How to understand Thomas Aquinas' proof of that every being is good?

[zhoudu]

Hi,

I am interested in Thomas Aquinas’ proof of that every being is good, and am trying to understand this proof. This proof is in “I answer that,” of First Part, Question 5, Article 1 (“Whether goodness differs really from being”) of his Summa Theologica. Here is a link to this proof: newadvent.org/summa/1005.htm

Now I have trouble in understanding this proof. It says that “Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection.” How to understand this? It seems that this is not self-evident. Why do all desire their own perfection?

Can anyone help me? I will appreciate it.

 

[John_Martin]

Hi,

I am interested in Thomas Aquinas’ proof of that every being is good, and am trying to understand this proof. This proof is in “I answer that,” of First Part, Question 5, Article 1 (“Whether goodness differs really from being”) of his Summa Theologica. Here is a link to this proof: newadvent.org/summa/1005.htm

Now I have trouble in understanding this proof. It says that “Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection.” How to understand this? It seems that this is not self-evident. Why do all desire their own perfection?

Can anyone help me? I will appreciate it.

“A thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect” = the “perfect part” of a thing is what makes it desirable; If I desire an apple that I see, I may take it even if I see a blemish on it, and I cut off the blemish with a knife before I eat the desired goodness without blemish - I ate the “perfected apple” (apple with removed defect). I desired the apple for its perfection (the unblemished portion) and did not desire it for its defect (blemish).

How does this fit with me desiring my own perfection? When I am desiring an apple that I am seeing, I am not actually desiring the apple - I am envisioning myself chewing and tasting the juiciness and sweetness and texture of the apple. I am sensing the intelligible object of “myself in union with the apple, consuming it so we are ‘one’”. This imagination is part of me being satisfied, and the actuality of that imagination is the work of the will to accomplish in actuality, as it moves my feet toward the table and my hand to grasp the apple and knife and cut, and as the will moves my hand to bring the apple to my mouth and my teeth to bite. Now I am “perfect”, complete in my whole being matching the visualization. And I smile as I chew.

Why do all desire their union with the things they see as good to be one with?
That is a kind of automatic thing with the will - when the reason or intellect sees the self in a union that is truthful or beneficial, the will is restless at the rest of the person not matching that actuality, and begins moving the whole being toward that “seeing of the reason and intellect” of the union.
The will is in that way moved into a “leaning toward” the perfecting of the “good known in the reason”, the good image of the visualized union, and this desire is the actual movement of the whole person toward obtaining the consumption.

Then we are perfect, and the will is in a state of “delight” or “joy”, the “known good” is the “actual reality” - union with the apple is happening in operation (of tasting and seeing that it is good).

What do you think?

 

[Vico]

Hi,

I am interested in Thomas Aquinas’ proof of that every being is good, and am trying to understand this proof. This proof is in “I answer that,” of First Part, Question 5, Article 1 (“Whether goodness differs really from being”) of his Summa Theologica. Here is a link to this proof: newadvent.org/summa/1005.htm

Now I have trouble in understanding this proof. It says that “Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection.” How to understand this? It seems that this is not self-evident. Why do all desire their own perfection?

Can anyone help me? I will appreciate it.

A thing is desirable insofar as it is perfect.
Everything is perfect insofar as it is actual (in actu).

Desire for perfection is the desire to be actually perfected.

 

[zhoudu]

“A thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect” = the “perfect part” of a thing is what makes it desirable; If I desire an apple that I see, I may take it even if I see a blemish on it, and I cut off the blemish with a knife before I eat the desired goodness without blemish - I ate the “perfected apple” (apple with removed defect). I desired the apple for its perfection (the unblemished portion) and did not desire it for its defect (blemish).

How does this fit with me desiring my own perfection? When I am desiring an apple that I am seeing, I am not actually desiring the apple - I am envisioning myself chewing and tasting the juiciness and sweetness and texture of the apple. I am sensing the intelligible object of “myself in union with the apple, consuming it so we are ‘one’”. This imagination is part of me being satisfied, and the actuality of that imagination is the work of the will to accomplish in actuality, as it moves my feet toward the table and my hand to grasp the apple and knife and cut, and as the will moves my hand to bring the apple to my mouth and my teeth to bite. Now I am “perfect”, complete in my whole being matching the visualization. And I smile as I chew.

Why do all desire their union with the things they see as good to be one with?
That is a kind of automatic thing with the will - when the reason or intellect sees the self in a union that is truthful or beneficial, the will is restless at the rest of the person not matching that actuality, and begins moving the whole being toward that “seeing of the reason and intellect” of the union.
The will is in that way moved into a “leaning toward” the perfecting of the “good known in the reason”, the good image of the visualized union, and this desire is the actual movement of the whole person toward obtaining the consumption.

Then we are perfect, and the will is in a state of “delight” or “joy”, the “known good” is the “actual reality” - union with the apple is happening in operation (of tasting and seeing that it is good).

What do you think?

Thank you for your reply. But, I still don’t understand Aquinas’ proof. You say that ““A thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect” = the “perfect part” of a thing is what makes it desirable”. So, it seems that you are saying that “perfect” = “desirable”. Is it right? If it is, then, how to understand that “everything is perfect so far as it is actual”, as said in Aquinas’ proof. Can there be a being that is actual but not perfect (that is, not desirable)?

Aquinas’ proof means that a being is desirable as long as it exists. But I cannot understand why a being is desirable as long as it exists. Can you help me?

 

[John_Martin]

Thank you for your reply. But, I still don’t understand Aquinas’ proof. You say that ““A thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect” = the “perfect part” of a thing is what makes it desirable”. So, it seems that you are saying that “perfect” = “desirable”. Is it right? If it is, then, how to understand that “everything is perfect so far as it is actual”, as said in Aquinas’ proof. Can there be a being that is actual but not perfect (that is, not desirable)?

Aquinas’ proof means that a being is desirable as long as it exists. But I cannot understand why a being is desirable as long as it exists. Can you help me?

Perfect means fully what its form defines. The form of an apple does not include the defect of a bruise, resulting in soft tissue under the bruised and discolored skin there on the apple.
It is a “perfect apple attended by accidental defects that are not part of its perfection”.
I do not throw out the apple for an attending defect, but I also do not desire or delight in the bruise on the apple - that I throw away into the garbage. So I desired the apple, but only in so far as it was perfect. There was also a green, unripe apple on the table. I did not take it (save that for later; I will one day desire it). It is not a perfected apple, but is in potential to perfection, potential to completeness of being ripe.

But the actual thing desired, again, is not the apple, not any apple.
The actual thing desired is the visualized image, that the will is moving my body to materialize.

The thing desired is my own perfection of appetite, where I imagine the goodness of eating a luscious apple. There is no bruise on the apple I imagine, so I have to “fix the apple”, I have to make it fully like my imagination of it - that imagination is the perfect object. That imagination’s fulfillment is what I am desiring to make real with the actual apple.

I am a being, I am actual, but I have defects attending to me also. And I am “not ripe”, too. I have not manifested yet my full form as “son of God” so that I shine like the Son.
Perfect means the object and form agree: the form does not define defect (only deviation from the form is defect); the form manifested in matter happens over time, so that in the intervening time there is not Yet perfection, but movement toward complete matching.

Desirable and good and true are all convertible. Perfect, however, is when that which is desirable reaches the last stage of desire (or last stage of love), which is the obtaining and enjoyment of the desired reality (when I am chewing the apple).
There is a sense in which the imagination of eating the apple is “perfect” in anticipation, perfect in potential (like the form of a body is perfect, but not yet manifested in Act).

When we desire God, it is not “Perfect God” we are desiring, but the “perfection of ourselves being in the Perfect God’s presence, knowing each other.” Union is perfection, union and enjoyment of that union.

 

[John_Martin]

Thank you for your reply. But, I still don’t understand Aquinas’ proof. You say that ““A thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect” = the “perfect part” of a thing is what makes it desirable”. So, it seems that you are saying that “perfect” = “desirable”. Is it right? If it is, then, how to understand that “everything is perfect so far as it is actual”, as said in Aquinas’ proof. Can there be a being that is actual but not perfect (that is, not desirable)?

Aquinas’ proof means that a being is desirable as long as it exists. But I cannot understand why a being is desirable as long as it exists. Can you help me?

Any time you see something, you are contemplating it to understand what it is - that is how we understand. If you understand something as being true (being what it ought to be), you are complacent about it being “in your world”, you accept it as a part of known reality. In a way, reality would not be complete without containing all the things you know are true.

The sun is desirable (sitting where it is in space, but not 5 feet away) for its light and warmth, in its truth of being a blaze of hydrogen fusion.
Any defects to the sun we do not desire (we are wary of solar flares and sunspots, which seem to be variations accidental to the sun).

But also, just the idea of a star has no goodness or evil to it, until it is an individual actual thing at the center of a solar system, and not just an idea or definition of a star in the intellect, a “universal” with no actual being.

We always visualize some actual individual object in some type of union to us - that is the place of desire, which then moves us to the material union. Only something with actual being can be in conjunction with us, as the sun is actually material in conjunction with our sight, its actual radiation warming our skin.

By the way, “as long as it exists” can also mean “provided it exists” (as an actual individual object, rather than a definition of an object, as “tiger” is a species definition that is only a reality in an actual large striped feline walking in a jungle). A tiger can be desired only if there is a real individual one alive. Otherwise there is nothing to desire (only ideas to wish for).

 

[petra22]

Your conversations are so “deep!”

 

[STT]

Hi,

I am interested in Thomas Aquinas’ proof of that every being is good, and am trying to understand this proof. This proof is in “I answer that,” of First Part, Question 5, Article 1 (“Whether goodness differs really from being”) of his Summa Theologica. Here is a link to this proof: newadvent.org/summa/1005.htm

Now I have trouble in understanding this proof. It says that “Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection.” How to understand this? It seems that this is not self-evident. Why do all desire their own perfection?

Can anyone help me? I will appreciate it.

The perfection is the state without changes. Therefore anything imperfect is subject to change unless it reaches perfection. Changes however cannot go to infinitum. Therefore everything eventually reaches to perfection. This means that there is a tendency for perfection.

 

[Vico]

The perfection is the state without changes. Therefore anything imperfect is subject to change unless it reaches perfection. Changes however cannot go to infinitum. Therefore everything eventually reaches to perfection. This means that there is a tendency for perfection.

Only God has infinite perfection. However, conversely for mankind, by analogy, an asymptote is always approaching.

 

[STT]

Only God has infinite perfection. However, conversely for mankind, by analogy, an asymptote is always approaching.

I think you need to show that there could be a tendency for perfection if perfection is infinite. My argument follows if you cannot. You can also argue against my argument.

 

[Bradski]

It says that “Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection.” How to understand this? It seems that this is not self-evident.

The two statements are not connected.

As to the second, it could be argued that we all desire perfection. But something could certainly be less than perfect (which effectively means everything) but we would still desire it.

My wife desires me and I’m sure she wishes I were more perfect. But I’m not yet she still does.

Lucky me…

 

[Vico]

I think you need to show that there could be a tendency for perfection if perfection is infinite. My argument follows if you cannot. You can also argue against my argument.

The statement that “The perfection is the state without changes” is incorrect.

• perfect: being entirely without fault or defect (Merriam Webster)

 

[STT]

The statement that “The perfection is the state without changes” is incorrect.

• perfect: being entirely without fault or defect (Merriam Webster)

That is not a suitable definition for our current purpose. I would say that perfection is the state of actual, what God is.

 

[Vico]

That is not a suitable definition for our current purpose. I would say that perfection is the state of actual, what God is.

Catholic Encyclopedia

In order to form a more systematic idea of God, and as far as possible, to unfold the implications of the truth, God is All-Perfect, this infinite Perfection is viewed, successively, under various aspects, each of which is treated as a separate perfection and characteristic inherent to the Divine Substance, or Essence. A certain group of these, of paramount import, is called the Divine Attributes.

Fox, J. (1907). Divine Attributes. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. newadvent.org/cathen/02062e.htm

 

[STT]

Catholic Encyclopedia

In order to form a more systematic idea of God, and as far as possible, to unfold the implications of the truth, God is All-Perfect, this infinite Perfection is viewed, successively, under various aspects, each of which is treated as a separate perfection and characteristic inherent to the Divine Substance, or Essence. A certain group of these, of paramount import, is called the Divine Attributes.

Fox, J. (1907). Divine Attributes. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. newadvent.org/cathen/02062e.htm

Can we say that God is perfection?

 

[Richca]

Thank you for your reply. But, I still don’t understand Aquinas’ proof. You say that ““A thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect” = the “perfect part” of a thing is what makes it desirable”. So, it seems that you are saying that “perfect” = “desirable”. Is it right? If it is, then, how to understand that “everything is perfect so far as it is actual”, as said in Aquinas’ proof. Can there be a being that is actual but not perfect (that is, not desirable)?

Aquinas’ proof means that a being is desirable as long as it exists. But I cannot understand why a being is desirable as long as it exists. Can you help me?

To be or to exist is good and desirable. Common sense tells us that to be or to exist is good and desirable rather than not to be or to be nothing. Philosophically, good is a transcendental property of being. Being is convertible with good because whatever is, is good, insofar as it is a being. The notion of good follows being because nothing can be good or called good unless it first is, has being, or exists. One and true are two other transcendental properties of being.

 

[zhoudu]

Thank all of you sincerely for your reply and help.

But, I am confused and still don’t understand the Aquinas’ proof of that every being is good.

I agree that if a being is desirable, the being is good, which is said in that proof. But I don’t see why it is true that if a being exists, the being is desirable, which that proof means. For example, can’t there be (in theory) a very horrible monster that is not desirable in any way?

 

[STT]

Thank all of you sincerely for your reply and help.

But, I am confused and still don’t understand the Aquinas’ proof of that every being is good.

I agree that if a being is desirable, the being is good, which is said in that proof. But I don’t see why it is true that if a being exists, the being is desirable, which that proof means. For example, can’t there be (in theory) a very horrible monster that is not desirable in any way?

I think your objection is right.

 

[Vico]

Thank all of you sincerely for your reply and help.

But, I am confused and still don’t understand the Aquinas’ proof of that every being is good.

I agree that if a being is desirable, the being is good, which is said in that proof. But I don’t see why it is true that if a being exists, the being is desirable, which that proof means. For example, can’t there be (in theory) a very horrible monster that is not desirable in any way?

Evil is like blindness or sickness, a deprivation of what is actual. St Thomas Aquinas therefore says that something is evil “inasmuch as it is deprived of some particular good that pertains to its due or proper perfection”.

 

[Vico]

Can we say that God is perfection?

St. Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica I, Q4, A1) quoted St. Gregory the Theologian to answer that.

Reply to Objection 1. As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): “Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God.” For that which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are brought into actuality, this word “perfect” signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.