From an Agnostic Viewpoint, How Do We Know Is God the Christain God?

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Gorgias:
Hmm. You seem to be making the argument that, if God is omnipotent, then the only way God can actualize that omnipotence is through an infinitely large application of force. (Therefore, you conclude that any application of force by God, results in a destruction of the universe. The universe is not destroyed, therefore God hasn’t applied force, therefore God isn’t omnipotent, etc, etc.) Am I understanding you correctly?
No.
OK; fair enough. However, since I’m not the only one who has taken what you’ve said and understood you in this way, could you help us understand what you mean, here?
Another night. I recall looking at those arguments many years ago, and they were incorrect. However, since my brain is very bad at recalling falsehoods (I cannot even remember my own lies) I struggle with most philosophy. Also, I do not recall argument chains, not even my own. This means that you are asking me to repeat an old process which was not especially rewarding the first time.
🤷 OK… but you realize that “I didn’t like it, but I don’t remember why” isn’t a particularly compelling defense of your position, right?
I have refuted several of T.A.'s arguments here on CAF before, but was met with the customary barrage of dogma. There seems no point in repeating that silly exercise.
Some will resist, purely on the basis that Thomas is Thomas. That’s weak sauce. However, it seems to be counter-productive to refuse to debate the issue based on immature reactions to the dialogue.
If you can … refrain from quoting a favorite authority figure, then, game on.
We “stand on the shoulders of giants”, don’t we? Why require that we re-invent the wheel? After all, we didn’t require you to refrain from quoting laws of thermodynamics, but rather, allowed it and engaged it in the dialogue – why should I allow you to hold me to a more restrictive standard?
 
Yes, principles of electrical behavior awaited our discovery, not our invention. However, anyone who has made a serious study of science knows that considerable leaps of mental insight and imagination were required to understand these principles well enough to formalize them.
OK… so it takes a reasonable amount of intellect to be imaginative. So what?
I guarantee that if I were to sit you down with a complete description of the preliminary rules of electrical behavior, Ohm’s Law, Ampere’s Law, and Faraday’s rule of induction, that you would not be able to sit down in a test chamber and derive Maxwell’s equations.
Immaterial. Someone did it.
Your idea applies even better to mathematical principles, because not even God can create them. They can only be discovered.
This is an interesting assertion. Can you defend it, rather than simply asserting it? After all, if we’re positing a creating God, then we have a God who created a universe that has certain underlying principles. You’re saying that God created a universe without creating the principles by which it exists?
You belittle the value of imagination.
Certainly not. Imagination is critical in the endeavor of increasing human knowledge. I was only addressing your assertion that imagination implies absolute originality of thought.
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greylorn:
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Gorgias:
The things that you describe as “unimaginative thought” are things that have been thought before, right?
Wrong again. 😦
Your retorts would work a lot better if you maintained a bit of consistency. Let me remind you of what you said, back in post #26:
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greylorn:
However, what makes humans interesting (on the very few occasions on which they actually are interesting) is imaginative thought. By that I take the common meaning, as the discovery of ideas or concepts which have not previously been discovered.
If “imaginative thought” is that “which (has) not previously been discovered”, then it’s wrong to define “unimaginative thought” as that “which has been thought before”? So much for “wrong again”…
The brain component handling curves, keeping the car on the road, and alerting me to slow traffic or potential danger, ran entirely on automatic, thinking unimaginatively but not repetitively.
OK – so the distinction you’re making is between ratiocination (that is, rational thought) and, apparently, subconscious “automatic” thought. Good distinction, but insufficient. I’m addressing your assertion by distinguishing between ratiocination that’s “original” and that which isn’t. It might take a little imagination to grasp the distinction, though… 😉
Totally wrong! I see that you have no appreciation for imagination. You are missing something.
Consider art or music. Do you really believe that Beethoven’s glorious 9th Symphony existed before he composed it? (Please don’t bring in the “God already knew it” dogma.)
Apples and oranges. Are you really equating the discovery of natural laws with the composition of well-understood principles of music and the application of existing musical forms?
Wrong again! You, not I, are positing in the context of an omniscient being.
Again, is it too much to ask consistency of you? You said:
An omniscient being who knows all things, literally, including the future, cannot have a unique, imaginative thought.
In other words, your context was “an omniscient being who knows all things”. Why am I wrong if I address the construct you proposed?
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greylorn:
I propose that if you took the trouble to get one, you might better appreciate those who’ve taken the trouble. It is not difficult.
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greylorn:
You are probably too busy studying dogma to have bothered with biology.
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Gorgias:
You are probably too busy studying biology to have bothered with philosophy.
Sensitive, aren’t we? No need to be.
LOL! Wait, let me understand: you insult me, without provocation – twice – and when I respond in kind, I’m at fault? Yeah, you’re right – I should let you impugn my intelligence and not complain… :rolleyes:
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greylorn:
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Gorgias:
This assertion holds – if all beings are considered to be equal.
IMO any nit can see that no two humans are equal in any respect, but I realize that intellectuals often have trouble making simple observations.
IMO any nit can see that “humans” =/= “beings”, but I realize that intellectuals often have trouble reading.

I also realize that I seem to have identified empther’s doppleganger… :rolleyes:
 
IMO any nit can see that no two humans are equal in any respect, but I realize that intellectuals often have trouble making simple observations.
In other words, no two humans are human.

Just call me a non-nit. I am the only one.
 
But what about all the relations you stand in, potentially and actually? It’s true that your not acting on being strong leaves an unaztualized potency in the object, but it also leaves your potential to be the lifter unactualized.

To be able to X is to have the potency to X. If you actually do X, then your potency is realized, otherwise, it’s unactualized.
I had to consult my Summa. Aquinas addresses this objection in part 1, question 25, article 1. Potency is distinguished between its active (the power to affect something) and passive (the power to be affected by something) variants. The principle of “actus purus” only requires that God be supreme in the first sort.

The objection is somewhat analogous to the complaint that God can’t be omnipotent because He can’t enact logical contradictions – even though “omnipotence” in the Thomist sense doesn’t require any such thing.
 
I had to consult my Summa. Aquinas addresses this objection in part 1, question 25, article 1. Potency is distinguished between its active (the power to affect something) and passive (the power to be affected by something) variants. The principle of “actus purus” only requires that God be supreme in the first sort.

The objection is somewhat analogous to the complaint that God can’t be omnipotent because He can’t enact logical contradictions – even though “omnipotence” in the Thomist sense doesn’t require any such thing.
I’m not sure if the original author(s) took that distinction into account, but I’m familiar with it. I’d still say something isn’t Pure Act if it has any unactualized potency, active or passive. Whereas, I’m sure the Thomist would disagree.
 
I’m not sure if the original author(s) took that distinction into account, but I’m familiar with it. I’d still say something isn’t Pure Act if it has any unactualized potency, active or passive. Whereas, I’m sure the Thomist would disagree.
OK, but that’s terminological nitpickery. The Thomist apologetical arguments that furnish the idea of God as actus purus don’t require that “actus purus” mean He is utterly devoid even of passive potentiality; similar to the misunderstanding re: omnipotence I described above.
 
OK, but that’s terminological nitpickery. The Thomist apologetical arguments that furnish the idea of God as actus purus don’t require that “actus purus” mean He is utterly devoid even of passive potentiality; similar to the misunderstanding re: omnipotence I described above.
I disagree. To me, this is like saying it’s terminological nitpickery to point out that an argument allegedly for omnipotence isn’t because it’s only for a superpowerful being.

But, the author(s) of the argument would be saying if God could do something that he isn’t doing, he’d have a passive potency, which is contradictory. To me, there’s nothing incompatible with this and Thomism.
 
  1. God is pure act. [Premise]
  2. If God is pure act, then if God could X, God does X. [Premise]
  3. Therefore, if God could X, God does X. (2), (1), M.P.]
  4. Therefore, if God does not X, God could not X. (3), Trans.]
Nothing immediately absurd? Well, check this out…
  1. God has not refrained from creating this universe. [Premise]
  2. Therefore, if God hasn’t refrained from creating this universe, then God could not refrain from creating this universe. (4), E.I.]
  3. Therefore, God could not refrain from creating this universe. (6), (5) M.P.]
So, apparently, our universe exists necessarily. Reductio ad absurdum.
Perplexity,

A couple of things have bothered me about your argument. One is the “passive potency” thing ya’ll have been discussing, so I’ll leave that one alone for the moment. The other, though, is that your reductio seems improperly applied. If a reductio exists, then what it does is refutes the logic of the preposition, not takes its conclusion and ratifies it! That is, given that you’ve shown that your arguments 1-4 lead to a reductio, then you must abandon the arguments! In other words, a few of us here are looking at (2) and saying, “nope, that doesn’t hold”, and you seem to have demonstrated for us that (2) cannot hold!

Can anybody help me out here? Maybe I just haven’t cleared the cobwebs yet today, and need a cup of coffee…
 
Gorgias: I’d respond that rejecting (2) makes for a modus tollens against (1).
 
OK; fair enough. However, since I’m not the only one who has taken what you’ve said and understood you in this way, could you help us understand what you mean, here?
I would be happy to do so, and some feedback from you and any others who would like clarification would help me out. Try reading my stuff a second or third time. The problem is that you are trying to put my ideas into the context of yours, where they do not fit. So try interpreting them as objectively as possible, forgetting, momentarily, your own opinions. Then come on back. If you genuinely want to understand my meaning, I will do my drattedness to support the process.
🤷 OK… but you realize that “I didn’t like it, but I don’t remember why” isn’t a particularly compelling defense of your position, right?
As a defense of my position, it pretty much sucks. Wasn’t offered that way. I’m trying to avoid unprofitable arguments. Perhaps if you and I can get past the issue addressed just above, we can move on to Aquinas.
Some will resist, purely on the basis that Thomas is Thomas. That’s weak sauce. However, it seems to be counter-productive to refuse to debate the issue based on immature reactions to the dialogue.
At least we are both lined up on what or is not counter-productive. I regard it as counter-productive to engage in an argument with a dogmatist. It is true that I cannot change what passes for a dogmatist’s mind by not arguing with him. However, when the exact same outcome is obtained by arguing with him, why waste my time?

I love discussions with intelligent, honest antagonists who are interested in exploring new ideas. Find me a few.
We “stand on the shoulders of giants”, don’t we? Why require that we re-invent the wheel? After all, we didn’t require you to refrain from quoting laws of thermodynamics, but rather, allowed it and engaged it in the dialogue – why should I allow you to hold me to a more restrictive standard?
All too often we find ourselves standing on the shoulders of fools.

In case you’ve not noticed, we do continue to reinvent and improve the wheel. The radial tires on a modern car differ greatly from the bias ply innertubed tires I was so often repairing as a young man. Do you really think that it would work to outfit a B-2 with chariot wheels?

I understand your point. If you read what I write about the laws of thermodynamics, you’ll find that they are not quite as written in physics texts, possibly not as described in Wikipedia. My understanding of those laws is good enough to allow me to explain and discuss them without references.

Moreover, I am concerned with and have often addressed the theological/metaphysical implications of these laws, which I find to be rather profound. This is not a mainstream take on the subject. Physicists do not agree with it.

So when I write about thermodynamics, I’m writing and discussing from my personal understanding. What I’m asking you (and, ideally others who might wish to expand their minds) is the same thing.

I want you to go into Aquinas or atop whoever’s shoulders you want to perch on, and profoundly understand his words, like I do with thermodynamics and most other topics I discuss on CAF.

This is a way of showing your good faith, and of proving that you are not a dogmatist and possibly worth my time. And with that comment, I’ve had enough low-level quibbling. Either get on a serious subject that you can have an open mind about, and about which you understand at the level beyond words, or else go quibble with someone else.
 
Gorgias: I’d respond that rejecting (2) makes for a modus tollens against (1).
No, I don’t think so. Your appeal to modus tollens mistakenly presumes I’m rejecting “if God could X, God does X”. I’m not (at the moment, that is). I’m rejecting the premise in its entirety (that if God is pure act, then it follows that if God could do X, God does X).

Let P = “If God is pure act, then (if God could do X, then God does do X)”

Let Y = “God is pure act”
Let Z = “If God could X, then God does X”

Now, by definition, if ~P then it implies that Y and ~Z.

Therefore:
Presuming that it’s false that “if God is pure act, then ‘if God could do X, then God does X’”, then…
It’s false that “if God could do X, then God does X”
It’s true that “God is pure act”.

Finally, you’ve posited that “if God could do (any act), then God does (any act)”, but by by presuming that your premise is false, we’ve been drawn to the conclusion that this part of the premise, too, is false. By the same logic, this means that:
It’s true that “God could do (any act)”
It’s false that “God does (any act)”.

It seems that, by rejecting P (not Z, as your appeal to modens tollens attempts to assert), the whole ball of wax you’re proposing collapses.
 
Gorgias: I’d respond that rejecting (2) makes for a modus tollens against (1).
Allow me to intrude.

Two conditions are required for your modus tollens against (1).
a) the acceptance of (2) as a true hypothetical (ie. there is a necessary connection between the antecedent and consequent)
b) the rejection of the consequent of (2)

I think Gorgias is saying that a) doesn’t hold. You seem to want to conflate a) and b) so that if one rejects a) then one also rejects b)… that does not follow.
 
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