Five Ways?

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SeekingCatholic

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Though a believer in God, I am not convinced by the Five Ways of Aquinas.

I’ll begin with the first two: argument from motion and argument from efficient cause. I’ll agree with the general points that nothing can be brought from potency into act except by something else already in act and that nothing can be the cause of itself.

It’s where the proof attempts to argue against the possibility of an infinite regress that things get murky. I’ll also agree that a hierarchically subordinated (per se) infinite regress is absurd. However, no examples of such in nature have been shown. And such is necessary for the first two ways to be successful as empirical proofs.

The classical distinction made between per se and per accidens subordination of a series is a man being able to generate because he is a man, rather than the son of a man. This makes the series only accidentally subordinated. If instead he were able to generate only and specifically because he was the son of a man, this would indeed be a hierarchically subordinated series.

Or, put more abstractly, to have a hierarchically subordinated series from motion it’s necessary to have, not only object A necessary to move object B from potency to act, but also object A necessary to keep it there. To have a hierarchically subordinated series from cause it’s necessary to have, not only object A necessary to cause object B’s original existence, but to keep object B in existence.

Also, at some level, given the fact that the cause or source of motion of certain objects (e.g. a snowflake) can legitimately held to be the physical laws of the universe, it seems any kind of philosophical proof will need to demand a cause or reason for the laws of the universe.
 
It’s where the proof attempts to argue against the possibility of an infinite regress that things get murky. I’ll also agree that a hierarchically subordinated (per se) infinite regress is absurd. However, no examples of such in nature have been shown. And such is necessary for the first two ways to be successful as empirical proofs.
A) what do you mean, “murky”? if you believe the argument concerning the impossibility of an infinite regress in causes and effects is unsound, can you say both how and why?

B) the proofs from motion and efficient causality are philosophical, not empirical (though they have empirical consequences).

C) what exactly are you saying hasn’t been shown to exist in nature?
 
A) what do you mean, “murky”? if you believe the argument concerning the impossibility of an infinite regress in causes and effects is unsound, can you say both how and why?
It’s not unsound, if applied to a hierarchically subordinated infinite regress. It is unsound, if applied to an only accidentally subordinated series. Why is it impossible, for instance, that a father-son generative-type chain should not go on to infinity? The Thomists themselves (cf. Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange) admit this kind of infinite series is not absurd.
B) the proofs from motion and efficient causality are philosophical, not empirical (though they have empirical consequences).
They are not ontological proofs. They depend upon what is observed in nature (e.g a posteriori proofs). That is what I meant.
C) what exactly are you saying hasn’t been shown to exist in nature?
A hierarchically subordinated series. Since the proof depends upon their existence they have to be shown to exist for the proof to be valid.
 
Hello SeekingCatholic,

Aquinas’ first proof does not depend on the premise that an infinite regress per se is impossible. Rather, Aquinas states that without the actual, there can be no potential. For example, a piece of wood is only potentially hot. It is made actually hot by an already hot fire. To remove the actual is to take away the potential. Hence, without something purely actual (i.e. the Prime Mover), there can be no potentialities, and hence no motion (re: change) from potentiality to actuality.
 
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