Grisez and Obligations to avoid Remote Occasions of sin?

[Melkite_Sword]

Hello,

I’ve been reading sections of “The way of the Lord Jesus” by Germain Grisez and one part that has constantly bothered me (I came across this a few years ago) was the way he deals with Remote Occasions of sin. I understand that classic moral theology teaches that we have an obligation to avoid proximate occasions of sin but no obligation to avoid Remote Occasions of sin because it would be almost (if not totally) impossible and it poses no serious danger of sin. Grisez however takes the approach that unnecessary occasions of sin are grave matter:

What if an act or omission venially sinful in itself is judged to be a remote occasion of mortal sin? The teaching of classical moralists provides no clear answer. But since there never can be any acceptable motive for committing even the slightest venial sin, it seems that any occasion at all sinful in itself becomes grave matter insofar as it involves an absolutely unjustifiable risk of so great an evil as mortal sin. For example, the content of much of the popular media leads to temptations to commit various serious sins: of envy, greed, vanity, lust, and so on. Often, too, there are good reasons, such as the waste of time involved, for not making use of the media, so that doing so is venially sinful in itself. In these circumstances, it is unjustifiable to expose oneself or others (such as one’s children) to content which might lead to a temptation to commit a mortal sin. Considering what is at stake, the matter seems to be grave.

twotlj.org/G-2-4-D.html

My question is, who is right on this very important topic? Are there any good sources that would help me with my question? Thanks

P.S I asked a similar question about this in the past but I don’t think responses were helpful with regards to my current question.

 

[e_c]

This is wrong.

First, the obligation to avoid proximate occasions of sin is not absolute, so how can that be grave matter? Certainly it could be a situation involving a grave attitude, a grave mind, a grave consideration, but grave matter, no. It is an “occasion,” not a sin itself. Grave matter is something that, should the intellect give perfect assent to through the will, is mortal sin. The reckless occasioning of sins for oneself or others would be just that - recklessness/imprudence (or scandal, for others). Anything that is a near occasion of sin can’t in itself be grave matter (unless we would say that sins are the only occasions of sin, which is nuts).

Second, as you said, remote occasions are ubiquitous. Unless Grisez means to say that most activities in daily life are grave matter… he is incorrect.

Dr. Grisez is a humble, obedient, faithful, intelligent, and kindly man who helped to reinvigorate the discussion of the natural law. But he just does not seem to understand what “object” is, which is not unique among moralists these days. Consider his position on craniotomies as a support of this point.

 

[e_c]

Dr. Grisez is saying that any occasion of mortal sin which is itself a venial sin is grave matter on account of the recklessness/imprudence/scandal involved in imperiling one’s soul, or rather that the recklessness itself is grave matter.

A willfully committed venial sin is still just that - a venial sin (with the added venial sin of assent to a venial sin, supposing there is not spite or presumption involved which would make such assent mortal). There need not be any recklessness. It is certainly imaginable that one would expose himself to a remote or even proximate occasion to mortal sin through a venial sin with full, deliberate knowledge that it could lead to mortal sin.

The argument falls apart right there, it seems. Grisez is assuming that there is always a recklessness involved.

He might respond that it is always reckless to imperil one’s soul. The problem with that is that any occasion of sin does, remote or proximate, sinful or innocent. It could be seen, in the logical extreme just given, that every act of virtue is reckless, since it is an occasion to pride. Nearly every act of daily life is some occasion of sin, as you pointed out. We can’t possibly be bound to avoid these things. What difference does the commission of a venial sin which is a possible occasion to mortal sin make in the analysis?

Another issue is that it does not seem that one would mortally sin committing a venial sin understanding the consequences should this act occasion a mortal sin (which, if such “recklessness” were grave matter, would constitute mortal sin). He still just commits a venial sin in what he does, ceteris paribus, albeit a willful one.

This is not to say that there could not be true recklessness of the soul involved, but it would have to be something separate than the mere occasion of sin, proximate, remote, sinful, innocent. Perhaps the habitual lack of consideration of the meaning of human acts could constitute a sin in the context of other sins? I’m not sure.

Dr. Grisez is a humble, obedient, faithful, intelligent, and kindly man who helped to reinvigorate the discussion of the natural law. But he just does not seem to understand what “object” entails, which is not unique among moralists these days. Consider his position on craniotomies as a support of this point.

 

[e_c]

Dr. Grisez is saying that any occasion of mortal sin which is itself a venial sin is grave matter on account of the recklessness/imprudence/scandal involved in imperiling one’s soul, or rather that the recklessness itself is grave matter.

A willfully committed venial sin is still just that - a venial sin (with the added venial sin of assent to a venial sin, supposing there is not spite or presumption involved which would make such assent mortal). There need not be any recklessness. It is certainly imaginable that one would expose himself to a remote or even proximate occasion to mortal sin through a venial sin with full, deliberate knowledge that it could lead to mortal sin and what mortal sin entails as its consequence.

The argument falls apart right there, it seems. Grisez is assuming that there is always a recklessness involved.

He might respond that it is always reckless to imperil one’s soul. The problem with that is that any occasion of sin does, remote or proximate, sinful or innocent. It could be seen, in the logical extreme just given, that every act of virtue is reckless, since it is an occasion to pride. Nearly every act of daily life is some occasion of sin, as you pointed out. We can’t possibly be bound to avoid these things. What difference does the commission of a venial sin which is a possible occasion to mortal sin make in the analysis? That it is “closer” or “stronger?”

Another issue is that it does not seem that one would mortally sin committing a venial sin understanding the consequences should this act occasion a mortal sin (which, if such “recklessness” were grave matter, would constitute mortal sin). He still just commits a venial sin in what he does, ceteris paribus, albeit a willful one.

A soul which knowingly and willingly abandons God is not being reckless, it is being uncharitable. In a way it is imprudent, inasmuch as it will not be a good means to attain ultimate perfection (which is what the soul “really wants”), but the very idea of “form” in the moral act has been jettisoned by such an analysis. We might as call every sin the love of money, since it is the “root of all evil.”

This is not to say that there could not be true recklessness of the soul involved, but it would have to be something separate than the mere occasion of sin: proximate, remote, sinful, innocent. Perhaps the habitual lack of consideration of the meaning of human acts could constitute a sin in the context of other sins? I’m not sure.

Dr. Grisez is a humble, obedient, faithful, intelligent, and kindly man who helped to reinvigorate the discussion of the natural law. But he just does not seem to understand what “object” entails, which is not unique among moralists these days. Consider his position on craniotomies as a support of this point.

 

[Melkite_Sword]

He might respond that it is always reckless to imperil one’s soul. The problem with that is that any occasion of sin does, remote or proximate, sinful or innocent. It could be seen, in the logical extreme just given, that every act of virtue is reckless, since it is an occasion to pride. Nearly every act of daily life is some occasion of sin, as you pointed out. We can’t possibly be bound to avoid these things. What difference does the commission of a venial sin which is a possible occasion to mortal sin make in the analysis? That it is “closer” or “stronger?”

I believe that is precisely his argument, that any occasion of sin is reckless hence he (admittedly) takes a stricter view that most classical moral theologians and says than their is an obligation to avoid even unnecessary Remote Occasions of sin. If the Remote Occasion is completely unjustifiable (such as venial sin) than it is grave matter. That is the way I read his argument. I don’t think he would see your assessment as a “problem”; just a logical conclusion.

I think he would also argue that if an act of virtue is an occasion of sin, that would be justified.

I’m also not sure he would agree that “nearly every act of daily life is an occasion of sin” As he defines an occasion of sin as a situation, person, place etc… in which temptation would be out of the ordinary (what ever that means).

You clearly know much more about this topic than me, I take issue with his arguments as well. Just thought those would be counter arguments that could be used.

I would say that taking his argument to its logical extreme would mean that every venial sin is automatically Mortal. Since every venial sin weakens our ability to resist mortal sin and nothing justifies putting ourselves in danger of mortal sin. Since nothing can justify venial sin, any venial sin would be mortal. I’m no moral theologian and I know Grisez is a well known and intelligent theologian, but that seems to me to be an absurd logical conclusion of his argument.

 

[e_c]

He is a rigorist in some ways, for sure. Humor is one example - a joke that involves a falsehood would, if I remember correctly, be wrong in his system. I seem to recall an article by Dr. Feser on the topic that dismissed this.

I think he would disagree that a venial sin is a mortal sin on three possible grounds:

1. It’s a venial sin. (Duh.)
2. Not all venial sins are necessarily occasions to mortal sin (not sure if he would agree).
3. Grave matter being attached to a venial sin which involves some less serious matter does not change the act itself of the venial sin but “rides on it” as an additional “act” or consequence (viz. the sin of recklessness is always attached to venial sin but is not part of the venial sin to which it is attached).

Thoughts?

 

[Bookcat]

I will leave Dr. Grisez aside for not time to discuss what he may or may not hold… and simply repost a post regarding occasions of sin.

Occasions of sin…

There are all sorts of remote occasions of sin in life…all sorts of possible good things that one can do --where there is a possibility that some temptation may come.

Normally we are* not* “obliged” to avoid “remote” occasions of sin.

We simply cannot avoid all such things nor are we usually obliged to do so. We would have to knock ourselves unconscious…

What then is a* “near” occasion* of mortal sin that we are to avoid especially?

It is not simply temptation (though let us seek to avoid temptations).

A near occasion of mortal sin is such where one would generally falls into mortal sin -one generally commits a mortal sin (or even always!)–or is what is likely to cause one to commit a particular mortal sin now. Due to the nature of thing itself or ones particular personal weakness.

Though there can at times be good reasons to be in them…ones confessor can guide one or those that cannot be avoided (involuntary) (necessary occasions…which one still tries to make more remote…)

Those are general principles one can apply. Ones confessor can guide one. In specifics.

So can it be sinful to put oneself into a near occasion of mortal sin? Or remain in one? Yes. (it may be venial or even mortal or even not a sin depending on the reasons).

A clear example of when such would be a mortal sin could be -(with full knowledge and deliberate consent) when I am morally certain that if I put myself into circumstance Y that I will commit mortal sin Z. And I do so with that needed knowledge and consent.

Ones confessor can advise.

 

[Melkite_Sword]

There are all sorts of remote occasions of sin in life…all sorts of possible good things that one can do --where there is a possibility that some temptation may come.

Normally we are* not* “obliged” to avoid “remote” occasions of sin.

We simply cannot avoid all such things nor are we usually obliged to do so.

Can you please provide an example of when one would be obligated to avoid a remote occasion of sin? The beach or a bar can be a remote (sometimes proximate for some) occasion of sin for many people, would one be obligated to avoid those if places if they’re remote? If so when does one draw the line so to speak. I feel like this is a topic that is yet very unclear.

 

[Melkite_Sword]

He is a rigorist in some ways, for sure. Humor is one example - a joke that involves a falsehood would, if I remember correctly, be wrong in his system. I seem to recall an article by Dr. Feser on the topic that dismissed this.

I think he would disagree that a venial sin is a mortal sin on three possible grounds:

1. It’s a venial sin. (Duh.)
2. Not all venial sins are necessarily occasions to mortal sin (not sure if he would agree).
3. Grave matter being attached to a venial sin which involves some less serious matter does not change the act itself of the venial sin but “rides on it” as an additional “act” or consequence (viz. the sin of recklessness is always attached to venial sin but is not part of the venial sin to which it is attached).

Thoughts?

It is venial but I think Grisez’s approach could remove any distinction between what is mortal and what is venial. Since every venial sin weakens our ability to resist mortal sin, we are being negligent every time we commit a venial sin. I suppose one could say that the venial sin is seperate to the mortal sin of negligence with one’s soul (for no good reason) everytime a venial sin is commited. But it’s still ridiculous. If you have a link to that article I’ll be interested in reading it or any critiques of Grisez’s views on this topic. Also moral theology is not my expertise so I could be way off base in my understanding/ representation of Grisez’s views and where they might lead.

 

[e_c]

You seem to have a pretty sophisticated grasp of it.

Once again though, he would certainly not say “a venial sin is a mortal sin,” and it doesn’t seem the logical extreme is that either, it is simply that there are “two sins” with each venial sin: the venial sin itself, and an additional sin of negligence, which is grave matter but does not necessarily carry full knowledge and full will.

If all that’s being put forward is that venial sin involves essentially a recklessness of the soul, that’s fine. But to call it “grave matter” ups the ante - if I now fully will and know that I am being reckless in committing this venial sin inasmuch as it is a temptation to mortal sin, I would also commit a mortal sin of “spiritual recklessness.” He’s failed to prove that. It seems Grisez is doing some question begging, though at the moment I can’t exactly put my finger on how… But it has to do with “not going to Hell” being a matter of prudence. It’s not, it’s a matter of charity.

St. Thomas proved that a fully willful venial sin does involve a second venial sin of “consent.” That’s about all there could be, in my analysis.

Regarding the article: do a Google search for: feser grisez joke

 

[e_c]

Regarding Bookcat’s post and your question…

The obligation to avoid certain occasions of sin depends either on some vice preceding one’s decision to enter the occasion (namely pride, but perhaps not exclusively), or also perhaps the moral certainty that it will lead you to that sin (which is humility, but leads to the downfall of charity if entered into anyway, ironically). Scandal could also be an issue in these things: when is the last time you saw Father at the beach? Etc.

 

[Bookcat]

Can you please provide an example of when one would be obligated to avoid a remote occasion of sin? The beach or a bar can be a remote (sometimes proximate for some) occasion of sin for many people, would one be obligated to avoid those if places if they’re remote? If so when does one draw the line so to speak. I feel like this is a topic that is yet very unclear.

Ordinarily one is* not *obliged to avoid remote occasions…for they are everywhere……

 

[Melkite_Sword]

Regarding Bookcat’s post and your question…

The obligation to avoid certain occasions of sin depends either on some vice preceding one’s decision to enter the occasion (namely pride, but perhaps not exclusively), or also perhaps the moral certainty that it will lead you to that sin (which is humility, but leads to the downfall of charity if entered into anyway, ironically). Scandal could also be an issue in these things: when is the last time you saw Father at the beach? Etc.

It seems that your answer only applies to proximate occasions, most moral theologians are agreed that we only have an obligation to avoid proximate occasions. I can see why you shouldn’t enter in to a remote occasion if your motive is sinful (as doing so would be commiting the actual sin). I was asking bookcat to give me an example of when one would be obliged to avoid a remote occasion, as their answer implies that sometimes we are obliged. With regards to the question about when the last time was that I saw Father at the beach; you’ll be surprised. As an Eastern Catholic, it’s not uncommon for our married clergy to go to the beach with their wife and kids and I’m not sure whether this could legitimately be scandalous, one can normally control their eyes at the beach if they really wanted to, I’m only talking from personal experience not regarding other people’s particular weaknesses. I would say it would be scandalous for a priest to go clubbing or actually publically committing mortal sins. I’m just not sure going to the beach fits the category of scandal hmm

 

[Melkite_Sword]

Ordinarily one is* not *obliged to avoid remote occasions…for they are everywhere……

I suppose my question is in regards to what you mean by the word “ordinarily” and in what “extraordinary” circumstance would one be obliged to avoid a remote occasion?

 

[Melkite_Sword]

You seem to have a pretty sophisticated grasp of it.

Once again though, he would certainly not say “a venial sin is a mortal sin,” and it doesn’t seem the logical extreme is that either, it is simply that there are “two sins” with each venial sin: the venial sin itself, and an additional sin of negligence, which is grave matter but does not necessarily carry full knowledge and full will.

If all that’s being put forward is that venial sin involves essentially a recklessness of the soul, that’s fine. But to call it “grave matter” ups the ante - if I now fully will and know that I am being reckless in committing this venial sin inasmuch as it is a temptation to mortal sin, I would also commit a mortal sin of “spiritual recklessness.” He’s failed to prove that. It seems Grisez is doing some question begging, though at the moment I can’t exactly put my finger on how…

Please note that it is not Grisez that is explicitly saying this, just my view of where his logic will lead. And yes I suppose they should be treated as two sins: the venial sin itself and the sin of recklesness involved with every venial sin. The problem is that for someone who theoretically “knows” that everytime they commit a venial sin they are being reckless then under this analysis everytime someone with a well formed concience commits a venial sin they are also committing an additional mortal sin. Ironically this would make willfully commiting venial sins worse than committing a mortal sin. As one would simply be a mortal sin and the other a venial sin in addition to a mortal sin.

 

[Bookcat]

I suppose my question is in regards to what you mean by the word “ordinarily” and in what “extraordinary” circumstance would one be obliged to avoid a remote occasion?

One is not obliged to avoid “remote” occasions of sin. They are everywhere. One would have to head out in a rocket to the moon…and then put oneself into deep sleep…

Could I imagine a time when one might be obliged? I would have to think about an example- but such might be difficult to come up with. It would though be of the order that the remote occasion is probably going to become now a near occasion. Like for example one knows if one keeps doing Y that Y will *become *a near occasion of mortal sin Z here and now…so one ought to now stop Y.

Given the fact that remote occasions are well….remote occasions and not something one is obliged to avoid – that is the general answer. (and readers should avoid any scrupling about such).

(That of course does not mean that one does not avoid temptations or not do various things to lessen those that one meets in life or not do various things (prayer etc) to resist and even escape…)