Death Penalty

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In the future, please don’t respond inside my quotes… it is not polite since it makes it considerably more awkward to reply to you with your quotes included.
It is not a question of manners but of space. Your post was lengthy; not separating out each quote significantly shortened the size my reply.
Aquinas, in his Summa, made no distinction between the sin committed and whether it opened the door to the Death Penalty.
Your quote was from Aquinas’ discussion of murder and it is a mistake to assume that his comments there apply equally to all other crimes. That assumption is clearly incorrect given this comment on theft and robbery (II/II 66,6):
Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible deformity.
In England, one could be executed for being a pick pocket until 1808 and anyone including children could be and were hung for theft.
True, but irrelevant to the point of what the Church taught should be done.
we can make no distinctions between mortal sin as to the nature of how serious a sin is.
Whatchu mean “we”? Most people have no such difficulty.
Justice at best is a subjective concept
" If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person." (You-know-who II/II 58,12)
The current Catechism argues that the Death Penalty should be used as a last resort. This clearly contradicts the notion that punishment is the primary objective.
There is definitely a contradiction, which is why I think 2267 is wrong. I don’t know what you mean by “punishment is the primary objective.” The primary objective of punishment is the redress of the disorder caused by the sin, not the protection of society nor the rehabilitation of the sinner. Given that 2267 ignores the primary objective and bases the ban on executions on a secondary objective it puts the catechism in conflict with itself.
It also is clearly at odds with what Thomas Aquinas wrote in the Summa.
Unless you have another quote you want to try I think this issue has been pretty well resolved.
Mercy must be tempered by the needs of society.
Who are you quoting here? I’ve never seen this claim.

Ender
 
I don’t see any reason as to why it would be preferable today, in a modern industrialized society, to execute someone as opposed to letting them live.
 
I don’t see any reason as to why it would be preferable today, in a modern industrialized society, to execute someone as opposed to letting them live.
If you accept the argument made in CCC 2267 that executions are only valid where necessary to protect the public then you could argue that, in modern industrialized societies, incarceration is sufficient to protect the public therefore executions are unnecessary and inappropriate. I’m not at all convinced that putting someone in prison actually achieves that goal, but that is a secular, prudential argument and not the one I’m interested in.

The reason executions are appropriate - in all societies - goes to the primary function of punishment itself: sin requires punishment and great sin requires great punishment. There are some crimes for which the only just punishment is death, so it is a matter of justice, not protection, and justice is an obligation in all societies.

Ender
 
It is not a question of manners but of space. Your post was lengthy; not separating out each quote significantly shortened the size my reply.
Your quote was from Aquinas’ discussion of murder and it is a mistake to assume that his comments there apply equally to all other crimes. That assumption is clearly incorrect given this comment on theft and robbery (II/II 66,6):

Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible deformity.
On the contrary :), Aquinas was not talking about when killing is murder (i.e. a sin) and when killing is lawful (and thus not sinful). Here he was ultimately arguing that it is perfectly just for the state to level the penalty of death on a person for unrepented mortal sin because their sin removed their dignity as a human person.

And if we are going to get into a game of throwing Aquinas Quotes at each other, I think it is only fair that we take those quotes in full context. In your case, Aquinas is answering a specific objection and that objection is that stealing must not be a mortal sin because if it were a mortal sin, then surely it would have brought the penalty of death in the Mosaic law. Further, you ommitted the first two sentances of the answer: “The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which is pronounced against sinners ‘according to the truth’”

As a result, at least as far as Aquinas is arguing here, the point of punishment cannot be based on the notion that certain sins require penalties by their nature. Rather, I think, when taken into the context of the whole of the Church’s teaching, that we must accept that the punishments are leveled either for the good of society (i.e. to restore to society some measure of that which was lost by society or to protect society from future harm) or for the good of the sinner (i.e. to bring about repentence.).

Now in reference to my statement that we can make a distinction between which mortal sins are more serious…
Whatchu mean “we”? Most people have no such difficulty.
Yes you are right, what I should say is that we should not make such distinctions. Certainly society can and does make distinctions as to which crimes require a certain punishment. However, from a theological perspective, if one dies without repenting mortal sin, the result is the same regardless of how serious human society judges the sin.
" If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person." (You-know-who II/II 58,12)
There is definitely a contradiction, which is why I think 2267 is wrong. I don’t know what you mean by “punishment is the primary objective.” The primary objective of punishment is the redress of the disorder caused by the sin, not the protection of society nor the rehabilitation of the sinner. Given that 2267 ignores the primary objective and bases the ban on executions on a secondary objective it puts the catechism in conflict with itself.
Unless you have another quote you want to try I think this issue has been pretty well resolved.
I would be very interested in seeing what you mean by “redress the disorder caused by the sin”. Ultimately the death penalty is in no way restorative to the victem of a crime. At best, the death penalty can force the perpetrator of the crime to repent their sins. Other positive goods that come from it are removing the corrupting influence of the sinner from society.

I also think it is very problematic to argue that since your interpretation of past arguments for the Death Penalty disagrees with the Catechism that it therefore stands to reason that it is the Catechism that is inncorrect. My efforts here are to reconcile the Catechism with the past teachings. In other words to understand how the whole can be consistent.
Who are you quoting here? I’ve never seen this claim.
Regarding the notion that “Mercy must be tempered by the needs of society”, I am not quoting anyone directly. Rather, I am recognizing a concept implicit in notions Justice. If we don’t balance mercy with the needs of society, then criminals would not be incarcerated or when needed executed and society as a whole would suffer.

–
Bill
 
Re your interpretation of Aquinas’ comments - (I’m taking sections of your last post, it’s too long to respond to in one bite).
On the contrary :), Aquinas was not talking about when killing is murder (i.e. a sin) and when killing is lawful (and thus not sinful). Here he was ultimately arguing that it is perfectly just for the state to level the penalty of death on a person for unrepented mortal sin because their sin removed their dignity as a human person.
Again, you read too much into his statement. His comment comes in question 64 - murder - in answer to the sub-question (2) whether it is lawful to kill a sinner (note also that he uses the word “sin” without distinguishing between mortal and venial, so if your interpretation was correct it would really apply to everyone). Even so, it is clear that he intends these comments to apply to this section only as in Q 66 (theft and robbery) he states in sub-question 6 both that theft is a mortal sin (Therefore theft, as being opposed to charity, is a mortal sin.) and that execution is not prescribed for every mortal sin (cited before) - which contradicts your interpretation of his comments in Q 64. He is clearly not calling for the execution of everyone who commits a mortal sin.
As a result, at least as far as Aquinas is arguing here, the point of punishment cannot be based on the notion that certain sins require penalties by their nature.
*All sins require penalties; the greater the sin the greater the punishment. *(I/II 87,4) *

Punishment is proportionate to sin.* (I/II 87,4)

*the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice * (I/II 87,6)

Ender
 
The nature of punishment …
Rather, I think, when taken into the context of the whole of the Church’s teaching, that we must accept that the punishments are leveled either for the good of society (i.e. to restore to society some measure of that which was lost by society or to protect society from future harm) or for the good of the sinner (i.e. to bring about repentence.).
The purposes of criminal punishment are rather unanimously delineated in the Catholic tradition. Punishment is held to have a variety of ends that may conveniently be reduced to the following four: rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, deterrence, and retribution. (Cardinal Dulles, 2001)

CCC 2266: *the **primary **scope of the penalty is to redress the disorder caused by the offense. *

From this is should be apparent that it is retribution that is the primary objective of punishment. I think we have completely lost this understanding and replaced it with one where, when someone sins, we see it not as his fault - which would merit punishment - but the fault of society. That is, we are losing the concept of individual, moral responsibility.
… we should not make such distinctions {as to which mortal sins are more serious}. Certainly society can and does make distinctions as to which crimes require a certain punishment. However, from a theological perspective, if one dies without repenting mortal sin, the result is the same regardless of how serious human society judges the sin.
The Church teaches that the punishment must fit the crime. We have the obligation in justice to levy penalties that are neither too severe nor too lenient.

Legitimate public authority has the right and duty to inflict penalties commensurate with the gravity of the crime. CCC 2266
Ultimately the death penalty is in no way restorative to the victem of a crime.
No penalty can repair the damage done by a murder but that isn’t an argument that no penalty should be applied.

Ender
 
The problem with 2267 …
I also think it is very problematic to argue that since your interpretation of past arguments for the Death Penalty disagrees with the Catechism that it therefore stands to reason that it is the Catechism that is inncorrect.
In CCC 2266 we are told that the primary objective of punishment is to “redress the disorder caused by the offense.” Cardinal Dulles explains that this phrase means retribution - the debt that must be paid by the sinner.

This is what Aquinas said as well: " the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice."

{Augustine says:} "Since therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly." (ST II/II 62,2) That is, the sin is not forgiven until the debt is paid and the size of the debt is commensurate with the gravity of the sin - and that our salvation requires it.

In the face of all this, what is said in 2267 is that capital punishment is banned unless it is necessary to protect the public, but the protection of the public is a secondary objective of punishment and no thought is given here of the primary objective. In this case it is actually claimed that since executions are not necessary to meet one (of three) secondary objectives we can ignore what is demanded by justice (the primary objective) as well as the other secondary objectives. This position makes no sense to me.

Ender
 
On mercy …
Regarding the notion that “Mercy must be tempered by the needs of society”, I am not quoting anyone directly. Rather, I am recognizing a concept implicit in notions Justice. If we don’t balance mercy with the needs of society, then criminals would not be incarcerated or when needed executed and society as a whole would suffer.
Understanding this concept gives me the most trouble. It has not been easy ferreting out statements that clearly explain it.

I don’t think that mercy is a component of justice: justice obligates us to apply a punishment appropriate to the crime; it is not mercy that forbids overly severe punishment, it is justice itself that forbids it.

Nor do I think that it is appropriate to show mercy in every case. Specifically, I don’t believe that the Church teaches that mercy should be shown to those who are unrepentant and are wholly responsible for their sins.

For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according to right reason, when and where this is requisite. (ST II/II 157, 2 ad 1)

Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that “this movement of the mind” (viz. mercy) “obeys the reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant.” (II/II 30,3)

The strongest argument against the claim that mercy should prevent us from executing anyone is that in order to make that claim one must first accept that the death sentence is just and I’ve not found anyone willing to make that concession. Anyway, here is one final quote on the relation between mercy and repentance:

There are no limits to the mercy of God, but anyone who deliberately refuses to accept his mercy by repenting, rejects the forgiveness of his sins, and the salvation offered by the Holy Spirit. Such hardness of heart can lead to final impenitence and eternal loss. CCC 1864

Ender
 
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