J
JDaniel
Guest
In regard to material things, there is a structure, which can be easily seen and easily known (I think), but, not necessarily well understood. Sciences, such as physics, mathematics, metaphysics, and general science, to name a few, are differentiated from one another not by studying this or that reality, but, by the real objects that interest them.
When the specialized scientist looks at an object he wants to study, he starts out first not with a specific “scientific method” (which may come later), but, with a prior and general determination of what it is about the object that can be said about it without going to the quantum level. In so doing, we can and do, in fact, differentiate our sciences.
But, there is an order by which accidental properties come to an object. For example, the mathematician and the scientist can look at the roundness of an orange. But, the mathematician looks at the mathematical quality of roundness, without regard for any of an orange’s other qualities. The natural scientist, on the other hand, looks at the orange in a different way. He sees the roundness as the termination of sensible matter. In fact, it can be said that he is indifferent to the character of roundness, unless it directly affects some other physical quality of the orange, such as color, texture, and taste.
But, is there an order presupposed, by us, and perhaps determined, by nature, that might not only differentiate the sciences interested in it, but also, lead us to better understand the matter with which those sciences deal, and how they deal with it? If so, which comes to the object first, the motions of the object, or its qualities, or its quantity, or its substance?
Now, since we are not speaking of these things with specific reference to time, as in which order these four exigencies came to the object as in “when”, but rather, in what ontological, and, perhaps, metaphysical, order do they came to the object?
jd
When the specialized scientist looks at an object he wants to study, he starts out first not with a specific “scientific method” (which may come later), but, with a prior and general determination of what it is about the object that can be said about it without going to the quantum level. In so doing, we can and do, in fact, differentiate our sciences.
But, there is an order by which accidental properties come to an object. For example, the mathematician and the scientist can look at the roundness of an orange. But, the mathematician looks at the mathematical quality of roundness, without regard for any of an orange’s other qualities. The natural scientist, on the other hand, looks at the orange in a different way. He sees the roundness as the termination of sensible matter. In fact, it can be said that he is indifferent to the character of roundness, unless it directly affects some other physical quality of the orange, such as color, texture, and taste.
But, is there an order presupposed, by us, and perhaps determined, by nature, that might not only differentiate the sciences interested in it, but also, lead us to better understand the matter with which those sciences deal, and how they deal with it? If so, which comes to the object first, the motions of the object, or its qualities, or its quantity, or its substance?
Now, since we are not speaking of these things with specific reference to time, as in which order these four exigencies came to the object as in “when”, but rather, in what ontological, and, perhaps, metaphysical, order do they came to the object?
jd