I don’t know of anything that is not essentially predicated by being - this being being the univocal expression of its existence - towit; essence is not conceivable without.
Nothing is possible without a primary reality that is reality and is the giver of reality. It is brutally evident that there is such a thing as potential possibilities. In order for there to be possibilities that become real, there has to be a reality in which possible beings can participate, since possibilities have no reality of there own. There has to be that which necessarily exists, and that which necessarily exist does so because it is in its nature to do so.
Nonetheless; as things are conceived by their essences; such a distinction is unnessecary for to know that it is and what it is is identical – therein; existence is indistinguishable from essence.
This is obviously false since it is contrary to logic. In the context of potentiality; we know of a things existence in respect of the fact that it exists, but it is evidently impossible for it to be identical to existence for the reason i gave in my previous post. This is proven by the very fact of potentiality. And you have given no reason why i should conclude otherwise, accept make assertions. That it is unnecessary for you to conceive of something as distinct in order to know something is not evidence in itself that there is no such distinction.
Furthermore; even an object of the mind is predicated by being; otherwise such a thing would not be conceived or indeed conceivable; and thus; both finite and infinite beings existence is indistinct from their essence.
This is a fallacy again. Just because a thing is inconceivable with out actuality is not evidence that the two are synonymous. In fact it is logically impossible for the two to be identical for the reasons given in my previous post. Perhaps you should read it again as i have made some edits that you might have missed.
This is where I disagree with Aquinas; he states that this is only the case in infinite beings; not finite ones.
You have no good reason to disagree other than to say that it appears as if the two were the same and thus therefore the two are the same. You have not shown why any of the logical arguments i have given in favor of such a distinction are false accept to say that you cannot imagine something. This is what your arguments amount to. But imagination is not the measure of logic or being.
The act or manifestation of their existence from potential to actual is irrelevant
It is not irrelevant, and your attempt here to ignore the relevance of it shows that you are not really being objective. Its like a B-theorist saying there is no such thing as time because it does not bind well with the idea of a 4 dimensional block universe in which all time and space exist at once.
in the predication of being as univocally intrinsic to all objects; both those in mind and fact - therein; to draw a distinction; particularly such an arbitrary one with regards to the finitude of a thing is absurd.
It is not intrinsic to the nature of all objects as i have made evident, and is evident to all of us who has eyes. Rather, an essence must exist first in order for us to know about it. We “know” it through its existence. That is not the same as saying that an object
is existence, since the
context in which you are making the argument is purely an
epistemological consideration and has little to nothing to do with the
ontological nature of beings accept to say that we see that things exist and cease to exist. There is a difference. A rose does not exist as a rose because it is a rose; rather, the rational approach would be to say, a rose exists because the possible essence that we understand to be rose has received reality. To say that we know of reality through the essences of things does not address nor disprove Aquinas argument.
Note, that nobody is claiming that an essence exists before it exists, but rather, a potential essence cannot exist if there is no such thing as existence. There has to be such a thing as necessary reality before we can speak meaningfully and rationally about potentiality. The potentiality of beings makes no logical sense without the esse/essence distinction