Free Will, Luck, and Moral Responsibility

[Veritas6]

Hello, here’s what I found from a Thomist about moral responsibility: “If there is a causal foundation for moral responsibility, then, in the Thomistic framework, it is fundamentally historical; it began in our having been created in time, as we were created; which is to say, it is in the meaning of being created good.” (Bold mine)

Quidquid Movetur, Ab Alio Movetur: On the Insufficiency of Strawson's “Basic Argument” to Invalidate the Thomistic Recognition of Moral Responsibility

Galen Strawson has offered, with his modification of the Basic Argument, an intriguing argument with a deceptively simple appearance for the refutation of moral responsibility and ultimately free will. It seems to stand up to a great deal of

www.academia.edu

There seems to be a dilemma from what is called the “Luck Objection”: “either actions are subject to present luck (luck around the time of the action), or they are subject to… constitutive luck (luck that causes relevant properties of agents, such as their desires, beliefs, and circumstances), or both (N. Levy 2011). Either way, luck undermines moral responsibility since it undermines responsibility-level control.”

Now luck is defined: “by way of possible worlds without reference to indeterminism or determinism, and it classifies luck as either chancy or not chancy . An agent’s being chancy lucky is defined as:

An event or state of affairs (i) that event or state of affairs is significant for that agent; (ii) the agent lacks direct control over the event or state of affairs; and (iii) that event or state of affairs fails to occur in many nearby possible worlds; the proportion of nearby worlds that is large enough for the event to be chancy lucky is inverse to the significance of the event for the agent. (N. Levy 2011: 36)

On the other hand:

An event or state of affairs occurring in the actual world that affects an agent’s psychological traits or dispositions is non-chancy lucky for an agent if (i) that event or state of affairs is significant for that agent; (ii) the agent lacks direct control over that event or state of affairs; (iii) events or states of affairs of that kind vary across the relevant reference group, and…in a large enough proportion of cases that event or state of affairs fails to occur or be instantiated in the reference group in the way in which it occurred or was instantiated in the actual case…

The problem of constitutive luck is similar in that an agent’s endowments— i.e., traits and dispositions—likewise result from factors beyond the agent’s control, are significant, and either chancy or non-chancy lucky. A historical compatibilist could respond, as they often do to manipulations cases, that as long as an agent takes responsibility for her endowments, dispositions, and values, over time she will become morally responsible for them. The problem with this reply, however, is that the series of actions through which agents shape and modify their endowments, dispositions, and values are themselves significantly subject to present luck—and, as Levy puts it, ‘we cannot undo the effects of luck with more luck’”. (Bold mine)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/#ImpoUltiResp

Do you think luck would apply to this if God created our endowments? What do you think?