For A Real Thomist: Discrepancies Between The Moral Duties In This Life v. The Next

[Mort_Alz]

A friend of mine (who is a Melkite Catholic) is a big adherent of Apocatastasis (or Apokatastasis). However, rather than being of the camp that the salvation of all is intrinsically possible and that it is the Christian duty to hope and pray for the salvation of all, he subscribes to the camp that it is absolutely certain. He even goes so far as to say that the idea of the universal salvation of all is the very core of the Gospel. History and Patristics aside (for which he has extensive knowledge), I’d like to explore some philosophical ideas which have come up in my mind upon reflection on the conversations between myself and him.

Firstly, I will give him credit that the idea of the eventual salvation of all is appealing to the intellect because it does away with a seeming contradiction in the overall will of God. From a Thomistic perspective, the ultimate reason that some perish and others live is so that God’s justice may be displayed in the damned and His mercy in the elect (Romans 9:22-23). Obviously, this would meet a greater, ultimate goal of having all aspects of God played out in reality (which, I guess, would please Him), but to us human beings who are subject to Him, we’d like to know why He chooses to damn this one, but save that one. The Thomistic tradition offers no answer together with St. Augustine: “Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.”

Secondly, Apocatastasis is appealing in practical personal piety because the command to pray for the salvation of the world is something which God intends to ultimately fulfill. So, there is never anymore doubt that your prayers (which you are commanded to pray) are in line with the will of God.

The defenses provided for a traditional Western concept of Hell make sense to me, but only up to a point. The mental block I run into takes the form of a discrepancy which the traditional view creates between our moral duties in this life (which places human life on a precious, indispensable scale) and our moral duties in the next life (which practically reduces humanity to simple, disposable property).

Take, for example, Jesus’ story of the Pharisee and the publican: The Pharisee is faulted for his prayer which begins thus, “O God, I give thee thanks that I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican.” (Douay-Rheims version of Luke 18:11) But St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa says that the punishment of the damned serves a secondary purpose of allowing the blessed to see their suffering and rejoice that they were saved from that fate. (See the Summa Question 99 Article 1 Reply to Objection 4) Thus, their praise is not very substantially different from that of the Pharisee. “Praise God for saving us from being extortioners, unjust, and adulterers.”

Further, take a look at the common Act of Contrition: “O my God, I am heartily sorry for having offended Thee and I detest all the sins of my life, not only because I fear the loss of heaven and the pains of hell, but because Thou art Thee, O my God, Who art all good and worthy of all love…” It’s inherent in the prayer itself that contrition or love caused by a fear of Hell is very imperfect. Why, then, (according to St. Thomas Aquinas) was there allowed a portion of the human population to be obstinate in wickedness and be damned so that the blessed could praise God for delivering them from Hell? To sum it up, in this life, it is imperfect to love God so that we can be delivered from Hell, but in the afterlife, we are supposed to love God because He delivered us from Hell. In this life, we are to sympathize with our neighbor, desire his salvation, and keep an humble opinion of ourselves, but in the afterlife, we are to practically mimic the Pharisee’s prayer. I’m not saying these things are without proper defense. I’m posting these objections here in order to be corrected.

Thanks,

-Mort Alz

 

[Beryllos]

… From a Thomistic perspective, the ultimate reason that some perish and others live is so that God’s justice may be displayed in the damned and His mercy in the elect (Romans 9:22-23). Obviously, this would meet a greater, ultimate goal of having all aspects of God played out in reality (which, I guess, would please Him)…

This is similar to the notion that one cannot perceive/know/appreciate one thing except in contrast to its opposite. One cannot appreciate light without darkness, joy without sadness, good without evil, heaven without hell. I believe this is a fallacy, and so I am not surprised that you have objections.

 

[John_Martin]

The wicked want to continue alive forever to continue in sin (finding satisfaction for their sinful desires by their own actions). And they will live forever doing just that. However, the place they will be will be a glorious place where it is totally evident that the things they see are from God. And it will be like a fire to them, bright, burning goodness, which will be torment to them because they have nowhere to fulfill their sin, no darkness in which to hide, no objects that lend themselves to being abused for self-satisfaction, so there will be eternal dis-satisfaction because they do not want God as their life but want themselves alone.

The Good will continue forever wanting and receiving good and life and satisfaction from God. And they will live forever with just that. The place they will be will be a glorious place where it is totally evident that the things they see are from God. And it will be light to them, bright, burning goodness, which will be joy to them because they have the presence of their God in all his works.

 

[Mort_Alz]

This is similar to the notion that one cannot perceive/know/appreciate one thing except in contrast to its opposite. One cannot appreciate light without darkness, joy without sadness, good without evil, heaven without hell. I believe this is a fallacy, and so I am not surprised that you have objections.

Thanks for noting this. It’s not unlike something else which I’ve been told. That is, St. Augustine and St. Chrysostom (the most fervent preachers of a hell that mirrors the pleasures of heaven with pain) both held on to this contrast in afterlife destinations because they were influenced by the Manichaeians who believed in a sort of hyper-dualism. In their mind, good always had to have a contrast (kind of in your example).

 

[Mort_Alz]

The wicked want to continue alive forever to continue in sin (finding satisfaction for their sinful desires by their own actions). And they will live forever doing just that. However, the place they will be will be a glorious place where it is totally evident that the things they see are from God. And it will be like a fire to them, bright, burning goodness, which will be torment to them because they have nowhere to fulfill their sin, no darkness in which to hide, no objects that lend themselves to being abused for self-satisfaction, so there will be eternal dis-satisfaction because they do not want God as their life but want themselves alone.

The Good will continue forever wanting and receiving good and life and satisfaction from God. And they will live forever with just that. The place they will be will be a glorious place where it is totally evident that the things they see are from God. And it will be light to them, bright, burning goodness, which will be joy to them because they have the presence of their God in all his works.

I’m aware of that perspective on Hell. I understand that C.S. Lewis promoted its kind as well as many Greek Christians (Orthodox and Catholic), but it doesn’t really answer my questions since I was not objecting to the punishment itself, but the morality expected of the blessed towards the damned in contrast to how they were expected to treat them on earth.

 

[John_Martin]

I’m aware of that perspective on Hell. I understand that C.S. Lewis promoted its kind as well as many Greek Christians (Orthodox and Catholic), but it doesn’t really answer my questions since I was not objecting to the punishment itself, but the morality expected of the blessed towards the damned in contrast to how they were expected to treat them on earth.

You need to understand this first. That when the beatified look on the “damned” they will see misery in people who are standing in the midst of goodness. They will not see an “evil” fire.

The actual answer of Thomas is not found in question 99 of the Third Part, but in question 94 where he says in the first article.,
“I answer that, Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for being compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in order that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and that they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned.”

The “punishment” inflicted by divine justice is a single good creation for all, and those who will to continue in sin are tormented in this.

And as to the attitude of the blessed regarding the damned, whether they rejoice when they see the damned (as the two men in the temple), in the third article he states:
"I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such:** and thus the saints will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked**, by considering therein the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill them with joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly. "

Question 99 presumes, rightly so, that you have lingered over question 94 and understand it fully before moving on to questions following, including 99.

 

[John_Martin]

As to God knowing who will be saved and who will be damned, you will need to understand “eternity” in God, and the “knowing” of God.
His eternity is not an “eternal now”, he does not exist in an eternal now. There is no “yesterday”, no “tomorrow”, and no “now” in God.
And as to his knowing, he knows himself, speaks himself, loves himself (the Trinity), and he also knows something that is not him, not God, but is temporal, is contingent, is spiritual and material (soul and body). And it is fully contingent, free, just as he knows it, so even knowing in eternity the results of that contingency, he did not order the results, but he “ordered the contingency to be contingent” and it was so. (is so).

Yes, he knows me in either heaven or hell, but he did not order me there.

 

[Mort_Alz]

You need to understand this first. That when the beatified look on the “damned” they will see misery in people who are standing in the midst of goodness. They will not see an “evil” fire.

The actual answer of Thomas is not found in question 99 of the Third Part, but in question 94 where he says in the first article.,
“I answer that, Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for being compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in order that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and that they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned.”

The “punishment” inflicted by divine justice is a single good creation for all, and those who will to continue in sin are tormented in this.

And as to the attitude of the blessed regarding the damned, whether they rejoice when they see the damned (as the two men in the temple), in the third article he states:
"I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such:** and thus the saints will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked**, by considering therein the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill them with joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly. "

Question 99 presumes, rightly so, that you have lingered over question 94 and understand it fully before moving on to questions following, including 99.

Does St. Thomas Aquinas subscribe to that view of hell? That all souls are in the same “place” (God’s unadulterated presence), but some are more disposed to receive him?

Also, I read questions 94 and 99 before. I don’t think I’m misunderstanding St. Thomas Aquinas here. I’m suspicious of regarding the sufferings of the damned as a matter of rejoicing even indirectly. Why can’t the blessed’s enjoyment of their own deliverance be fully enjoyed without another party’s damnation? It may be spun all kinds of ways, but the ultimate reality still remains: God set up the afterlife (according to this model) in a way that allows the blessed to further their enjoyment at the expense of the damned. They are a scapegoat to further the appreciation of the saints that they have been delivered from it. The more intrinsic reason of God allowing a portion to persist in obstinacy so that His justice might be manifest makes a bit more sense, but it still begs the question which the system does not answer: Why this one and not the other? Also, it does seem a bit arbitrary when thought about in the context of the human experience in this life.

I still don’t see a substantial difference in the Pharisee rejoicing in God that he was not evil like other men and the blessed appreciating their salvation more that God did not let them become as the damned are before them.

 

[Mort_Alz]

As to God knowing who will be saved and who will be damned, you will need to understand “eternity” in God, and the “knowing” of God.
His eternity is not an “eternal now”, he does not exist in an eternal now. There is no “yesterday”, no “tomorrow”, and no “now” in God.
And as to his knowing, he knows himself, speaks himself, loves himself (the Trinity), and he also knows something that is not him, not God, but is temporal, is contingent, is spiritual and material (soul and body). And it is fully contingent, free, just as he knows it, so even knowing in eternity the results of that contingency, he did not order the results, but he “ordered the contingency to be contingent” and it was so. (is so).

Yes, he knows me in either heaven or hell, but he did not order me there.

Where does that quote come from?

 

[tdgesq]

Also, I read questions 94 and 99 before. I don’t think I’m misunderstanding St. Thomas Aquinas here. I’m suspicious of regarding the sufferings of the damned as a matter of rejoicing even indirectly. Why can’t the blessed’s enjoyment of their own deliverance be fully enjoyed without another party’s damnation?

I don’t think Aquinas’ reasoning here is to postulate how the blessed will be maximally joyful. It’s to explain that given there will be some souls in hell (perhaps not a given to you and me), knowledge of their suffering will bring greater joy than an absence of such knowledge. He explains in Q 94, A 1, ad 2 that God, who has perfect knowledge, sees both the beautiful and deformed, so will the blessed who possess the glory of God.

It may be spun all kinds of ways, but the ultimate reality still remains: God set up the afterlife (according to this model) in a way that allows the blessed to further their enjoyment at the expense of the damned. They are a scapegoat to further the appreciation of the saints that they have been delivered from it.

That’s not really the way Q 94, A 3, co reads though. It states that the punishment of the damned only increases their joy indirectly; that is, by considering the order of divine justice and their own deliverance. The just are not gleeful about the suffering of those in hell. It is their own beatification vis a vis the damned that is cause for them to rejoice.

The more intrinsic reason of God allowing a portion to persist in obstinacy so that His justice might be manifest makes a bit more sense, but it still begs the question which the system does not answer: Why this one and not the other?

God may have no choice but to allow some to persist in obstinacy, at least if he doesn’t want to contradict free agency. I have spoken to many on this issue (not you personally) who have never considered that a human being might prefer to exist eternally apart from God. Yet it is logically possible. Whether this is a component of Aquinas’ theology is debatable; the penalty for invoking the Angelic Doctor.

I still don’t see a substantial difference in the Pharisee rejoicing in God that he was not evil like other men and the blessed appreciating their salvation more that God did not let them become as the damned are before them.

I really don’t see the comparison. The Pharisee was confident of his own righteousness, exalting himself above those who recognize they are sinners. He even cites to his own satisfaction of the works of the law, fasting and giving his tithe, which of course are God’s due anyway and not evidence of anything. That is not what Aquinas is referring to.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

A friend of mine (who is a Melkite Catholic) is a big adherent of Apocatastasis (or Apokatastasis). However, rather than being of the camp that the salvation of all is intrinsically possible and that it is the Christian duty to hope and pray for the salvation of all, he subscribes to the camp that it is absolutely certain. He even goes so far as to say that the idea of the universal salvation of all is the very core of the Gospel. History and Patristics aside (for which he has extensive knowledge), I’d like to explore some philosophical ideas which have come up in my mind upon reflection on the conversations between myself and him.

Your friend is a material heretic. The Catholic Church teaches that salvation is possible for all, but it does not teach that all will, in fact, be saved. You can also surmise that most people will be lost. The Church teaches nothing about the exact number either way.

From a Thomistic perspective, the ultimate reason that some perish and others live is so that God’s justice may be displayed in the damned and His mercy in the elect (Romans 9:22-23). Obviously, this would meet a greater, ultimate goal of having all aspects of God played out in reality (which, I guess, would please Him), but to us human beings who are subject to Him, we’d like to know why He chooses to damn this one, but save that one. The Thomistic tradition offers no answer together with St. Augustine: “Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.”

Secondly, Apocatastasis is appealing in practical personal piety because the command to pray for the salvation of the world is something which God intends to ultimately fulfill. So, there is never anymore doubt that your prayers (which you are commanded to pray) are in line with the will of God.

As I said, this is an heretical teaching.

The defenses provided for a traditional Western concept of Hell make sense to me, but only up to a point. The mental block I run into takes the form of a discrepancy which the traditional view creates between our moral duties in this life (which places human life on a precious, indispensable scale) and our moral duties in the next life (which practically reduces humanity to simple, disposable property).

What do you mean by " duties in the next life? " In the next life there will be no more temptations, we will always do what is good because we will enjoy the Beatific Vision and God will so fill our hearts that our entire intellect and will will be in perfect union with God’s own.

Take, for example, Jesus’ story of the Pharisee and the publican: The Pharisee is faulted for his prayer which begins thus, “O God, I give thee thanks that I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican.” (Douay-Rheims version of Luke 18:11) But St. Thomas Aquinas in the Summa says that the punishment of the damned serves a secondary purpose of allowing the blessed to see their suffering and rejoice that they were saved from that fate. (See the Summa Question 99 Article 1 Reply to Objection 4) Thus, their praise is not very substantially different from that of the Pharisee. “Praise God for saving us from being extortioners, unjust, and adulterers.”

Further, take a look at the common Act of Contrition: “O my God, I am heartily sorry for having offended Thee and I detest all the sins of my life, not only because I fear the loss of heaven and the pains of hell, but because Thou art Thee, O my God, Who art all good and worthy of all love…” It’s inherent in the prayer itself that contrition or love caused by a fear of Hell is very imperfect. Why, then, (according to St. Thomas Aquinas) was there allowed a portion of the human population to be obstinate in wickedness and be damned so that the blessed could praise God for delivering them from Hell? To sum it up, in this life, it is imperfect to love God so that we can be delivered from Hell, but in the afterlife, we are supposed to love God because He delivered us from Hell. In this life, we are to sympathize with our neighbor, desire his salvation, and keep an humble opinion of ourselves, but in the afterlife, we are to practically mimic the Pharisee’s prayer. I’m not saying these things are without proper defense. I’m posting these objections here in order to be corrected.

Our acts of contrition are usually somewhat imperfect, we are human not gods. You cannot compare our lives in heaven with that of the Pharisees. They were filled with pride. We will be filled with love, we will not be " proud " in any arrogant sense. We won’t be comparing our good fortune with anyone’s bad fortune.

Linus2nd

Thanks,

 

[Mort_Alz]

“God may have no choice but to allow some to persist in obstinacy, at least if he doesn’t want to contradict free agency.”

You’re right. This does not at all fit in with the Thomistic framework. Previously, the Summa states that it belongs to God to reprobate some men. In other words, it is a part of His ultimate will that some should be reprobated. (It should be noted that the Angelic Doctor successfully holds this to be true while retaining that the fault of the cause of reprobation [sin] lies entirely with the reprobate). However, this has nothing to do with the question at hand. The question at hand has more to do with whether a universe in which the Apokatastasis takes place is better (more perfect and more properly belonging to God) than a universe in which there are some predestined to life and others reprobated. In order for the latter to more properly belong to God, there would have to be some intrinsic value in the punishment of the wicked. My objection is that the attempt to provide intrinsic value to the occurrence of damnation causes a kind of rift between our behavior and attitudes towards God in this present life and our behavior in the next. In this life, we are to hope and pray for the salvation of all, but, in the next life, all of this desire for the good of ALL our neighbors ceases. In other words, it is a vain exercise in this life. This belief, I think, has unconsciously caused some to jump the gun and behave towards their fellow humans in this life how they appear to be commanded to behave towards them in the next as if damnation has already occurred, but maybe THAT was the true fault of the Pharisee; not that he rejoiced that he had been spared from incurring many other faults.

 

[John_Martin]

Where does that quote come from?

It is not a quote - it is the understanding you have of God if you are Thomas’ student.
You will find the infinity of God and the understanding of time / infinity for him in the First Part, question 7, which cannot have its full impact apart from questions 1 - 6 and an even greater impact after a full understanding of the whole of the Summa.
For the red, you would have to understand the causality of God, making creation “like himself” in causality - while he is the first cause initially and continuously causing, his creature (material universe) is like him in being a “direct causer” of material events. And with humans, being intelligent and free direct causes, of their own and other movement. All causes causing movement that would move to the full actualization within the first cause, which is the End of movement (goal). An intelligent cause (God, and secondarily, man) does his “causing” to actualize the object he “knows” in his presence, in the desire (will) to be one with it. But learn the whole First Part of the Summa and you would also write that God ordained (set the order) that contingency be fully contingent (yet intelligible, since it is like him). The red is there, read the Summa again (and again) and you will find it to be true.

 

[Mort_Alz]

We won’t be comparing our good fortune with anyone’s bad fortune.

Linus2nd

Thanks,

St. Thomas Aquinas seems not to agree…

“Secondly, they are useful, because the elect rejoice therein (in the eternal punishment of the wicked), when they see God’s justice in them, and realize that they have escaped them.”

 

[John_Martin]

St. Thomas Aquinas seems not to agree…

“Secondly, they are useful, because the elect rejoice therein (in the eternal punishment of the wicked), when they see God’s justice in them, and realize that they have escaped them.”

Actually, Linus2nd is correct. They are not rejoicing in the punishment, but in seeing God’s Justice (good) manifested in the punishment. They are rejoicing in the goodness of God, and in the fact that they themselves know that goodness. This will not be a “self-proud” knowing, which Linus was speaking to, but a recognition of the truth of the situation.

Notice “when” the rejoicing in the punishment occurs: “When they see God’s Justice”
It does not happen “when they see the punishment, suddenly they rejoice”, but when they conclude that they are seeing God’s Justice. It is not “me fortunate, them punished”, but “Look at the goodness of God” in the joy of the blessed.

Absolutely everything in the Resurrection, all the sights, will display the goodness and justice of God (which are the same), and will be the source of Joy.

 

[Mort_Alz]

Actually, Linus2nd is correct. They are not rejoicing in the punishment, but in seeing God’s Justice (good) manifested in the punishment. They are rejoicing in the goodness of God, and in the fact that they themselves know that goodness. This will not be a “self-proud” knowing, which Linus was speaking to, but a recognition of the truth of the situation.

Notice “when” the rejoicing in the punishment occurs: “When they see God’s Justice”
It does not happen “when they see the punishment, suddenly they rejoice”, but when they conclude that they are seeing God’s Justice. It is not “me fortunate, them punished”, but “Look at the goodness of God” in the joy of the blessed.

Absolutely everything in the Resurrection, all the sights, will display the goodness and justice of God (which are the same), and will be the source of Joy.

That’s not really the flavor I get from St. Thomas here. He says they rejoice once they “realize that they have escaped them” (the punishments). This escapement of punishment, in Thomas’ system, is due entirely to God.

Let’s put it this way: I’m one of the blessed in heaven. I am able to see the suffering of the wicked. I note that it is just that they are punished so I rejoice that God is just. Makes sense so far. Then, I realize that the punishment which I am witnessing was my default destination until God decided to have mercy on me and change me into a person who no longer deserved that punishment. So, I rejoice upon realizing what I was saved from and God is praised all the more by me for being good and delivering me from evil.

Is this correct so far? Please correct me if it’s not because I’m having trouble getting my head around why the suffering of the damned is worth a display of justice so that the blessed may see that God is both just and merciful. In other words, the damned serve to communicate information about God to the blessed. Why is this worth a soul suffering forever?

 

[John_Martin]

That’s not really the flavor I get from St. Thomas here. He says they rejoice once they “realize that they have escaped them” (the punishments). This escapement of punishment, in Thomas’ system, is due entirely to God.

Let’s put it this way: I’m one of the blessed in heaven. I am able to see the suffering of the wicked. I note that it is just that they are punished so I rejoice that God is just. Makes sense so far. Then, I realize that the punishment which I am witnessing was my default destination until God decided to have mercy on me and change me into a person who no longer deserved that punishment. So, I rejoice upon realizing what I was saved from and God is praised all the more by me for being good and delivering me from evil.

Is this correct so far? Please correct me if it’s not because I’m having trouble getting my head around why the suffering of the damned is worth a display of justice so that the blessed may see that God is both just and merciful. In other words, the damned serve to communicate information about God to the blessed. Why is this worth a soul suffering forever?

Well, that person is suffering forever because God will not do violence to it, and he will not permit evil to be done in his new creation just so that this person is finally “satisfied” by being able to commit the evil he wills to commit eternally.

This person does not want the resurrection of the righteous. He wants an eternity of sinning. And God will not do him violence of forcing him to be good against his will. So, he is in torment wanting to sin but with no opportunity, lusting with no avenue to satisfy. Do you somehow think the damned person wants to be with the righteous he sees, as if he envied them? He is in no way like the “sinner in the temple” of a previous post, who wanted mercy.

 

[tdgesq]

“God may have no choice but to allow some to persist in obstinacy, at least if he doesn’t want to contradict free agency.”

You’re right. This does not at all fit in with the Thomistic framework.

That’s not what I said though. What I said, or at least what I meant, is that there is debate among Thomists as to the precise relationship between freedom and predestination, particularly with respect to the damned. There is an argument for it from St. Thomas’ writings:

[1] From this it is also evident that providence is not incompatible with freedom of will.

[4] Besides, by the governance of every provident agent the things governed are led to a suitable end; hence, Gregory of Nyssa says of divine providence that it is the “will of God through which all things that exist receive a suitable end.” But the ultimate end of every creature is to attain the divine likeness, as we showed above. Therefore, it would be incompatible with providence for that whereby a thing attains the divine likeness to be taken away from it. Now, the voluntary agent attains the divine likeness because it acts freely, for we showed in Book One [88] that there is free choice in God. Therefore, freedom of will is not taken away by divine providence.

[6] Hence it is said: “God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel”; and again: “Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him” (Sirach 15:14, 18). dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3a.htm#73

Previously, the Summa states that it belongs to God to reprobate some men. In other words, it is a part of His ultimate will that some should be reprobated. (It should be noted that the Angelic Doctor successfully holds this to be true while retaining that the fault of the cause of reprobation [sin] lies entirely with the reprobate).

The only question is why God would will some to be eternally separated from Himself:

Another reason is because man sinned in his own eternity [Cf. I-II, 87, 3, ad 1]; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv), it belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should never cease to be punished, who in this life never ceased to desire sin. And if it be objected that some who sin mortally propose to amend their life at some time, and that these accordingly are seemingly not deserving of eternal punishment, it must be replied according to some that Gregory speaks of the will that is made manifest by the deed. For he who falls into mortal sin of his own will puts himself in a state whence he cannot be rescued, except God help him: wherefore from the very fact that he is willing to sin, he is willing to remain in sin for ever. For man is “a wind that goeth,” namely to sin, “and returneth not by his own power” (Psalm 77:39). Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit whence he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished to remain there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself. Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and since the whole of life is directed to its end, it follows that for this very reason he directs the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing to remain in sin forever, if he could do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says on Job 41:23, “He shall esteem the deep as growing old” (Moral. xxxiv): “The wicked only put an end to sinning because their life came to an end: they would indeed have wished to live for ever, that they might continue in sin for ever for they desire rather to sin than to live.” Q 99, A 1.

However, this has nothing to do with the question at hand. The question at hand has more to do with whether a universe in which the Apokatastasis takes place is better (more perfect and more properly belonging to God) than a universe in which there are some predestined to life and others reprobated.

I respectfully disagree. It think it’s the central question at hand, because Apocatastasis is not possible if the reprobate freely choose eternal separation from God, at least not for Aquinas. He affirms that freedom is not taken away by divine providence, and that there can be no objection to God’s judgment where the reprobate desires to remain in sin forever. I guess I would ask your Melkite acquaintance how Apocatastasis can work with a sinner who has finally and definitively said “no” to God’s offer of salvation.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

St. Thomas Aquinas seems not to agree…

“Secondly, they are useful, because the elect rejoice therein (in the eternal punishment of the wicked), when they see God’s justice in them, and realize that they have escaped them.”

Yes that is a kind of comparison, but is not a gloating comparison. But again, Thomas is only speculating.

Pax
Linus2nd