Did Aristotle's God create the world?

[Linusthe2nd]

Yes! At least that was the opinion of Thomas Aquinas. And that is all that matters, because Thomas’ proofs for the existence of God are based on Thomas’ interpretation of Aristotle. This is not my discovery, it was given to me by Fr. James A. Weisheipl in his book Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages ( or you can find it in the article " The Celestial Movers in Medieval Physics, " The Thomist, no. 24 ( 1961 ) , pgs. 286- 326 ).

On page 171 he says, " Over and above the mode of becoming by which something comes to be through change or motion, there must be a mode of becoming or origin of things, without any mutation or motion through the influx of being per influentiam essendi ]. 1. St. Thomas goes on to say that, although Plato and Aristotle did posit that immaterial substances and even heavenly bodies always existed, " we must not suppose on tthat account that they denied to them a cause of their being. 2, similarly 3,4 below

Let’s examine Thomas’ commentary. ( All footnotes refer to Thomas’ commentaries on A’s works, which can be found here: dhspriory.org/thomas/ .

The the creation of a world that has eternally existed, is not contradictory. " Thus it is clear that there is no contradiction in saying that something made by God has always existed. Indeed, if there were some contradiction, it would be amazing that Augustine failed to see it, for exposing such a contradiction would be a most effective way of proving that the world is not eternal, and although Augustine offers many arguments against the eternity of the world in XI and XII De Civitate Dei, he never argues that his opponents’ view is contradictory. On the contrary, Augustine seems to hint that there is no contradiction involved. Thus, speaking of the Platonists, he says (X De Civitate Dei cap. 31), "They somehow contemplate a beginning in causation rather than a beginning in time. Imagine, they say, a foot that has been in dust since eternity: a footprint has always been beneath it, and nobody would doubt that the footprint was made by the pressure of the foot. Though neither is prior in time to the other, yet one is made by the other. 1.

Thomas thought that Aristotle’s God created a world that has existed eternally.

" 1164. Now common causes must be eternal, because the first causes of beings which are generated must not themselves be generated, otherwise the process of generation would proceed to infinity; and this is true especially of those causes which are altogether immobile and immaterial. For those immaterial and immobile causes are the causes of the sensible things evident to us, because they are beings in the highest degree, and therefore are the cause of other things, as was shown in Book II (290). From this it is evident that the science which considers beings of this kind is the first of all the sciences and the one which considers the common causes of all beings. Hence there are causes of beings as beings, which are investigated in first philosophy, as he proposed in Book I (36). And from this it is quite evident that the opinion of those who claimed that Aristotle thought that God is not the cause of the substance of the heavens, but only of their motion, is false. [against Ibn-Rushd] 2.

" 996. Very special attention should be paid to what is here said, because, as is mentioned in Metaphysics II, the arrangement of things in existence and in truth is the same. Therefore, just as some things are always true and yet have a cause of their truth, so Aristotle understood that there are some eternal beings, namely, the heavenly bodies and separated substances, which nevertheless have a cause of existence.

From this it is evident that although Aristotle posited a world that was eternal, he did not believe that God is not the world’s cause of existence but of its motion only, as some maintained. Finally, he concludes his main proposition with a summary. And he says: “Let this conclude what we have to say in support of our claim that there never was a time when there was not motion and there will never be a time when there will not be motion. " 3.

" 296. Now this is necessary, because everything that is composite in nature and participates in being must ultimately have as its causes those things which have existence by their very essence. But all corporeal things are actual beings insofar as they participate in certain forms. Therefore a separate substance which is a form by its very essence must be the principle of corporeal substance. " 4.

1. In De Aeternigtate Mundi, the whole article
2. VI Metaph, lect. 1. n. 1164
3. VIII Phys, lect 3, n. 996
4. II Metaph, lect 2, n. 296-296

• Also De Caelo, lect 8, ch 4, n. 91, para 4

The importance of this in regard to The First Way on next post.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Why is this important for the First Way ( either as found in the SCG or in S.T. ) ? For the simple reason that many objectors insist on limiting the First way to local motion, and by making such a limitation they think they have disarmed the argument from motion.

As you recall, the example of motion given in the First Way ( S.T. ) is that of fire heating wood which is potentially hot until it becomes actually hot. And what causes the fire to move from something potentially " firy " to actually firy must itself be moved from potentially to actuality. But this cannot go on to infinity, we must eventually arrive at a First Mover which is Itself Unmoved or Pure Actuality. And being Pure Actuality, this First Mover does not exist in the world of beings compsed of actuality and potentiality.

But how does this First Mover move the things of this world if it is pure act, the wood and the fire for example? It causes them to move first by creating something that can cause fire ( i.e. lightening or the sun shining through glass ). And when God creates something he gives it the power to move itself ( some times ) and to cause other things to move. And he creates other things which have the potentiality to be set on fire.

So God causes the things of the world to move, first of all, by creating them and creating them with certain powers or natures by which some can move themselves and which have the ability to move/change other theings. And he creates all things with a nature which can be moved or changed.

Take a man pushing a rock. God created the man with a nature which has the power to push a rock. And he created the rock which has the nature to be moved.

And even if things are not moving or changing other things, they are still acting or moving, they are exercising the act of existence which God gave them. And God is, so to speak, moving them directly by sustaining their very act of existence.

Here is an excellent video by Edward Feser explaining an Aristotelian proof for the existence of God from motion. It is very good, I hope you will watch it.

bing.com/videos/search?q=edward+feser%2c+an+aristotelian+proof+for+the+existence+for+god&FORM=VIRE1#view=detail&mid=C4B645023938D3FA5706C4B645023938D3FA5706

Thomas’ first proof for the existence for God from motion ( S. T. )

newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

The First Way is just that there must be a First principle of the world because it is contingent. I’ll finish watching the video latter, but I don’t see a physics argument for God, as if forces don’t make sense with an infinite force that can Think working with them.

If someone doesn’t understand contingency, not one of the 5 ways are going to make sense. Bertrand Russell for example said that he didn’t know what contingency meant outside of a logical sentence. I don’t think Feser offers anything here that would convince Russell

 

[thinkandmull]

I don’t know what translation Aquinas had of Aristotle, but the one I have from the library has Aristotle saying several times that reason knows for certain that the world is eternal, while Aquinas insisted that Aristotle only said it was probable. I don’t know if Aquinas agreed with Aristotle on that or, Augustine: “Augustine offers many arguments against the eternity of the world in XI and XII De Civitate Dei” I’d like to know what arguments Augustine used

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I don’t know what translation Aquinas had of Aristotle, but the one I have from the library has Aristotle saying several times that reason knows for certain that the world is eternal, while Aquinas insisted that Aristotle only said it was probable. I don’t know if Aquinas agreed with Aristotle on that or, Augustine: “Augustine offers many arguments against the eternity of the world in XI and XII De Civitate Dei” I’d like to know what arguments Augustine used

If you follow the references in my post you will see how Thomas is responding to Aristotle’s works. Now Thomas has been accused of " baptizing " Aristotle. Perhaps he is giving Aristotle ( Plato too ) credit for things they didn’t actually hold. That doesn’t matter, all that matters is that Thomas is giving us arguments based on his interpretation. Even if Aristotle did not hold those views, Thomas would simply have said that Aristotle was wrong and gone ahead giving his own interpretation. And that is what matters. Thomas is giving us proofs that work, that is all that matters.

Obviously the world is contingent, even if it is eternal, the things in it still come into existence and out of existence. First of all, even if the world is eternal, as the arguments assume, it is dependent on God for existence. And that is the definition of " contingent. " That a substance can either be or not be means that it is dependent on God for its existence.

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

Sure things change and decay, but you make the same mis-step that Aquinas makes at the beginning of the Third Way. The question is whether the **elements **are contingent. I think to deny that contingency is either to be not philosophical in thinking, or to be worshipping matter.

The First Way is very strange because it speaks of motion and that THIS cannot go back infinitely, when he really means the series needs a first incorporeal principle, and THIS, not the motion, cannot go back infinitely. I think he meant the 5 ways to be used by common people, and wanted it to be interpreted by them as not allowing an eternal world because such an idea was above them

Efficient causes is nothing less then design in nature. So we have design. Why can’t the design be God? Because its contingent! So the 2nd and 5th way are the same, and also based on the third, although the 1st and 2nd way add the common sense argument that there can’t be an infinite of spiritual beings, one dependent on another.

The 4rth way is the same. Why isn’t the world the infinite good even though we may not be able to see it. Because its contingent

 

[thinkandmull]

“Therefore, just as some things are always true and yet have a cause of their truth, so Aristotle understood that there are some eternal beings, namely, the heavenly bodies and separated substances, which nevertheless have a cause of existence.”

Where is this from again?

This seems to show that arguments from proportion or analogy aren’t really valid. Aquinas himself uses them a lot, like when he tries to prove from reason that there are angels

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Sure things change and decay, but you make the same mis-step that Aquinas makes at the beginning of the Third Way. The question is whether the **elements **are contingent. I think to deny that contingency is either to be not philosophical in thinking, or to be worshipping matter.

Thomas is talking about essences here, natures which have existence. When the essence ceases to exist ( angel, man, a gold bar, a cylinder of hydrogen, etc. ) there are still " elements " which exist. But these too can be or not be. And when separtated from their former substances, they become essences proper. And if these cease to exist as well, then nothing will exist. And that is impossible, as is proven in the case of efficient causes. Now this cannot be the case with all essences, for if no essence existed necessarily, nothing could exist now. But things do exist now, so there must be one essence who must necessarily exist, who possesses his necessity of himself and not through another. And this we call God.

I did not deny contingency, why do you keep saying that I do? All created essences are contingent.

The First Way is very strange because it speaks of motion and that THIS cannot go back infinitely, when he really means the series needs a first incorporeal principle, and THIS, not the motion, cannot go back infinitely.

You are incorrectly restricting motion/change to physical motion/change. He is talking about any kind of change, whether corporeal or incorporeal. At some point there must be a source of change which is pure Act and is not subject to change. Go back and read Aquinas.by Edward Feser again. He explains it very well.

I think he meant the 5 ways to be used by common people, and wanted it to be interpreted by them as not allowing an eternal world because such an idea was above them

I don’t think so, common people do not have the necessary education.

Efficient causes is nothing less then design in nature. So we have design.

Of course nature, in the broad sense, represents God’s plan, and it was God’s plan to use the more perfect things of nature ( I include angels as a part of nature, where we identify nature with God’s plan ), to guide the less perfect. But some things, angels and man, he caused to have a nature or essence which would enable them to see and carry out God’s plan for their own good and for the good of God’s overall plan. See : S.C.G., chapters 16-25, dhspriory.org/thomas/english/ContraGentiles3a.htm

Why can’t the design be God? Because its contingent!

God has the " plan " in his intellect. His plan is not contingent, it uses contingent essences to carry out the plan.

So the 2nd and 5th way are the same, and also based on the third, although the 1st and 2nd way add the common sense argument that there can’t be an infinite of spiritual beings, one dependent on another.

Each argument employes different concepts to arrive at the same end, a Being that is Pure Act, which is the First Cause of all motion, efficient causes, being, necessity, and goodness. And no, there cannot be an infinite series of immaterial, eternal causes, there must be one that is the cause of all the others. But I think we can disregard immaterial causes other than God, because Thomas was thinking of Aristotle’s immaterial souls which moved the heavenly bodies, and these do not exist. Angels exist but they cannot be demonstrated to exist through philosophy.

The 4rth way is the same. Why isn’t the world the infinite good even though we may not be able to see it. Because its contingent

The world cannot be the ultimate good because it is contingent. The ultimated good is uncaused and can only be God.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

“Therefore, just as some things are always true and yet have a cause of their truth, so Aristotle understood that there are some eternal beings, namely, the heavenly bodies and separated substances, which nevertheless have a cause of existence.”

Where is this from again?

It is from his De Caelo, It would be well to read Thomas’ commentary as well. But remember that these can no longer be considered as any part of Thomas’ proof for the existence of God because these notions were proven incorrect by modern science.

This seems to show that arguments from proportion or analogy aren’t really valid. Aquinas himself uses them a lot, like when he tries to prove from reason that there are angels

I don’t follow you here. What arguments disprove his notion of analogy?

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

A point of clarification.

91 ( Thomas’ numbering for the number of comments he has made thus far on De Caelo. It corresponds to the 14th made on Book 1, chapter 4 of Aristotle. But each of Thomas’ comments are several paragraphs long. And this is the 4th and 5th paragraphs of comment 91. ) I had a devil of a time trying to associate Thomas’ comments to Aristotle’s own work. The paragraphs immediately following are Thomas’ comments. I have placed them in quotes. Following that I have placed Aristotle’s words in brackets. So you will be able to see how much Thomas reads into Aristotle. He is not necessarily wrong because he draws conclusions not only from chapter 4 of Book 1 but from other areas of the work and even from other works.

" Consequently, it is plain that if there are two contrary circular motions, there would have to be something in vain in nature. But that this is impossible he now proves: Whatever exists in nature is either from God, as are the first natural things, or from nature as from a second cause, as, for example, lower effects. But God makes nothing in vain, because, since He is a being that acts through understanding, He acts for a purpose. Likewise nature makes nothing in vain, because it acts as moved by God as by a first mover, just as an arrow is not moved in vain, inasmuch as it is shot by the bowman at some definite thing. What remains, therefore, is that nothing in nature is in vain.

It should be noted that Aristotle here posits God to be the maker of the celestial bodies, and not just a cause after the manner of an end, as some have done. "

[And even if the motion round a circle is the contrary of the reverse motion, one of the two would be ineffective: for both move to the same point, because that which moves in a circle, at whatever point it begins, must necessarily pass through all the contrary places alike. (By contrarieties of place I mean up and down, back and front, and right and left; and the contrary oppositions of movements are determined by those of places.) One of the motions, then, would be ineffective, for if the two motions were of equal strength, there would be no movement either way, and if one of the two were preponderant, the other would be inoperative. So that if both bodies were there, one of them, inasmuch as it would not be moving with its own movement, would be useless, in the sense in which a shoe is useless when it is not worn. But God and nature create nothing that has not its use.]

I just thought it interesting.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Well, the " philosophers " on C.A. may not be interested in this topic, about which there can be none more philosophical, since it is at the very heart of Aquinas’ proofs for the existence of God, but it was important enough for the folks at Alethia to write a column about it.
aleteia.org/en/scienvironment/article/can-matter-be-eternal-and-created-5797760989134848?utm_campaign=NL_en&utm_source=daily_newsletter&utm_medium=mail&utm_content=NL_en-13/04/2015

By the way, Alethia is a supurb online Catholic magazine that everyone should be reading.

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

Thomas is talking about essences here, natures which have existence. When the essence ceases to exist ( angel, man, a gold bar, a cylinder of hydrogen, etc. ) there are still " elements " which exist. But these too can be or not be. And when separtated from their former substances, they become essences proper. And if these cease to exist as well, then nothing will exist. And that is impossible, as is proven in the case of efficient causes. Now this cannot be the case with all essences, for if no essence existed necessarily, nothing could exist now. But things do exist now, so there must be one essence who must necessarily exist, who possesses his necessity of himself and not through another. And this we call God.

I did not deny contingency, why do you keep saying that I do? All created essences are contingent.

You are incorrectly restricting motion/change to physical motion/change. He is talking about any kind of change, whether corporeal or incorporeal. At some point there must be a source of change which is pure Act and is not subject to change. Go back and read Aquinas.by Edward Feser again. He explains it very well.

I don’t think so, common people do not have the necessary education.

Of course nature, in the broad sense, represents God’s plan, and it was God’s plan to use the more perfect things of nature ( I include angels as a part of nature, where we identify nature with God’s plan ), to guide the less perfect. But some things, angels and man, he caused to have a nature or essence which would enable them to see and carry out God’s plan for their own good and for the good of God’s overall plan. See : S.C.G., chapters 16-25, dhspriory.org/thomas/english/ContraGentiles3a.htm

God has the " plan " in his intellect. His plan is not contingent, it uses contingent essences to carry out the plan.

Each argument employes different concepts to arrive at the same end, a Being that is Pure Act, which is the First Cause of all motion, efficient causes, being, necessity, and goodness. And no, there cannot be an infinite series of immaterial, eternal causes, there must be one that is the cause of all the others. But I think we can disregard immaterial causes other than God, because Thomas was thinking of Aristotle’s immaterial souls which moved the heavenly bodies, and these do not exist. Angels exist but they cannot be demonstrated to exist through philosophy.

The world cannot be the ultimate good because it is contingent. The ultimated good is uncaused and can only be God.

Linus2nd

I didn’t say you didn’t believe in contingency. I said that all the 5 ways are based on contingency. That are forms of one argument. “He is talking about any kind of change, whether corporeal or incorporeal.” Then the First and Second way are indistinguishable. “At some point there must be a source of change which is pure Act and is not subject to change.” Are you saying you can prove this from physics? Either that, or contingency (Third Way). That’s the only option

 

[thinkandmull]

It is from his De Caelo, It would be well to read Thomas’ commentary as well. But remember that these can no longer be considered as any part of Thomas’ proof for the existence of God because these notions were proven incorrect by modern science.

I don’t follow you here. What arguments disprove his notion of analogy?

Linus2nd

In the beginning of his treatise on angels, Aquinas says that reason teaches us that there are angels.

“Therefore,** just as **some things are always true and yet have a cause of their truth, so Aristotle understood that there are some eternal beings, namely, the heavenly bodies and separated substances, which nevertheless have a cause of existence.”

Analogy argument. And Aquinas disagrees with this way. So one can dismiss his argument from reason for angels.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I didn’t say you didn’t believe in contingency. I said that all the 5 ways are based on contingency. That are forms of one argument. “He is talking about any kind of change, whether corporeal or incorporeal.” Then the First and Second way are indistinguishable. “At some point there must be a source of change which is pure Act and is not subject to change.” Are you saying you can prove this from physics? Either that, or contingency (Third Way). That’s the only option

The first and second ways are distinguishable in that the First starts from visible motion of any kind, then moves to the reduction of all potencies to act. The second stresses efficient causality. It is just that the stress of each is slightly different. And yes, all three arguments are based on the contingency of creatures.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

In the beginning of his treatise on angels, Aquinas says that reason teaches us that there are angels.

“Therefore,** just as **some things are always true and yet have a cause of their truth, so Aristotle understood that there are some eternal beings, namely, the heavenly bodies and separated substances, which nevertheless have a cause of existence.”

Analogy argument. And Aquinas disagrees with this way. So one can dismiss his argument from reason for angels.

Well, I don’t see where " analogy " comes in, but I agree that the existence of angels cannot be proven.

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

'There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and will (14, 8; 19, 4). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is limited to “here” and “now.” Hence the perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature. ’
newadvent.org/summa/1050.htm

An “it is fitting argument” although we just saw Aristotle had one also for angels always existing

 

[Linusthe2nd]

'There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and will (14, 8; 19, 4). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is limited to “here” and “now.” Hence the perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature. ’
newadvent.org/summa/1050.htm

An “it is fitting argument” although we just saw Aristotle had one also for angels always existing

" Fitting " is not proof. So we can discard all notions of any " movers " between the created material world and God, who is immaterial, incorporeal, eternal by nature. So God moves creatures, after creating them, through the natures he has given them. I am speaking philosophically here.

But if one permits faith to enter the picture, it is conceivable that God uses angels to move at least some aspects of creation. We already know for certain that thay act as God’s messangers and that each of us has an angel, good and bad, influencing us to do good or evil. So it is highly possible, even probable in my opinion, that God uses angels to guide the universe and various systems such as the weather.

Linus2nd

 

[thinkandmull]

Aquinas says the universe “requires” angels by reason, you say its “probable” that they act in our creation, for me… I don’t see that area of contemplation fruitful of distinct certainty so I rather assume that things could be one way or maybe another. Maybe their will be more surprises than we would expect when we pass

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Aquinas says the universe “requires” angels by reason, you say its “probable” that they act in our creation, for me… I don’t see that area of contemplation fruitful of distinct certainty so I rather assume that things could be one way or maybe another. Maybe their will be more surprises than we would expect when we pass

I imagine that in heaven God will give us the answers to many things we have wondered or speculated about. We have a lot to look forward to.

Linus2nd