Ethical dilemna: the explorer, the serial killer and the rescue dog

[Seraphignatius]

You were right in pointing out that I did not make an argument by merely stating that the idea of intrinsic value is irrational. Now I would like to point out that you are also making a statement without argument, and without actually responding to the points I made. At any rate, I don’t wish to hijack the thread, which was originally about who to save from drowning.

Indeed proving the existence of God is for another thread, but by the definition of God there is nothing contradictory about saying that he assigns value to things and that said value is intrinsic to them.

 

[anon99031074]

Well, I won’t speak for many unnamed Catholics, but the Church has traditionally (though unofficially) endorsed Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law whereby value is inherent in humans but calls for explanation which must be ultimately rooted in God (because value will be grounded in final causality, for instance).

I think the Church has endorsed a lot of ideas that turned out to be mistaken. When it comes to value existing as some sort of substance, I don’t even know what that would mean. We can casually speak of a valuable item, but all it means is that lots of humans value it.

A-T argues that goodness is “convertible” with being. That they are convertible does not mean that they are synonymous; it means (to employ some analytic jargon) that they differ in sense but not in reference. When we call something good, we are referring to an aspect of its being.

ok.

(One way to grasp this is by noting that “is good” is a logically attributive, rather than logically predicative, adjective. In other words, “x is good” is indeterminate; we cannot assess whether x is good unless we know what sort of thing x is. If x is F, then “x is good” is materially equivalent to “x is a good F”. “is good” differs in sense according to whether it is predicated of, say, a cat or a knife, and is thereby consequent upon being.

Knife is merely a conceptual label, and there is no purpose located within it. Once someone has a purpose with it, it can be good or bad with regards to that purpose. Which again would determine what value the knife has to that person. If you are walking in the mountains, and you find a flat rock, you may choose to call that rock a table, and then judge the goodness or badness of the table depending on how well it fits your purposes (eating your lunch from it). Nothing happens to the rock, though. No substance change, no magical transference of value to it.

To say that “cat1 is good” and “cat2 is bad” is to assess “how well” cat1 and cat2 succeed at being cats. This can be objectively grounded in the natures of cats; ie. we call cat2 bad because it is missing a leg, and cats as a natural kind possess four legs in order to achieve their various other ends.

The word cat is also a conceptual label, an abstraction. No two cats are the same. They succeed perfectly well at being what they are.

There is a slightly relational aspect to goodness/value in the respect that I can misjudge what is good, and if I were a sick freak I might believe that it is good for cats to have three legs rather than four, but that is an error that can be assessed objectively from a study of what cats are. This only scratches the surface of A-T metaethics, however.)

What cats are changes over time (evolution). Perhaps some day a three legged cat that functions well will appear. However, robbing a cat of one of its legs would indeed be wrong in my opinion, since it would cause needless suffering for the cat, and make it more difficult for it to survive.

A Catholic speaking carefully would qualify that if per impossibile God did not exist, there would be no value. Or one might say, “God is a necessary condition for anything else existing, so if God did not exist, then nothing would exist, so there would be no value.”

That is not the argument I was referring to, but the more limited argument that “without God, everything is permissible”, “without God, no objective value” etc.

 

[anon99031074]

Indeed proving the existence of God is for another thread, but by the definition of God there is nothing contradictory about saying that he assigns value to things and that said value is intrinsic to them.

Sorry, I didn’t see this. There is nothing contradictory in saying that God values humans. But valuing is still something minds do. Value is not something located within things or animals. Valuing may be done on the basis of attributes, such as being created in the image of God. But the imago dei is not value in itself, it is what is valued by the someone (in this case God).

With regards to the example in question. Many humans value other humans above dogs, apparently even serial killers. That is something they do. Many humans also believe that the God they worship likewise values humans above dogs. That is also something they do.

This has little to do with the poor dog, which enjoys its life and wishes to live. There is nothing called value that can be located within the dog (or any human), and if you disagree I would love for you to show me where this value is.

 

[polytropos]

I think the Church has endorsed a lot of ideas that turned out to be mistaken.

That’s quite possibly true. (Look up “conscious evolution.” Although that is not endorsed by the Church–just some crazy liberal American nuns.)

When it comes to value existing as some sort of substance, I don’t even know what that would mean. We can casually speak of a valuable item, but all it means is that lots of humans value it.

There are subjective aspects to valuing; I also do not deny that “value” is to a large extent a family resemblance concept (ie. that we could not subsume our use of the term under a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions). It doesn’t really follow that no sense of the term “value” can be objective. But I will get to that below.

Knife is merely a conceptual label, and there is no purpose located within it. Once someone has a purpose with it, it can be good or bad with regards to that purpose. Which again would determine what value the knife has to that person.

I agree with this to a large extent, in that a knife is an artifact, so its “purposes” and “ends” are functions of the intentions of the user.

If you are walking in the mountains, and you find a flat rock, you may choose to call that rock a table, and then judge the goodness or badness of the table depending on how well it fits your purposes (eating your lunch from it). Nothing happens to the rock, though. No substance change, no magical transference of value to it.

I have not suggested that by evaluating anything, we are attributing value to it. Evaluation can be partly subjective. A-T concedes this, because the difference of any transcendental (ie. things that are convertible with being, like goodness, truth, arguably beauty) with being is a difference of sense but not of reference (so we refer to the same reality). When I evaluate a thing, I am referring to the aspect of its being qua desirable.

The word cat is also a conceptual label, an abstraction. No two cats are the same. They succeed perfectly well at being what they are.

Cat is a conceptual label; it does not follow that our usage does not correspond to any formal principle of unity in res. I would argue that it does. (Whether two cats are the same is irrelevant; of course any two distinct cats are non-identical, even if they are “identical” twins.)

Note that the dispute over whether value can be objective then hinges on whether or not one can accept essentialism. That’s another debate, but it’s a position that is far from implausible. (And essentialism is a view that has seen a revival in contemporary philosophy in the last few decades.)

What cats are changes over time (evolution). Perhaps some day a three legged cat that functions well will appear.

If the change is sufficiently large, then you no longer have a cat on your hands. I’d suggest that if what are currently cats evolved to have three legs, then they would be a new species with a new corresponding set of ends and purposes rooted in their form.

However, robbing a cat of one of its legs would indeed be wrong in my opinion, since it would cause needless suffering for the cat, and make it more difficult for it to survive.

Don’t worry. I will make sure the cat is well-provided for.

That is not the argument I was referring to, but the more limited argument that “without God, everything is permissible”, “without God, no objective value” etc.

Such theists are I think being intemperate. Formally, “Humans have inherent value” implies that “God exists” (or one could make that argument). But the former can be recognized without one having recognized the latter. That is why it is possible for there to be, for example, atheists of good will, and it is also why it is possible for atheists to sin knowingly and willingly despite not knowing that God exists.

 

[anon99031074]

That’s quite possibly true. (Look up “conscious evolution.” Although that is not endorsed by the Church–just some crazy liberal American nuns.)

I looked at the Wikipedia article. It didn’t really tell me very much, but I agree it sounds a bit strange on the surface of it. I guess it depends on what they mean by words such as evolution and species.

There are subjective aspects to valuing; I also do not deny that “value” is to a large extent a family resemblance concept (ie. that we could not subsume our use of the term under a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions). It doesn’t really follow that no sense of the term “value” can be objective. But I will get to that below.

Well, I don’t know what objective would mean in this context. It is not that I deny it. I simply don’t know what it means. For instance, if God says humans are the most valuable creature on our planet, how does this make it objectively true? You could say it is true by definition, but it would only be true to those who accept the definition, and the reasons for it. One would assume the devil disagrees. God, being omnipotent, can of course sanction the devil for not accepting his authority, but I don’t see what power has to do with objectivity.

I agree with this to a large extent, in that a knife is an artifact, so its “purposes” and “ends” are functions of the intentions of the user.

Ok.

I have not suggested that by evaluating anything, we are attributing value to it. Evaluation can be partly subjective. A-T concedes this, because the difference of any transcendental (ie. things that are convertible with being, like goodness, truth, arguably beauty) with being is a difference of sense but not of reference (so we refer to the same reality). When I evaluate a thing, I am referring to the aspect of its being qua desirable.

Well, I doubt that there is anything that is desirable in and of itself. Desirable to whom? A human, heterosexual male might find a certain young woman desirable. I am quite sure a cat, frog, leopard, bird, or some other animal will look at her in entirely different ways. Meaning that desirability to some extent is a function of the mind of the perceiver. It also changes over time as physical attributes change, context changes, etc. The first iPhone that was launched was viewed as highly desirable a few years back. Now, not so much. Also, no composite seems to last for ever. At least not in my experience, and so as something decomposes, it becomes less desirable.

Cat is a conceptual label; it does not follow that our usage does not correspond to any formal principle of unity in res. I would argue that it does. (Whether two cats are the same is irrelevant; of course any two distinct cats are non-identical, even if they are “identical” twins.)

Of course. We can both recognize a cat if we see one. But the concept of a cat is an abstraction we have created due to the limitations of the human mind, and for purposes of communication. We have derived the concept from observing several living beings. It is descriptive, not prescriptive. The value judgement of what is or is not a good cat is not determined solely by looking at this abstraction.

Note that the dispute over whether value can be objective then hinges on whether or not one can accept essentialism. That’s another debate, but it’s a position that is far from implausible. (And essentialism is a view that has seen a revival in contemporary philosophy in the last few decades.)

Yes. You hit the nail right on the head. Essentialism is the issue.

If the change is sufficiently large, then you no longer have a cat on your hands. I’d suggest that if what are currently cats evolved to have three legs, then they would be a new species with a new corresponding set of ends and purposes rooted in their form.

Well, you could say that, but species designation is a conceptual label, much like knife or table. One could, if one were so inclined, refer to all sentient beings on earth as one species, such as earthling. There are practical reasons why we divide animals into species, but the divisions are human conventions and could easily be different than what they are without violating principles of logic and reason.

Such theists are I think being intemperate. Formally, “Humans have inherent value” implies that “God exists” (or one could make that argument). But the former can be recognized without one having recognized the latter. That is why it is possible for there to be, for example, atheists of good will, and it is also why it is possible for atheists to sin knowingly and willingly despite not knowing that God exists.

Well, I think it is quite possible to be a person of good will, who greatly values humans (and other sentient beings) without thinking that value is contingent on some sort of internal essence within certain animals. This kind of thinking can lead to all kinds of suffering. Slavery, for instance, is usually based on dehumanization. Dehumanization is based on essentialism, because the dehumanizer thinks that there are animals that look just like humans, but they lack the essence of what makes someone truly human and therefore what gives them value (people who kept slaves argued that their slaves lacked souls, for instance, and hence it was acceptable to treat them as less-than-human animals). Some argue that fetuses lack this elusive essence, and so it is ok to kill them, others argue that criminals no longer are human, that their actions have destroyed their human essence, and so they may be “monsters” or “pond scum” that we not only could, but ought to kill.

What we are discussing are not merely abstract philosophical ideas. They have real world consequences.