Immaterial God cannot know anything

[Bahman]

Here it is the argument:

1. God is immaterial
2. Immaterial things doesn’t have shape
3. From (1) and (2) we can deduce that God is shapeless
4. Knowledge is structured
5. From (4) we can deduce that knowledge has shape
6. From (3) and (5) we can deduce that immaterial God cannot have any knowledge

 

[Beryllos]

Bahman, it’s amazing how many ways you have discovered to say that God is nothing special, even lower than man.

I believe the error in this latest proposition is the assumption that physical form, or matter, is necessary for knowlege. Of course if you assume that there is nothing else which is capable of knowledge, you will conclude that nothing else is capable of knowledge…

 

[Beryllos]

Here it is the argument:

1. God is immaterial
2. Immaterial things doesn’t have shape
3. From (1) and (2) we can deduce that God is shapeless
4. Knowledge is structured
5. From (4) we can deduce that knowledge has shape
6. From (3) and (5) we can deduce that immaterial God cannot have any knowledge

… but more specifically to the Original Post, the error may be in #2. You are assuming that immaterial means less than material. What if immaterial is more ordered, more structured, more capable of knowledge, will, and action than material? What if immaterial is not sub-material, but rather super-material?

 

[Rohzek]

I don’t agree with the formulation of the problem, but it is indeed a very mysterious problem. Knowledge is only possible with two things that humans have: scope and limits. So how does God have knowledge of anything at all? If he has no limits, then he has no scope. And if there is no scope, then where does his explanatory power come from. My only guess is that his way of knowledge is totally different from ours. He’s sort of like the Sirian in Voltaire’s “Micromegas.”

 

[MT1926]

Here it is the argument:

1. God is immaterial
2. Immaterial things doesn’t have shape
3. From (1) and (2) we can deduce that God is shapeless
4. Knowledge is structured
5. From (4) we can deduce that knowledge has shape
6. From (3) and (5) we can deduce that immaterial God cannot have any knowledge

#7 How do we know what we know could even come close to what knowledge truly is?

I think we are referred to as sheep for a pretty good reason.

Matthew 19:26

 

[e_c]

It goes wrong at #4. I am not sure what you mean by “structured,” but by it you indicate that it has something to do with physical shape…

Immateriality is actually the condition for knowledge. The more material a thing is, the more obscure its knowledge, since knowledge is the product of containing immaterial things (ideas, abstractions, sense data, being in general) in the mind.

 

[porthos11]

Here it is the argument:

1. God is immaterial
2. Immaterial things doesn’t have shape
3. From (1) and (2) we can deduce that God is shapeless
4. Knowledge is structured
5. From (4) we can deduce that knowledge has shape
6. From (3) and (5) we can deduce that immaterial God cannot have any knowledge

Yet another argument from you with non-sequiturs. Here’s where your argument fails:

P: Since knowledge is structured, we can deduce that knowledge has shape.

Seriously?

No. It does not follow that structure implies shape. Your “deduction” in fact a case of non-sequitur: It does not follow. End of story. Next argument.

 

[porthos11]

It goes wrong at #4. I am not sure what you mean by “structured,” but by it you indicate that it has something to do with physical shape…

Immateriality is actually the condition for knowledge. The more material a thing is, the more obscure its knowledge, since knowledge is the product of containing immaterial things (ideas, abstractions, sense data, being in general) in the mind.

Points 1 through 4, even though somewhat dubiously worded, can be conceded to a degree, even the claim that knowledge is structured, because knowledge has a kind of order, at least in the human sphere.

It’s premise 5 that brings the argument down because somehow, he claims that structure implies form, which we know from nature is not always the case. For example, in computer science, data structures are abstract concepts where data is literally structured. But neither the data nor their organizations have shape, but they are indeed structured (linked lists, arrays, queues, stacks). None of those things exist in space, and the most basic physical manifestations we can obtain as a result of them are changes in electrical signals, which mean nothing in the natural sphere. These structures are significant only in the human mind, but they do exist as structured entities, even though they have no shape and take up no space.

Since the failure of this premise renders the argument erroneous, no further addressing or apologetics against it is necessary or even possible.

 

[Bradski]

Where’s one that makes more sense to me.

1. It is assumed that God is Omniscient.
2. The assumption is not correct.

 

[Bahman]

Bahman, it’s amazing how many ways you have discovered to say that God is nothing special, even lower than man.

Because the definition God provided in Catholicism is problematic.

I believe the error in this latest proposition is the assumption that physical form, or matter, is necessary for knowlege. Of course if you assume that there is nothing else which is capable of knowledge, you will conclude that nothing else is capable of knowledge…

One can start with the fact that knowledge has shape. Of course one can easily conclude that a shapeless God cannot know anything.

 

[Bahman]

… but more specifically to the Original Post, the error may be in #2. You are assuming that immaterial means less than material. What if immaterial is more ordered, more structured, more capable of knowledge, will, and action than material? What if immaterial is not sub-material, but rather super-material?

Of course my argument fail if you assume that immaterial world is richer than material world. However in Catholicism, it is assumed that God is simple and has no part.

 

[Bahman]

I don’t agree with the formulation of the problem, but it is indeed a very mysterious problem. Knowledge is only possible with two things that humans have: scope and limits. So how does God have knowledge of anything at all? If he has no limits, then he has no scope. And if there is no scope, then where does his explanatory power come from. My only guess is that his way of knowledge is totally different from ours. He’s sort of like the Sirian in Voltaire’s “Micromegas.”

Could you please elaborate what do you mean with scope and limits and how they are related to knowledge?

 

[Bahman]

It goes wrong at #4. I am not sure what you mean by “structured,” but by it you indicate that it has something to do with physical shape…

By structured I meant that knowledge is made of parts and these parts form knowledge by ordering in a specific way,

Immateriality is actually the condition for knowledge. The more material a thing is, the more obscure its knowledge, since knowledge is the product of containing immaterial things (ideas, abstractions, sense data, being in general) in the mind.

None of things that you mentioned is shapeless. For example you can differentiate two different ideas since they are distinguishable which means that they have different shape.

 

[Bahman]

Yet another argument from you with non-sequiturs. Here’s where your argument fails:

P: Since knowledge is structured, we can deduce that knowledge has shape.

Seriously?

No. It does not follow that structure implies shape. Your “deduction” in fact a case of non-sequitur: It does not follow. End of story. Next argument.

Yes, seriously. Something which is structured is made of parts in specific order and they are distinguishable. Suppose you have the knowledge of A and B, where A and B are whatever, two theorems for example. How could you distinguish the difference between them if they are shapeless?

 

[porthos11]

Yes, seriously. Something which is structured is made of parts in specific order and they are distinguishable. Suppose you have the knowledge of A and B, where A and B are whatever, two theorems for example. How could you distinguish the difference between them if they are shapeless?

First of all, the definition of God in Catholicism is not faulty. It is your logic that is.

Two theorems do not require shape to be distinguished any more than true or false need shape to be distinguished. Distinction of concepts does not require form or shape.

I’ll give you the opportunity to prove your point. Here’s the Pythagorean theorem:

c^2 = a^2 + b^2

What’s the shape of that theorem? How much space does it occupy?

Here’s another, this time a boolean postulate. There’s the AND truth table.

0+0=0
0+1=0
1+0=0
1+1=1

Same questions. What’s the shape of that knowledge? I can easily distinguish between the concept of the Pythagorean theorem and the AND truth table, and I can go on to include the OR truth table, the NOT truth table, the XOR truth table, as well as the NAND and NOR. What are their shapes? If they had a shape, you can easily identify that, even if the shape is irregular.

We are talking about concepts here, not shapes or form. You’re trying to take the Catholic definition of God’s not occupying any space and use a faulty premise to “prove” that God somehow cannot have knowledge and therefore cannot exist as per the Catholic definition.

Well first of all God’s knowledge is not the same as human knowledge. Man structures his knowledge because in his limitations within time and space, he needs to organize it for better recall and use. God is not like that. God is absolute simplicity, and so is his knowledge. In fact, Catholicism correctly defines God as not merely having knowledge, but is in fact Knowledge itself. Because God is Existence itself, there is no structuring or distinction of concepts within him. There is only one eternal Object of his knowledge, and that is himself. His knowledge of everything anything that exists is all eternal to him, all present to him, since God is not subject to time. Divine Knowledge, like God himself, is absolutely simple, and is therefore not subject to structure. In fact, this Knowledge is so simple and Eternal that this is a key concept in the dogma of the Trinity, as this is how the Son is generated. Like God himself, his knowledge has no parts.

Therefore, your argument is still erroneous and is to be rejected. And thanks to your clarification earlier, we now also have to reject P4 as erroneous as well, because you have effectively limited it to knowledge in the temporal sphere, which is not the same as define Knowledge in the theological sphere.

P4: Knowledge is structured: This is true only in human knowledge which is by nature limited and linear. It does not form part of the Catholic definition of God’s knowledge, and is therefore rejected.
P4: Knowledge has shape. This remains rejected. Even in human knowledge, concepts such as truth values do not have shape. They may have values, which allows for distinction, but that’s not form or shape, as truth does not occupy space.

With two premises shown to be incorrect (P4 as not fitting the Catholic definition for the sake or argument, and P5 as simply wrong), the argument remains erroneous.

 

[Rhubarb]

Here it is the argument:

1. God is immaterial
2. Immaterial things doesn’t have shape
3. From (1) and (2) we can deduce that God is shapeless
4. Knowledge is structured
5. From (4) we can deduce that knowledge has shape
6. From (3) and (5) we can deduce that immaterial God cannot have any knowledge

I disagree with 5, as there is an ambiguity in the word ‘structure’. A structure has a shape. Something that is structured doesn’t have to - a story is structured but it doesn’t have a physical shape. A symphony is structured, but it’s just sound. I might also take issue with knowledge being structured in all instances.

 

[Wesrock]

Material is a limiting factor. It plants a being at a particular time and space. An immaterial essence is not limited in such a way, and God’s immaterial essence is also equal to pure and total existence. All other beings are a limited existence, they possess it in a lesser degree than God does.

Plus the other flaws in the logic pointed out by other users.

Immaterial is not formless. Nor is it nothing.

 

[Rohzek]

Could you please elaborate what do you mean with scope and limits and how they are related to knowledge?

Knowledge is a creative enterprise and thus a meaningful one. If you don’t have limits to what can or cannot be thought of or felt of rationally, then due to the lack of a limit, you won’t have any scope. So if you don’t have any scope, then how can you even begin to conceive of any knowledge?

Take DNA for example. Your DNA gives limits to how your body grows. Those limits give your arms and legs scope. And since they have scope/shape, they can be used in a variety of constructive ways. The same principle applies to the brain and mind. If you didn’t have any limits in your DNA on body growth, then you would be some sort of ameboid and probably couldn’t even manage to walk.

So in short, what I was getting at is that if God has no limits or is supposed to not have any, then he shouldn’t have intelligence. If we abide by the principles that we have, then God should have no scope and thus have no knowledge and thereby be dumber than us. It’s quite the mystery/problem.

I agree with your conclusion: God shouldn’t know anything. However, I really do think he knows a lot to say the least. So I confess this to be a mystery that is beyond the capacities of human understanding, much like the Holy Trinity.

 

[Bahman]

First of all, the definition of God in Catholicism is not faulty. It is your logic that is.

First of all you evade to answer my question so I repeat it again: How could you distinguish the difference between knowledge of two distinct concepts if they are shapeless?

Two theorems do not require shape to be distinguished any more than true or false need shape to be distinguished. Distinction of concepts does not require form or shape.

They have shape. In fact any concept occupies some space in our brain through wiring of neurons. There is a rewiring process inside our brain any time that we learn something new.

I’ll give you the opportunity to prove your point. Here’s the Pythagorean theorem:

c^2 = a^2 + b^2

What’s the shape of that theorem? How much space does it occupy?

Here’s another, this time a boolean postulate. There’s the AND truth table.

0+0=0
0+1=0
1+0=0
1+1=1

Same questions. What’s the shape of that knowledge?

They have shape: no wiring inside brain means no knowledge.

I can easily distinguish between the concept of the Pythagorean theorem and the AND truth table, and I can go on to include the OR truth table, the NOT truth table, the XOR truth table, as well as the NAND and NOR. What are their shapes? If they had a shape, you can easily identify that, even if the shape is irregular.

Yes, we can easily recognize them after we learn about them but the process of learning requires rewiring. No rewiring means not learning.

We are talking about concepts here, not shapes or form. You’re trying to take the Catholic definition of God’s not occupying any space and use a faulty premise to “prove” that God somehow cannot have knowledge and therefore cannot exist as per the Catholic definition.

No. We are talking about concepts and how they occupy different shape inside our brains. A shapeless mind cannot know anything since knowledge is structured. Returning to my original question: How different concepts could be distinguishable if they don’t have different shapes?

Well first of all God’s knowledge is not the same as human knowledge.

So you need to explain how a shapeless mind could distinguish between two different concepts?

Man structures his knowledge because in his limitations within time and space, he needs to organize it for better recall and use.

That is not a limitation but an advantage over your concept of God.

God is not like that. God is absolute simplicity, and so is his knowledge.

Yes, that I knew. But an absolutely simple thing cannot be omniscient.

In fact, Catholicism correctly defines God as not merely having knowledge, but is in fact Knowledge itself. Because God is Existence itself, there is no structuring or distinction of concepts within him. There is only one eternal Object of his knowledge, and that is himself. His knowledge of everything anything that exists is all eternal to him, all present to him, since God is not subject to time. Divine Knowledge, like God himself, is absolutely simple, and is therefore not subject to structure. In fact, this Knowledge is so simple and Eternal that this is a key concept in the dogma of the Trinity, as this is how the Son is generated. Like God himself, his knowledge has no parts.

This is a set of claims without any support. God is knowledge! What this does ever mean? How God could distinguish between different concepts if his knowledge is shapeless?

Therefore, your argument is still erroneous and is to be rejected. And thanks to your clarification earlier, we now also have to reject P4 as erroneous as well, because you have effectively limited it to knowledge in the temporal sphere, which is not the same as define Knowledge in the theological sphere.

No P4 is not erroneous. That is my claim which is consistent with what I am defining, You need to define knowledge in theological sphere and show that it is possible when God’s mind is shapeless.

P4: Knowledge is structured: This is true only in human knowledge which is by nature limited and linear. It does not form part of the Catholic definition of God’s knowledge, and is therefore rejected.

God’s knowledge has no structure means that his knowledge is shapeless. What this does mean? God doesn’t know anything.

P4: Knowledge has shape. This remains rejected. Even in human knowledge, concepts such as truth values do not have shape. They may have values, which allows for distinction, but that’s not form or shape, as truth does not occupy space.

That is already been answered.

With two premises shown to be incorrect (P4 as not fitting the Catholic definition for the sake or argument, and P5 as simply wrong), the argument remains erroneous.

So my argument follows and your argument is nonsense.

 

[Bahman]

I disagree with 5, as there is an ambiguity in the word ‘structure’. A structure has a shape. Something that is structured doesn’t have to - a story is structured but it doesn’t have a physical shape. A symphony is structured, but it’s just sound. I might also take issue with knowledge being structured in all instances.

Something which is structured means that it is made of parts and these parts are connected in an organized way. Hence something which is structured has a shape.