Discussion of Spaemann's proof of God

[TheWhim]

I’d like to discuss with you an argument for God’s existence that seems to be lesser known on English-speaking Internet-pages. As far as I know, it has been originated by the German philosopher Robert Spaemann and was just lately put into a broader shape in both the books Das unsterbliche Geruecht [The Immortal Rumor], Stuttgart 2007 and Der letzte Gottesbeweis [The Last Proof of God’s Existence], Muenchen 2007.

Below I present an extract from the following internet-page:

communio-icr.com/articles/PDF/spaemann32-4.pdf

I would like to clarify what I mean, namely, the fact that

truth presupposes God, by means of a final example, a proof for the

existence of God, which is, so to speak, Nietzsche-resistant, a proof

for the existence of God that is based on grammar, or more precisely,

on the so-called futurum exactum. The futurum exactum, the

future perfect, is for us necessarily conceptually connected with the

present. To say about something that it is now is at the same time to

say that it will have been in the future. In this sense, every truth is

eternal. The fact that on the evening of 6 December 2004, a large

number of people gathered together in the Hochschule fuer

Philosophie in Munich for a lecture on "Rationality and Faith in

God" was not only true on that evening, it is always true. If we are

here today, then tomorrow we will have been here. The present

always remains actual as the past of the future present. But what sort

of actuality is this? A person could say: it is real in the traces that it

leaves behind through its causal impact. But these traces become

fainter and fainter. And they are only traces insofar as that which left

them behind is recalled for what it is.

To the extent that past events are remembered, it is not

difficult to answer the question concerning their mode of being.

They have their reality precisely in being remembered. But at some

point memory comes to an end. And at some point there will no

longer be any human beings on the earth. Ultimately, the earth itself

will disappear. Because a present always belongs to the past, whose

past it is, we also have to say: if the past disappears, then so does the

conscious present-and presence exists only as something known-

and so, too, the futurum exactum loses its meaning. But this is

precisely what we are unable to think. The sentence, "In the distant

future, it will no longer be true that today we were gathered

together," is nonsense. It cannot be thought. If it will ever be true

that we were not here, then we are in fact not really here now, just

as Buddhism has consistently claimed. If the present reality will at

some point no longer have been, then it is in fact not really real.

Whoever dismisses the futurum exactum dismisses the present.

But once again: what sort of reality does this reality of the

past have, the eternal truth of every truth? The sole answer can be:

we have to think of a consciousness in which everything that

happens is taken up, an absolute consciousness. No word can later be

unspoken, no pain unsuffered, no joy unexperienced. What has

happened can be forgiven, but it cannot be made not to have

happened. If there is such a thing as reality, then the futurum exactum

is inevitable and, with it, the postulate of God’s reality. "I am

afraid," Nietzsche wrote, "that we are not free from God, because

we still believe in grammar." But we cannot get around believing in

grammar. Even Nietzsche could only write what he wrote because

the very things he wanted to say, he entrusted to grammar.

…to be continued…

 

[TheWhim]

Okay, let’s take a brief look at some of Spaemann’s claims:

The sentence, "In the distant

future, it will no longer be true that today we were gathered

together," is nonsense. It cannot be thought.

I think this cannot be challenged. Let’s express part of this thought a little differently:

1. Everything that is now will necessarily have been some time or other.
2. If it would be now it couldn’t be that it won’t have been anymore some time or other.
3. Therefore, if it won’t be anymore then it isn’t now.

As Spaemann expresses so ingeniously, we indeed run into absurdity if we deny the futurum exactum and its claim upon our ways of thinking.

Well, but let’s first consider the absurdity-solution(somehow: the Buddhist solution): since the present isn’t really present - indeed it would seem to be logically impossible that it could be present - the present must be a sheer illusion. But if the present is a mere illusion, if something that is cannot really be, if the present is build upon absurdity, the whole world seems to fall back into absurdity and we can only save truth and reasonable statements if we invoke God to save the present and thereby a sense of reality and truthfulness.

So seems to be the reasoning of Spaemann. Well, I can’t agree with this because it seems apparent to me that Spaemann is putting in a premise into his argument that isn’t quite evident - indeed, some would fight it vociferously.

But before I settle this point, let me point out one another thing: it strikes me as curious that the present, if indeed it should be logically impossible, is nevertheless experienced by me as being patently real every waking hour from moment to moment. And the belittling of this profound experience as a mere illusion doesn’t change anything in this regard. My immediate experience is the only channel to the world and this experience is always instantiated in the present. Therefore this experience of the present remains a fact even if it is called an illusion - because even the action of calling this experience, which constitutes my very self, an illusion, can only be instantiated in the present. If indeed it would be logically impossible, then we shouldn’t expect there to be this fact - call it illusion or by any other name you’d like to choose - but a mere void, yeah, our own annihilation.

This somehow reminds me of the strange reasonings of those scientific minds who do not fail to point out on every second occasion that our consciousness, that is, our immediate experience that constitutes our self, is just an illusion; and indeed in their world-view it must be because the globalisation of temporally and spatially seperated neuronal centers of activity in the brain into a psychic entity(consciousness) is emperically simply not explainable and never will be so - emperically, there is no subjectivity in matter, no interior life in matter, so to say, no ghost in the machine - this collides with all scientific principles. Well, what is the scientists’ solution? Just call it an illusion. Oh, call it by every name you like but the mere fact that you are forced to pay attention to it - the mere fact that you have to call it an illusion - means that it is an experience you cannot circumvent, that forever hounds you, and the only question that really matters is not calling this tremendous fact petty names, but why, why on earth it can be there at all if according to all scientific principles it is an impossibility that it can be - and indeed is - there.

…continued…

 

[TheWhim]

Okay, this was a vast disgression but in some way it serves as a bridge to one certain example of shrewdness in Spaemann’s argument I’d like to draw attention to, as announced above. Spaemann writes:

… if the past disappears, then so does the

conscious present-and presence exists only as something known-

and so, too, the futurum exactum loses its meaning.

In other words it seems to me that Spaemann’s argument will indeed prove God’s existence, but only to a certain group of people - namely, dogmatic idealists.

Because in my opinion - as far as this opinion is advanced as yet - the argument could also be taken to prove the existence of an objective reality(as well as the objectivity of psychic events, but this is of no concern here).

If a certain butterfly passes my window this moment - and if I happen to be the only one who observes it - then surely enough I will have forgotten it some time later. But this woud mean that the present - as it passes now - will not have been later; what clearly is irrational(as stated above). But what is to follow from this? Well, my immediate experience of the presence, of the butterfly flying by, is a brute fact. I cannot possibly deny(if I do not want to deny myself). But this fact, so it follows from logic since I’ll forget it some time, doesn’t actually happen now, that is, is not a fact now. It follows that the butterfly passes my window but doesn’t pass my window.

Since this is irrational, a natural conclusion would be the following: the fact remains even if I, as a conscious mind, cannot remind the fact anymore. In other words: the existence of an objective reality is proven. You see now, plainly enough the underlying assumption in Spaemann’s argument: that a reality that is not reminded, beheld or otherwise observed by a conscious mind - simply doesn’t exist. But this is an idealistic assumption. Indeed, if one happens to be an idealist one has to step to postulate the existence of an universal consciousness - i.e. God - in order to escape the logical pitfall. But before such a necessary postulate can be made, idealism has to be proven to be right.

So long as the argument doesn’t prove that one would go astray in logic again by postulating the objectivity of outer reality, the whole argument can well be taken to prove just this: the objectivity of reality. One would go logically astray again if facts could not be conceived to exist by themselves, that is, without being beheld by a conscious mind.

Okay, I’m so far advanced in the analysis of Spaemann’s interesting argument by now. Does anybody share my conclusions or finds some fallacy in them?

Yours.

 

[Ridgerunner]

Apologize for jumping in just to find the thread later when I have more time to study it.

 

[TheWhim]

Nevermind, Ridgerunner. So far this is anyway entirely a soliloquy.

In another forum it happend that I was a little misunderstood so I may reasonably presume that some further comments are required to forestall any misunderstanding.

My first post will undoubtedly have shown you that I’m not in agreement with Spaemann’s proof because I think it relies too much on idealism - that reality is only reality if it is apprehended by a conscious mind.

Now a good deal can be said in defence of idealism. Indeed, we, if it comes to that, cannot apprehend the world objectively but only via our own conscious minds. It was a scientist and not a philosopher I read once saying: “A world where there were no conscious minds would indeed be no world at all” - simply because no one would be able to ascertain that this world exists via subjective-conscious experience.

However, I believe that even this sort of “light” idealism doesn’t suffice to make Spaemann’s proof solid. Because if we cannot ascertain that something exists it need not follow that therefore it cannot exist. As I said in my first post, I think Spaemann’s proof can both be taken to prove God as well as to prove objectivity in this world(in other words: realism). It all depends just on your own premise: are you a dogmatic idealist or rather some sort of a realist?
Therefore, Spaemann’s proof makes us stand at the crossroads and it’s our own choice, according to our own premises in theory of cognition, which road to take - if be want to be lead to the postulate of God’s existence or to a strengthening of our sense of objectivity.

Well, as I said, I don’t think that “light” idealism is enough to infer God’s existence via this argument. I believe that we stand at the crossroads because we either have to choose dogmatic idealism or realism(and, just for the sake of argument, I would even subsume the sort of “light” idealism described above under the headline of realism just to mark the tremendous difference to dogmatic idealism in this argument, that is, in Spaemann’s, and the conclusions it could lead to).
Only if we hold that a world without a concious mind is not only unascertainble, but impossible, we do arrive at God. This dogmatic idealist reasoning runs as follows: The present events will once have passed out of the memory of conscious minds. And if it is impossible that anything is that is not in a conscious mind, it would follow that the present is not at all - but the present is - therefore God(universal conscious mind), who will always remember everything, exists.
But - and this is, instead, the reasoning of “light” idealism - if it is possible(though unasertainable) that something that is not present in a conscious mind exists, it would follow that the present will also have been in the future, though it isn’t remembered anymore.
(Both arguments, as presented now by me, are pretty inconclusive but I already spelled them out at sufficient lenght in my first post and surely need not repeat them here in an unimpeachably coherent manner.)

Therefore, I think it doesn’t suffice if a lot can be said in support of a “light” idealism. I rather conclude that one has to be a dogmatic idealist - who believes in the impossibility of anything existing outside a conscious mind - to arrive at God with Spaemann’s proof.

And I do not want this thread to turn into a debate over such matters: whether dogmatic idealism could be true or not.

What I’m asking is effectively this: do you share my conclusion that Spaemann’s argument is valid proof for God - that is, at least for an universal conscious mind - for a dogmatic idealist - but only for a dogmatic idealist?

I just want to make sure I got this right.

 

[JDaniel]

Apologize for jumping in just to find the thread later when I have more time to study it.

Likewise.

jd

 

[punkforchrist]

Hi Whim,

I think your analysis is correct. Spaemann’s argument is correct if and only if some mind is necessary for a fact (more specifically, a true proposition). We might supplement his argument by pointing out what might be termed a “trilemma.”

Abstract objects (i.e. propositions, numbers, sets, etc.) are either: a) contingent; b) necessary and mind-independent; or c) necessary concepts of a mind.

You seem to agree that anti-realism is ruled out once we consider the ramifications (i.e. “2 + 2 = 4” - Is this proposition only contingently true?). This leaves us with the possibility of mind-independence (Platonism, or something remotely like it) or conceptualism (which may have some important ties with idealism, though not necessarily in all respects).

We might begin by pointing out that there’s nothing absurd in the notion of conceptualism/idealism. That is to say, no logical contradiction is imminent in the conjunction of the following two statements: 1) There are necessary truths; and 2) Truths are conceptual in nature.

That leaves us with a possible critique of mind-independence. Abstract objects do not stand in causal relations. Yet, in order to have knowledge of something that exists independently of the mind, there must be a causal relationship between the subject who knows and the external object being known. For example, your eyes act as a bridge in the causal relation between your mind and your computer screen. Since abstract objects don’t stand in any causal relations, then it would follow that we would not be capable of having knowledge of them. But, we do have knowledge of abstract objects (i.e. I know that “2 + 2 = 4”). Hence, abstract objects are necessary concepts of a mind.

Now, consider the union of all true propositions. We might call it U. U is itself an abstract object, and so it must be known by some mind. However, it cannot be known by just any mind, since only an omniscient mind could know all true propositions. From this it follows that an omniscient mind - God - exists.

What do you think?

 

[JDaniel]

Nevermind, Ridgerunner. So far this is anyway entirely a soliloquy.

In another forum it happend that I was a little misunderstood so I may reasonably presume that some further comments are required to forestall any misunderstanding.

My first post will undoubtedly have shown you that I’m not in agreement with Spaemann’s proof because I think it relies too much on idealism - that reality is only reality if it is apprehended by a conscious mind.

Now a good deal can be said in defence of idealism. Indeed, we, if it comes to that, cannot apprehend the world objectively but only via our own conscious minds. It was a scientist and not a philosopher I read once saying: “A world where there were no conscious minds would indeed be no world at all” - simply because no one would be able to ascertain that this world exists via subjective-conscious experience.

However, I believe that even this sort of “light” idealism doesn’t suffice to make Spaemann’s proof solid. Because if we cannot ascertain that something exists it need not follow that therefore it cannot exist. As I said in my first post, I think Spaemann’s proof can both be taken to prove God as well as to prove objectivity in this world(in other words: realism). It all depends just on your own premise: are you a dogmatic idealist or rather some sort of a realist?
Therefore, Spaemann’s proof makes us stand at the crossroads and it’s our own choice, according to our own premises in theory of cognition, which road to take - if be want to be lead to the postulate of God’s existence or to a strengthening of our sense of objectivity.

Well, as I said, I don’t think that “light” idealism is enough to infer God’s existence via this argument. I believe that we stand at the crossroads because we either have to choose dogmatic idealism or realism(and, just for the sake of argument, I would even subsume the sort of “light” idealism described above under the headline of realism just to mark the tremendous difference to dogmatic idealism in this argument, that is, in Spaemann’s, and the conclusions it could lead to).
Only if we hold that a world without a concious mind is not only unascertainble, but impossible, we do arrive at God. This dogmatic idealist reasoning runs as follows: The present events will once have passed out of the memory of conscious minds. And if it is impossible that anything is that is not in a conscious mind, it would follow that the present is not at all - but the present is - therefore God(universal conscious mind), who will always remember everything, exists.
But - and this is, instead, the reasoning of “light” idealism - if it is possible(though unasertainable) that something that is not present in a conscious mind exists, it would follow that the present will also have been in the future, though it isn’t remembered anymore.
(Both arguments, as presented now by me, are pretty inconclusive but I already spelled them out at sufficient lenght in my first post and surely need not repeat them here in an unimpeachably coherent manner.)

Therefore, I think it doesn’t suffice if a lot can be said in support of a “light” idealism. I rather conclude that one has to be a dogmatic idealist - who believes in the impossibility of anything existing outside a conscious mind - to arrive at God with Spaemann’s proof.

And I do not want this thread to turn into a debate over such matters: whether dogmatic idealism could be true or not.

What I’m asking is effectively this: do you share my conclusion that Spaemann’s argument is valid proof for God - that is, at least for an universal conscious mind - for a dogmatic idealist - but only for a dogmatic idealist?

I just want to make sure I got this right.

Good morning, Whim:

Hmmm. Pretty deep stuff. On first reading, I found myself tending to agree with you wholeheartedly. On second reading, I’m now not so sure.

It seems that Spaemann has gone further than just having left the proof of God’s existence in the hands (or, minds, as it were) of hard-line “idealists”. He has worked hard, throughout his dissertation, to prove “reality” (the objecivity-ness of things, happenings, brute facts, etc.). And, the dissertation is much more, perhaps, a proof for the existence (being), and permanence, of reality regardless of whether or not a conscious being remains to remind the past.

You have noted that Spaemann has placed the crux of proof of reality into the hands of grammar in such a way that it must necessarily remain in the hands of a for-all-time conscious mind (thus, God). Therefore, that which was still is - at least as a “concept” - and shall remain timelessly true.

Well, of course, the realist will counter that only the argument itself requires a leap to a perpetual mind, or god. He will say that “reality” does not require that leap and once the memory of a past exigency has expired, that it is no longer True is not important as there will be no one left to feel the ramifications of any legacy effects at all.

The problem is, if this is the case, then we can really have no assurances that what is outside, past the viewpoint of consciousness, is both real and true. All we will know is the shadows on the wall: nothing behind us, nothing above us, nothing below us, nothing to our sides. But, the immediate argument only leaves us in this quandry. It is of no help in resolving it.

cont . . .

 

[JDaniel]

Good morning, Whim:

Hmmm. Pretty deep stuff. On first reading, I found myself tending to agree with you wholeheartedly. On second reading, I’m now not so sure.

It seems that Spaemann has gone further than just having left the proof of God’s existence in the hands (or, minds, as it were) of hard-line “idealists”. He has worked hard, throughout his dissertation, to prove “reality” (the objecivity-ness of things, happenings, brute facts, etc.). And, the dissertation is much more, perhaps, a proof for the existence (being), and permanence, of reality regardless of whether or not a conscious being remains to remind the past.

You have noted that Spaemann has placed the crux of proof of reality into the hands of grammar in such a way that it must necessarily remain in the hands of a for-all-time conscious mind (thus, God). Therefore, that which was still is - at least as a “concept” - and shall remain timelessly true.

Well, of course, the realist will counter that only the argument itself requires a leap to a perpetual mind, or god. He will say that “reality” does not require that leap and once the memory of a past exigency has expired, that it is no longer True is not important as there will be no one left to feel the ramifications of any legacy effects at all.

The problem is, if this is the case, then we can really have no assurances that what is outside, past the viewpoint of consciousness, is both real and true. All we will know is the shadows on the wall: nothing behind us, nothing above us, nothing below us, nothing to our sides. But, the immediate argument only leaves us in this quandry. It is of no help in resolving it.

If, on the other hand, one can think of the futurum exactum of a reality-instance (occurance, thing, thought, factical) then think of the thought-instance of that futurum exactum one has gone past the original simultaneousness of the present and the future perfect, possessing both the original factical and the factical of that factical, which is actually what proves “reality” to us, to a proof of the truth (as well as, reality) of the original futurum exactum.

In other words, a conscious mind is capable of not only fully grasping the simultaneousness of the future perfect with the present, but also, fully capable of grasping that thought itself as present and future perfect - thus, the ideal is real and true for all time. In fact, it is as true and real as any factical can possibly be.

Now this would be that which absolutely can’t be done except and only by that which is made in the image of God. It cannot be illusion. For, we know it presently and we will know it in the furture and presently we know we will know it in the future, and, in the future, we will know we knew it in the past and will know that we knew we would know it. “Illusion”, by is very nature (and defintion) is arbitrary and fleeting, here at this moment and gone the next. Of course, anyone can endow “illusion” with any determinates one wishes, but, even illusion follows some “rules”. One of those rules is the inability of illusory things to persist. In other words, to claim that what we have is illusion is to prove that it is not.

Thus, here we have the Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth. And, more than that, we have the Real, the Whole Real, and Nothing but the Real. If mankind expires; if the world expires, if the unverse expires, the truth and reality of the futurum exactum of the futurum exactum of a factical persists. It matters nothing whether anyone thinks it important or not. The realness of that factical cannot be swept away by the arbitrary whim of a conscious mind. (No pun intended.)

jd

 

[TheWhim]

Hello JDaniel,

Let me try to address your posts.

Well, of course, the realist will counter that only the argument itself requires a leap to a perpetual mind, or god. He will say that “reality” does not require that leap and once the memory of a past exigency has expired, that it is no longer True is not important as there will be no one left to feel the ramifications of any legacy effects at all.

Oh! I don’t think the realist can say that past events no longer remembered aren’t true anymore. If I’m not mistaken, he would be guilty of a logical fallacy, because Spaemann’s argument, which I clumsily recast in the following terms…
1.Everything that is now will necessarily have been some time or other.
2. If it would be now it couldn’t be that *it *won’t have been anymore some time or other.
3. Therefore, if it won’t be anymore then it isn’t now.
… this very argument would lead him to conclude that also the present isn’t true, that it is an illusion – which is, as I explained, and as you agree, not tenable. Besides, a realist would never subscribe to the proposition that the present is a mere delusion.

I’d rather think the realist would not take the futurum exactum as his starting point but rather argue beginning with the present, like this:

1. Everything that is now will necessarily always have been, otherwise it wouldn’t be now(see the three steps above).
2. The present events are…well… present(now) and cannot be denied to be so.
3. Therefore, the present events will always have been, always remain true, though they might not be remembered anymore by a conscious mind.
   subsequent comment: I only want to add now, as a sidenote and stepping aside of the general argumentative flow of this post, that I’m quite uneasy about this realist counter-argument, that I suspect some deficiency in it – but unless I’ve thought the matter through for some time I will not write about this. This uneasiness is, however, so great, that I fattened this side-remark - I shall surely turn to this point again some days off from now.]

Okay, I just wanted to say that we should remain fair with the realist – I think he will never believe in the nontruth of the past.

The problem is, if this is the case, then we can really have no assurances that what is outside, past the viewpoint of consciousness, is both real and true.

The idealist will have no assurances of such a kind but not so the realist(unless, of course, the idealist turns to God).

…continued…

 

[TheWhim]

If, on the other hand, one can think of the futurum exactum of a reality-instance (occurance, thing, thought, factical) then think of the thought-instance of that futurum exactum one has gone past the original simultaneousness of the present and the future perfect, possessing both the original factical and the factical of that factical, which is actually what proves “reality” to us, to a proof of the truth (as well as, reality) of the original futurum exactum.

I fancy I see what you mean. The futurum exactum proves that the present is real, according to these three steps:

1. Everything that is now will necessarily have been some time or other.
2. If it would be now it couldn’t be that it won’t have been anymore some time or other.
3. Therefore, if it won’t be anymore then it isn’t now.

And you turn now to rightly show that we can also extend the argument farther, like this:

1. Everything that will have been some time or other will necessarily also have been some time or other.
   Since the futurum exactum has been already tied down to the present(if it won’t be anymore it isn’t now, which is impossible etc.) – and since the present cannot be an illusion(as you also say below), the futurum exactum of the futurum exactum is also shown to be true.

A realist certainly won’t feel any need to quarrel with you here. However, I think your step is plainly superfluous.
The realist won’t start beginning with the futurum exactum(nor with the futurum exactum of the futurum exactum) but simply with the present. I showed his (assumed) reasoning above.

But if we regard your argument with the idealist’s eye, it is both superfluous and unsatisfying.
It doesn’t change the old argument…

1. Everything that is now will necessarily have been some time or other.
2. If it would be now it couldn’t be that it won’t have been anymore some time or other.
3. Therefore, if it won’t be anymore then it isn’t now.
   … an inch. And it does in no way calm the restless question of the idealist what will happen to the present if it is no longer remembered in the future – the future of the future is, viewed from the present, nothing else than this: the future. So our unhappy idealist still asks ruminatively: what will happen to the present if it is no longer remembered in the future of the future?

In other words, a conscious mind is capable of not only fully grasping the simultaneousness of the future perfect with the present, but also, fully capable of grasping that thought itself as present and future perfect - thus, the ideal is real and true for all time. In fact, it is as true and real as any factical can possibly be.

This restating of your argument brings you now into full company with the realist who argues as follows:

1. Everything that is now will necessarily always have been, otherwise it wouldn’t be now(see the three steps above).
2. The present events are…well… present(now) and cannot be denied to be so.
3. Therefore, the present events will always have been, always remain true, though they might not be remembered anymore by a conscious mind.
   You argue likewise: the simultaneousness of the future perfect with the present(which is undubitably real) confirms the realness of the future perfect, which again(so to so) becomes a real present for another then equally real future perfect(the future perfect of the future perfect). The three points above are just an easier reading of the same thought, it seems to me.

Now this would be that which absolutely can’t be done except and only by that which is made in the image of God.

Sorry, I can’t follow your argument here. Please add some explanations. Why invoke God? I think our realist is perfectly content with present reality alone.

In other words, to claim that what we have is illusion is to prove that it is not.

Yeah, I completely share your opinion as to this remark, as twice pointed out above.

If mankind expires; if the world expires, if the unverse expires, the truth and reality of the futurum exactum of the futurum exactum of a factical persists. It matters nothing whether anyone thinks it important or not. The realness of that factical cannot be swept away by the arbitrary whim of a conscious mind.

That’s the realist’s reasoning. Still I do not see why God must be invoked to fit into this concept. He is simply not required here.

Okay, JDaniel, if I got something wrong with your argument, just be so friendly not to feel bothered but rather take your time to respond in all patience to any possible misrepresentations of your ideas.

 

[TheWhim]

Hi punkforchrist,

therefore, your argument, in strict relation to the question discussed here, runs somehow like this(of course, the points below do not constitute a wholesome argumentation and only make sense when viewed in light of your comprehensive explanations):

1. It is a true proposition that something that is now will always have been.
2. True propositions always remain true(i.e. they are not contingent)
3. True propositions do not exist independently of a conscious mind(to use a gross image, like self-sufficient ideas floating around somewhere).
4. The true proposition “what is now will always have been” exists in a conscious mind.
5. Humans forget about things.
6. The true proposition “What is now will always have been” will once escape from the universal human memory; it will slip out of human consciousness.
7. Since true propositions are not contingent, and also aren’t independent objects, they have to continue to exist in some mind even though they aren’t in any human mind anymore.
8. And this very mind in which true propositions are always present is God’s omniscient mind.

Do you think this is a proper appliance?

 

[punkforchrist]

I’d say that’s a decent summary of the argument.

 

[TheWhim]

I announced an addition to the argument with these words:

[subsequent comment: I only want to add now, as a sidenote and stepping aside of the general argumentative flow of this post, that I’m quite uneasy about this realist counter-argument, that I suspect some deficiency in it

And the realist counter-argument to Spaemann’s argument I construed as appearing such:

1. Everything that is now will necessarily always have been, otherwise it wouldn’t be now(see the three steps above).
2. The present events are…well… present(now) and cannot be denied to be so.
3. Therefore, the present events will always have been, always remain true, though they might not be remembered anymore by a conscious mind.

What made me so reluctant to join the in the realist’s assertion was the plain yet, if one thinks about it, quite wondrous fact that the objective world is onely seen subjectively - that we are only able to perceive the objects around us(and the very word perceive implies so) as embedded into our subjective consciousness, as states of our subjective mind, as abstract objects, if one would like to say so, that are given a special meaning, unique to us, via our subjective consciousness.

For instance, if a neuroscientist applied some equipment to my head in order to look at the pattern of my brain-activity on a screen while I was eating sweet chocolate, the pattern that would be constituted by these means would be the perfect material-objective equivalent to my conscious-subjective experience of eating sweet chocolate - yet the qualitative difference between the two would still remain insurmountable. The wonder, the pleasure, the feeling of appetite and of a joyful taste, all the memories and associations combined with sweet chocolate in my ideas, all these widely-different aspects of an inner life all rolled into one experience - the scientist will get no idea of this, even if he would lick my brain while I was eating, even though his hyper-tech-futuristic brain-scanner would allow him mind-reading and enabling to scientifically observe all my ideas; they wouldn’t be his own; he wouldn’t experience them subjectively; the abyss between subjectivity and objectivity is still streching dark, mysterious and wide.

And everyone is taken by different sentiments and associations when eating sweet chocolate. It follows that the *significance * that I bestow on material objects while experiencing them is not an object of the material world yet it is as true as anything could be, truer than the sun at noon. My subjectivity is the only channel to the world. I already quoted the seemingly shocking yet incontestable statement that a world without a conscious mind would somehow be no world at all because it never could be experienced that there was a world at all.
Well, this significance I necessarily and inevitably bestow and experience is no material, but a psychic event - if one might say so, it is an abstract object.

It cannot be contingent because everything that I experience now I will always have experienced. That is the unalterable law of grammar and we cannot step aside of our own language as much as we cannot step aside of our own consciousness. And, what’s the more, it is the realist’s very premise.
But neither is this abstract object mind-independent like material objects(if they exist indeed, but one may safely assume so, if one pleases - fortunately this form of the argument advanced here renders the question if dogmatic idealism is true or rubbish superfluous - it has no impact at all on the argument). Such abstract-objects are not mind-independent, because, as punkforchrist has shown in his post #7, we couldn’t be causally related to such objects somehow conceived semi-materially as floating around somewhere.
It follows that these abstract objects are neither contingent nor mind-independant. But, one may rapidly interject, this seems ridiculous since we well know that we have forgotten such a vast amount of experiences - this would render these abstract objects contingent. But since they cannot be so, they must continue to exist in some other mind, an everlasting, omniscient mind indeed.

Okay, I’ve written this down somewhat hastely and am well aware that a finer touch and more elaboration could have been given to the steps I advanced to reach my conclusion. However, it seems to me that the extract from Spaemann’s essay I quoted in post #1, in combination with punkforchrist’s subtle and lucid clarifications in post #7, are perfectly sufficient to make up for a sound, well-looking argument in favour of God’s existence.

This is my opinion so far. What do you think? Please share any misgivings, if extant.
[/quote]

 

[punkforchrist]

Whim, I think you’ve got a pretty good handle on the argument. My only addition in this post is meant to supplement what you said regarding our subjective experiences of the objective world around us.

P.F. Strawson, one of a handful of philosophers who, in the last century has dealt with transcendental arguments made a very important point about our subjective experiences. He says that we can doubt many things, but we cannot doubt that we’ve had some phenomenal experience of the objective world (the noumena). The reason why is because one would first have to have the experience in order to doubt that one has had the experience. It would be self-defeating, then, to suggest that the experiences themselves lack any objectivity.

Let’s make this more concrete. I am currently having the experience that I am sitting in front of my laptop, surrounded by my apartment walls, and that I can hear various noises around me (traffic, etc.). I can doubt that these things are real independently of me, but I cannot doubt that the experiences I’ve described are objectively real. My own existence, and the experiences that result from my perceptions, are certain to me. Given my own contingency, however, we are still left with the question of whether the noumena can be an illusion, and I don’t believe this can be the case, given what we have already shown, e.g., the necessity of an omniscient mind.

Great thoughts so far, Whim. Keep it up!

 

[MindOverMatter]

I’d like to discuss with you an argument for God’s existence that seems to be lesser known on English-speaking Internet-pages. As far as I know, it has been originated by the German philosopher Robert Spaemann and was just lately put into a broader shape in both the books Das unsterbliche Geruecht [The Immortal Rumor], Stuttgart 2007 and Der letzte Gottesbeweis [The Last Proof of God’s Existence], Muenchen 2007.

Below I present an extract from the following internet-page:

communio-icr.com/articles/PDF/spaemann32-4.pdf

…to be continued…

The idea that a truth is eternally true is absolutely correct. Ultimately there must be an eternal truth that explains all truth including itself; otherwise how could there be any truth? This is impossible.

It is impossible that an event could occur in the future if in fact it wasn’t always true that an event was going to occur in the future.

I like it.

Destiny and freewill are wholly compatible.

 

[JDaniel]

I’d like to discuss with you an argument for God’s existence that seems to be lesser known on English-speaking Internet-pages. As far as I know, it has been originated by the German philosopher Robert Spaemann and was just lately put into a broader shape in both the books Das unsterbliche Geruecht [The Immortal Rumor], Stuttgart 2007 and Der letzte Gottesbeweis [The Last Proof of God’s Existence], Muenchen 2007.

Sorry it took so long to reply to your questions and replies to my posts. My intentions were to provide as succinct and coherent an thought as possible.

I don’t really like engaging in manipulating syllogisms. That said, I would propose some minor changes to your first one:

1. Everything that is will have been in the future, by necessity.
2. If it is now, it cannot be that it won’t have been at any time in the future, by necessity.
3. Therefore, if it won’t have been at any time in the future, then it isn’t now, by necessity.
4. Or the positive, if it will have been at any time in the future, then it is now, by necessity.

This syllogism is the logic that defines the truth of reality by its reference into the future. That reference can only be made if it is simultaneous with the present. It refutes idealism in as much as it is said to be an explanation for the absurdity of existence. It is extraordinary in that it defines, for us, the hard-factness, if I may, of reality such that we are made aware that there really is being.

Your next sentence might be altered like so, “As Spaemann expresses so ingeniously, we indeed run into absurdity if we deny the *futurum exactum *and its claim upon our way of knowing being, or, reality.

What Spaemann is arguing ever so correctly, in my opinion, is that the manner of knowing is what is important here – we must escape the cave and risk possible blindness. The *futurum exactum *is merely the absolute expression in the future of that which is now. In other words, consider the word, “I”. I know that “I am” not merely because I can think, as Descartes puts it, but, because of what I think. I think that, in the future, I will have been precisely because, in fact, I will have thought this at this very moment. It is I that will have held this concept. Therefore, I am real. Illusions cannot manifest the future; they can merely say that it could be.

Simultaneously, I know the fleeting present, which, as you point out, I can never (fully) possess. The instant I possess it, it is gone from my grasp. But, that it is inextricably bound to the futurum exactum of it, permits me the extravagance of certainty about its reality: its past being-ness.

Furthermore, the present has being necessarily because of the simultaneity of the futurum exactum with the fleeting present. That it is, is incontestable. It cannot be illusory. It cannot be an illusion. It cannot be some sort of “ lite idealism”, because it is.

If the present has being necessarily because of the inextricable binding of the fleeting present with the futurum exactum, then you and I and all things have being precisely because you and I and all things are projected into the fleeting present and futurum exactum. It is the incontestable understanding and definition of “being.” Therefore, it is Nietzsche-proof. It seems that ultimately Nietzsche himself knew this.

Only that which is (has being, exists) can be projected into the future, as reality, unless it has, just this moment, had being. There is an order here that the illusionists will not allow. You see, that I am writing this now, will have been – with far too much “force of reality” - a million years from now, whether or not there is anyone left to speak of it. Therefore, it is not dependent upon sentient, temporary beings. Sentient, temporary beings only get to participate, as actors, up to the point of their full-level knowledge of the shadows on the wall, which is, as you can very well see, quite limited.

Now, in the future – perhaps just a day from now – all that I have left of the reality of the writing of this - if my computer crashes - is my memory of it: the rumor, so to speak, as far as I and the other chained actors will ever be concerned. And, if I concede that my memory might not be as precise as I would like it to be, then it surely does become rumor even to me.

Continued . . .

 

[JDaniel]

I’d like to discuss with you an argument for God’s existence that seems to be lesser known on English-speaking Internet-pages. As far as I know, it has been originated by the German philosopher Robert Spaemann

However, if my memory fails, or, becomes cluttered with other things, does not matter a bit. That it happened; that traces of it were left; that we can rely on those traces (to be our regurgitations of what happened), these are all limited vestiges of that which was. We must understand that our current understanding of it is from the point of view of life in a cave and that we are now about to leave it.

Now, the vestiges, the traces, are not the being, the reality. They are memoirs, ideas of the being, or reality. They are apparitions, as it were. But, they are more – and, in some ways, less - than that; they are memories, ideas and apparitions of our conceptualizations of the fully realized futurum exactum. They do not represent the fullness of the memory or the fullness of the idea, or the fullness of the apparition. Interestingly, we cannot even possibly deny the rumor because the rumor itself has the very same certitude of being and reality that the original being, or reality, had – at the moment it was. It is its footprint in the sand.

We are left with but one question: if all that is real (in its fullness), if all that had being (in its fullness) becomes for us, in the future, all that which is not, are we being intellectually honest with ourselves? Or, are we making ourselves targets of sophistry?

Part 2 discusses what believers’ conceptions of God are. Succinctly, Spaemann says that the believer’s concept of God is the juxtaposition of two contraries. He says that we never see them together, in life, but, when we think through each of them “all the way to the end” we have no choice but to include each within the other.

Benjamin Franklin once said, “Beer is proof that God exists and wants us to be happy.” The two prime concepts of God, as held by believers, are “absolute goodness” and “ absolute power”. It should be clear, then, that Ben Franklin’s statement could not have made sense if God were not “unconditional good” and “unconditional power” together simultaneously.

Conditional good and conditional power can be conceived of, for example, as residing in a benevolent dictator. But, a benevolent dictator could not have created the universe, nor could he have sustained it, much less have guaranteed that every decision made would have been the best that it could possibly have been and every action he required would have been done with exactitude, to the letter. And, his past and futurum exactum would soon disappear as forgotten memories.

He further contends that as distinct as these two concepts are on the ideality level, they can come together on the level of thought but only because of the Sacrifice. The necessary outcome of the combining of absolute power and absolute goodness, is “absolute Love.” For us God is, therefore, Unconditional Love. But, what is Unconditional Love? He answers, “Truth.” No less and no more.

This exercise is not intended to extend a logically irrefutable syllogism for God’s existence, as Aquinas does in his five “proofs”. In fact, that God exists is presupposed. It is intended to solidify what we think when we think of God – including the reality of his existence. It is intended to show that all of this is the trace of God-as-irrefutable-Truth. God-as-irrefutable-Truth is what He left behind for us so that we might grasp that we are currently at that future time, that futurum exactum, simultaneously with His act of creating the universe, and His walk on the earth’s soil.

I’ve done so much tweaking of this that I had to stop and post it, or, I could have gone on indefinitely. I hope it makes some sense. I am awed by this description of being.

jd

 

[Gottle_of_Geer]

Okay, let’s take a brief look at some of Spaemann’s claims:

I think this cannot be challenged. Let’s express part of this thought a little differently:

1. Everything that is now will necessarily have been some time or other.
2. If it would be now it couldn’t be that it won’t have been anymore some time or other.
3. Therefore, if it won’t be anymore then it isn’t now.

As Spaemann expresses so ingeniously, we indeed run into absurdity if we deny the futurum exactum and its claim upon our ways of thinking.

Well, but let’s first consider the absurdity-solution(somehow: the Buddhist solution): since the present isn’t really present - indeed it would seem to be logically impossible that it could be present - the present must be a sheer illusion. But if the present is a mere illusion, if something that is cannot really be, if the present is build upon absurdity, the whole world seems to fall back into absurdity and we can only save truth and reasonable statements if we invoke God to save the present and thereby a sense of reality and truthfulness.

So seems to be the reasoning of Spaemann. Well, I can’t agree with this because it seems apparent to me that Spaemann is putting in a premise into his argument that isn’t quite evident - indeed, some would fight it vociferously.

But before I settle this point, let me point out one another thing: it strikes me as curious that the present, if indeed it should be logically impossible, is nevertheless experienced by me as being patently real every waking hour from moment to moment. And the belittling of this profound experience as a mere illusion doesn’t change anything in this regard. My immediate experience is the only channel to the world and this experience is always instantiated in the present. Therefore this experience of the present remains a fact even if it is called an illusion - because even the action of calling this experience, which constitutes my very self, an illusion, can only be instantiated in the present. If indeed it would be logically impossible, then we shouldn’t expect there to be this fact - call it illusion or by any other name you’d like to choose - but a mere void, yeah, our own annihilation.

This somehow reminds me of the strange reasonings of those scientific minds who do not fail to point out on every second occasion that our consciousness, that is, our immediate experience that constitutes our self, is just an illusion; and indeed in their world-view it must be because the globalisation of temporally and spatially seperated neuronal centers of activity in the brain into a psychic entity(consciousness) is emperically simply not explainable and never will be so - emperically, there is no subjectivity in matter, no interior life in matter, so to say, no ghost in the machine - this collides with all scientific principles. Well, what is the scientists’ solution? Just call it an illusion. Oh, call it by every name you like but the mere fact that you are forced to pay attention to it - the mere fact that you have to call it an illusion - means that it is an experience you cannot circumvent, that forever hounds you, and the only question that really matters is not calling this tremendous fact petty names, but why, why on earth it can be there at all if according to all scientific principles it is an impossibility that it can be - and indeed is - there.

…continued…

If X cannot be thought, it cannot be written, neither can it be recognised as not able to be thought. But he said of something he wrote, “It cannot be thought”. So he is contradicting himself. ​

 

[TheWhim]

Dear JDaniel,

your two last posts only contain ideas that I’ve already addressed in my former posts - and I’m sure you won’t be offended if I, by lack of time and humour, refrain to return on them.

However, I just want to propose a few indications and gently ask you to return to my posts and those written by punkforchrist.

These indications are:

• your thinking I’ve dealt with as the “realist” position which, however, might now be more properly termed the realist-materialist position
• I don’t think the realist-materialist position has any need of God(as explained) - to the contrary, the invocation of God becomes superfluous here
• you confound abstract objects(propositions made by a subjective-concious mind) with material objects in believing that abstract objects could be mind-independent(what apparently you do, otherwise you wouldn’t think it necessary to disagree with me and restate you own position in two full-blown posts)

I also conceive that you are not representing Spaemann’s ideas correctly. I can only bid anyone to return again to the original post and read the extract by Spaemann I copied.
I believe one will easily see that the bend that punkforchrist and I have been given to the argument is much nearer to Spaemann’s intention than Daniel’s veiled realist-materialist rendering of it which doesn’t get more theological just because the concept of God is unnessarily, arbitraily attached to it.

Yours.