Does Hume's Fork void cosmological argument?

[Neithan]

I was reading the Wikipedia article (always dangerous, I know) on David Hume’s famous “fork” and noticed the claim that it “makes it pointless to try to prove the existence of God (for example) as a matter of fact” because apparently arguments about God are just like playing with words and not applicable to reality.

But is that actually the case? I can see how Hume’s fork could be used to marginalize the ontological argument, given that it does not use any material data; but does the fork really puncture the cosmological argument “cosmo” for brevity]. Cosmo argues from the state of material affairs - matter of fact - to the first cause, prime mover or necessary existent. So does Hume’s fork work?

 

[utunumsint]

I was reading the Wikipedia article (always dangerous, I know) on David Hume’s famous “fork” and noticed the claim that it “makes it pointless to try to prove the existence of God (for example) as a matter of fact” because apparently arguments about God are just like playing with words and not applicable to reality.

But is that actually the case? I can see how Hume’s fork could be used to marginalize the ontological argument, given that it does not use any material data; but does the fork really puncture the cosmological argument “cosmo” for brevity]. Cosmo argues from the state of material affairs - matter of fact - to the first cause, prime mover or necessary existent. So does Hume’s fork work?

Hume’s fork can be turned against itself. He comes by it a priori.

We can demonstrate this by substituting the words “divinity and metaphysics” with “Fork” in the following quote:

If we take in our hand -]any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics/-], the fork, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? **No. **Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.[8] - An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

God bless,
Ut

 

[Neithan]

Hume’s fork can be turned against itself. He comes by it a priori.

We can demonstrate this by substituting the words “divinity and metaphysics” with “Fork” in the following quote:

God bless,
Ut

Ha, clever! So that settles it then?

 

[dmar198]

Ha, clever! So that settles it then?

If I understand the fork correctly, it says that we should dispense with any claim of certainty regarding all ideas that are not proven by either standard mathematics or formal logic. (And if I understand the concept of formal logic correctly, it refers to the kind of logic that can be put into symbols and computed mathematically.) I can think of at least two reasons why this doesn’t make it void to argue for God’s existence: first, the fork itself is an idea that has not been proven by either math or formal logic. Thus it dispenses with any certainty regarding itself. Second, I have seen attempts to translate some of the classic and modern arguments for God’s existence into formal logic and symbolic logic. Thus, even if Hume’s fork was certainly true, it allows for proof by math and formal logic, and at least some of the arguments for God’s existence may be formulated in those systems.

I also think there is a fallacy in this sentence from the wikipedia article: “If God is not literally made up of physical matter, and does not have an observable effect on the world, making a statement about God is not a matter of fact.” – How do they know that the only facts are facts connected with physical matter and observable effects? It seems that the article assumes that the only real facts are material facts and then argues that if God is not connected to matter, He must not be a fact. There seems to be some kind of fallacy there. They cannot rule out the possibility of spiritual facts by the mere assertion that only material facts count. Also, even their faulty argument is based on the premise that God “does not have an observable effect on the world.” The existence of miracles, however, suggests that this premise is flawed.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Pascal and Kant at least agree that arguments for the existence of God can be accepted or rejected, but that none of these arguments is a smoking pistol of proof. By the way, there also is no smoking pistol of proof that God does not exist.

This is why Pascal offered the wager argument. The Wager avoid the traditional proof and offers in their place an argument that, whether or not you can prove God exists, it is in our profound and eternal interest always to give God the benefit of our doubt.

It’s a difficult argument to rebut, and the only one Bertrand Russell never even tried to rebut.

 

[utunumsint]

Pascal and Kant at least agree that arguments for the existence of God can be accepted or rejected, but that none of these arguments is a smoking pistol of proof. By the way, there also is no smoking pistol of proof that God does not exist.

This is why Pascal offered the wager argument. The Wager avoid the traditional proof and offers in their place an argument that, whether or not you can prove God exists, it is in our profound and eternal interest always to give God the benefit of our doubt.

It’s a difficult argument to rebut, and the only one Bertrand Russell never even tried to rebut.

Hume, Kant, and Pascal are just part of the riptide of radical skepticism initiated by Descartes although not exclusively caused by him.

The church teaches in the CCC:

34 The world, and man, attest that they contain within themselves neither their first principle nor their final end, but rather that they participate in Being itself, which alone is without origin or end. Thus, in different ways, man can come to know that there exists a reality which is the first cause and final end of all things, a reality “that everyone calls God”.
35 Man’s faculties make him capable of coming to a knowledge of the existence of a personal God. But for man to be able to enter into real intimacy with him, God willed both to reveal himself to man, and to give him the grace of being able to welcome this revelation in faith.(so) the proofs of God’s existence, however, can predispose one to faith and help one to see that faith is not opposed to reason.

God bless,
Ut

 

[balto]

Ha, clever! So that settles it then?

It actually is really that simple. Hume seems to enjoy a prominent standing among many skeptics, but his thinking oftentimes seems to refute itself, as utunumsint demonstrated above. I believe Elizabeth Anscombe was the one that referred to him as a “mere brilliant sophist” and I think the description is probably apt. Although Hume’s fork was the result of following some of Descartes’ theories to their logical conclusions, so Descartes is probably a culprit as well.

One good reference on this subject is Peter Kreeft’s book Socrates Meets Hume in which Kreeft imagines a fictional dialogue between Socrates and Hume where Socrates rationally cross-examines Hume and his ideas. Kreeft’s writings are very accessible to lay readers and, dare I say it, reminiscent of C.S. Lewis’ apologetics. Another good one to pick up if you are interested is Socrates Meets Descartes since Descartes’ ideas influenced Hume’s ideas somewhat.

 

[balto]

Hume, Kant, and Pascal are just part of the riptide of radical skepticism initiated by Descartes although not exclusively caused by him.

The church teaches in the CCC:

God bless,
Ut

I would be cautious about including Pascal in this list. Pascal was skeptical of Descartes’ extreme rationalism to be sure, but Descartes’ rationalism is something that ought to be doubted in any event. Pascal seems to have accepted traditional Aristotelian arguments for God’s existence, but argued that such knowledge is stale if it does not ultimately lead to an acceptance of Christ. The aim of the Pensees was to argue for the reality of fallen human nature, argue that Christianity at least offers a solution to this problem (disregarding whether it is actually true or not), and then argue that it would ridiculous to not want Christianity to be true, so the skeptic ought to at least have that desire so they can investigate and search for Christ honestly. It was actually an argument for skeptics, not a skeptical argument itself.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

I would be cautious about including Pascal in this list. Pascal was skeptical of Descartes’ extreme rationalism to be sure, but Descartes’ rationalism is something that ought to be doubted in any event. Pascal seems to have accepted traditional Aristotelian arguments for God’s existence, but argued that such knowledge is stale if it does not ultimately lead to an acceptance of Christ. The aim of the Pensees was to argue for the reality of fallen human nature, argue that Christianity at least offers a solution to this problem (disregarding whether it is actually true or not), and then argue that it would ridiculous to not want Christianity to be true, so the skeptic ought to at least have that desire so they can investigate and search for Christ honestly. It was actually an argument for skeptics, not a skeptical argument itself.

Pascal was skeptical only of the power of the traditional arguments to persuade atheists that God exists. He was not skeptical of the traditional arguments themselves. Indeed, those arguments (some of them anyway) are persuasive to anyone who is willing to entertain their merits as probable rather than smoking pistol certain.

 

[Rhubarb]

Ha, clever! So that settles it then?

I don’t think so. The fork is about methodology. It’s not an existential argument or claim. If you want to dispense with the fork, you can simply disagree with Hume’s strict empiricism. (There are plenty of arguments for it)

Though even if you keep the fork, it doesn’t disprove God - it only follows that God can’t be proven. But even then, there’s an ambiguity in “proof”. Hume thinks proof is tied in empirical observation where as I think most of us agree that proof is more than emperical verification. (If memory serves me regarding Hume)

 

[Richca]

I was reading the Wikipedia article (always dangerous, I know) on David Hume’s famous “fork” and noticed the claim that it “makes it pointless to try to prove the existence of God (for example) as a matter of fact” because apparently arguments about God are just like playing with words and not applicable to reality.

But is that actually the case? I can see how Hume’s fork could be used to marginalize the ontological argument, given that it does not use any material data; but does the fork really puncture the cosmological argument “cosmo” for brevity]. Cosmo argues from the state of material affairs - matter of fact - to the first cause, prime mover or necessary existent. So does Hume’s fork work?

No. The CCC#286, quoting Vatican Council I, says “The existence of God the creator can be known with certainty through his works, by the light of human reason.”

And St Paul says “For what can be known about God is evident to them, because God made it evident to them. Ever since the creation of the world, his invisible attributes of eternal power and divinity have been able to be understood and perceived in what he has made.” (Romans 1: 19-20).

And Psalm 19: 2-5, "The heavens declare the glory of God;
the firmament proclaims the works of his hands.

Day unto day pours forth speech;
night unto night whispers knowledge.

There is no speech, no words;
their voice is not heard;

A report goes forth through all the earth,
their messages, to the ends of the world."

 

[Neithan]

I don’t think so. The fork is about methodology. It’s not an existential argument or claim. If you want to dispense with the fork, you can simply disagree with Hume’s strict empiricism. (There are plenty of arguments for it)

Though even if you keep the fork, it doesn’t disprove God - it only follows that God can’t be proven. But even then, there’s an ambiguity in “proof”. Hume thinks proof is tied in empirical observation where as I think most of us agree that proof is more than emperical verification. (If memory serves me regarding Hume)

We can agree that there are no strict proofs of God’s existence but there are deductively demonstrative arguments. Setting aside the self-defeating use of Hume’s fork (as utunumsint pointed out) does it even work when applied to arguments [e.g. cosmo] based on empirically observable premises?

 

[Rhubarb]

We can agree that there are no strict proofs of God’s existence but there are deductively demonstrative arguments. Setting aside the self-defeating use of Hume’s fork (as utunumsint pointed out) does it even work when applied to arguments [e.g. cosmo] based on empirically observable premises?

I don’t think the Fork is self-defeating. Hume was talking about existential claims and arguments. (From what I gather) The Fork is discussing ideas, not making ontological claims. If the Fork was making an existential claim, then the Fork would say there is no way to prove the Fork. To be self-defeating you need to take the Fork as given, which means no proof is necessary.

But then I think there’s some talking-past going on. For Hume, proof is empirical verification. Clearly, that’s not something we can do when concerning God. That’s why he wants to dismiss with theology and metaphysics, as these mostly deal with rational existential arguments rather than inductive empirical verification of existence.

All this being said, I think the power of the Fork disappears if you’re not a strict empiricist. The Fork is a consequence of Hume’s epistemology. I mean, I don’t particularly find the cosmological, teleological, or ontological arguments very compelling but it’s not because of the Fork.

 

[Neithan]

All this being said, I think the power of the Fork disappears if you’re not a strict empiricist. The Fork is a consequence of Hume’s epistemology. I mean, I don’t particularly find the cosmological, teleological, or ontological arguments very compelling but it’s not because of the Fork.

Cosmo is quite subtle and difficult to grasp when fully formulated (such as in the Summa contra Gentiles). Philosopher Edward Feser is one of the best at interpreting it for us post-moderns. David Hume’s criticisms of it all seem to fall flat - not just the fork, but his ideas about the problem of induction and infinite causal regress. I actually think Hume didn’t understand Aquinas.

 

[utunumsint]

In Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume divides all ideas into the following categories:

1. 
   *]Impressions: By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will.
   *]Thoughts or Ideas: The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas…impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.
   
   For Hume, thoughts and ideas are merely the results of
   
   the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. All our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.
   
   He applies this to the idea of God:
   

   Even those ideas, which, at first view, seem the most wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer scrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression.

   He also issues this challenge:
   

   Those who would assert, that this position is not universally true nor without exception, have only one, and that an easy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived from this source.

   Throughout the first few sections of his book, he complains about how hard and abstract the ideas are that are found in metaphysics and such philosophies. And obviously, he has embarked on a bold plan of throwing it all in the garbage. He thinks this is a powerful attack on metaphysics, but I believe Aquinas and Aristotle would be the first to admit that what he says is true, up to a certain point. Ideas are derived from physical sense impressions. At least, that is the foundation on which any good philosophy ought to build on. However, unlike Hume, they would not stop there. But they would certainly admit, that any good philosophy must be grounded in observations about the empirical world.
   
   Aquinas and Aristotle would deny, however, that these ideas are merely obscure or distorted sense impressions. They would say that there comes a point when these sense impressions get translated into concepts. And this move from impression to concept occurs through abstraction. What results then and what the mind works on are universals stripped of their particulars. A human intellect can easily know what a chiliagon is, but will find it impossible to imagine it. And the reason why it can do so is because ideas and thoughts are not merely weakened sense impressions.
   
   What Hume is here representing as a weakness is actually one of the key building blocks of Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy. They also have a far better developed epistemology to represent this conversion based on the four causes.
   
   More to follow when I have time.
   
   God bless,
   Ut

 

[utunumsint]

Secondly. If it happen, from a defect of the organ, that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation, we always find, that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that sense, in which he is deficient; by opening this new inlet for his sensations, you also open an inlet for the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving these objects. … It is readily allowed, that other beings may possess many senses of which we can have no conception; because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us, in the only manner, by which an idea can have access to the mind, to wit, by the actual feeling and sensation.

I would say I only need to point to Helen Keller to show that this is non-sense.

digital.library.upenn.edu/women/keller/life/life.html

Lately she been much interested in colour. She found the word “brown” in her primer and wanted to know its meaning. I told her that her hair was brown, and she asked, “Is brown very pretty?” After we had been all over the house, and I had told her the colour of everything she touched, she suggested that we go the hen-houses and barns; but I told her she must wait until another day because I was very tired. We sat in the hammock; but there was no rest for the weary there. Helen was eager to know “more colour.” I wonder if she has any vague idea of colour–any reminiscent impression of light and sound. It seems as if a child who could and hear until her nineteenth month must retain some of her first impressions, though ever so faintly. Helen talks a great deal about things that she cannot know of through the sense of touch. She asks many questions about the sky, day and night, the ocean and mountains. She likes to have me tell her what I see in pictures.

What is interesting about this example is that Helen is able to conceptually understand colour without ever having experienced it. She relies on the experience of others. And yet, somehow, with only the senses of taste, touch, and smell, she can somehow create a concept of what is experienced in faculties she has never had.

I wonder what she would have said to Hume in response to this:

When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light, we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute, which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.

Her world would indeed be a very limited place were she to agree with Hume.

God bless,
Ut

 

[thinkandmull]

It actually is really that simple. Hume seems to enjoy a prominent standing among many skeptics, but his thinking oftentimes seems to refute itself, as utunumsint demonstrated above. I believe Elizabeth Anscombe was the one that referred to him as a “mere brilliant sophist” and I think the description is probably apt. Although Hume’s fork was the result of following some of Descartes’ theories to their logical conclusions, so Descartes is probably a culprit as well.

One good reference on this subject is Peter Kreeft’s book Socrates Meets Hume in which Kreeft imagines a fictional dialogue between Socrates and Hume where Socrates rationally cross-examines Hume and his ideas. Kreeft’s writings are very accessible to lay readers and, dare I say it, reminiscent of C.S. Lewis’ apologetics. Another good one to pick up if you are interested is Socrates Meets Descartes since Descartes’ ideas influenced Hume’s ideas somewhat.

Can you name an idea from Descartes that Hume used?

 

[thinkandmull]

I don’t think so. The fork is about methodology. It’s not an existential argument or claim. If you want to dispense with the fork, you can simply disagree with Hume’s strict empiricism. (There are plenty of arguments for it)

Though even if you keep the fork, it doesn’t disprove God - it only follows that God can’t be proven. But even then, there’s an ambiguity in “proof”. Hume thinks proof is tied in empirical observation where as I think most of us agree that proof is more than emperical verification. (If memory serves me regarding Hume)

If there are truly “plenty of arguments” for strict empiricism, type them up for us so we can have the opportunity of assessing them.

If there is an infinite series of past motions, it could never reach now, so it’s an impossibility. Kant and Hume believed we can only say that it is indefinite, but I disagree. That is where the disagreement arises. Metaphysicians say that there are two things, thoughts and matter. Imagine a tiny point-blob. If has no motions going on in it, it is not an infinite series like dominoes. How did it suddenly become the world?? Where did the action come from? A mind however can potentially **not **have a series of separate motions going infinitely in the past so it can be in a type of “eternity”; it just decides “after eternity” to move itself. Therefore a mind could take the point-blob-singularity and make the big bang happen

 

[Rhubarb]

If there are truly “plenty of arguments” for strict empiricism, type them up for us so we can have the opportunity of assessing them.

Perhaps I wasn’t clear. There are plenty of arguments for disagreeing with strict empiricism. That is, against strict empiricism.

 

[You]

If Hume, the materialist, fell off his horse, so to speak, and had a divine encounter would his materialist argument be affected if he sort of denied a materialist argument. Strange things happen and I’m sure that Hume would be sure but would everyone else be sure?