Critique of Kantian epistemology

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LeonardDeNoblac

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As far as I’ve understood, Kant’s main point in the Critique of Pure Reason is that the role of our reason is to regulate our experience of things, but we can’t know if it says anything real about things in themselves. That’s why Kant considered the classical proofs of the existence of God (like the cosmological arguments and the teleological arguments ) not conclusive, and denied the possibility of proving (or disproving ) the existence of God through reason.

However, I see a fundamental problem in Kantian epistemology. In order to show it, I use the Aristotelian/Scholastic category of relation.

A relation is, by definition, an order of something to something else. It has three components: the subject (the origin of the relation ), the term (the end of the relation ) and the foundation (that wich makes the relation real ) - for example, in the relation of a father to his son, the father is the subject, the son is the term and the generation of the son by the father is the foundation.
A relation can be either a real relation (the foundation exists in reality ) or a relation of reason (the foundation exists only in the mind ). An example of a relation of reason is location: I can say that I am behind a chair, but I have no basis, outside of my mind, for saying so. I could also say, at the same time, that I am in front of the same chair, without any real contradiction.
Now, a relation can be real only if it is symmetric - that is, the subject is ordered to the term and the term is ordered to the subject. If there’s no symmetry, the relation is only one of reason, either in the subject or in the term.
The relation between us and the things we think about is a real one in us, because our action of thinking about them orders us to them, while in the things thought by us it is only one of reason, because the fact that they are thought by us doesn’t really order them to us.

In Kantian epistemology, there is a real distinction between the things in our experience (Phenomena ) and thought (Noumena ) and the things in themselves: so it is possible to have knowledge of the former, but not of the latter.
This, however, means that our knowledge of the things in themselves is a relation of reason, not only in the things themselves, but also in us. That’s because our knowledge of things doesn’t order us to them in themselves, but to them as they are in our experience and thought.
So, our knowledge relates only to itself, and nothing else really relates to it; in other words, we are absolute beings.
But this is absurd and evidently false.

Therefore, Kantian epistemology is false, and there’s no real distinction between the things in our experience (Phenomena ) and thought (Noumena ) and the things in themselves.

Do you think that’s a good argument? Perhaps there’s something that I’ve misunderstood about Kantian epistemology?
 
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LeonardDeNoblac said:
So, our knowledge relates only to itself, and nothing else really relates to it; in other words, we are absolute beings.
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I’m a bit rusty on Kant, but my recollection is that “we are absolute beings” isn’t what he was getting at, precisely. It’s more that “things in themselves” is something that we are wholly and completely unable to access; rather, we can only access the phenomena of things. That might make us isolated, to an extent, but not absolute in our individual selves.

On the other hand, his whole project seems to be that, through our experiences, we become (part of?) the Spirit (“geist”) of the universe.

I think there are many ways to critique Kant, but I’m scratching my head, attempting to conclude that he’s mistaken because he calls humans (individually) “absolute”. Maybe I’m forgetting something in his works?
 
Gorgias said:
we are absolute beings” isn’t what he was getting at, precisely
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Kant never said that. I just think that, if you logically follow his principle (the real distinction between the things in our experience/thought and the things in themselves ), you come to this conclusion, wich is absurd and evidently false - a fact that can be brought as an objection against Kantian epistemology.
Gorgias said:
On the other hand, his whole project seems to be that, through our experiences, we become (part of?) the Spirit (“geist”) of the universe
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This seems more Hegelian to me.
 
There’s a Hegelian I frequently argue with who says that under some interpretations Kant could be considered an aspect dualist instead of a worlds dualist, and in his words almost makes Kant sound like a moderate realist, but that seems to be a very minority opinion and I’m convinced he’s just being contrarian with everything I say. Either way, we do seem to be left with the notion that the objects of our thoughts are our thoughts and not the things in themselves, and I have a hard time seeing Kant saying otherwise.
 
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I’m no expert, but I have a couple of questions about your OP. First, why have you introduced what you call the “the Aristotelian/Scholastic category of relation”? I can’t see the purpose of that, in this context. Why not cut straight to Kant?

Second, I think these two paragraphs are basically correct:
LeonardDeNoblac said:
In Kantian epistemology, there is a real distinction between the things in our experience (Phenomena ) and thought (Noumena ) and the things in themselves: so it is possible to have knowledge of the former, but not of the latter.
This, however, means that our knowledge of the things in themselves is a relation of reason, not only in the things themselves, but also in us. That’s because our knowledge of things doesn’t order us to them in themselves, but to them as they are in our experience and thought.
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… but after that you would need to add what Kant says about space and time. This information will modify, in an important way, your conclusion that, in Kant’s view, “our knowledge relates only to itself.”

Please note, I am not arguing that Kant is correct in everything he says. On the contrary, like you I am not convinced by his arguments. My only concern here is the accuracy of your brief summary of Kant’s epistemology.
 
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BartholomewB said:
First, why have you introduced what you call the “the Aristotelian/Scholastic category of relation”?
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I wanted to avoid any possibility of equivocation
BartholomewB said:
… but after that you would need to add what Kant says about space and time. This information will modify, in an important way, your conclusion that, in Kant’s view, “our knowledge relates only to itself.”
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Can you be more specific, please?
 
LeonardDeNoblac said:
Therefore, Kantian epistemology is false, and there’s no real distinction between the things in our experience (Phenomena ) and thought (Noumena ) and the things in themselves.
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If I follow your argument then ought not the conclusion be: “Kantian epistemology is false, and there is a real distinction between the things in our experience (Phenomena ) and thought (Noumena ) and the things in themselves.”

That is to say, contra Kant, reality is singular and independent of the thinking mind.
 
LeonardDeNoblac said:
Therefore, Kantian epistemology is false, and there’s no real distinction between the things in our experience (Phenomena ) and thought (Noumena ) and the things in themselves.
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I don’t think Kant is completely wrong. If the brain is in anyway rendering or reproducing the information perceived with the senses, then we are only ever seeing what the brain presents to us and not necessarily the things in themselves. The question is, does the brain give a faithful presentation of objective reality. I don’t think there is any good reason to think that it doesn’t.
 
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