Goodness and Form Aquinas

[Burning_Sapling]

Hi all,

I take it that when Aquinas says that “being” and “goodness” are convertible terms he means that if some subject p has a “principle of activity and rest” and hence a “form” in the Aristotelian sense then that form provides the subject p with a standard for the evaluation of it as a good or bad, healthy or unhealthy, etc. member of its kind. But then what to make of the appearance that certain phenomena that admit of forms in this sense do not at a first glance seem to admit of evaluation as good or bad?

Take smoke, for instance. It has general tendencies for certain kinds of movement- for instance it rises when nothing impedes it. So Aquinas would presumably want to say it has a form. And yet, it does not seem obvious that smoke admits of evaluation as smoke.What do I mean by this? I mean that while it is obvious that one can evaluate smoke according to how well it fulfills functions, purposes, or ends that do not belong to smoke of its nature (say, as cigarette smoke, or perhaps for aesthetic or symbolic purposes) it is not as obvious that one can evaluate smoke for how well it fulfills functions, purposes, or ends that do belong to smoke of its nature. But Aquinas needs to be able to say that we can evaluate smoke as smoke, because it is the point of the goodness- being convertibility thesis that anything that admits of a form admits of evaluation as good or bad as a thing of the kind prescribed to it by its form.

Sure, we might say of some instance of smoke that it is pure smoke, but one might think that we are not really using “pure” in a normative sense (i.e. a sense to do with goodness or badness) when we talk like this. That is, one might think that we are simply using “pure” to mean “freedom from admixture by foreign (non- smoke) substances”.

One might reply- smoke can either be actualized as smoke or not, and to be actualized as smoke is to have realized the good available to smoke. But this seems to be just what is in question- why think that actualization = goodness when there are some subjects that seem as though they can actualize their natures and yet do not seem at a glance to admit of normative evaluation?

One reason is this- God makes everything that exists, everything that God makes is good. I cannot use this reasoning in my Philosophy paper, however!

relevant section of ST: newadvent.org/summa/1005.htm

Thank you!
Sapling

 

[lmelahn]

I take it that when Aquinas says that “being” and “goodness” are convertible

I think it would be better to say that in I, q. 5, a. 1, Aquinas is doing what he terms a resolutio, or analysis (a discovery of the fundamental principles that underlie common notions), of the notion of goodness.

So, he starts with the common, most easily understood notion of goodness, which for Aquinas is desirability: a thing, a being, is “good” to the degree that some subject (whether that be a rational subject, such as a man or angel, or a sub-rational one, such as an animal, or any other creature, really) considers it as an object of desire.

Investigating (or “resolving”) further, he discovers that the a thing is desirable, hence good, inasmuch as it bestows something to the subject that desires it: it is “perfective,” in his parlance. Moreover, if a thing is “perfective,” it must be “perfect”: it must possess something intrinsically that is communicable to the subject that desires it.

Take, for example, a pizza. It is “good” inasmuch as it is desirable for a hungry person. (Here “desire” must be taken in its noble sense, as a tendency to fulfill a legitimate need.) The pizza is “perfective” inasmuch as it provides nutrition and a pleasurable culinary experience. Moreover, it is “perfective” inasmuch as it is “perfect”: inasmuch as it possesses certain intrinsic characteristics that are communicable to the one who desires it (for example, certain nutrients, the ability to excite the taste buds and nose in a pleasurable way, and so on).

What is “perfection”? Aquinas goes on to say that “perfection” is really a kind of being: the pizza (in our example), after all, is crusty, tasty, and nourishing.

Hence, Aquinas argues, behind every “good” is a kind of being. It is, he argues, really the act of being that, if you will, produces the goodness of a thing.

That is what he means when he says “being and goodness are convertible.” In other words, he argues, hidden or latent in the very notion of “being” is always the notion of “good.”

There are no exceptions, because even evil things are things that are fundamentally good (they are good according to what Aquinas calls their “substantial being”) but lacking in some due perfection. For example, the Devil is good inasmuch as he is an angel—that is his “substantial being”—but he is evil because he has failed to fulfill a fundamental obligation of all spiritual creatures—namely, obedience to God.

Take smoke, for instance. It has general tendencies for certain kinds of movement- for instance it rises when nothing impedes it. So Aquinas would presumably want to say it has a form.

Let’s just make sure that we understand what Aquinas means by “form.” We should, first of all, not confuse “form” with “shape.” “Shape,” for Aquinas would only be one very particular kind of form.

Rather, “form” has two fundamental meanings in Aquinas’ system. Aristotle admitted two fundamental kinds of composition: between substance and accident, and between what he calls prime matter and substantial form. Aquinas adds a third one: the composition between being and essence.

A concrete substance, for Aristotle (and Aquinas) is a kind of substrate or “matter,” which we are to imagine sort of like the clay in the hands of a potter. It can be “molded” into different shapes (or forms); Aquinas calls this “molding” the “accidental form.” However, the geometrical shape of a material substance is only one of many possible accidental forms that it might have: its height, weight, color, orientation, and even relationships to other things can all be considered “accidental forms” of that substance.

There is a more profound composition, however, that can be discerned in the fact that material beings are found as multiple individuals of the same species. For example, we can identify many individual substances as cats, all of which are fundamentally of the same “kind,” or species. Unless there is a principle that allows one to distinguish between the individuals, argues Aristotle, cats would be indistinguishable from one another—that is, there could only be one cat in the world! Since that is obviously not the case, each concrete substance must, he says, possess an indeterminate principle that can be “molded” or determined according to the species it belongs to. This indeterminate principle he calls “prime matter” and the determinate principle (which coincides with the species) he calls “substantial form.”

In summary: there are two kinds of form in Aquinas: substantial form (which determines a thing’s species—the kind of thing it is), and accidental form (which determines the various perfections and qualities that a thing has).

And yet, it does not seem obvious that smoke admits of evaluation as smoke.

But this seems to be just what is in question- why think that actualization = goodness when there are some subjects that seem as though they can actualize their natures and yet do not seem at a glance to admit of normative evaluation?

I think it is simpler than that. Smoke is always “good” inasmuch as it simply is a being. Nevertheless, on some occasions—as when the smoke is noxious—we could not call it “good” without making a qualification (i.e., that it is good simply because it is a being). Smoke is only “good” absolutely, or without qualification, when it is somehow desirable (for example, when it is fragrant or helpful for liturgical celebrations).

One reason is this- God makes everything that exists, everything that God makes is good.

God is, so to speak, the extrinsic cause of the goodness of things. The intrinsic cause of their goodness is their being; I think that is the whole point of Quaestio 5.

I hope I was able to help!

 

[Burning_Sapling]

Thank you for your helpful reply. One of the things that is helpful about it is your clarification of terms. What I meant in saying “form” is “substantial form”- i.e. that which determines the kind to which the subject belongs and provides it with a principle of activity and rest.

I think we understand the goodness- being convertibility thesis differently. I am taking it that “desirability” in Aquinas’ sense is not the sense in which we usually think of desire. Rather I take it that when Aquinas says that what is perfective of a subject is also what is desirable for that subject, what he means is that all subjects (or at least all subjects that admit of a standard of perfection) naturally desire (in his sense of that term) their own perfection. On this reading it would be clear that “desire” can’t mean what we normally think of it as meaning, since some subjects (ones that admit of a standard of perfection, even)- like pizza, for instance- are not capable of fostering desires at all let alone desires about the condition that they actualize. Rather, on my reading, what “desirable” means is just “that condition towards which the subject naturally tends”. A pizza, for instance, has characteristic activities (and therefore has a “telos”, function, or end)- it provides, as you say, a pleasurable culinary experience and provides nutrition. So, the condition that a pizza “desires” to attain is the condition that it naturally tends towards attaining- which will be one that includes its (1) providing nutrition and (2) a pleasurable culinary experience, or at least being such as to do (1) and (2) if eaten. So the measure of the goodness of a thing, on my reading, is not relative to what some third party that it is capable of “desire” in the contemporary sense may want from it. Rather it is relative to what the subjects’ own natural “desires” are- where “desire” is to be read as “natural tendency”.

I think there are reasons to favor the kind of account I have suggested above. One is that, at least if the author of this blog- readingthesumma.blogspot.com/2009/12/question-5-general-notion-of-good.html- is right, it does better justice to the meaning of the latin term that Aquinas used which most translations render as “desire” (and also to Aristotle’s greek term that Aquinas based his account on). Admittedly, the author may not be right in his translation of Aquinas latin term that most texts translate as desire. But I will provide additional reasons to think my reading is right below. At any rate, here is what the author of the aforementioned blog says:

“In this question Aquinas quotes Aristotle saying that “the good is what all things desire”. The sense of the word “desire” corresponds to seeking. Modern translations of the Nicomachean Ethics (directly from the Greek, rather than indirectly via the Latin that was available to Aquinas) usually read “the good is that which all things seek”. This latter is certainly the sense that Aquinas uses. Even more, the sense is that of “have an innate tendency towards”; this tendency is not restricted to creatures capable of desire in the sense that we usually use it.”

Now, I suggested above that I would provide further reasons to think that my reading- viz. the reading that states that the standard of goodness of a subject is provided by what the subject itself naturally tends towards and not necessarily what a third party capable of desire in the contemporary sense desires in the subject. Here then, is the above promised additional support for my reading. Cannot one have a noble desire to use some inanimate thing in some way that does not entail that inanimate things’ being actualized as a thing of the kind to which it belongs? Might I want, for instance, to use a cat in a film that I am making precisely because it is an unhealthy cat and thus fits the role in the film perfectly? But in that case, the desirability of the cat to me, noble as my desire may be- I may be making a beautiful and moving film extolling holy things and not even harming the cat in the process but simply using a cat that is already unhealthy anyway- my regarding the cat as desirable does not entail that the cat is “good” as member of the species “cat”, where I take it that for a cat to be good as a member of the species cat would just be for it to be healthy (or something like this).

Now, what the upshot of this would be is that the question I asked in the OP remains an interesting one. Smoke has “a principle of movement and rest”- it moves in certain ways under circumstances, different ways under other circumstances, and rests (somewhat, at least) under other circumstances. This, if I have the term “substantial form” right, is to say that smoke has a “substantial form”. Yet substantial forms are supposed to bring with them a conception of the goodness of the subject- one that is not relative to what people, animals, angels, etc. might desire in smoke, but rather one that is relative only to what smoke’s innate tendencies are. And yet, do we ever say that smoke is “good” smoke, or anything of the like, when we are not referring to its use for us but rather simply to the extent to which it fulfills its own innate general tendencies to act in certain ways?

Imelahn, I apologize if I have gotten your view wrong. I also apologize if I have misused Aristotelian- Thomist terminology. I hope at least that the sense of my question is clear and pressing. If you think that my reading of Aquinas is wrong, however, I would be curious to hear this.

Thank you!

 

[lmelahn]

Thank you for your helpful reply. One of the things that is helpful about it is your clarification of terms. What I meant in saying “form” is “substantial form”- i.e. that which determines the kind to which the subject belongs and provides it with a principle of activity and rest.

The Aristotelian and Thomistic term for substance (or essence—Aristotle uses the same word ousia for both) when considered as the principle of activity is nature (in Greek, physis), just so you know.

Note that, for Aquinas, the substantial form only makes something “relatively” good (in Latin secundum quid, or “with respect to a particular aspect”). It is the accidental form that makes something good or bad “absolutely” (in Latin simpliciter, or “without qualification”). Pizza is always good inasmuch as it exists, but only crispy, hot, tasty pizza is “simply” good.

So nature is the principle of activity (hence it is a “relative” good); activity itself is the fulfillment (or frustration!) of nature (hence it is an “absolute” good).

I think we understand the goodness- being convertibility thesis differently.

I suggest reading Aquinas’ Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, especially numbers 1 and 21, which explains more thoroughly his doctrine on the so-called “transcendentals” (the properties that are convertible with being). Question 21 deals with the good in particular.

If you are brave, I wrote a paper (not published, unfortunately, so it can’t be cited) about this issue. Especially relevant is the first chapter about “bonum” (the good).

I am taking it that “desirability” in Aquinas’ sense is not the sense in which we usually think of desire.

So the measure of the goodness of a thing, on my reading, is not relative to what some third party that it is capable of “desire” in the contemporary sense may want from it. Rather it is relative to what the subjects’ own natural “desires” are- where “desire” is to be read as “natural tendency”.

Well, actually, I don’t think we are that far apart. I did not have a chance to finish, because of space constraints. The intrinsic goodness of a thing (i.e., its perfection) does not depend on its relationship to a subject, but (and here is Aquinas’ point) its knowability does.

Aquinas in his treatise weaves together three aspects of goodness: (1) the intrinsic attractiveness of being, by which we know that things are good, (2) the underlying perfection that causes that attractiveness, and (3) the natural tendency for all beings to seek their own perfection.

Notice the “resolutive” progression here: Aquinas begins with what is most easily known (the evident attractiveness or repulsiveness of things), to what is less well known (its intrinsic perfection or lack thereof), arriving at the most profound principle (that all things seek their own perfection or happiness).

So there are two types of desire in question here (or better said, the same desire is considered in two different ways): the desire on the part of a subject seeking fulfillment in some other good (1), and the desire of all things to seek their own perfection (3).

Note that all three aspects can legitimately be called “good,” albeit in slightly different ways.

Note that “desire” here is an analogical term: all things seek (“desire”) their own perfection: angels, men, animals, and even stones. But obviously, stones do so in a very basic, mechanical way, and animals’ desires are strictly sensitive, whereas men and angels have desires that are mediated by their wills.

Also, when we talk about the good in the first sense (1), it is the activity of the thing desired, not its nature (which is determined by the substantial form) as such, that renders that good attractive. I like hot, tasty pizza, not just any pizza. The same holds true for the other senses of goodness: a thing is “perfect” inasmuch as it has perfect activity (i.e., activity in conformity with its nature); for creatures, having perfect “nature” is not enough. (The Devil’s nature is superior to man’s, but we are much better off being men in the grace of God!)

As the Angelic Doctor himself says many times, good and end (telos) are also convertible.

I also agree that we have to take “desire” in its noble sense, as seeking to fulfill a legitimate need. (Aquinas of course admits of perverted desires, but that is not the normal sense of the term.) In short, I totally agree with the blogger on this one. Perhaps I was not clear in my answer.

**

 

[lmelahn]

[Continued…]

Now, I suggested above that I would provide further reasons to think that my reading- viz. the reading that states that the standard of goodness of a subject is provided by what the subject itself naturally tends towards and not necessarily what a third party capable of desire in the contemporary sense desires in the subject.

I think that Aquinas would say that the goodness of a thing fundamentally depends on its intrinsic perfection, which is not measured by any third party (save God). A thing’s essence (nature) serves as the intrinsic measure of that goodness. Aquinas brings up desirability because it is how we know that things are good. That is why “desirability” (taken in the sense given by the blogger) is the most basic notion of the good.

Here then, is the above promised additional support for my reading. Cannot one have a noble desire to use some inanimate thing in some way that does not entail that inanimate things’ being actualized as a thing of the kind to which it belongs?

A “desire” is precisely a seeking of our own perfection, not the perfection of the thing desired, not as such. (Sure, we can desire the good of another person—the so-called amor benevolentiae, which is actually the perfection of love—but even this is inseparable from the desire of the lover to seek his own perfection. In loving another person, the lover hopes to be happy.)

Might I want, for instance, to use a cat in a film that I am making precisely because it is an unhealthy cat and thus fits the role in the film perfectly?

Sure. Remember, desire is for your own perfection, not the cat’s. The sick cat is providing something desirable for making a good film, here. (Naturally, when other persons are involved, things get more complicated, because our own happiness is tied to our duties to our fellow man.)

I think we could say, in this example, that the cat is “good” in the first sense (1), because it is desirable for the filmmaker’s projects, but not in the second sense (2), since clearly the cat is is some way failing to reach its own feline perfection. For sub-rational creatures, it seems to me that the first sense always prevails over the second (since such creatures are ordered to the use of men), whereas for spiritual creatures (men and angels), the opposite is the case.

Now, what the upshot of this would be is that the question I asked in the OP remains an interesting one. Smoke has “a principle of movement and rest”- it moves in certain ways under circumstances, different ways under other circumstances, and rests (somewhat, at least) under other circumstances. This, if I have the term “substantial form” right, is to say that smoke has a “substantial form”.

Just to clarify, the substantial form is its principle of movement and rest of the smoke. Note that “movement and rest” need not be local movement, but any kind of change or alteration (or lack thereof). (“Movement and rest” here is synonymous with “activity” or “operation.”) Hence, every substance has a substantial form, and that substantial form produces different kinds of movement and rest. (Actually, the substantial form produces certain accidents—i.e., accidental forms—and these in turn produce various activities.)

So, assuming that smoke has the necessary unity to be a single substance, then yes, it has a substantial form, and hence a single principle of movement and rest.

Yet substantial forms are supposed to bring with them a conception of the goodness of the subject- one that is not relative to what people, animals, angels, etc. might desire in smoke, but rather one that is relative only to what smoke’s innate tendencies are. And yet, do we ever say that smoke is “good” smoke, or anything of the like, when we are not referring to its use for us but rather simply to the extent to which it fulfills its own innate general tendencies to act in certain ways?

Again, let us not lose sight of the three slightly different ways that things can be “good”: something is “good” if it is desirable to some third party (1), has an intrinsic perfection (2), or has achieved its natural seeking for perfection (3). Clearly, smoke has only a very weak “desire” to seek its own perfection: it “desires” to fill the air, and that’s about it. Also its reaching of intrinsic perfection (2) is very ephemeral—it dissipates very quickly. Hence, as with most merely material creatures (particularly the inanimate ones), it is the first sense of goodness that prevails here: i.e., its pleasantness or usefulness (or noxiousness).

Imelahn, I apologize if I have gotten your view wrong. I also apologize if I have misused Aristotelian- Thomist terminology.

Not at all! These are not easy texts to interpret.

 

[thinkandmull]

Can you really say that a pizza is crusty warm and delicious? Aren’t those its accidents? Thomas Aquinas doesn’t believe the substance of things can be seen I thought

 

[lmelahn]

Can you really say that a pizza is crusty warm and delicious? Aren’t those its accidents? Thomas Aquinas doesn’t believe the substance of things can be seen I thought

Sorry, I have been away on a retreat: I am back now.

Sure, those are accidents of the pizza. They don’t “be” in the same way as the substance “is,” but they still “are,” they still exist. (Forgive the strange grammar, but it is the best way to express the idea.) Obviously, the being proper to a substance is of a more excellent kind that that proper to accidents. (Accidents, according to Aquinas don’t “be” so much as they “are in” a substance.)

So yes, a pizza “is” indeed crispy, hot, and delicious (at least I hope my pizza is like that ).

As regards seeing substance, it depends on what you mean. If you are considering “substance” as a metaphysical principle—as the base or “substrate” for the accidents—then you are right, it is invisible as such. Of course, neither can you see the accidents, taken in that sense.

If, however, by “substance” you mean a concrete individual (which, according to Aquinas, and following Aristotle, is the primary sense), then we do indeed see substances. In fact, substances are all we see, at least directly. There is no such thing as a substanceless accident: there is no subsistent redness or tallness (nor, for that matter, susbsitent crispiness, heat, or deliciousness), but only red, tall (or crispy, hot, and delicious) things.

It is true that we see substances (taken in the second sense here) by means of the accidents (if there were no colors, for example, we would see nothing), but it is the substances that we see. We arrive at the accidents only after doing a lot of reflection.

Naturally, in Aquinas (as with Aristotle), “seeing” is generally a metaphor for “knowing,” which, for material things, always involves the use of the senses (especially, but not exclusively, sight). Aquinas holds that the proper object (the object most suited) to the human intellect is what he calls the “quiddities of material things”—basically, their essences (or substances—with Thomas, as with Aristotle, “essence” and “substance” are roughly synonymous) as abstracted from the particular matter that they possess.

 

[lmelahn]

@thinkandmull

I should point out that Aquinas probably wouldn’t have considered a pizza a single substance, but rather an aggregate of associated substances (bread, cheese, sauce, toppings, etc.). Substances, for Aquinas, have to have what he calls “substantial unity,” that is, be united by a single substantial form.

Hence, according to Aquinas (and Aristotle) an animal or plant is clearly a single substance, as is a man or an angel, but with non-living things, the question becomes more complex: is a stone a substance, or an aggregate? If an aggregate, what are the constituent substances?

At this point, the limitations of Aquinas’ physics and chemistry (if we can call them that) come into play: Aquinas did not know that stones and earth are made of 98 naturally occurring elements that are packaged into atoms and molecules. How to square Aquinas metaphysics with modern science is an interesting and open question.

Anyway, sorry for the digression .

 

[Burning_Sapling]

LMelahn,

Thanks so much for all of your helpful knowledge and insights about the Aristotelian- Thomist tradition in this thread. I wanted to follow up with a question about your reply to my original question. You say:

[Continued…]

I think we could say, in this example, that the cat is “good” in the first sense (1), because it is desirable for the filmmaker’s projects, but not in the second sense (2), since clearly the cat is is some way failing to reach its own feline perfection. For sub-rational creatures, it seems to me that the first sense always prevails over the second (since such creatures are ordered to the use of men), whereas for spiritual creatures (men and angels), the opposite is the case.

…

Again, let us not lose sight of the three slightly different ways that things can be “good”: something is “good” if it is desirable to some third party (1), has an intrinsic perfection (2), or has achieved its natural seeking for perfection (3). Clearly, smoke has only a very weak “desire” to seek its own perfection: it “desires” to fill the air, and that’s about it. Also its reaching of intrinsic perfection (2) is very ephemeral—it dissipates very quickly. Hence, as with most merely material creatures (particularly the inanimate ones), it is the first sense of goodness that prevails here: i.e., its pleasantness or usefulness (or noxiousness).

Is the point here that in the context of non- sentient concrete subjects the kind of goodness (2) just amounts to the kind of goodness (1)? i.e. are you saying that the perfection that it is just in the essence of e.g. smoke to pursue in every action is just some form of suitability for human use? This seems to me like it might be right. Are there any places where Aristotle and/ or Aquinas explicitly espouse this view?

 

[lmelahn]

Is the point here that in the context of non- sentient concrete subjects the kind of goodness (2) just amounts to the kind of goodness (1)? i.e. are you saying that the perfection that it is just in the essence of e.g. smoke to pursue in every action is just some form of suitability for human use? This seems to me like it might be right. Are there any places where Aristotle and/ or Aquinas explicitly espouse this view?

Not exactly. Aquinas is arguing that goodness is really just a facet of being. (That is the subject Quaestio 5 from the first part of the Summa.)

For Aquinas, being is not just the mere fact that something exists. Rather, it is a metaphysical principle, from which a thing draws all of its perfections.

Remember how Aristotle discovers a twofold composition in material things, between substance and accident, and between substantial form and prime matter? Aquinas goes a step further, saying that every (created) substance, even an immaterial one (e.g., an angel) has an analogous, but deeper, metaphysical composition between what he calls the “act of being” and the “essence.” (For Aquinas’ best description of this composition, see , q. 7 a. 2 ad 9De potentia.)

This “act of being” is like the well or fountain from which all proper perfections in a substance arise: the being of the substance itself, the being of the proper accidents, and the substance’s actions.

Anyway, Aquinas argues, a thing is good precisely to the degree that it is. In other words, in reality, there is no difference between a thing’s intrinsic goodness and the degree of being that it possesses (with the caveat that we call something “good” primarily because it has attained perfection in its accidents and action, whereas we call something “being” primarily because of its substance).

Between being and goodness there is merely a difference in notion. The concepts of being and goodness are different, but the underlying reality is the same.

So you see, there are two levels at play here: the question of notion, and the question of underlying reality.

Aquinas argues that know what goodness is through our appetites (desires); that is meaning (1). If we desire something (or we observe some other creature desiring something), it must be because the thing we desire has the capacity to perfect; that is meaning (2). Aquinas goes deeper, however, saying that what is capable of perfecting must also be “perfect” in itself—that it must have some intrinsic quality that is independent of whether it is actually desired by something else or not. That is meaning (3).

Take opera, for example. Is it desirable to watch Mozart’s Marriage of Figaro? It is for me, certainly (so it is a “good” for me according to meaning 1). That means it has the ability to perfect me in some way (meaning 2). If it can perfect me, then it must have an intrinsic perfection (meaning 3).

But it is not desirable for everybody. Some people have not acquired the taste for opera. Hence, the opera is not a “good” for them in the first sense (they don’t like it), or even in the second (they get nothing out of it). The Marriage of Figaro certainly does retain its intrinsic perfection (3), for it is a marvelous work of art, regardless of how many (or how few) people appreciate it.

Another aspect to keep in mind is that all beings, even non-sentient ones, seek to increase their perfection, so to speak. (This results from the structure of being that I talked about above: the act of being is like a well from which perfections flow. As a result, the substance always seeks to grow and improve, as much as it can.) That is also the origin of our appetites, by which we know what goodness is (as we saw above).

Now, back to your example of smoke. Since it is not a sentient being, its own “appetites” are extremely weak. Its “desire” for perfection consists in mechanically fulfilling the laws of nature (expanding to fill the room and eventually settling as dust, etc.).

My point was that, for a spiritual being such as man, the question of its (or his) goodness tilts towards how much that being has attained its own perfection. A “good man” is one who has acquired moral virtue (an intrinsic perfection).

For a nonspiritual being (animals and below), the more important question becomes how well it serves as an object of desire for man. A “good animal” is one that offers service to man. A “bad animal” is one that is harmful to man. Likewise, “good smoke” is smoke that is pleasing to man; “bad smoke” is harmful smoke.

Does that make sense?

 

[lmelahn]

Is the point here that in the context of non- sentient concrete subjects the kind of goodness (2) just amounts to the kind of goodness (1)?

Goodness (1) (desirability) and goodness (2) (perfectivity) always rise and fall together, because they correspond to the two poles of an act-and-potency pair.

I desire the warmth of the fire precisely because the fire can warm me. (I am the potential principle here, and the fire is the active principle.)

Goodness (3) (intrinsic perfection) is more profound than goodness (1) or (2) and underlies them both. Therefore, things can be intrinsically perfect and yet not desirable or perfective. Like opera, for people who don’t like opera. Or like Michael the Archangel. He is intrinsically more perfect than we are, but he can’t really be considered an object of desire for us (much as we are grateful for his battles against the Evil One).

Goodness (1) and (2) are always considered relative to the one who desires.

Goodness (3) is considered in an of itself. (Or, if you will, relative to God, who is Goodness Itself.)

 

[Burning_Sapling]

Another aspect to keep in mind is that all beings, even non-sentient ones, seek to increase their perfection, so to speak. (This results from the structure of being that I talked about above: the act of being is like a well from which perfections flow. As a result, the substance always seeks to grow and improve, as much as it can.) That is also the origin of our appetites, by which we know what goodness is (as we saw above).

Now, back to your example of smoke. Since it is not a sentient being, its own “appetites” are extremely weak. Its “desire” for perfection consists in mechanically fulfilling the laws of nature (expanding to fill the room and eventually settling as dust, etc.).

My point was that, for a spiritual being such as man, the question of its (or his) goodness tilts towards how much that being has attained its own perfection. A “good man” is one who has acquired moral virtue (an intrinsic perfection).

For a nonspiritual being (animals and below), the more important question becomes how well it serves as an object of desire for man. A “good animal” is one that offers service to man. A “bad animal” is one that is harmful to man. Likewise, “good smoke” is smoke that is pleasing to man; “bad smoke” is harmful smoke.

Does that make sense?

Yes, everything you are saying makes sense, and your threefold division of Aquinas’ account of the good is helpful. I suppose I’m just struggling to see how it answers the question. The question is this. Aquinas thinks that all substances strive toward their intrinsic perfection. Yet it seems odd to us to say that certain substances admit of a standard of intrinsic perfection (or at least I have been taking it that this much is true, though perhaps I am wrong about this- I will return to this issue in a moment). If I have you right, you are saying that this is because goodness (1) and (2)- both relative aspects of goodness, I take it- “prevail” over intrinsic goodness, or goodness (3), in these cases. But whether it is the case that “relative goodness” prevails over intrinsic perfection in the context of e.g. non- sentient substances, those substances still have intrinsic perfection (or strive toward the realization of their intrinsic perfection of necessity). But if that is right, and this is the question, then why would it seem odd to us to say that, in addition to admitting of relative perfection, smoke (e.g.) also admits of (a standard of) intrinsic perfection? Is your point just that we are not used to talking in this way about non- sentient subjects since our use of them is more relevant to us than their intrinsic perfection? Or perhaps that their “relative goodness” is even objectively more important than their intrinsic perfection?

I just don’t see why the fact that A is more important than B should make it such that talking about B should seem odd. If Sammy Sampson wins the nobel prize and also wins the “respects the environment” award from his high school, then surely the nobel prize is more important than the latter award, but it would nonetheless not be odd to mention that he also won the latter award. So if the relative perfection of smoke “prevails over” or is somehow more important than its intrinsic perfection, I see no reason why this should make it seem odd to attribute intrinsic perfection to smoke.

Does this make sense?

Here is one response (or non- response) that I have been considering- maybe when we say that some instance of smoke is beautiful we are saying that it has intrinsic perfection (even if we only came to know about this intrinsic perfection through its desirability, as you say Aquinas thinks is always the way that we come to know about the intrinsic perfection of things). If that were right, then perhaps the question would be deflated, or rendered a non- issue: in that case, perhaps there aren’t cases where we feel that it is odd to ascribe intrinsic perfection to something despite its being a substance in Aquinas’ sense. And thus my issue would be dissolved.

 

[lmelahn]

If I have you right, you are saying that this is because goodness (1) and (2)- both relative aspects of goodness, I take it- “prevail” over intrinsic goodness, or goodness (3), in these cases. But whether it is the case that “relative goodness” prevails over intrinsic perfection in the context of e.g. non- sentient substances, those substances still have intrinsic perfection (or strive toward the realization of their intrinsic perfection of necessity). But if that is right, and this is the question, then why would it seem odd to us to say that, in addition to admitting of relative perfection, smoke (e.g.) also admits of (a standard of) intrinsic perfection? Is your point just that we are not used to talking in this way about non- sentient subjects since our use of them is more relevant to us than their intrinsic perfection? Or perhaps that their “relative goodness” is even objectively more important than their intrinsic perfection?

What I meant was that, when we qualify something as “good”, sometimes we do so primarily because it gives us some benefit (1 and 2), and in other cases primarily because it is good in itself (3).

When I say that “goodness 1 and 2” prevail, I mean that they prevail in the order of knowledge. They prevail in how we conceive of the thing as good or evil. In the order of being, goodness (3) always prevails, because goodness 3 is the cause of 1 and 2.

Whether 1 and 2 prevail in the order of knowledge depends on the nobility of the thing in question. At the end of the day, we don’t really care if smoke reaches its intrinsic perfection or not. We only care if, in so doing, it serves us somehow. On the other hand, we care very much if a man reaches his intrinsic perfection or not.

I just don’t see why the fact that A is more important than B should make it such that talking about B should seem odd. If Sammy Sampson wins the nobel prize and also wins the “respects the environment” award from his high school, then surely the nobel prize is more important than the latter award, but it would nonetheless not be odd to mention that he also won the latter award. So if the relative perfection of smoke “prevails over” or is somehow more important than its intrinsic perfection, I see no reason why this should make it seem odd to attribute intrinsic perfection to smoke.

We do attribute intrinsic perfection to smoke. It just happens to be so slight (in the order of being) that it is not the first thing that comes to mind (in the order of knowledge).

(Remember what Aquinas says: a thing’s intrinsic goodness is in proportion to how much being it has, so to speak. Smoke is a very poor being indeed, and so it has very little intrinsic goodness.)

Here is one response (or non- response) that I have been considering- maybe when we say that some instance of smoke is beautiful we are saying that it has intrinsic perfection (even if we only came to know about this intrinsic perfection through its desirability, as you say Aquinas thinks is always the way that we come to know about the intrinsic perfection of things).

I think that is basically right. A things “relative goodness,” as you call it (its goodness “for us men,” so to speak), is always caused caused by its intrinsic goodness. Smoke is beautiful (for us) precisely because it possesses an intrinsic beauty.

And actually, we always learn about intrinsic goodness through desirability. (Either directly, as when we see a pizza, or by using reason, as when we talk about angels and the like.)

If that were right, then perhaps the question would be deflated, or rendered a non- issue: in that case, perhaps there aren’t cases where we feel that it is odd to ascribe intrinsic perfection to something despite its being a substance in Aquinas’ sense. And thus my issue would be dissolved.

I didn’t quite understand this. Aquinas teaches that all substances have intrinsic perfection of some kind: at a minimum, what he calls their “substantial being,” the fact that they exist (which is different, incidentally, from the “act of being” that I mentioned in the last post). They all strive to reach their “last” or “ultimate” perfection (which, in the case of spiritual beings, is happiness).

 

[Burning_Sapling]

Ok great, that really clears it up. Before I didn’t understand what you meant by “prevail” in saying that (1) and (2) prevail over (3) in the context of some substances. I also did not get that you were saying that while it is “not the first thing that comes to mind” to attribute (3) to certain substances, it is nonetheless not counter- intuitive to do so. I thought you were providing an explanation of why it does seem counter- intuitive to attribute (3) to (e.g.) smoke. So I understood your explanation in a different way than you meant it and as a result could not see that it worked. Thanks for clearing it up- now that I see what you were saying it is all very helpful.

You say:
“I didn’t quite understand this. Aquinas teaches that all substances have intrinsic perfection of some kind: at a minimum, what he calls their “substantial being,” the fact that they exist (which is different, incidentally, from the “act of being” that I mentioned in the last post). They all strive to reach their “last” or “ultimate” perfection (which, in the case of spiritual beings, is happiness).”

I understand all of this. What I was saying is that my original question was premised on the thought that we ordinarily would take it to be odd to attribute intrinsic perfection, or (3), to a range of non- sentient substances including smoke. So if this much is wrong- i.e. if we do not ordinarily take it that it would be odd to attribute intrinsic perfection to such phenomena- then my original question seems to be misplaced, at least as it is formulated. It would require slight adjustment to be a meaningful question since it is premised on a false assumption. That is all I was saying. In any case, there’s no need to worry about this, I don’t think.

 

[thinkandmull]

So the substance as changed in the Eucharist is something outside of space? How do we know, and why do we believe, that such a substance exists? Aquinas says (biblehub.com/library/aquinas/summa_theologica/whether_light_is_a_quality.htm) “substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text.26: whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place, because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another”

When people think about matter, the object of there intellect is not some invisible support of the matter. Further, color is an accident of matter, therefore matter is the substance, as Aquinas says in the Summa. But then the matter is an accident of the invisible substance, and yet it “is impossible that what is a substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another”. He says that light is an accident-quality of the sun, and yet “substantial forms are not themselves objects of the senses”. Cannot the sun be hypothetically “touched”? How does any of this make sense?

 

[lmelahn]

So the substance as changed in the Eucharist is something outside of space? How do we know, and why do we believe, that such a substance exists? Aquinas says (biblehub.com/library/aquinas/summa_theologica/whether_light_is_a_quality.htm) “substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text.26: whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place, because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another”

When people think about matter, the object of there intellect is not some invisible support of the matter. Further, color is an accident of matter, therefore matter is the substance, as Aquinas says in the Summa. But then the matter is an accident of the invisible substance, and yet it “is impossible that what is a substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another”. He says that light is an accident-quality of the sun, and yet “substantial forms are not themselves objects of the senses”. Cannot the sun be hypothetically “touched”? How does any of this make sense?

“Subtantial form” is a metaphysical principle, the active principle that goes with “prime matter.” “Substance” is not exactly the same notion as “substantial form;” when Aquinas says “substance,” he usually means a concrete being (a stone, a fish, a tree, a man, an angel, etc.) It is the substance that is, moves, eats, talks (if it can do these things), etc., not the substantial form. The substance exists thanks to its substantial form, but (in material beings) it is not identical with that form.

(Pure spirits—i.e., angels—do not have any matter, so they are identical to their substantial form, if we can call it that.)

So, to clarify, the accidents do not inhere in the prime matter, but in the substance (the concrete being).

Sometimes Aristotle and Aquinas speak of substance as a kind of “secondary matter,” which forms the “substrate” in which the accidents can inhere. However, this “secondary matter” is understood as a compound of prime matter and substantial form.

This occurs because there are (at least) two compositions in material beings:

• the prime matter with its substantial form
• the substance (= “secondary matter”) with its accidents (= “accidental forms”)

The substantial form (not the substance!) is not immediately accessible to the senses, because you have to do a lot of analysis to get to it. What we see readily are trees, men, and mice; these (substances) are indeed accessible to the senses (though we can’t know them in themselves except with our intellects). The fact that they are all composed of prime matter and a substantial form takes quite a bit of reasoning.

 

[thinkandmull]

No but my problem is with this idea that there is something besides the matter that is before the eyes. Trying to separate form from matter seems absurd to me. Prime matter is not an idea of anything; I know Aquinas thought that Prime Matter was the quintessense, but didn’t the quintessense of the stars have form plus matter in his opinion? Matter can only exist as a type of matter, and in a certain shape. There is way to separate something into two aspects like that. Saying there is furthermore an invisible substance outside of space attached to each piece of matter is likewise unfounded, as far as I can see…

 

[lmelahn]

No but my problem is with this idea that there is something besides the matter that is before the eyes. Trying to separate form from matter seems absurd to me. Prime matter is not an idea of anything; I know Aquinas thought that Prime Matter was the quintessense, but didn’t the quintessense of the stars have form plus matter in his opinion? Matter can only exist as a type of matter, and in a certain shape. There is way to separate something into two aspects like that. Saying there is furthermore an invisible substance outside of space attached to each piece of matter is likewise unfounded, as far as I can see…

No, Aquinas didn’t identify prime matter with the quintessence. The quintessence, according to Aquinas’ primitive “chemistry” or “physics,” was another element like fire, earth, water, and air; it was a more perfect element that did not undergo generation or corruption.

The Thomistic/Aristotelian notion of “matter” is very different from the concept in modern physics. Think of it as pure potency: when we encounter a physical or material substance (e.g., a tree, a dog, a man, a stone, or what have you) we find that is must be made out of something. That “something” is not identical with the substance itself (even a tree is more than just an agglomeration of xylem and phloem with some chlorophyll); there is something more (i.e., the form) that makes it what it is.

So, there is no question of separating matter from form: far from it. In material things, matter cannot exist without form, and vice versa.

The modern concept of “matter” is closer to the notion of “secondary matter” (although not exactly the same). The kinds of things that physicists consider (elementary particles and so forth) are, in Aristotelian/Thomistic terms, already substance, not pure matter. (If you think about it, even a quark or an electron has a substantial form. It already has certain qualities, properties, etc., that distinguish it from other kinds of particles.)

(I don’t know if this was an issue, but for Aristotle and Aquinas, “form” is not the same thing as “shape.” “Substantial form” means the principle that determines “what kind of thing this substance is.” It is only called “form” by analogy.)