Form and Matter: Are they Really Antiquated?

[KyrieEleison17]

Crucial in classical philosophy are the concepts of Form and Matter. Modernly, however, we do not see the need for these distinct concepts, certainly not for practical purposes. The theory ultimately rests on a purported necessity that in material objects an account of them is impossible without giving two principles that are ultimately diverse and irreducible (to each other). Or in other words, that something as basic as a proton or neutron cannot be accounted for without giving it forms and its matter, which any physical body of any kind will necessarily have simultaneously.

Is this true? And if so, what constitutes form and what matter? Where do we draw the line? And how do we properly draw that line?

Much has been said, for example, about how Aristotelian philosophy requires an admission of final causality (among other things), otherwise the system becomes inchoate or otherwise collapses. Aristotle’s system is an elaborate one dependent upon many basic theories and relationships that, if any one should fail or prove false at any crucial point, undermines and disentangles his whole system. The difference (or is it a strict diversity?) between Form and Matter is one such elementary, so to speak, concept, without which not only Aristotle’s but Plato’s system of philosophy also would seem to collapse. Nor can Form simply supplant matter in something like a linguistic shift, which would be meaningless. Both Plato and Aristotle saw matter and form as two distinct aspects or irreducible principles of physical reality.

Granting that no one really denies the validity of the concept of matter, what requires demonstrating is a basis for thinking that in reality there is another active principle irreducible to matter that were classically identified as forms. What I seek to do here is provide a reflection that might at least help us to see why someone might posit their existence and fundamental difference from matter strictly speaking. I am not claiming to fully understand the concept, only to posit a basic basis for thinking that the concept has some objective validity.

Let us take a fixed quantity of wax. This fixed quantity will be the basis of our experiments - no more wax will be added or taken away. Let us first have this wax in the shape of a brick. What properties might we reasonably attribute to this brick of wax? What might we reasonably say of it? We might say that, given its shape and the properties of wax, that it can be stacked with other similar bricks of wax. Depending on the strength of the underlying wax, we might say it is similarly useful for holding something up or balancing something.

Let us now make this brick of wax into a ball or sphere of wax. What might we now say about it? Can we say, for example, that is useful or lends naturally to being stacked upon with other, similar balls of wax? Surely not. Would it be wise to use a ball of wax as a prop? With care and in certain (perhaps desperate) situations maybe, but overall probably no: it would not be wise or congenial. That being said, we can attribute certain things to this ball of wax: e.g., that it is likely to roll or be rolled.

Now considering this, what is or are the underlying difference or differences that made the first instance of wax (the brick) apt for certain things (like stacking or being used as a simple support prop for something) but not for other thinks (like rolling)? And similarly again for the ball of wax. What is the reason for this? Is it perhaps something to do with the quantity or amount of wax involved? Surely not, as it is the same in both instances. Well, perhaps someone might say that the differences arise from the wax. But it is the same kind of wax in both cases. From what, then, comes the differences? Clearly the differences originate not from the matter (the wax) but from the shape given to the wax, which obviously the wax did not give or grant to itself, as if giving itself a Christmas or birthday present because no one remembered him. Let us call this its Form. Now it remains to be seen whether or not this Form is reducible to or convertible with the matter, such that no distinction is required. And upon further examination we will quickly see that it is not, just by asking a few more simple questions.

1. In virtue of what, specifically, does a ball of wax (all things being equal) imply something of a capacity to roll?
2. Again, in virtue of what does a brick of wax (again all things being equal) imply something of a capacity to be stacked?

In both cases the answer is not the matter of the object (“wax”) but rather the object’s “Form” (ball or brick) as we have identified it. It would be indefensible to argue that it was in virtue of its being wax that one instance was likely to roll while in other not so but rather likely to be useful for stacking or propping something up. In other words the wax, simply by granting it a different Form, would gain or lose physical properties, without the wax being any more or less wax. Good for “rolling” or “stacking” cannot be attributed to wax as such, as the same instance of wax can change (while remaining wax) and lose the one attribute or possibly even both.

Comments? Criticisms?

 

[polytropos]

James Ross argued that form is indispensable to our best science.

 

[KyrieEleison17]

James Ross argued that form is indispensable to our best science.

Thank you for sharing that. It was interesting but seems to presuppose a lot. I am trying to ground the concept of Forms more obviously in daily life.

 

[polytropos]

Thank you for sharing that. It was interesting but seems to presuppose a lot.

Definitely, it’s a very broad purview of the current state of analytic philosophy.

I am trying to ground the concept of Forms more obviously in daily life.

One thing that I would note is that the wax you are discussing (at least, qua shaped one way or another) is an artifact. Its purpose is an extension of the intentions of its creator (you). Its powers and operations are nevertheless rooted in its structure (ie. the separate functions of a ball of wax and a block of wax) but in the case of wax, ultimately derive from the way you want to use it.

It is also noteworthy that the material cause of the block of wax isn’t just wax. Wax is properly its form as well. The underlying primordial matter has the forms of wax and block, say, but the constituent particles need not be wax, even.

 

[KyrieEleison17]

One thing that I would note is that the wax you are discussing (at least, qua shaped one way or another) is an artifact. Its purpose is an extension of the intentions of its creator (you).

I understand where you are coming from. My point though is that the physical properties associated with being a ball or a brick is objective and not just the intentions of the creator or, in other words, we want it to be a brick form because being of that form entails certain things and similarly with being in a ball form. That bricks or spheres entail certain things isn’t due to our subjective intentions.

It is also noteworthy that the material cause of the block of wax isn’t just wax.

Yes I know that wax itself would be seen as a form, I think, by the ancients; but in terms of a ball or brick of wax the wax would be the material, I think, as Aristotle would give bronze as the material cause of a bronze statue.

Wax is properly its form as well. The underlying primordial matter has the forms of wax and block, say, but the constituent particles need not be wax, even.

Understood and thank you.

EDIT: ADDED: Actually, do you have any more links that might be helpful? Thank you again!

 

[Tomyris]

KyrieEleison17;11528177:

Yes I know that wax itself would be seen as a form, I think, by the ancients; but in terms of a ball or brick of wax the wax would be the material, I think, as Aristotle would give bronze as the material cause of a bronze statue.

You need to specify which ancients.

Aquinas (and I think Aristotle and Plato, to name drop) would have regarded wax as itself a composite of matter and form, the matter being something that merely had potentiality until called into existence by the form of waxiness.

Then, I think, he would have considered another form to be applied to the wax to make whatever object is made out of wax.

What if Aristotle Were a Software Engineer

I’m currently reading Kreeft’s “Summa of the Summa” and I am on my second book on Aristotle, which means I am ignorant enough to really mislead you. I suggest you read Mortimer Adler’s book on Aristotle.“Aristotle for Everybody”.

 

[KyrieEleison17]

You need to specify which ancients.

Plato and Aristotle

Aquinas (and I think Aristotle and Plato, to name drop) would have regarded wax as itself a composite of matter and form, the matter being something that merely had potentiality until called into existence by the form of waxiness.

Yes, I think for them below the level of what is evident or can be confirmed by the senses would have been most safely put in the level of matter or prime matter. Atoms were if-y for them I think as, especially in their day, they were purely theoretical and only had flimsy logical necessity. Democritus’ atoms were much simpler than the modern or contemporary idea of them.

Then, I think, he would have considered another form to be applied to the wax to make whatever object is made out of wax.

Yes, no doubt. I think that it why it is so easy to “lose” people in their doctrines once you start adding and combining forms - seemingly forms upon forms and forms - and why so many of our contemporaries see it as virtually baseless. I hope though that my example above helps people to perceive the reality and day-to-day basis of Forms and how they can’t be reduced absolutely to matter. After all, then as now, we don’t define a circle or a sphere with any reference whatsoever to matter at all.

What if Aristotle Were a Software Engineer

I’m currently reading Kreeft’s “Summa of the Summa” and I am on my second book on Aristotle, which means I am ignorant enough to really mislead you. I suggest you read Mortimer Adler’s book on Aristotle.“Aristotle for Everybody”.

I think you are much more on track than I was at that stage and have a far clearer conception. I wrestled with Thomas and Aristotle night and day and couldn’t make any sense of it though I kept having memories from when I was a boy and thinking like this and it made sense. It was odd. I know that even as a very young boy (and lonely and isolated, because we moved a lot, and I spent a lot of time just thinking about the nature of things as it was constant and I enjoyed it) I firmly remember coming to concepts like act and potency and form and matter. It wasn’t until I was increasingly confused by atomism and electromagnetism that I gave up, even though in the former I could see a lot of potential and had less difficulty. I was eventually just overwhelmed and certainly my school days weren’t helping as we didn’t take any remote interest in things like this.

Thank you for the link - I’ll be sure to read it and hopefully pick up the book you recommended!

God bless and merry Christmas.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Crucial in classical philosophy are the concepts of Form and Matter. Modernly, however, we do not see the need for these distinct concepts, certainly not for practical purposes. The theory ultimately rests on a purported necessity that in material objects an account of them is impossible without giving two principles that are ultimately diverse and irreducible (to each other). Or in other words, that something as basic as a proton or neutron cannot be accounted for without giving it forms and its matter, which any physical body of any kind will necessarily have simultaneously.

Is this true? And if so, what constitutes form and what matter? Where do we draw the line? And how do we properly draw that line?..comments? Criticisms?

Your example is a particularly difficult one. We can always dream up extreme examples and then ask for an explanation. It is better to start with common examples and explain them.

Take a horse for example. It is clear that the horse has a certain nature evidenced by certain " horse " powers and activities. Clearly there is an inner principle which is the sourse of these powers and activities. It is also clear that there is a material element in a horse. But matter is not living, so the basic matter belonging to a horse, considered in itself, is just inert matter. But life comes to it through the " nature " of the horse. But clearly the horse’s " matter " is a part of the horse’s nature. This matter becomes living when it is informed by or receives the " active " part of the horse’s nature, that which brings to the composite it’s " horseness, " that which makes a horse a horse.

Therefore there is a " passive " principle in the horse, its matter. There is also an " active " principle in the horse, that which informs the matter with the life of " horseness. " Aristotle has given the name of " potency " to the passive principle and " act " to the active principle. So the horse is a composite of potency and act. This is to say that the horse;'s nature is composed of a passive principle, its matter, and an active principle, its form, the " form " of horseness. The matter, the potency, the passive principle are said univocally of the informed aspect of horseness. The act, form, and active principle are said univocally of the informing aspect of horseness.

So the horse’s nature is composed of both passive and active principles.

It is difficult to discuss this topic within the limits of this thread. You might go to Aquinas by Edward Feser for a more full explanation. Or you can go directly to the commentaries on Aristotle by Aquinas himself. . dhspriory.org/thomas/

Good luck

Linus2nd