*Since an idea is immaterial it must be conceived by a power which is of the same order, that is to say, the intellect is an immaterial power. *
Could be true, but isn’t logically required. It does seem very strange that a material being think of immaterial concepts, however; one might ask, “How?” This could be resolved in several ways: 1) There is no “material” (James’ answer above), so material/immaterial is a false dichotomy 2) God allows the material mind to fathom immaterial concepts (by “exerting” omnipotence), 3) There is no such thing as an “immaterial ideas”, because ideas are simply patterns drawn from experience.
I think #1 and #3 are compatible. #3 has some appeal to me, because it prioritizes experience. Interesting…now that I think about it, #3 seems to *entail *#1.
If ideas are patterns drawn from experience, then the idea of “material” must be a pattern drawn from experience. But from what experience? If we have never truly experienced anything “immaterial”, then the concept of “material” itself becomes meaningless.
I wonder, is this what Bishop Berkeley was getting at?
There is another solid reason for saying that a man’s intellect is an immaterial power. It is the fact that it can reflect upon its own operations…
Doesn’t this just beg the question? If it’s operations are material, then second level reflection is material too. There’s no contradiction there.
A material organ can only strive to possess a material thing.
This is convincing premise, but once again not logically necessary. It doesn’t seem like a rock, for example, could ever seek to possess wealth; but wealth, looked at as a “pattern” or a “sum” might seem to be “material”.
First, I don’t understand why something immaterial must be conceptualized by a power of “the same order” (immaterial vs. material). Why can’t a material mind be wired in such a way to recognize patterns in nature and organize them into abstractions and generalizations?
Exactly.
Fr. Alexander explains that the human soul is of the same order as its powers, the intellect and the will. However, how do we know that the intellect and the will (hence the soul) are immaterial? How do we know that they can exist without an accompanying object?
We don’t. This is a subject that – absent revelation – we have to suspend judgment on. The Bible speaks about us getting a new body, but does it speak about us hanging out, immaterially, “in between”? I don’t think so. To my mind, it is perfectly reasonable to believe (in the context of Catholic eschatology) that a continuous consciousness can be “transferred” from one body to another, without loss of identity. No necessity to posit any “material” or “immaterial” realities, at all.