D
DavidFilmer
Guest
OK, how about a nice, juicy metaphysical question:
PREDICATE: God is eternal and unchanging. The Nature of God can never change in any way; change requires potential (ie, might be one thing, or might be another), but God has no potentiality, only actuality (ie, what IS). He is the same yesterday, today, and tomorrow.
PREDICATE: The Incarnation occurred at a specific point in time and space. In this event, “human nature was assumed, not absorbed” (CCC 470), and “what [Jesus] was, he remained, and what he was not, he assumed.” (CCC 469).
These two predicates appear to be mutually self-exclusive. The Divine Nature cannot change, but it absorbed a human nature in a space/time event. To me, this seems to suggest a change in the Divine Nature.
POSSIBLE ANSWER: God exists outside of space/time, and sees all existence in an eternal “now.” Thus, although we perceive the Incarnation as occurring in a specific point in space and time, to God, it is an eternal event.ANSWER DISPROVED: If the human aspect of God’s nature is eternal (like God) then it means the Divine Nature is dependent on human nature. This makes the existence of God contingent upon the existence of mankind. But, since God is a necessary existence, that would also require that mankind be a necessary existence. But there cannot be more than one necessary existence (I’m skipping a lot of sub-proofs; logicians will follow this). Thus, it is not possible that the human aspect of the Divine Nature is eternal.
So how do we logically explain the absorption of a human nature into the Divine Nature without also predicating a change in the Divine Nature? I have a feeling it has something to do with this distinction between “absorption” and “assumption,” but I cannot develop a proposition that I think will stand up.
Any Thomists (etc) out there wanna give this a shot?
PREDICATE: God is eternal and unchanging. The Nature of God can never change in any way; change requires potential (ie, might be one thing, or might be another), but God has no potentiality, only actuality (ie, what IS). He is the same yesterday, today, and tomorrow.
PREDICATE: The Incarnation occurred at a specific point in time and space. In this event, “human nature was assumed, not absorbed” (CCC 470), and “what [Jesus] was, he remained, and what he was not, he assumed.” (CCC 469).
These two predicates appear to be mutually self-exclusive. The Divine Nature cannot change, but it absorbed a human nature in a space/time event. To me, this seems to suggest a change in the Divine Nature.
POSSIBLE ANSWER: God exists outside of space/time, and sees all existence in an eternal “now.” Thus, although we perceive the Incarnation as occurring in a specific point in space and time, to God, it is an eternal event.ANSWER DISPROVED: If the human aspect of God’s nature is eternal (like God) then it means the Divine Nature is dependent on human nature. This makes the existence of God contingent upon the existence of mankind. But, since God is a necessary existence, that would also require that mankind be a necessary existence. But there cannot be more than one necessary existence (I’m skipping a lot of sub-proofs; logicians will follow this). Thus, it is not possible that the human aspect of the Divine Nature is eternal.
So how do we logically explain the absorption of a human nature into the Divine Nature without also predicating a change in the Divine Nature? I have a feeling it has something to do with this distinction between “absorption” and “assumption,” but I cannot develop a proposition that I think will stand up.
Any Thomists (etc) out there wanna give this a shot?