Infinite chains of temporal efficient causality do exist?

[Blue_Horizon]

(a) If it is valid to hold that the Universe had no beginning in time THEN
(b) it appears equally valid to hold that motion of the heavenly bodies goes back in time to eternity AND
(c) this must logically require that chains of efficient causality going back in time eternally are possible YET
(d) Aristotle asserts that cause/effect chains of material motion/change (efficient causality) cannot track back forever in time AND
(e) I further assert as a further simplifying condition of this question that: by “motion” Aristotle can be validly understood to consistently refer to **material change **(esp local motion) BECAUSE
(f) if this principle of motion applies for all types of motion/change then it must also be true for any single type of change. In this case I assert for simplicity sake we strictly stick to material change only…of which local motion of the celestial bodies is his prime example in mind.

Clearly there is a logical contradiction between these six premises.
But which is the offending premise? And why

 

[inocente]

I’ve not read Aristotle, but think he doesn’t assert (d):

“Aristotle argues at the opening of Physics bk. 8 that motion and change in the universe can have no beginning, because the occurrence of change presupposes a previous process of change.” - plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/

And that does seem to be the case, as in book 8 Aristotle writes “But so far as time is concerned we see that all with one exception are in agreement in saying that it is uncreated: in fact, it is just this that enables Democritus to show that all things cannot have had a becoming: for time, he says, is uncreated. Plato alone asserts the creation of time, saying that it had a becoming together with the universe, the universe according to him having had a becoming. Now since time cannot exist and is unthinkable apart from the moment, and the moment a kind of middle-point, uniting as it does in itself both a beginning and an end, a beginning of future time and an end of past time, it follows that there must always be time: for the extremity of the last period of time that we take must be found in some moment, since time contains no point of contact for us except the moment. Therefore, since the moment is both a beginning and an end, there must always be time on both sides of it. But if this is true of time, it is evident that it must also be true of motion, time being a kind of affection of motion.” - classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.8.viii.html

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I’ve not read Aristotle, but think he doesn’t assert (d):

“Aristotle argues at the opening of Physics bk. 8 that motion and change in the universe can have no beginning, because the occurrence of change presupposes a previous process of change.” - plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-natphil/

And that does seem to be the case, as in book 8 Aristotle writes “But so far as time is concerned we see that all with one exception are in agreement in saying that it is uncreated: in fact, it is just this that enables Democritus to show that all things cannot have had a becoming: for time, he says, is uncreated. Plato alone asserts the creation of time, saying that it had a becoming together with the universe, the universe according to him having had a becoming. Now since time cannot exist and is unthinkable apart from the moment, and the moment a kind of middle-point, uniting as it does in itself both a beginning and an end, a beginning of future time and an end of past time, it follows that there must always be time: for the extremity of the last period of time that we take must be found in some moment, since time contains no point of contact for us except the moment. Therefore, since the moment is both a beginning and an end, there must always be time on both sides of it. But if this is true of time, it is evident that it must also be true of motion, time being a kind of affection of motion.” - classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.8.viii.html

Well thats pretty much what, below, I believed to be implicit inc Aristotles understanding of the eternity of the world.

Perhaps it is Aquinas who believe infinite chains of efficient causality (motion) must terminate in an unmoved mover.

However I believes he does sleight of hand - he changes from material efficient causality to spiritual efficient causality (outside of time) somewhere in the chain. And even that looks more like a switch away from pure efficient causality to something more complicated.

 

[kdbueno]

Causality is caused by infinite being. The temporal efficient causality is caused by a heretical understanding of God. The infinite chains of love is caused by the reason of supreme eternal law.

 

[Sacred_Heart_1]

(a) If it is valid to hold that the Universe had no beginning in time THEN
(b) it appears equally valid to hold that motion of the heavenly bodies goes back in time to eternity AND
(c) this must logically require that chains of efficient causality going back in time eternally are possible YET
(d) Aristotle asserts that cause/effect chains of material motion/change (efficient causality) cannot track back forever in time AND
(e) I further assert as a further simplifying condition of this question that: by “motion” Aristotle can be validly understood to consistently refer to **material change **(esp local motion) BECAUSE
(f) if this principle of motion applies for all types of motion/change then it must also be true for any single type of change. In this case I assert for simplicity sake we strictly stick to material change only…of which local motion of the celestial bodies is his prime example in mind.

Clearly there is a logical contradiction between these six premises.
But which is the offending premise? And why

The offending premise is (f), most likely. Because you want to stick with “material change” only, which denies a spiritual presence as change. However, the whole argument becomes difficult because of the lack of the idea of spiritual presence.

What is the purpose of material change? It is a spiritual presence that is the purpose of material change. The cause is the purpose of this known universe.

 

[Richca]

(a) If it is valid to hold that the Universe had no beginning in time THEN

Cannot be philosophically demonstated

(b) it appears equally valid to hold that motion of the heavenly bodies goes back in time to eternity AND

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Cannot be philosophically demonstated

I think we all know that … therefore it is not logically inconsistent to hold this.
That is the simple point I make.
Do you disagree?

Eternity of motion cannot be philosophy demonstated ----Eternity of motion and the eternal existence of the universe is simply Aristotle’s opinion which he believed could not be philosophically demonstated.

Again, I think we all know that … therefore it is not logically inconsistent to hold this.
I assert that if (a) happens to be true then (b) logically must follow.
That is the simple point I make.
Do you disagree?

perhaps in an ordered series of efficient causes per accidens in which it is logically possible to proceed indefinitely into the past and in which all the members of the series need not exist all at once or simultaneously.

I understand the “perhaps” based on the non demonastrability of a and b above.
However, given that I am asserting the possible case that (a) is actually the case then I believe one must assert (c) is logically demanded.
Do you disagree?

An ordered series of efficient causes per se all exist simultaneously in the here and now.

I believe you may be asserting a logical contradiction, though I may be mistaken because I have never seen a clear definition of a real-world “ordered series of efficient causes per se”?

For your statement to be true in the material order (which is what we speak of wrt “motion” in this thread) then I would assert with Newton that a chain of efficient causality is inherently temporal and therefore “simultaneity” (I presume you mean at the very same instant of time) of motion is impossible.

I note a distinction between “efficient causes” and “efficient causality” in the English language. The former seems to refer more to the ontic existance of the “efficient cause/effect” (ie the “agent”) while the other refers more to the motion of the efficient cause/effect" (the “agency” if you will) .

Perhaps the baffling and interminable arguments over “per se, per accidens” refers to two different understandings of Aristotle’s “efficient cause”.

“Cause/effect” afterall is more to do with Physics, while “efficient cause” is more to do with Metaphysics.

So it seems to be that when we regard Aristotle’s “motion” as loco-motion (a valid example), we must remain in Physics if we are consistent. And if we do that then temporality is inherent to this understanding of chains of efficient causality.

Aquinas starts out by saying we observe loco-motion change in every day reality.
This is a temporal understanding of efficient causality (cause/effect of Physics).
Yet somewhere along the way we suddenly jump to a subtley different type of efficient causality that is in fact ontic/existence based (perhaps that is what you call “per se”) and the understanding of “motion” changes subtely also to potency/act.

However if we start with local motion (which does not admit of simultaneity in chains of efficient causality) how can we logically suddenly introduce a a different understanding of “motion” which allows for non-temporal simultaneous chains and, possibly, an alleged need for an unmoved first mover.

In short, irreconcilable definitions of “motion” and “efficient cause” may be at play and are used equivocally here.