Does free will violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason?

[blase6]

The PSR states that everything has to have a sufficient explanation for why it exists.

There is deterministic causation, which says that under the conditions for X to happen, X invariably happens. Under deterministic causation, X always has a sufficient reason to happen.

Then there is indeterministic causation, which says that under the conditions for X to happen, X may or may not happen. This form of causation contradicts the PSR, because either a sufficient reason for X exists, but we don’t know it, in which case there is actually deterministic causation; or X happened without a sufficient reason for why, under circumstances which allowed the possibility for X to happen, X happened rather than did not happen.

In libertarian free will, a free agent, given the circumstances necessary for the choice between X or Y to happen, may either choose X or choose Y. Obviously this is indeterministic causation. Therefore, libertarian free will seems to violate the PSR:

1. Even if the free agent has a sufficient reason for why the choice between X and Y itself was made, the free agent has no sufficient reason for why a particular choice of X or Y was made, OR:
2. If a sufficient reason for why a particular choice of X or Y exists, then the choice was not a free choice, since the particular choice was necessitated by the sufficient reason.
3. A sufficient reason cannot exist for both choosing X and choosing Y, because only one option can be taken.

It might be argued against me that I am assuming that given a sufficient reason for X to happen, X must happen. But this is always true in deterministic causation, and even if it is not true in every case, we still have no explanation for why we make particular choices:

1. If we have no reason for our particular choice to exist, then the PSR is violated;
2. If we simply say that we decide our choices, then we have the circular condition of “I made my choice because I made my choice because…” It can’t go anywhere.
3. If it could go anywhere, whether God, our environment, or something else, it would be a determined choice, not a free choice.

Please correct me if anywhere I am wrong.

 

[dmar198]

1. If a sufficient reason for why a particular choice of X or Y exists, then the choice was not a free choice, since the particular choice was necessitated by the sufficient reason.
2. A sufficient reason cannot exist for both choosing X and choosing Y, because only one option can be taken.

These two points appear to assume that having a sufficient reason for a choice necessitates that choice. I’m not sure that’s true. I wonder if you can have a sufficient reason for picking a bowl of Chocolate ice cream, but choose something else instead.

Moreover, in answer to your second trilemma, I would argue you can choose the chocolate ice cream or something else and still have a sufficient reason for it that did not necessitate that choice. “Why did you choose chocolate?” – “Because I like chocolate” – but the sufficient reason in that case does not necessitate the choice.

 

[AlNg]

It’s a word game because for any choice you made, it can be argued that there was some reason for it.

 

[Gorgias]

In libertarian free will, a free agent, given the circumstances necessary for the choice between X or Y to happen, may either choose X or choose Y. Obviously this is indeterministic causation.

Please correct me if anywhere I am wrong.

I think you’re wrong. In your conclusion, you’ve modified the claim in order to make it appear that there’s a problem. Moreover, you’ve insufficiently stated the claim to begin with!

• I would assert, first, that in libertarian free will, not only is there a “choice between X and Y”, but implicitly, there can be the choice “neither X nor Y”, and therefore, there are actually three options in play. I’m going to change your variables (the reason should become clear shortly):

1. Choose Z
2. Choose Y
3. Choose neither Z nor Y.
   I think that this fully describes the set of possible choices. (If Y = ~Z, then the first two are sufficient to describe the set.)

• Deterministic causation, then, wouldn’t predict which choice is made, but rather, would assert only that the event happens. The event X that you’ve described is “choose between the possible options”. In fact, that precise event occurs. Note that, even though X is “choose between Z, Y, and neither”, the event is not “Z” or “Y” or even “neither Z nor Y” – the event is the choice. That event invariably happens, and therefore, by the definitions you’ve given here, it fits deterministic causation.

In other words, the dilemma you propose (“no sufficient reason for why a particular choice is made”) doesn’t come into play here, since the event is merely the choice. The reason isn’t part of the construct, based on the way you’ve framed up the scenario.

 

[AlNg]

I think that this fully describes the set of possible choices.

You can choose Z and Y
You can choose Z and not Y
You can choose not (Z or Y)
You can choose not (Z and Y)

 

[Gorgias]

Gorgias:

I think that this fully describes the set of possible choices.

You can choose Z and Y
You can choose Z and not Y
You can choose not (Z or Y)
You can choose not (Z and Y)

• We’re assuming one choice, not multiple choices, aren’t we?
• Z and not Y is already covered (i.e., choose Z)
• Not (Z or Y) reduces to ~Z and ~Y, which was already mentioned (i.e., choose neither).
• Not (Z and Y) has the same value as “neither, or Z, or Y”… which was the entirety of the definition of the single choice.

 

[blase6]

The set of choices is irrelevant, as long as there is a choice to be made.

My claim is that free will violates the PSR because it involves indeterministic causation. Indeterministic causation means that despite the sufficient conditions for X to happen, X is not guaranteed to happen. Instead, Y, Z, or anything else possible in the situation could happen. Thus, while there is a sufficient reason for an outcome to happen, there is not a sufficient reason for any particular outcome to happen. Therefore, if X happens, we have no explanation for why X happened and not something else. Thus X happening is a brute fact, and indeterministic causation and free will violate the PSR.

 

[STT]

We are creating a chain of causality when we make decision, otherwise we are a part of chain of causality.

 

[blase6]

http://www.bsu.edu/libraries/benefi...ng/principleofsufficientreasonandfreewill.pdf

Here is a more in-depth discussion of what I am talking about. The author claims that the PSR is compatible with free will if the PSR is defined such that no contingent fact is required to have an explanation for why it is not otherwise. However, I find the new definition he gives for the PSR to leave out the necessity of explanations for necessary facts, I find his claim of examples of indeterministic sufficient explanations to be “not difficult to find” unsubstantiated (his lightswitch example seems to be erroneous), and, he is effectively admitting what I had already recognized: that no sufficient reason exists for why the outcome of a free choice was not otherwise.

 

[AlNg]

My claim is that free will violates the PSR because it involves indeterministic causation.

With classical mechanics, there is always a determining cause for a subsequent action. However, with quantum mechanics and free will not so much.

 

[Gorgias]

My claim is that free will violates the PSR because it involves indeterministic causation. Indeterministic causation means that despite the sufficient conditions for X to happen, X is not guaranteed to happen.

Yes, I understand your claim.

However, your conclusion doesn’t hold, because although you wish to demonstrate a problem with the choice, you unfortunately frame up your ‘X’ as “a choice between two things happens.” When that choice occurs, your ‘X’ has been satisfied, without the problem you assert is present.

 

[blase6]

As I said, the number of available options does not matter, as long as there is a choice to make. I don’t see how you have shown that my conclusion “doesn’t hold”.