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Someone2841
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I’m trying to wrap my head around the Thomist idea that God’s Essence is His Existence. Here is a briefish quote from Feser’s book Aquinas:
In general, “every essence or quiddity can be understood without its act of existing being understood. I can understand what a man or phoenix is, and yet not know whether or not it exists in the nature of things” ( DEE 4). The phoenix example is perhaps more instructive than the humanity one: someone unaware that the phoenix is entirely mythical might know that its “essence” is to be a bird that burns itself into ashes out of which a new phoenix arises, without knowing whether there really is such a creature. But in that case, “it is evident that the act of existing is other than essence or quiddity” for “whatever is extraneous to the concept of an essence or quiddity is adventitious, and forms a composition with the essence” ( DEE 4). Or in other words, if it is possible to understand the essence of a thing without knowing whether it exists, its act of existing (if it has one) must be distinct from its essence, as a metaphysically separate component of the thing.
Human beings certainly exist, and presumably phoenixes do not. That is to say, there are beings with the essence of humanity (the substantive properties required to be human) but no beings with the essence of phoenixity (the substantive properties required to be a phoenix). I might argue that existence is a part of every being’s essence insofar as without existence it would fail to be a being at all. Why is God special in this case?The significance of the distinction between essence and existence is indicated by another argument Aquinas gives for it. If essence and existence were not distinct, they would be identical; and they could be identical only in “something whose quiddity is its very act of existing … such that it would be subsistent existence itself” ( DEE 4). That is to say, something whose essence is its existence would depend on nothing else (e.g. matter) for its existence, since it would just be existence or being. But there could only possibly be one such thing, for there would be no way in principle to distinguish more than one. We could not coherently appeal to some unique form one such thing has to distinguish it from others of its kind, “because then it would not be simply an act of existing, but an act of existing plus this certain form”; nor could we associate it with some particular parcel of matter, “because then it would not be subsistent existence, but material existence,” that is, dependent on matter for its being ( DEE 4). In fact there is, in Aquinas’s view, a being in whom essence and existence are identical, namely God; and the identity of his essence and his existence entails (among other things) that God is a necessary being, one that cannot possibly not exist.