How people make choices and then act upon them

[blase6]

I am starting this thread because at least one person here doesn’t get how people are moved to act.

I will start with the self-evident fact that: No agent can act without a motive. It is logically impossible. God does not act for no reason at all, he acts out of motivation by his good nature. The rock does not move for no reason at all, it moves because something else pushed it. You do not go buy a candy bar for no reason at all, you buy it because you felt like there was some reason to.

So before any decision made by a person to act, motives must present themselves to the awareness of the person. I cannot choose to buy a candy bar if the knowledge of that option never presents itself to me. If the motives arise simultaneously, to buy a candy bar, to buy coffee, or to not buy anything, then the subsequent actions based on those motives become feasible choices for me.

This is all logically sound, right? Let me go on:

When a person is presented with conflicting motives in a situation, then they begin to consider how to act. For example, I may think in favor of not buying a candy bar because I desire to save money, or I may think in favor of buying it, because I like how it tastes. In all of these considerations for the choice to be feasible, it must appear good in some way. Thinking that I should buy the candy bar because I will get sick due to an allergy is not a logically possible consideration to make. There would have to be some foreseen benefit to having an allergic reaction, for me to be able to find it a desirable choice.

So when someone makes a choice, they are acting towards a foreseen benefit from that choice.

Free will is not necessary to explain this process of making decisions, so it is up to you to show how freedom is more probable than determinism.

 

[balto]

I am starting this thread because at least one person here doesn’t get how people are moved to act.

I will start with the self-evident fact that: No agent can act without a motive. It is logically impossible. God does not act for no reason at all, he acts out of motivation by his good nature. The rock does not move for no reason at all, it moves because something else pushed it. You do not go buy a candy bar for no reason at all, you buy it because you felt like there was some reason to.

So before any decision made by a person to act, motives must present themselves to the awareness of the person. I cannot choose to buy a candy bar if the knowledge of that option never presents itself to me. If the motives arise simultaneously, to buy a candy bar, to buy coffee, or to not buy anything, then the subsequent actions based on those motives become feasible choices for me.

This is all logically sound, right? Let me go on:

Sounds about right. But you concluded this:

Free will is not necessary to explain this process of making decisions, so it is up to you to show how freedom is more probable than determinism.

When right before that you wrote this:

When a person is presented with conflicting motives in a situation, then they begin to consider how to act. For example, I may think in favor of not buying a candy bar because I desire to save money, or I may think in favor of buying it, because I like how it tastes. In all of these considerations for the choice to be feasible, it must appear good in some way. Thinking that I should buy the candy bar because I will get sick due to an allergy is not a logically possible consideration to make. There would have to be some foreseen benefit to having an allergic reaction, for me to be able to find it a desirable choice.

So when someone makes a choice, they are acting towards a foreseen benefit from that choice.

Which is basically an exposition on how the free will works. None of the good options that you considered necessitates your will. Yet you have reasons for choosing one over the other that are your own reasons. What is that if not free will? What is your answer to why you choose one over the other? A chemical imbalance? Then you don’t have reasons for choosing one over the other, but you explicitly affirmed that you did.

 

[blase6]

Which is basically an exposition on how the free will works. None of the good options that you considered necessitates your will. Yet you have reasons for choosing one over the other that are your own reasons. What is that if not free will? What is your answer to why you choose one over the other? A chemical imbalance? Then you don’t have reasons for choosing one over the other, but you explicitly affirmed that you did.

The problem is that thought is not really a free process. It just happens. Things around us put thoughts in our heads, and we go off of that. Choosing one option over the other just means that that option appeared better to you in that instant of choosing it.

 

[balto]

The problem is that thought is not really a free process. It just happens.

Well no, it doesn’t “just happen” because it happens for a reason. You have reasons for choosing it. That is free will.

Things around us put thoughts in our heads, and we go off of that. Choosing one option over the other just means that that option appeared better to you in that instant of choosing it.

Now you seem to be saying that we really do have reasons for our actions, but that there is some kind of timer counting down and when the clock hits zero we’re forced to choose whatever option happened to be the most favorable at that instant (or something equivalent to that where the decision just happens due to some outside agent). But that is not what happens. When you act, it is because you have rationally judged that A is better than B and if you are wrong about this then your misjudgment was either willed (culpable) or not (invincible). So you, and nothing else, has committed yourself to A.

I anticipate the next objection will be that you cannot possibly be culpable for ignorance or misjudgment, which is the Socratic/Platonic view. But that seems to be contradicted by our ordinary experience. Let’s say we have always known that A is to be preferred to B. Yet we are tempted to choose B over A due to the temporal goodness B will bring, yet it directly contradicts A which is a higher good. So we arbitrarily decide to do B anyway because the temporal pleasure is our real end and motive, not because we have reasoned that either there is no contradiction between B and A or that B is actually better, but because “well I can’t really know that A is true anyway, lots of people disagree that A is better, I can always claim I didn’t know later, yada, yada, yada.” Does any of that establish that B is okay? No, but yet we choose it anyway and rationalize it away after the fact. So it seems that we can be culpable for our decisions. How culpable is another matter.

 

[blase6]

Well no, it doesn’t “just happen” because it happens for a reason. You have reasons for choosing it. That is free will.

Thought precedes choices. So thought should then be predetermined. You will have to show me 1. Spontaneous thought exists, and 2. Spontaneous thought is not random.

Now you seem to be saying that we really do have reasons for our actions, but that there is some kind of timer counting down and when the clock hits zero we’re forced to choose whatever option happened to be the most favorable at that instant (or something equivalent to that where the decision just happens due to some outside agent). But that is not what happens. When you act, it is because you have rationally judged that A is better than B and if you are wrong about this then your misjudgment was either willed (culpable) or not (invincible). So you, and nothing else, has committed yourself to A.

It is your disposition prior to making a choice which influences what you will see as the best choice. This is why it is easier for a virtuous person to make good choices as opposed to a vicious person; virtue being a predisposition.

I anticipate the next objection will be that you cannot possibly be culpable for ignorance or misjudgment, which is the Socratic/Platonic view. But that seems to be contradicted by our ordinary experience. Let’s say we have always known that A is to be preferred to B. Yet we are tempted to choose B over A due to the temporal goodness B will bring, yet it directly contradicts A which is a higher good. So we arbitrarily decide to do B anyway because the temporal pleasure is our real end and motive, not because we have reasoned that either there is no contradiction between B and A or that B is actually better, but because “well I can’t really know that A is true anyway, lots of people disagree that A is better, I can always claim I didn’t know later, yada, yada, yada.” Does any of that establish that B is okay? No, but yet we choose it anyway and rationalize it away after the fact. So it seems that we can be culpable for our decisions. How culpable is another matter.

If it is real ignorance it is not culpable. You may be culpable for ignoring what your faith teaches, but you are not culpable for not knowing a specific teaching in your faith. The first case implies that you do in fact know something about what your faith teaches.

 

[MPat]

The problem is that thought is not really a free process. It just happens. Things around us put thoughts in our heads, and we go off of that. Choosing one option over the other just means that that option appeared better to you in that instant of choosing it.

You cannot reach that conclusion yet, as you haven’t defined “free”. You are arguing as if that was a synonym of “unpredictable”, but you haven’t explicitly said so.

Also, it does not look like “free” is a synonym of “unpredictable”. If you would offer a drunkard and a teetotaller a glass of wine, it is easy to predict that teetotaller would refuse to take it. The drunkard might take it, or he might take offense and refuse it, or he might punch the one offering it into face etc. Thus teetotaller’s actions are more predictable. And yet we’d say they are also more free…

 

[PseuTonym]

The problem is that thought is not really a free process. It just happens. Things around us put thoughts in our heads

Let us suppose that a writer goes to a cabin in the woods with blank paper and a typewriter. What will the writer write about? Maybe about paper, typewriters, and cabins. Maybe not.

 

[balto]

Thought precedes choices. So thought should then be predetermined. You will have to show me 1. Spontaneous thought exists, and 2. Spontaneous thought is not random.

The passive will desires universal good necessarily. That is part of what it means to be a rational agent. So the finite good in any created reality attracts the passive will. Once identified, the intellect either recognizes the universal type of the desired good either through abstraction or recognition with previously understood types. The intellect then considers the particular goods of all available options and reasons that one is more perfect than the others. Since the will desires only universal goodness, the intellect is not necessarily constrained to choose any of the particular goods. Then the freely selected particular good is proposed as an end for the active will, which actively seeks to obtain it. Hence free will. Where is the randomness in there? Your reasoning is completely under your control since nothing necessitates it except adherence to first principles, i.e. self-evident truths like X is not non-X and good is to be sought.

It is your disposition prior to making a choice which influences what you will see as the best choice. This is why it is easier for a virtuous person to make good choices as opposed to a vicious person; virtue being a predisposition.

You used the key word “influence.” They influence but do not determine. You determine. Hence free will. Your point about virtue is important, the virtuous person is more free since they are able to seek what is actually good more easily than a vicious person. Hence the true objective of any morality should be to foster virtue in its adherents and not simply elicit good effects as consequentialism would demand.

 

[PseuTonym]

The passive will desires universal good necessarily. That is part of what it means to be a rational agent. So the finite good in any created reality attracts the passive will. Once identified, the intellect either recognizes the universal type of the desired good either through abstraction or recognition with previously understood types. The intellect then considers the particular goods of all available options and reasons that one is more perfect than the others. Since the will desires only universal goodness, the intellect is not necessarily constrained to choose any of the particular goods. Then the freely selected particular good is proposed as an end for the active will, which actively seeks to obtain it. Hence free will. Where is the randomness in there? **Your reasoning is completely under your control since nothing necessitates it except adherence to first principles, i.e. self-evident truths like X is not non-X and good is to be sought.
**

You used the key word “influence.” They influence but do not determine. You determine. Hence free will. Your point about virtue is important, the virtuous person is more free since they are able to seek what is actually good more easily than a vicious person. Hence the true objective of any morality should be to foster virtue in its adherents and not simply elicit good effects as consequentialism would demand.

That is an excellent message. I suspect that I could have neither thought of that nor expressed such thoughts in words. However, the part that I emphasized is difficult for me to let stand as it is without comment.

I think that it is better to consider two separate stages: First, the construction of some step-by-step reasoning. Second, the search for flaws in the step-by-step reasoning, such as lack of clarity or reliance upon invalid steps. In other words, among the goals that one pursues can be the goal of ensuring that every step in one’s reasoning is valid.

Perhaps an analogy with chess will help make it clear what is at stake. If one were to examine in detail a particular configuration of the pieces along with the specification of who is to move next, then some options for a player’s next move – options that are permitted by the rules – might be initially rejected as very unlikely to be to the advantage of the player who would select any of those options. However, after detailed consideration of plausible scenarios for how the game might play itself out to a draw or checkmate, some options that were initially rejected might be considered to be among the best possible choices.

This train of thought draws attention to one very important difference between solitary reasoning and reasoning in dialogue with another person. In conversation, there is an option that is not available in chess. That option is to say, “That move has such low quality, that if you make it, then you will inevitably lose. Therefore, I forbid that move, although the rules permit it.”

If one tries to respond by saying, “That is my move. I am not convinced that you are now destined to win. Show me that you can win by actually winning”, then the answer is likely to be “No, you resigned when you made that move. Better luck next time.” In chess, you do not have the option of announcing that your opponent has resigned.

People are in control of their own minds. That control allows them to simply refuse to follow a train of thought. It allows them to replace their own previously given reasoning that was clearly invalid with something that is simply unclear, and for that reason no longer clearly invalid. A tactic or an attitude can be dressed up in the language of ideas, but when taken at face value as an idea, the response might be an accusation that you do not understand and that you are “taking everything literally.”

Again, I need to say that your post was excellent. If you disagree with anything that I wrote above, then I hope that you will draw to my attention where I may be mistaken. I do not want to be like a chess player who announces “you have resigned.”

 

[balto]

That is an excellent message. I suspect that I could have neither thought of that nor expressed such thoughts in words. However, the part that I emphasized is difficult for me to let stand as it is without comment.

Well thank you, I try my best . Though truth be told, I had to consult the Angelic Doctor himself to formulate an answer to blase6’s question, which was good since it caused me to learn something new as well. Here are the relevant passages for curious minds:

ST I: Question 79: The Intellectual Powers Articles 1-4
ST I: Question 82: The Will Articles 1-4
ST I: Question 83: Free-Will Articles 1-4

I think that it is better to consider two separate stages: First, the construction of some step-by-step reasoning. Second, the search for flaws in the step-by-step reasoning, such as lack of clarity or reliance upon invalid steps. In other words, among the goals that one pursues can be the goal of ensuring that every step in one’s reasoning is valid.

Yes, I think you are right here. When I spoke about “first-principles”, I meant things that cannot be logically doubted. It would seem to be impossible to sincerely doubt that the Law of Non-Contradiction is true. There are certain necessary truths that are doubtable because it is unclear at first how their denial leads to a denial of a first principle. For instance, I may doubt that the Pythagorean Theorem is true, but after being shown how a denial of it leads to a denial of the law of identity for something like that (via step-by-step reasoning as you said), I cannot continue to doubt it. The problem with a lot of moral claims is that they involve contingent truths, which can be denied without entailing a denial of a first principle. I may claim that “horses do not exist” and be wrong, but not be necessarily wrong since the claim “horses do not exist” is possibly true. So you can give step-by-step reasoning in a moral argument and yet the conclusion can be willfully denied because “well you can’t prove that to me” in which case the ignorance is willed because the finite pleasure of some other end is preferred to true knowledge.

There seems to be this interplay between the will and intellect: the free will process seems to begin with universal goodness necessarily attracting the passive will to an object which the intellect considers under necessary first principles, yet the contingent truths about it can be willfully denied in favor of some other particular good leading to the intellect proposing inappropriate particular ends for the active will.

If one tries to respond by saying, “That is my move. I am not convinced that you are now destined to win. Show me that you can win by actually winning”, then the answer is likely to be “No, you resigned when you made that move. Better luck next time.” In chess, you do not have the option of announcing that your opponent has resigned.

People are in control of their own minds. That control allows them to simply refuse to follow a train of thought. It allows them to replace their own previously given reasoning that was clearly invalid with something that is simply unclear, and for that reason no longer clearly invalid. A tactic or an attitude can be dressed up in the language of ideas, but when taken at face value as an idea, the response might be an accusation that you do not understand and that you are “taking everything literally.”

I’m not sure I understand what you are saying here so you may have to clarify, but if all you are saying is that it is possible for a rational agent to freely consider that her current reasoning is wrong and rectify her knowledge then I would agree.

 

[Bahman]

Thought precedes choices. So thought should then be predetermined. You will have to show me 1. Spontaneous thought exists, and 2. Spontaneous thought is not random.

Options are predetermined if realizing situation which grant options does not involve free decision. For example, you are deriving and you suddenly realize an obstacle. Otherwise, there are tones of decisions needed to be made for a thought process once finalized you have final options. Needless to say that subconsciousness is very important in finalizing options since all concept are preserved there. In simple world thought process is an interaction between consciousness (which experience current concept) and subconsciousness (which hold all correlated concepts) with the aim to realize options. Consciousness then make the final decision. The rest is just to face the brute fact and see the consequence of your decision.

 

[inocente]

So before any decision made by a person to act, motives must present themselves to the awareness of the person.

That’s not really true, for example if you put your hand on a stove which you thought was cold but it’s burning hot, you will quickly move your hand and perhaps squeal, well before those options enter your awareness.

Free will is not necessary to explain this process of making decisions, so it is up to you to show how freedom is more probable than determinism.

I think that’s what’s called compatibilism (free will is compatible with determinism), but many philosophers disagree.



Diagram from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will

 

[GaryTaylor]

Consciousness then makes the final decision, and forms the initial choice of act, act-contrary or not act and think about it. Some would also supposedly claim there is no free will or conscious to choose only Gods will, I think its an early Islamic argument.

 

[rinnie]

I am starting this thread because at least one person here doesn’t get how people are moved to act.

I will start with the self-evident fact that: No agent can act without a motive. It is logically impossible. God does not act for no reason at all, he acts out of motivation by his good nature. The rock does not move for no reason at all, it moves because something else pushed it. You do not go buy a candy bar for no reason at all, you buy it because you felt like there was some reason to.

So before any decision made by a person to act, motives must present themselves to the awareness of the person. I cannot choose to buy a candy bar if the knowledge of that option never presents itself to me. If the motives arise simultaneously, to buy a candy bar, to buy coffee, or to not buy anything, then the subsequent actions based on those motives become feasible choices for me.

This is all logically sound, right? Let me go on:

When a person is presented with conflicting motives in a situation, then they begin to consider how to act. For example, I may think in favor of not buying a candy bar because I desire to save money, or I may think in favor of buying it, because I like how it tastes. In all of these considerations for the choice to be feasible, it must appear good in some way. Thinking that I should buy the candy bar because I will get sick due to an allergy is not a logically possible consideration to make. There would have to be some foreseen benefit to having an allergic reaction, for me to be able to find it a desirable choice.

So when someone makes a choice, they are acting towards a foreseen benefit from that choice.

Free will is not necessary to explain this process of making decisions, so it is up to you to show how freedom is more probable than determinism.

Where was it ever said that free will has not benefits? And if there is no free will to buy or not to buy, then what? Free will is the choice to do anything. Not just right and wrong. Sometimes free will does not have to be right or wrong, its just your choice.

 

[teeboy]

The degree of freedom of thought is affected by consciousness.

For instance, how free are you in your dreams?

As you are driving down the road are you constantly thinking about driving down the road? Probably not. You might see your friend passing in the other direction. Now what are you thinking about?