There’s also a possible issue in the difference between objectivity and collective subjectivity, which is fertile ground for misunderstandings. The latter says that there are universal concepts that are only to be found inside our heads, and much of what we take to be objective cannot be found outside our heads.
This is a very interesting point.
My first response is a purely technical, philosophical point. I take it that “concepts” are merely mental representations that have no share in reality whatsoever. This is why we do not pursue concepts; rather, we pursue the objects *or properties *that pertain to these concepts.
To explain: when I say, “Bob is intelligent”, what needs to be true to make this statement true? Bob must exist, and he must have a certain property, “being intelligent”. Does it follow that there is an object “out there” called intelligence, perhaps a Platonic form or some such thing? No indeed. Nevertheless, Bob can still be intelligent.
Just so, if I seek to be wise, I am not seeking a thing, but rather
a way of being. There are moral and immoral ways of being, I would say, but these ways of being depend on the existence of rational agents that can “be” in those ways.
Potatoes have to exist in order for “baked potatoes” to exist. This does not make us question whether baked potatoes objectively exist, does it? Just so, people have to exist in order for there to be good people. Nevertheless, the (objective) standard of goodness for a person is real, although you are right to say that it is “only to be found inside our heads”.
But what is the **ground **of this objectivity? Simply put, God. You might call this “collective subjectivity”, I suppose, if you first clarify that human nature is precisely what God thinks human nature is, and human thriving is exactly what God thinks human thriving is. Whether this system is truly objective or collectively subjective would, in my view, hinge on the answer to the Euthyphro question. (In one form, this is “Is justice good because God desires it, or does God desire justice because it’s good?”) But I’m not sure whether we want to go there.
The Rom 14 issue is that you can say I’m whittling away at the reasons why we should believe, and I can argue that science may eventually cause you a minor upset by locating morality in dynamic processes in the brain.
As for science, this is a misunderstanding. Science can never show that physical causation is the *only *cause for an event. It is certainly true that the movement of electrons is my brain corresponds exactly to the content of my decisions. But so what? This does not show that there is not a hidden cause for *both *the electron movement and the decision. No scientific experiment can ever disprove agent causation.
But the Romans 14 issue is interesting. We might take a “live and let live” reading of the passage, but this is clearly contradicted by the rest of Paul’s writings. In Romans 14, Paul seems to be saying that *certain *beliefs don’t matter much to a person’s salvation. For example, I think there are certain objectively good and bad human ends, and you think that morality is process-driven. About this, perhaps, we can agree to disagree – and actually I suspect your “process theory” carries more than a grain of truth.
However, how exactly is “a process that God gave us to decide what is good and bad” not objective? Presumably, it is
one specific process, though it will manifest itself in different ways? That sounds pretty objective to me.
I mean, consider: a teacher might say that a student would be graded on the quality of the final paper, or alternately the process followed to attain a final paper. But (provided the teacher is a good judge) aren’t both grading systems objective?
For me, the moral teaching of the Gospel is an exploration of love. We come closer to God not by rigidly following laws but through a deeper revelation of love.
Absolutely! Do you think that all objectivists believe that morality is just following codes of morality? To the contrary, I think that goodness is found in love, and that love is much more than following certain rules!
But underlying all of this is an objective truth: Love is a good. For if we did not know that love was a good, then we would not know what love was, at all – since love is essentially good. And I can tell, from our discussions, that you do know that love is a good. So then why does it matter if it’s objectively or “intersubjectively” good? It’s all good.
(I unfortunately have misplaced the name of the photographer for my signature. Darn internet.)