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timber501
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When presenting St. Thomas Aquinas Arguments of Efficient causes, how do you counter “using that Logic God had to be created as well”
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Wesrock
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If you’re presenting the premises right the logic doesn’t mean God had to be created as well. Can you give me a quick rundown of how you’d present the argument, just so I can see if the issue is the presentation on your end.
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Theo520
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Wesrock
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If the premises are presented wrong he can end up special pleading for God. The actual argument Aquinas makes doesn’t do that.timber501:
I thought that was excluded by the logic itself
Of course, a lot of times people just make baseless accusations of special pleading because they either (1) don’t actually understand the argument or (2) don’t know what special pleading actually is.
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timber501
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i just copied and pasted the Argument of Efficient Causes #2 and they are saying it’s special pleading
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timber501
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Yes they are saying special pleading
So my question is how is the Argument of Efficient causes not special pleading. It does seem that God doesn’t play by the rules of the argument.
So my question is how is the Argument of Efficient causes not special pleading. It does seem that God doesn’t play by the rules of the argument.
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Wesrock
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So you’re basically just sharing the snippet from the opening of the Summa?
All Aquinas develops in this quick passage is that things that have an essential efficient cause must have an Uncaused First Cause. The premise is not that everything must have a cause, only that a thing that does have an efficient cause cannot be the cause of itself. What this also means is that Aquinas hasn’t developed (in these few sentences by themselves) that there can only be one Uncaused First Cause. With what’s said here the door is still open to there being more than one.
That there can only be one can be demonstrated from this, but it’s not done in the words above. As noted before, Aquinas is only presenting this as a quick refresher to seminariams already familiar with the argument and the philosophy, and so doesn’t develop everything fully here.
But since Aquinas’ premise isn’t “everything must have an efficient cause” there is no special pleading if it ends up that at least one thing (or more) doesn’t have one.
I am going to personally recommend against doing that. The Summa was meant for seminarians already versed in the background philosophy, and this is just a quick reminder. There’s a lot that isn’t immediately apparent for those not already familiar with it, and so it won’t be convincing. I have to suggest that you develop a way of putting it into your own words, which means learning it better and presenting it more thoroughly than Aquinas does right here in the Summa.
All Aquinas develops in this quick passage is that things that have an essential efficient cause must have an Uncaused First Cause. The premise is not that everything must have a cause, only that a thing that does have an efficient cause cannot be the cause of itself. What this also means is that Aquinas hasn’t developed (in these few sentences by themselves) that there can only be one Uncaused First Cause. With what’s said here the door is still open to there being more than one.
That there can only be one can be demonstrated from this, but it’s not done in the words above. As noted before, Aquinas is only presenting this as a quick refresher to seminariams already familiar with the argument and the philosophy, and so doesn’t develop everything fully here.
But since Aquinas’ premise isn’t “everything must have an efficient cause” there is no special pleading if it ends up that at least one thing (or more) doesn’t have one.
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IWantGod
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In principle a thing is either caused to exist or existence is simply a natural expression of it’s nature (to exist is it’s nature). There is no other basis for thinking that a thing can be real.
There cannot be an infinitely long chain of beings that are dependent on one-another for their existence without a cause that is not dependent, because then it would follow that the chain itself has no sufficient cause for it’s existence due to the fact that none of it’s parts are the origin of existence. Since nothing in the chain is the source, it follows that the chain itself does not naturally exist. So what you essentially have is a sequence of effects that are mediating existence, and that is to say they are receiving existence but none of them are actually the giver of existence. Since none of them are the source of their own actuality, there is no reason for the chain to exist at all if there is no giver of existence; and there lies the irrecoverable contradiction of it’s existence. Therefore there has to be an un-caused cause, an unmoved mover, a naturally existing act of reality in-order to sufficiently explain the ontological presence of an existential dependency. Otherwise absolutely nothing would exist.
There is no special pleading once you understand the argument, because all that’s really being said is that there has to be a being which is necessary-existence and can give existence in-order for there to be the possibility of natures, things, or states, that do not naturally exist.
Everybody of right reason should agree with this. And so the accusation of special pleading is especially weak in this regard and only works on misrepresentations of Aquinas’ work. The real question should be whether or not the argument reflects objective reality. In other-words is the argument tautological; after-all why can’t the universe as we know it be the necessary being. To this it is the reality of change that we point to in response.
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Gorgias
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This!
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Gorgias
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Actually, it was meant for philosophers. And, like you say, it references arguments with which they were already familiar, so it doesn’t fill in all the details in the way a textbook would. Moreover, it’s written in a style of argumentation that was common in Aquinas’ day but which is unfamiliar to casual readers in the 21st century.
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