Death Penalty and Justice

[o_mlly]

This summary is not justified by what Ambrose wrote, …

Take it up with the author. Do your credentials match Megivern’s? If so, your interpretation may be worth some study. Let me know.
James J. Megivern, Professor Emeritus
Phone: (828) 883-4280
Email: Jimmeg2@AOL.com
Degrees
• Th.D., Fribourg University
• S.S.L., Biblical Institute, Gregorian University
• A.B., Mary Immaculate College
Areas of Expertise
• Early Christian history
• New Testament, especially Gospel studies
• Christian ethics, especially involvement with capital punishment throughout history

… but I will grant that his letter links the incident of the woman to be stoned and capital punishment (the first time I have seen this). Ambrose is concerned with redemption (not protection) even as he acknowledges the magistrate’s right to impose the death penalty.
You see therefore both what power your commission gives you, and also whither mercy would lead you (Letter 25)
In any event, rehabilitation (Ambrose’s concern) is one of the four legitimate objectives of punishment but, as with the protection of society, it is a secondary concern. Both Aquinas and Augustine address the question of mercy and make the point that mercy is not automatic nor does it necessarily override justice.

I cannot follow any logical train in the above quote to your conclusions. However, I do note that by truncating Ambrose’s quote, you alter his meaning. I give the complete quote below.

Let us stay on focused on your claim – “The teaching of the Church on capital punishment was consistent at least as early as 405 through 1969. It was changed in 1995 …” All I need show is that the teaching, if any, has been ambiguous, tentative and altered in that time period. I use Ambrose as my first source.

Ambrose is counseling Studious, a judge, on applying the death penalty. Examine the complete quote and note that Ambrose gives high praise to the restraint of judges who do not impose the death penalty.

1. … For some there are, although out of the pale of the Church 139, who will not admit to the divine Mysteries those who have deemed it right to pass sentence of death on any man. Many too abstain of their own accord, and are commended, nor can we ourselves but praise them, although we so far observe the Apostle’s rule as not to dare to refuse them Communion.
2. You see therefore both what power your commission gives you, and also whither mercy would lead you; you will be excused if you do it, and praised if you do it not. Should you feel unable to do it, and are unwilling to afflict |183 the criminal by the horrors of a dungeon, I shall, as a priest, the more commend you.

Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that “this movement of the mind” (viz. mercy) “obeys the reason,** when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded,** whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant.” (Aquinas, ST II/II 30,3)
2266 states:* “the primary scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense.”* That is, the primary objective of all punishment is retributive justice. Having just said that, however, 2267 bases its prohibition of capital punishment on just one of the secondary objectives - the protection of society - and ignores the other three objectives, including the primary one. The ironic thing here is that the question of deterrence (another secondary objective) could actually reverse the restriction of 2267. The question of the deterrence value of executions is unanswered; neither side has conclusively resolved it, but suppose it turns out that deterrence actually works. Given a protection of society standard this would not merely permit but would require the aggressive use of executions. Since 2267 doesn’t discuss justice (but only protection) in its restriction on executions, surely justice could be equally ignored should protection benefit from an enhanced use of executions.

The protection standard does not merely ignore justice, it renders it irrelevant as the punishment being meted out is based on what the criminal may do in the future, not on what he has done in the past. By this standard we cannot execute someone who has killed in the past; we may do it only if we are fairly sure he will kill in the future. Executions thus become preventative measures divorced from punishment, as Brugger points out: "A careful examination justifies the conclusion that a theoretical foundation is being laid for a substantive revision in the Church’s teaching on the morality of capital punishment. That** revision would teach that capital punishment** as punishment is no longer legitimate"
As is Mr. Brugger but I have been careful to quote only Church sources in discussing what the Church teaches. I cited Keating for his comment on the (prudential) nature of 2267, not for his opinion on what it means. Ender

This is just more repition of your prior arguments. Since I think you and I are the only ones that continue to read this thread and that neither will convince the other, I end my comments with this post.

 

[Ender]

I give you an early Church Father, someone who conversed with an apostle, and you incredibly argue that Clement’s comment doesn’t pass your muster because “he was a theologian, not a pope or even a bishop.”

What you gave me was an assertion, you did not cite what Clement actually said and since you restricted me to bishops I assumed you thought that distinction significant.

You, however, prefer Aquinas who, may I remind you, was “a theologian, not a pope or even a bishop.” In citing Tradition, the early Church Fathers have special standing.

Speaking of special standing (emphasis in the original):

“Who dare imagine the sinful words these blind fools would have for the most Brilliant Theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas] ever: whose systematic method of reasoning Scholasticism] and sacred writings have been lauded by Holy Mother Church and every Pope for the last 800 years.” (Pius IX, 1873)

And, you probably should stayed away from Aquinas for he argued also that the death penalty finds its justification in protecting the community: “if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community … he may be killed in order to safeguard the common good.” Thomas Aquinas, S. Th., II-11, q. 64, a. 2. It should also be noted that Aquinas’ comment parallels the legitimate defense theology in justifying the application of the death penalty used by JP II in EV.

The difference is that Aquinas rightly acknowledges protection as a valid objective of punishment while JPII cites it as the only valid objective, so it is not accurate to say the death penalty “finds its justification” in protection. All punishment - as the Church teaches today - finds its primary justification in retributive justice.

“the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice” (ST, I/II 87,6)

“Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judgments.” (ST, I/II 87 3 ad 1)

You should probably read the Catechism of Trent more closely. As a final cause, the end purpose of the commandment must apply to all its applications. I gave you the very words from the Catechism of Trent teaching that the end of the death penalty is most certainly in concert with the end of the commandment, “Now the punishments inflicted by the civil authority, which is the legitimate avenger of crime, naturally tend to this end, since they give security to life by repressing outrage and violence." Did you miss that?

Of course … I have already said (several times) that protection is a valid objective but it is not the primary objective and it is only one of the three secondary objectives of which everything except protection was ignored in 2267.

In summary, the above shows your complaint that JP II had no Tradition to support EV in teaching legitimate defense as a just constraint in applying the death penalty is in error.

It is interesting to note that there is not a single reference in either EV 56 or CCC 2267 to anything the Church has ever said on the subject in support of this new position. I think the reason for that is obvious.

Innocent I’s vehicle for this passive and rather tolerant acceptance of the application of the death penalty – a rhetorical question followed by a submissive stance – is an encyclical epistle – a letter written by the Pope to part of the Church, e.g., bishops or laity in a particular country, leaders of religious orders, priests, etc. (Innocent I is replying to the Bishop of Toulouse). Because encyclical epistles are directed to a particular audience within the Church, they receive little attention from those outside the audience to which they are directed.

Well, if we are to disregard the teaching of a pope shall we disregard the opinions of theologians and bishops as well - or are we to keep your theologian and discard my pope?

If we are going to track papal epistles, then Nicholas I must also be quoted. In the year 866, Pope Nicholas I took a different stance to Innocent I in his letter to the newly Christianized Bulgarians. Nicholas urges the them to promote life both of body and soul, and to “rescue from death not only the innocent, but also the guilty.”
Nicholas 1, Epist. 97, 25: Responsa ad Consulta Bulgarorum, PL 119, 99 1.

I’m aware of his comments, but a request to spare the guilty is not at all the same as saying they may not be executed nor especially does it address the point JPII raised about protection. It is completely extraneous to that.

Ender

 

[Ender]

Take it up with the author. Do your credentials match Megivern’s? If so, your interpretation may be worth some study.

Wiki: *Appeal to authority is a fallacy of defective induction, where it is argued that a statement is correct *because the statement is made by a person or source that is commonly regarded as authoritative.

However, I do note that by truncating Ambrose’s quote, you alter his meaning.

If so that was not my intent. I found both letter 25 and 26 and felt I understood what he was saying. It is also worth pointing out that he said this as well:

I do not think that a Christian, a just and a wise man, ought to save his own life by the death of another; just as when he meets with an armed robber he cannot return his blows, lest in defending his life he should stain his love toward his neighbour. (Three Books on the Duties of the Clergy, Bk 1, ch 4)

This quite clearly is not what the Church teaches about self defense: “Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty…”

All I need show is that the teaching, if any, has been ambiguous, tentative and altered in that time period. I use Ambrose as my first source.

Do not assume that Ambrose’ position was necessarily what the Church taught nor in fact does Ambrose say capital punishment may not be used, only that he would prefer it were not.

This is just more repition of your prior arguments. Since I think you and I are the only ones that continue to read this thread and that neither will convince the other, I end my comments with this post.

Not so, I’ve got lots of unused arguments. I am sorry you’re giving up but at least I learned something about Ambrose. I’ll keep looking for the citation from Clement.

Ender

 

[Ender]

o_mlly:

Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–216) was the first Church Father addressed in particular the purposes of punishment; chief among these were correction of the punished and the general protection of society. Brugger EC

I would be interested in exactly what Clement said …

As I stated earlier, it would be good to know exactly what comment of Clement’s Professor Brugger is referring to because I have a hard time believing that the protection of society was ever seen as a primary objective of punishment. Although I am rather sure I didn’t find the passage on which Brugger based his opinion, I did find this:

And God does not inflict punishment from wrath, but for the ends of justice; since it is not expedient that justice should be neglected on our account. Each one of us, who sins, with his own free-will chooses punishment, and the blame lies with him who chooses. (The Instructor, Bk I, Ch VIII)

This fits exactly with what the Church teaches today: that justice is the primary objective of punishment and that he who sins merits punishment.

Ender

 

[Lycorth]

No need to apologize; no one has posted otherwise, as far as I know.

I wasn’t apologizing, merely correcting.

The state’s right remains open but its just use remains subject to the Magisterium’s teaching. God as the Author of life has forever the right to end my life as it pleases Him; that He (so far) chooses not to do so does not in any way diminish His right.

The just use of the death penalty has already been handled by the Magisterium, citing the catechetical references I have provided. They reflect Church teaching on the matter.

There is no debate about where the Church stands morally on the death penalty.

“The modern mind will accept nothing on authority, but will accept anything on no authority. Say that the Bible or the Pope says so and it will be dismissed without further examination. But preface your remark with ‘I think I heard somewhere,’ or, try but fail to remember the name of some professor who might have said ‘such-and-such,’ and it will be immediately accepted as an unshakable fact.”
G, K. Chesterton

Indeed.