Free Will

[Cajetan]

Assumption (dogmatic): The Divine omniscience (all-knowingness) and Providence entails that every event in history – past, present, and future – is predetermined. If Providence (from eternity) has me eating an ice cream cone while talking to my mother on my cell phone at 5:43pm in Chicago on July 14, 2023, then it will happen. Too, if the eternal Providence has me murdering a man two years from now, it will happen.

Result 1: "Free will’ in the sense of popular culture (and some theological traditions) – that is, ‘libertarian’ free will in which the choices made by moral agents are not predetermined like in the above paragraph – is not a reality but an illusion.

Result 2: Causal determinism is a fact, not just for Nature generally but for moral agents.

Concern: Whither free will? Does not ‘taking away’ free will in the popular sense do damage to the moral responsibility of persons for their actions?

Answer: There are some very real and substantial senses of ‘free will’ or ‘freedom’ that are perfectly compatible with the Divine omniscience and Providence, and the results 1 and 2 above. Most importantly, they do not place limits on Providence or God’s sovereigny; also of great importance, they do no damage to the moral responsibility of persons for their actions. These are senses of freedom which work within full-on, unadultered Divine omniscience and Providence (and causal determinism).

1. Voluntarist. Freedom is personally desiring the object of whatever choice we make and never being forced to choose what we do not personally desire. (Aristotle, Aquinas, Calvin)
2. Non-Necessitarian. Freedom is the fact that while our choices are determined, they are not necessitated: that we do this or that is not a universal truth (“1+1=2”) but is merely a singular contingent truth (“David ate the cookie at 2pm”). Singular contingents, though causally determined, always could have been otherwise insofar as they are not universal truths. Lack of necessity equals freedom. (Aquinas, Leibniz)
3. Transcendental. Freedom is the state of having realized or understood that causal determinism is the reality of nature and everything in it. This awakening ‘act’ allows us to rise above, as it were, the immature ethical-epistemological state of the average person (who falsely assumes that he has libertarian free will just because it seems to him that he does). Having been ‘freed’ in this way, persons may actually be able ‘redirect’ the causal chain of their destiny in certain ways in a certain sense, although always within and under the reality of Divine Providence. (The Stoics, Spinoza, Hegel)
4. Theological. Freedom is the Divine gift of rectitude of will, the state of willing what God wills (as opposed to slavery – to sin – the state of willing what fallen Man wills). (Augustine, Anselm, Calvin)

I contend that freedoms 1 and 4 – the ‘Voluntarist’ and the ‘Theological’ – provide the solutions to the problem which our initial dogmatic assumption entails. (2 and 3 I just find conceptually interesting, having picked them up in my studies.)

Discuss.

 

[Eucharisted]

Providence is God’s action of providing for mankind and guiding you to salvation, whether it is by a narrow and crooked road or by a wide and easy back alley.

Philosophically speaking, the fruits of love are mercy, joy. and peace. Since God is love, He must also be mercy, joy, and peace. So God is mercy, and He, in His mercy, provides what man needs for his body and soul, and for all mankind and all His creatures and creations, and, in so providing, together with the cooperation of His creatures, and bringing good out of physical and moral evil, God brings man to salvation, that is, to Himself.

He created all things for man, and man for Himself. The angels, therefore, pray for man. But the demons, who rebelled against God, now seek man’s damnation and tempt him to commit sins. But God, who foreknows all things, brings good out of evil, even permitting evil to bring good out of it; for example, He permitted His Son to die on a cross in order to bring out of mankind’s redemption. We cannot fully grasp the Provdience of God or how He works with us or how He brings good out of evil, but we can trust in Him, knowing He knows all things, is always with us, and can do all good things.

Now, if man did not have free-will, but was predestined to sin and to do virture, than God would be both good and evil; He would be good-evil, and not wholly good, the goodness itself, which He is as love (again, philosophy). In fact, to say God is good-evil is a heresy, Duelism I believe it’s called. Some would venture further to say God is the cause of all evil, and man is only His puppet, by claiming that the origin of evil is good, because they believe that evil is the corruption of good; however, evil is actually the very abscene of good, and hence, since there is no good in evil, it is the very opposite of good, so God cannot possibly be the origin of evil. Rather, it is when His creatures reject God that evil arises, for where God is absent in the human heart, there will evil arise.

But what is free-will? Some believe it is the freedom to do whatever one wants. However, it is not the freedom to simply choose, to do this or to do that. If that was the case, than God would be responsible for every evil action we do; however, because He is goodness itself, He can only create good (and He certainly created free-will). So free-will is not the freedom to do as one wills, but rather, it is the freedom to do all the good one will - and because God is the source of all goodness, free-will is the freedom to do God’s Will.

Of course, this dose bring up damnation. How could God allow a soul to be damned, or an angel to rebel against Him for that matter? God dose everything in His power to save a creature, even going the extra-mile (given His power is infinite), but when that creature rejects Him, abusing free-will, than He can do no more; not because He is limited but because the creature rejects everything He dose for it, no matter what He dose in His mercy.

 

[cpayne]

1. Non-Necessitarian. Freedom is the fact that while our choices are determined, they are not necessitated: that we do this or that is not a universal truth (“1+1=2”) but is merely a singular contingent truth (“David ate the cookie at 2pm”). Singular contingents, though causally determined, always could have been otherwise insofar as they are not universal truths. Lack of necessity equals freedom. (Aquinas, Leibniz)

Dear Cajetan: I have a question. This position is non-necessitarian in that our choices are not necessary, but holds that our choices are determined insofar as God’s knowledge of our choices cannot be otherwise. That’s fine so far.

My question is, what’s wrong with calling this libertarianism, as Eleonore Stump does? What’s the crucial difference between this and libertarianism–since the “determined” aspect of this is not our choices but rather God’s knowledge of our choices?

 

[Cajetan]

Dear Cajetan: I have a question. This position is non-necessitarian in that our choices are not necessary, but holds that our choices are determined insofar as God’s knowledge of our choices cannot be otherwise. That’s fine so far.

What do you mean by “God’s knowledge of our choices cannot be otherwise”? Do you just mean that God’s knowledge of a (from our perspective) future event ‘cannot fail’ (for example, if it is a part of God’s knowledge that John will gain five pounds over the next two months, then it simply will happen)?

 

[cpayne]

What do you mean by “God’s knowledge of our choices cannot be otherwise”? Do you just mean that God’s knowledge of a (from our perspective) future event ‘cannot fail’ (for example, if it is a part of God’s knowledge that John will gain five pounds over the next two months, then it simply will happen)?

Yes. It is necessary that God’s knowledge of this event be unfailing and perfect, but it is not otherwise necessary that the event occur—which makes it a result of libertarian free will, doesn’t it?

In other words, God’s unerring knowledge of the action is necessary, but that does not make the action necessary. Neither would it CAUSE the action, would it? in which case, again, the action is a libertarian decision.

God is an ultimate cause in the sense that John’s freedom is caused by God. But to look for the cause of John’s action, we don’t have to look any further than John’s (uncaused) decision. Do you think this diminishes God’s sovereignty? If the answer is yes, and God is the direct cause of John’s decision, how is this different from simple determinism?

Maybe I stuck too many questions in one post.

 

[faithfulrock3r]

and we seem to be back to square one: “does God’s omniscience necessitate determinism?” personally, i agree with cpayne, and would argue that of course, God’s knowledge never changes (neither qualitatively nor quantitatively). however, his knowledge does not cause (determine) our action, rather the knowledge of a specific action exists because the action existed. If the action did not exist, the knowledge would need not exist. Because that specific action never occured, His knowledge of every action would remain perfect. Because God’s knowledge is timeless, his knowledge neither causes nor results from our action, rather, it is contemporaneous to it.

I also don’t understand how you believe that “freedoms” 1 and 4 provide a solution to the problem of determinism. In the first freedom, God predestines man’s actions. All men desire all of these actions, whether good or evil. Thus God has seemingly predestined men to evil actions, which would seem impossible for the all-good Christian God (contrary to what Calvin believed). Freedom 4 seems even worse, claiming that God predestined some men to conform to his will and others not to. Or do they in fact have the free will to conform or not, in which case determinism collapses?

What I am primarily saying is that you are trying to marry two incompatible theories, free-will and determinism. While it may seem elementary to do so, i just cannot help but make the point that if God predestines our actions, then we do not choose them. If, as you say, “eternal Providence has me murdering a man two years from now, it will happen”, then you seem to really have no say at all in the matter, free will has been utterly abolished. Perhaps i am simply not seeing what you are trying to say, but i still see no reconciliation between free will and determinism.

 

[Shredderbeam]

If we agree that reality is causal, and our decision-making process is solely a result of our biological equipment, then no, free will does not exist.

What does it matter, though? We still think and feel as though we can act independently.

 

[cpayne]

If we agree that reality is causal, and our decision-making process is solely a result of our biological equipment, then no, free will does not exist.

What does it matter, though? We still think and feel as though we can act independently.

Well, this seems simply a form of materialist determinism. Cajetan is not arguing for this, since this implies a couple of things: (1) Humans are completely material because (2) reality is completely material. Cajetan would not accept either of these propositions, since material things don’t “make decisions” at all.

On the other hand, you may be arguing that freedom is an emergent property of the biological equipment (like, for example, John Searle would argue), I’ve heard this before, but I’ve never understood it. If this is what you are saying, could you spell it out a little more? Thank you in advance.

 

[Shredderbeam]

Well, this seems simply a form of materialist determinism. Cajetan is not arguing for this, since this implies a couple of things: (1) Humans are completely material because (2) reality is completely material. Cajetan would not accept either of these propositions, since material things don’t “make decisions” at all.

I believe that there have been studies that show areas in the brain linked to decision-making. Wouldn’t that be an example of material things making decisions? Or would that not be counted as a decision, since the particles of the brain were simply acting as causality requires?

cpayne:

On the other hand, you may be arguing that freedom is an emergent property of the biological equipment (like, for example, John Searle would argue), I’ve heard this before, but I’ve never understood it. If this is what you are saying, could you spell it out a little more? Thank you in advance.

I’m not arguing that freedom comes from biological equipment, I’m making the point that whether or not our lives are completely determined, it matters little. We still “seem” to have freedom of choice, and we act as though we do. If determinism is correct, it’s a philosophical point of mere academic interest.

 

[jkiernan56]

Assumption (dogmatic): The Divine omniscience (all-knowingness) and Providence entails that every event in history – past, present, and future – is predetermined. If Providence (from eternity) has me eating an ice cream cone while talking to my mother on my cell phone at 5:43pm in Chicago on July 14, 2023, then it will happen. Too, if the eternal Providence has me murdering a man two years from now, it will happen.

Predeterminism is a fallacy. What is KNOWN does not CAUSE. The fallacy of predeterminism is that it implies that what God knows is also caused (determined) by God. Not true.

I understand the concept of cause and effect. I have yet to hear the rational of the relationship between knowing and causing. God’s knowing does not cause.

 

[faithfulrock3r]

I believe that there have been studies that show areas in the brain linked to decision-making. Wouldn’t that be an example of material things making decisions? Or would that not be counted as a decision, since the particles of the brain were simply acting as causality requires?

I’m not arguing that freedom comes from biological equipment, I’m making the point that whether or not our lives are completely determined, it matters little. We still “seem” to have freedom of choice, and we act as though we do. If determinism is correct, it’s a philosophical point of mere academic interest.

it’s not just an academic interest, it has everything to do with morality, good and evil, God, and salvation. If a man does not make decisions but merely operates according to some pre-determined laws of causaliuty, what seperates him from a machine? If our actions, thoughts, feelings, and beliefs are all pre-determined, we lose our humanity.

 

[The_Catholic]

it’s not just an academic interest, it has everything to do with morality, good and evil, God, and salvation. If a man does not make decisions but merely operates according to some pre-determined laws of causaliuty, what seperates him from a machine? If our actions, thoughts, feelings, and beliefs are all pre-determined, we lose our humanity.

Exactly! Which is why I started another thread called “Determinism.” I’d like to get some interesting conversations going. I’m curious.