scientist (or philosopher). In these disciplines, a mere correlation does not suffice to prove assertions.

Finding a correlation between two phenomena is huge step toward to understanding of the truth. Formulating a theory which it can describe the correlation is another step. A theory is however not a proof.

You keep making this claim, without giving proof. We’ve been through this before. Bald assertion just doesn’t suffice to justify truth propositions.

Could we agree on this?: Any physical process give rises to a state of matter.

How does one measure this state, then?

There is a set of order parameters when matter is in a specific state. We don’t know yet that what are those order parameters in the case of consciousness otherwise we could measure consciousness.

So, are you saying it’s not measurable? Are you saying it’s subjective?

You could of course measure how conscious is a person if you know what are the order parameters. Needless to say that we can know about the mode of consciousness that a person undergoes by scanning his brain, mode of deep sleep for example. But you cannot know what the subjective experience really are, for example we cannot know how a bat feels.

Well, if you cannot demonstrate or prove your claim, then it’s just your opinion. I’m cool with you having opinions; the thing is, you can’t assert them as truth unless you can substantiate them, nor can you expect us to concur with them.

As I mentioned showing the correlation is a big step in understanding the reality.

I could measure the motion of the balls prior to the moment of impact, at the moment of impact, and following the moment of impact. I could use these measurements to demonstrate that energy has been conserved. I could demonstrate that the velocities and directions of the balls follow from the way the impact occurs. In short, yes: I could demonstrate that the motion of the cue ball and the subsequent motions of the balls follow from the impact. That is, I could demonstrate the cause and effect.

You are just giving a theory which describe the correlation. You are not proving anything.

No. You just said (above), that you cannot demonstrate that brain processes cause internal awareness; in other words, that means that you cannot measure brain activity and infer consciousness.

That is not correct. We know that there exist a correlation between a certain activity in a part of brain and seeing red. Measuring consciousness as I mentioned before requires the knowledge of order parameters.

Wait – you read this Wiki page and didn’t find anything that helped you understand the various types of monism? Not even these quotes?

Yes. Nothing interesting regarded what we are discussing, consciousness.

See the descriptions above. It looks like you’re talking about “substance monism”.

Thanks.

 

[STT]

Physical processes is any kind of physical activity. Physical causal chains is physical activity or physical processes. Why would you think otherwise?

Because we are in some occasion, when we need to decide, aware of options which each related to a chain of causality yet options are the result of single physical process. Therefore physical process is generally different from chain of causality.

A physical process is the activity of physical objects.

Yes.

According to you it is the processes in the brain that give rise to self consciousness and without that activity consciousness will cease. I don’t deny that we need a brain in order to be conscious of physical reality, but i do think that it is unreasonable to reduce the nature of consciousness to physical processes alone.

What else?

You say that self consciousness is just self-aware matter and nothing more. You haven’t proven that to be the case. You are just asserting this idea based on a correlation between consciousness and the physical processes in the brain. But nobody is denying there is a relationship between the brain and consciousness. We are denying that the two are identical in nature.

Consciousness has no nature. It is mere state.

Let me ask you then, do physical processes choose those options or does a self aware being make those choices? If self conscious choices are reduced to physical activity in the brain how can there be a real choice when there is no distinction between the two? All outputs of the brain would be determined by physical processes in the brain and nothing more.

Physical process leads to conscious mode, realization of options. Decision is either the result of physical process, subconscious decision, or the property of electromagnetic field, conscious decision. That is the best of my understanding. I am open to discuss them and know your opinion about subject matter too.

 

[STT]

David Chalmers’s view is a type of property dualism but he calls it naturalistic dualism. Like me, he views the mind as being nonphysical but still dependent on the brain. In a paper entitled, [Weak and Strong Emergence](Strong and Weak Emergence ), he talks about consciousness being an emergent property and gets into downward causation towards the end. So the mind dependence and emergence from the brain I assume is what forms the “natural” basis as opposed to any supernatural involvement.

I adopt many of his views but I also went the extra mile to find scientific evidence to back it up, and this is evidence which I assume CHalmers did not know about when he was writing his book and papers on consciousness.

How could we go under unconscious mode, when are asleep deeply or are under anesthesia, if property dualism is correct?

 

[AgnosticBoy]

How could we go under unconscious mode, when are asleep deeply or are under anesthesia, if property dualism is correct?

I assume you’re asking about how or why **physical **substances (brain and anesthetics) affect a nonphysical mind. Under property dualism, the mind is nonphysical but this type of dualism differs from substance dualism in that the nonphysical mind is derived from and depends on the brain. One big problem remaining is the interaction problem between the physical and nonphysical but that is not necessarily a disproof but rather it’s something to be solved, and it’s one that a materialists must deal with as well until they can provide evidence that the mind is entirely physical.

I also question the validity of your point regarding anesthesia. There is some uncertainty as to how consciousness arises in the brain so naturally there would be uncertainty as to how to dampen it completely in a living person whether we use anesthetics or other means. It also doesn’t help that people do report having some awareness during anesthesia, about 1%, but then the percentage is even more when we factor in reports of people dreaming. Dreams count as experience, as well, so people under anesthesia may not be as unconscious as scientists have assume. People may just not remember their experiences.

Here’s one study:
Dreaming during anesthesia and anesthetic depth in elective surgery patients: a prospective cohort study.

Dreaming reported after anesthesia remains a poorly understood phenomenon. Dreaming may be related to light anesthesia and represent near-miss awareness. However, few studies have assessed the relation between dreaming and depth of anesthesia, and their results were inconclusive. Therefore, the authors tested the hypothesis that dreaming during anesthesia is associated with light anesthesia, as evidenced by higher Bispectral Index values during maintenance of anesthesia

Results:
Dreaming was reported by 22% of patients on emergence.

Dreaming during anesthesia is unrelated to the depth of anesthesia in almost all cases.

Now, I take 22% to just represent people who REMEMBERed their dreams during anesthesia. I’m wiling to bet that the number would’ve been much higher if it were not for the amnesic effects of anesthesia.

Here’s a good perspective from experts:
Consciousness and Anesthesia

The anesthetized patient: Unconscious or unresponsive?

Clinically, at low-sedative doses anesthetics cause a state similar to drunkenness, with analgesia, amnesia, distorted time perception, depersonalization, and increased sleepiness. At slightly higher doses, a patient fails to move in response to a command and is considered unconscious. This behavioral definition of unconsciousness, which was introduced with anesthesia over 160 years ago, while convenient,** has drawbacks**. For instance, unresponsiveness can occur without unconsciousness. When we dream, we have vivid conscious experiences, but are unresponsive because inhibition by the brainstem induces muscle paralysis (13).

At doses near the unconsciousness threshold, some anesthetics block working memory (20). Thus, patients may fail to respond because they immediately forget what to do. At much lower doses, anesthetics cause profound amnesia

 

[STT]

I assume you’re asking about how or why **physical **substances (brain and anesthetics) affect a nonphysical mind.

No, I am asking how could you possibly undergo unconscious mode if consciousness is a property of matter? You should be always conscious.

Under property dualism, the mind is nonphysical but this type of dualism differs from substance dualism in that the nonphysical mind is derived from and depends on the brain.

That I agree.

One big problem remaining is the interaction problem between the physical and nonphysical but that is not necessarily a disproof but rather it’s something to be solved, and it’s one that a materialists must deal with as well until they can provide evidence that the mind is entirely physical.

Matter is either conscious or consciousness is a state resulting from motion of matter. We know that we could undergo unconscious state therefore the first case is irrelevant unless one claims that we are always minimally conscious, when we are in deep sleep for example. You don’t have interaction problem under materialism. The problem in materialism is over-determination. That I can show that is not a problem.

I also question the validity of your point regarding anesthesia. There is some uncertainty as to how consciousness arises in the brain so naturally there would be uncertainty as to how to dampen it completely in a living person whether we use anesthetics or other means. It also doesn’t help that people do report having some awareness during anesthesia, about 1%, but then the percentage is even more when we factor in reports of people dreaming. Dreams count as experience, as well, so people under anesthesia may not be as unconscious as scientists have assume. People may just not remember their experiences.

Here’s one study:
Dreaming during anesthesia and anesthetic depth in elective surgery patients: a prospective cohort study.

Now, I take 22% to just represent people who REMEMBERed their dreams during anesthesia. I’m wiling to bet that the number would’ve been much higher if it were not for the amnesic effects of anesthesia.

Here’s a good perspective from experts:
Consciousness and Anesthesia

What I am asking is not whether you could be completely unconscious under anesthesia or not. What I am asking is that how unconscious state is possible under property dualism.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Ok, I try my best. Unfortunately I am thinking as the discussion evolves. That is why there is a gap in my response.

So lets put facts together. (1) There exist matter and (2) Consciousness is a mode of matter and (3) Matter has motion. Where consciousness could come from?

Thank you STT! I would like to focus on this part of your answer and later, if it is still necessary, I will consider the other relevant parts. One thing is clear to me: there exists what is called “consciousness” (the “I”) and the object, or objects, of “consciousness” (the “no-I”). I can agree with you that some on those objects of “consciousness” are what is called “material objects”. Then, it seems to me that your intent, together with materialist monists, is to reduce “consciousness” to material objects. There has been also, on the side of those called “idealist monists” the intent of reducing the objects of “consciousness” to a content of “consciousness”. An the third possibility, which also has it representatives among the philosophers, is that “consciousness” and its objects are irreducible to each other. I am in favor of this third position.

What I understand you offer in support of your materialism is that when you affect the brain by means of matter (a chemical substance such like a drug) you alter the mode of consciousness (which of course even the dualist Descartes acknowledged as true). And from this you believe you are logically authorized to conclude that “consciousness” is not essentially different from matter: You affirm that “Consciousness is a form of matter”. What I say is that your argument is not logically valid: from the premises a) Drugs affect the functioning of the brain, and b) Drugs affect the mode of consciousness; you cannot conclude (but only hypothesize) that consciousness is the brain or an aspect of brain.

It is true that if you affect the brain puting a drug in it, you affect the mode of consciousness; and it is also true that if you artificially affect your senses (like when you exercise a little pressure on your eyes with your fingers) you also affect your mode of consciousness. Same thing if you put a deformed glass between you and the objects you are observing. And it also happens when another agent modifies the scene in front of you. All of these are causal chains in which your brain is affected at some point, only that the last I have mentioned is the longest chain. But which logical equivalence or elemental inference rule would allow us to go from your valid premises to your conclusion? (Your assertion that if something is affected by a physical process, then it is a material entity or aspect of a material entity is not an elemental inference rule, but a materialist dogma).

 

[STT]

Thank you STT! I would like to focus on this part of your answer and later, if it is still necessary, I will consider the other relevant parts. One thing is clear to me: there exists what is called “consciousness” (the “I”) and the object, or objects, of “consciousness” (the “no-I”). I can agree with you that some on those objects of “consciousness” are what is called “material objects”. Then, it seems to me that your intent, together with materialist monists, is to reduce “consciousness” to material objects. There has been also, on the side of those called “idealist monists” the intent of reducing the objects of “consciousness” to a content of “consciousness”. An the third possibility, which also has it representatives among the philosophers, is that “consciousness” and its objects are irreducible to each other. I am in favor of this third position.

There exists a place for sense of self in brain. Putting all facts together I am convinced that materialist monists is correct. I have difficulty to imagine how different consciousnesses can share such a reality. Isn’t your position dualist?

What I understand you offer in support of your materialism is that when you affect the brain by means of matter (a chemical substance such like a drug) you alter the mode of consciousness (which of course even the dualist Descartes acknowledged as true). And from this you believe you are logically authorized to conclude that “consciousness” is not essentially different from matter: You affirm that “Consciousness is a form of matter”. What I say is that your argument is not logically valid: from the premises a) Drugs affect the functioning of the brain, and b) Drugs affect the mode of consciousness; you cannot conclude (but only hypothesize) that consciousness is the brain or an aspect of brain.

You cannot explain anesthesia under Cartesian dualism since soul is always conscious, consciousness is soul’s essence.

It is true that if you affect the brain puting a drug in it, you affect the mode of consciousness; and it is also true that if you artificially affect your senses (like when you exercise a little pressure on your eyes with your fingers) you also affect your mode of consciousness. Same thing if you put a deformed glass between you and the objects you are observing. And it also happens when another agent modifies the scene in front of you. All of these are causal chains in which your brain is affected at some point, only that the last I have mentioned is the longest chain. But which logical equivalence or elemental inference rule would allow us to go from your valid premises to your conclusion? (Your assertion that if something is affected by a physical process, then it is a material entity or aspect of a material entity is not an elemental inference rule, but a materialist dogma).

How consciousness could be more than a brain state when you can switch it off, anesthesia? It doesn’t have any essence.

 

[IWantGod]

You cannot explain anesthesia under Cartesian dualism since soul is always conscious, consciousness is soul’s essence.

Being awake and aware of ones physical surroundings is not what one is referring to when they describe the quality of being self-ware or having subjectivity. Of course one has to be awake in-order to be aware of objective reality. Of course the brain is responsible for whether we are aware or not, but that does not mean that it is responsible for the quality we describe as self-awareness or subjectivity.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

There exists a place for sense of self in brain. Putting all facts together I am convinced that materialist monists is correct. I have difficulty to imagine how different consciousnesses can share such a reality. Isn’t your position dualist?

You cannot explain anesthesia under Cartesian dualism since soul is always conscious, consciousness is soul’s essence.

How consciousness could be more than a brain state when you can switch it off, anesthesia? It doesn’t have any essence.

If I am injured in the eyes and they are destroyed, I will be unable to interact with the surrounding objects as I used to do: I won’t see colors nor shapes. If my hearing system is injured, something similar will happen. My interaction capabilities will be reduced as my body is affected in that way. If I suffer brain damage such interaction capabilities will be reduced in a similar manner, even if my sense organs remain intact. My being as a system will be damaged, and my interaction modes together with my conscious modes will be impoverished. Total anesthesia will switch my consciousness off, as you say. All this is true. Nevertheless, it does not authorize me from a logical standpoint to conclude that my consciousness is an state of my brain.

But what am I saying? If materialist monism is true, what would logic be? It would be no more than a subset of possible brain states, and the claims of its normativity would just be another subset of possible brain states. Your materialist position and my spiritualist position would be no more than that either. The realm of relations would be indistinguishable from the realm of interactions. Do you think that relations are reducible to interactions, STT?

 

[AgnosticBoy]

No, I am asking how could you possibly undergo unconscious mode if consciousness is a property of matter? You should be always conscious.

Not quite. Your view on consciousness is too broad. Consciousness is an emergent property under my view. This means that it is not an inherent property but rather it is one that develops or arises at higher levels of structure/function of the brain. Perhaps there may be more than one forms of property dualism but if the label is a problem then I’m more than happy to call my position emergent dualism.

Matter is either conscious or consciousness is a state resulting from motion of matter. We know that we could undergo unconscious state therefore the first case is irrelevant unless one claims that we are always minimally conscious, when we are in deep sleep for example. You don’t have interaction problem under materialism. The problem in materialism is over-determination. That I can show that is not a problem.

In my view, consciousness itself is not entirely physical. It’s connected to the physical in terms of its cause but not in terms of its effects (e.g. mental imagery, etc.).

You cannot explain anesthesia under Cartesian dualism since soul is always conscious, consciousness is soul’s essence.

Factor in my points from scientific studies and perspectives regarding how anesthesia does not necessarily take away consciousness if you consider people that dream during anesthesia. Sure, most are not conscious of the environment (via sensory stimuli) but consciousness also involves awareness of the contents of the mind, as well, whether it be thoughts, memories, dreams, etc.

 

[STT]

If I am injured in the eyes and they are destroyed, I will be unable to interact with the surrounding objects as I used to do: I won’t see colors nor shapes. If my hearing system is injured, something similar will happen. My interaction capabilities will be reduced as my body is affected in that way. If I suffer brain damage such interaction capabilities will be reduced in a similar manner, even if my sense organs remain intact. My being as a system will be damaged, and my interaction modes together with my conscious modes will be impoverished. Total anesthesia will switch my consciousness off, as you say. All this is true. Nevertheless, it does not authorize me from a logical standpoint to conclude that my consciousness is an state of my brain.

I see.

But what am I saying? If materialist monism is true, what would logic be? It would be no more than a subset of possible brain states, and the claims of its normativity would just be another subset of possible brain states. Your materialist position and my spiritualist position would be no more than that either. The realm of relations would be indistinguishable from the realm of interactions. Do you think that relations are reducible to interactions, STT?

Could you give an example of something which plays the role of relation but it is not interaction?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I see.

Could you give an example of something which plays the role of relation but it is not interaction?

Of course! Any relation will do. Here you have a de Morgan’s law:

~(a • b) = ~a v ~b

 

[Gorgias]

An hallucination is a conscious mode. The very fact that we can make a person to have an hallucination by changing physical process indicates that consciousness is a physical state.

Your claim was that hallucinations prove that consciousness is caused by physical states. If consciousness pre-exists a hallucination, then hallucinations cannot prove consciousness. That they occur within the context of a conscious state is a reasonable claim, but that doesn’t prove anything about consciousness.

Physical process defines state of matter.

So, hallucinations are a physical process. Fair enough. But, since hallucinations are experienced by a pre-existing conscious state, your example fails to hold.

No. We only observe a correlation in motion of things and then suggest a theory in which it describe the motion. There is no proof here.

However, your theory must be based on something, and not just be an assertion. We’ve seen that the basis of your theory is “well, I’m a monist, so this is the way it must be.” As a ‘scientific theory’, that just doesn’t work.

We know that the reality is about correlation between things. We don’t need to prove that.

If by ‘reality’ you mean the universe, then its existence isn’t about “correlation between things.”

So you deny that the cause when you lough at a joke is due to hearing the joke?

There’s a chain of events: you are conscious; you think of a remark that is humorous to you; you engage your mouth to tell the joke; sound waves propagate in the air; my ear picks up the sound waves; my auditory system turns those sound waves into impulses; the impulses are sent to my brain; I interpret the impulses as sounds and recognize them as speech; I process the speech; I comprehend the meaning of the speech; I realize the humor in the remark; I cause my body to ‘laugh’.

Which of these is the cause of my laugh? Which of these proves that consciousness is merely a physical state? None of them.

It does. Do you want me to prove that too.

Yes, please. It’ll be interesting to see how you think that happiness (an emotion – that is, a non-physical state of mind) ‘causes’ a physical action (e.g., a smile)…

Finding a correlation between two phenomena is huge step toward to understanding of the truth.

Agreed. Yet, a correlation is an insufficient basis upon which to found a scientific theory. It merely asserts that some sort of relationship exists – and not that it demonstrates that one is the cause of another.

Formulating a theory which it can describe the correlation is another step. A theory is however not a proof.

Agreed. However, theories posit cause-and-effect relations, not correlation relations.

Could we agree on this?: Any physical process give rises to a state of matter.

Are you merely saying that physical processes affect physical matter and/or physical energy? Sure; that’s fair enough. However, that statement doesn’t say that only physical processes affect physical matter, or that physical processes only affect physical matter… right?

How does one measure this state, then?

There is a set of order parameters when matter is in a specific state. We don’t know yet that what are those order parameters in the case of consciousness otherwise we could measure consciousness.

In other words, you cannot measure what you claim is merely a physical state. And yet, you’re willing to assert an unsubstantiated theory based on an unmeasurable condition. You can see that you’re on pretty thin ice, can’t you? :sad_yes:

You could of course measure how conscious is a person if you know what are the order parameters.

Take a deep breath before reading this, and think carefully: you could measure “order parameters” (that is, brain activity)… but how would you assert that these “order parameters” are actually what consciousness is? I mean, you might be able to make the case that these “order parameters” are a physical representation of consciousness… but you wouldn’t have anything that proves that they are consciousness itself.

You are just giving a theory which describe the correlation. You are not proving anything.

So… you disagree that there are causal chains of events in the physical universe? Well, then, you’re gonna have an awful hard time proving that consciousness – which, as you state, gives rise to physical states in the body – actually cause these states. You can’t have it both ways.

That is not correct. We know that there exist a correlation between a certain activity in a part of brain and seeing red.

Fair enough. You can’t prove that ‘consciousness’ is ‘certain activity in a part of the brain’, though; that’s why your theory doesn’t do what you think it does.

Measuring consciousness as I mentioned before requires the knowledge of order parameters.

Right: so, you can’t even measure the effect, and yet, you think you can explain the cause. :nope:

Yes. Nothing interesting regarded what we are discussing, consciousness.

You asked about types of monism, not types of consciousness.

 

[STT]

Your claim was that hallucinations prove that consciousness is caused by physical states. If consciousness pre-exists a hallucination, then hallucinations cannot prove consciousness. That they occur within the context of a conscious state is a reasonable claim, but that doesn’t prove anything about consciousness.

Consciousness is a physical state, which comes with experience, and is the result matter activity/shape.

So, hallucinations are a physical process. Fair enough. But, since hallucinations are experienced by a pre-existing conscious state, your example fails to hold.

No, you disturb matter and get hallucination. Could we agree on that?

However, your theory must be based on something, and not just be an assertion. We’ve seen that the basis of your theory is “well, I’m a monist, so this is the way it must be.” As a ‘scientific theory’, that just doesn’t work.

No, that is not my theory. It was a theory of others which was confirmed by experiment too. We are discussing about a scientific fact.

If by ‘reality’ you mean the universe, then its existence isn’t about “correlation between things.”

By reality I mean what we are experiencing. We experience, we then make a theory, then we examine our experience again to confirm the theory.

There’s a chain of events: you are conscious; you think of a remark that is humorous to you; you engage your mouth to tell the joke; sound waves propagate in the air; my ear picks up the sound waves; my auditory system turns those sound waves into impulses; the impulses are sent to my brain; I interpret the impulses as sounds and recognize them as speech; I process the speech; I comprehend the meaning of the speech; I realize the humor in the remark; I cause my body to ‘laugh’.

Yes. That is how things work. Your facial shape only is the result of what you hear unless you intervene and fake it for example.

Which of these is the cause of my laugh? Which of these proves that consciousness is merely a physical state? None of them.

This is discussed in the previous comment.

Yes, please. It’ll be interesting to see how you think that happiness (an emotion – that is, a non-physical state of mind) ‘causes’ a physical action (e.g., a smile)…

I thought you could not prove principles otherwise they are reduced into other principles and therefore couldn’t be principle.

Agreed. Yet, a correlation is an insufficient basis upon which to found a scientific theory. It merely asserts that some sort of relationship exists – and not that it demonstrates that one is the cause of another.

We realize a correlation between theory which we make and what we experience.

Agreed. However, theories posit cause-and-effect relations, not correlation relations.

Yes, theories are about the relation between things that we experience/measure.

Are you merely saying that physical processes affect physical matter and/or physical energy? Sure; that’s fair enough. However, that statement doesn’t say that only physical processes affect physical matter, or that physical processes only affect physical matter… right?

More, I am saying that consciousness is an state like other states of matter, solidity for example.

In other words, you cannot measure what you claim is merely a physical state. And yet, you’re willing to assert an unsubstantiated theory based on an unmeasurable condition. You can see that you’re on pretty thin ice, can’t you? :sad_yes:

You don’t need to measure it to know the truth. It is something that we experience and agree on and trusted it.

Take a deep breath before reading this, and think carefully: you could measure “order parameters” (that is, brain activity)… but how would you assert that these “order parameters” are actually what consciousness is? I mean, you might be able to make the case that these “order parameters” are a physical representation of consciousness… but you wouldn’t have anything that proves that they are consciousness itself.

We know consciousness exist because we simply experience it, from first point of view. There is no need to measure it to know that is true, from third point of view.

So… you disagree that there are causal chains of events in the physical universe?

No, I agree with that. On top of that I argue that we sometimes aware of chain of causalities when it comes to personal decision and we can choose one. That is when we consciously decide. We also sometimes decide subconsciously.

 

[STT]

Well, then, you’re gonna have an awful hard time proving that consciousness – which, as you state, gives rise to physical states in the body – actually cause these states. You can’t have it both ways.

That is simply the property of physical state when it comes to decision.

Fair enough. You can’t prove that ‘consciousness’ is ‘certain activity in a part of the brain’, though; that’s why your theory doesn’t do what you think it does.

That is simply an observation. That is how science works, you observe, make theory and then examine it. Do you believe that we are communicating through a device made by scientist?

Right: so, you can’t even measure the effect, and yet, you think you can explain the cause. :nope:

You don’t need to measure it since you are on that state and can experience it directly. You can even give a measure for your feeling, I was very happy today.

You asked about types of monism, not types of consciousness.

Yes, you are correct.

 

[AgnosticBoy]

Under the materialist paradigm, I’m expected to believe that consciousness is completely physical, reducible, and completely determined, and that it does nothing in terms of causation. Am I missing anything?

However, when I look at the research and listen to experts, I find that consciousness or mind is to date irreducible to any part of the brain, it has causal powers (CBT induced neuroplasticity; CBT= mental causation), and it’s unobserved or Indirectly observed. These are among some of the reasons why I believe that the mind is nonphysical, emergent, and causally efficacious. If anyone can offer scientific peer-reviewed / replicated evidence (in other words, I don’t want just philosophy unless it can be EMPIRICALLY verified) that solves the hard problem then please post it.

 

[STT]

Under the materialist paradigm, I’m expected to believe that consciousness is completely physical, reducible, and completely determined, and that it does nothing in terms of causation. Am I missing anything?

However, when I look at the research and listen to experts, I find that consciousness or mind is to date irreducible to any part of the brain, it has causal powers (CBT induced neuroplasticity; CBT= mental causation), and it’s unobserved or Indirectly observed. These are among some of the reasons why I believe that the mind is nonphysical, emergent, and causally efficacious. If anyone can offer scientific peer-reviewed / replicated evidence (in other words, I don’t want just philosophy unless it can be EMPIRICALLY verified) that solves the hard problem then please post it.

What I am arguing is that that is also a state of matter.