Is Actus Purus pantheism?

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I am having some difficulties with understanding the concept of God as actus purus, a prime concept in Thomism.

If God is his act or energia, pure act, would this not compromise the distinction between God and creature?

Because God and act are one and the same, Gods act of creating the world is, as such, God himself. In other words, God being purely act, God is the creation/creature.

So is actus purus pantheism?
 
I am having some difficulties with understanding the concept of God as actus purus, a prime concept in Thomism.

If God is his act or energia, pure act, would this not compromise the distinction between God and creature?

Because God and act are one and the same, Gods act of creating the world is, as such, God himself. In other words, God being purely act, God is the creation/creature.

So is actus purus pantheism?

No.​

To be created is to be finite, IOW to have boundaries to one’s being. God is is free from all finiteness. He does not have being - He is Being. To Be God, is to be other than all created things - & this “boundedness” of creaturely being is what makes the creature that which has no likeness to God. Any likeness, must come from God - it is not attained by the creature, but poured out on it. Creaturely striving =/= God’s generous self-giving.

IOW, there is a relation between creatures & Creator - but it is real only from God’s “end”, never from ours. St. Thomas has a lot to say about relations of thought & real relations.

St. Thomas is close to Acosmism & to pantheism - but his insistence that God Alone is really real (I paraphrase) keeps him from pantheism; that’s why he is close to being an Acosmist. (C.S. Lewis seems to be Acosmist, if someone recent is wanted).

Any use to you ?
 

No.​

To be created is to be finite, IOW to have boundaries to one’s being. God is is free from all finiteness. He does not have being - He is Being. To Be God, is to be other than all created things - & this “boundedness” of creaturely being is what makes the creature that which has no likeness to God. Any likeness, must come from God - it is not attained by the creature, but poured out on it. Creaturely striving =/= God’s generous self-giving.

IOW, there is a relation between creatures & Creator - but it is real only from God’s “end”, never from ours. St. Thomas has a lot to say about relations of thought & real relations.

St. Thomas is close to Acosmism & to pantheism - but his insistence that God Alone is really real (I paraphrase) keeps him from pantheism; that’s why he is close to being an Acosmist. (C.S. Lewis seems to be Acosmist, if someone recent is wanted).

Any use to you ?
I see it.

But I still find the entire issue superfluous.

Let me ask: why not just make the Essence-Energy distinction, and separate God from his creation (his action) and avoid both acosmism and pantheism, instead of sticking to St. Thomas actus purus?

That is, what are the philosophical reasons for maintaining this Thomist view? What benefits does it have, over Essence-Energy distinctionism?
 
I am having some difficulties with understanding the concept of God as actus purus, a prime concept in Thomism.

If God is his act or energia, pure act, would this not compromise the distinction between God and creature?

Because God and act are one and the same, Gods act of creating the world is, as such, God himself. In other words, God being purely act, God is the creation/creature.

So is actus purus pantheism?
Welcome, TheLearner:

Well, there are several concepts inter-weaved in the concept of Actus Purus. First among them is the problem of Potentiality. If the Divine is not Pure Act, then there would be, of necessity, an inferred potentiality, i.e., imperfection, subsiding within the Divine. But, this cannot be.

If one conceives of a scale with primary matter (pure potential) on one end and God (pure act) on the other, one can understand that everything else is in between them. Since everything else is, by the essence of each thing, not Pure Act, each exigency therein contains imperfection (potency). Since each contains imperfection, each cannot be God, nor can each be a part of God. Each part of Nature is relative and is a composite being - its contingent nature and its contingent existence. God is not a composite; he is a simple, non-contingent unity (a simple One). Therefore, Actus Purus is not Pantheism.

Also (1), in current usage, the word “necessity” is understood in a relative sense. We think of one thing being necessary to another, for example. But, the necessity in and of God is an entirely different order and is unique. It is not relative to anything outside of Him, but is absolute and entirely due to Him and within Him. God cannot but exist. However, the same cannot be said of all other things which are contingent things. This clearly provides another distinction between Pure Act and the effects of His creative will.

Also (2), our words, our feeble attempts to describe the essence and nature of the Divine, is the detriment, not God Himself. We hold our concepts analogically, yet imperfectly, and only then ascribe perfection to the concepts. You ask, “is not . . . God’s act of creating the world . … , as such, God [creating] himself?” If God was continuously creating Himself that would be correct. However, that would mean that God is constantly changing states. He is constantly becoming. He is “dependent” upon something.

God’s act(s) of creation are distinct from him and from his essence. Because he contains within him the nature of absolute being, i.e., actuality, does not mean that each of his creations must therefore be an emanation of said nature. He contains the nature of actuality on a supraphysical level. The rest of creation contains only a physical and, therefore, relative level of being.

jd
 
Well, there are several concepts inter-weaved in the concept of Actus Purus. First among them is the problem of Potentiality. If the Divine is not Pure Act, then there would be, of necessity, an inferred potentiality, i.e., imperfection, subsiding within the Divine.
Why?

This seems to be one of the Thomistic assumptions. It is not an explanation. You are assuming that potentiality means imperfection. Why do you assume this? Why do you make potency or potentiality synymous with imperfection?

It’s like saying, because a painter could have painted his painting a thousand other ways, his painting is imperfect. But the potentialities that he chose to exclude exactly prove perfection: any choice is an act of exclusion of potentiality. Any choice is a rejection of everything else but that which you choose. That’s how perfection is achieved.
I think it supports theology surrounding divine providence.
I need deeper answers than that. Could you elaborate?
 
Why?

This seems to be one of the Thomistic assumptions. It is not an explanation. You are assuming that potentiality means imperfection. Why do you assume this? Why do you make potency or potentiality synymous with imperfection?

It’s like saying, because a painter could have painted his painting a thousand other ways, his painting is imperfect. But the potentialities that he chose to exclude exactly prove perfection: any choice is an act of exclusion of potentiality. Any choice is a rejection of everything else but that which you choose. That’s how perfection is achieved.?
Not so. There are two kinds of becoming in nature, which we know from experience. The first is the coming-to-be of a new substance, or, substantial change, and, the second is a coming-to-be in the order of accidents. Accidental change would be say, a man who is on his way to becoming a guitarist. At the beginning, there is the subject, the man. The first contrary one would notice is that he cannot play the guitar at all. In terms of perfection as a guitar player, the subject, does not have that perfection. As a guitar play, he is imperfect. As he receives more and more instruction, he gains more and more of the perfection of guitar playing.

Tommy Emmanuel youtube.com/watch?v=hU-3_D26mUg&feature=related , is one of the best around, and although he might not be absolutely perfect, he certainly has much more of that perfection than most other players and, clearly, more perfection than the original guy who cannot play at all.

In your example, only the painter, himself, is the judge of his own perfection. If he is dissatisfied with his end painting, he could change some of the painting’s attributes and thus make it better. So, for now, it is imperfect. Upon changing the colors, lines, foreground or background, etc., he might achieve exactly what he wants. In the painting’s earlier being, it lacked perfection. Once amended, it now possesses perfection.

jd
 
Not so. There are two kinds of becoming in nature, which we know from experience. The first is the coming-to-be of a new substance, or, substantial change, and, the second is a coming-to-be in the order of accidents. Accidental change would be say, a man who is on his way to becoming a guitarist. At the beginning, there is the subject, the man. The first contrary one would notice is that he cannot play the guitar at all. In terms of perfection as a guitar player, the subject, does not have that perfection. As a guitar play, he is imperfect. As he receives more and more instruction, he gains more and more of the perfection of guitar playing.

Tommy Emmanuel youtube.com/watch?v=hU-3_D26mUg&feature=related , is one of the best around, and although he might not be absolutely perfect, he certainly has much more of that perfection than most other players and, clearly, more perfection than the original guy who cannot play at all.

In your example, only the painter, himself, is the judge of his own perfection. If he is dissatisfied with his end painting, he could change some of the painting’s attributes and thus make it better. So, for now, it is imperfect. Upon changing the colors, lines, foreground or background, etc., he might achieve exactly what he wants. In the painting’s earlier being, it lacked perfection. Once amended, it now possesses perfection.

jd
Is this understood correctly: Because the guitar player or the painter originally had a potential to become better, they were imperfect. But after they achieved the perfection they didn’t have the potential for higher perfection and were thus perfect. Is it just about the “potential for perfection”?

The potential for perfection obviously says something about perfection. But that is begging the question. There is much “potential” which cannot be measured merely by “perfection”, because perfection cannot be quantified in some kind of mathematic calculation or metric.

Mere variety or diversity of options doesn’t say anything about perfection. There might be two guitar pieces out there that are equally perfect, or two paintings that are equally perfect. They are qualitatively different, but when it comes to perfection, they are quantitively equal.
 
Bump. I am still interested in answering the questions in the above posts. Anyone?
 
Is this understood correctly: Because the guitar player or the painter originally had a potential to become better, they were imperfect. But after they achieved the perfection they didn’t have the potential for higher perfection and were thus perfect. Is it just about the “potential for perfection”?
No. The painter and the guitar player are efficient causes. And, they are not effects, except that they are the effects of their own coming-to-be, and the effects of their growth processes. In our example from art, the privation (potency) exists only in the blank canvas. It is the blank canvas that embodies, so to speak, potency. The process of going from potency (blank canvas) to act (painted canvas), is the action of coming to be.

Now, derivatively, one could say that the finished painting developed, or, better, exhibited a new potency, or privation. But, the nature of this new potency is less a substantial one, and more an accidental one. After the painting became an effect, the efficient cause (the painter) noticed flaws, or imperfections, that perhaps only he recognizes, or responds to, due to his own, well-trained sensibilities and sensitivities as a painter of pictures. Upon making the changes, the effect takes on a slightly modified, or newer, or different, mode of existence - but only accidentally, even if the artists starts all over from scratch, providing he uses the same canvas and paints.

The effect that is the finished painting is like a ripened apple. Prior to turning red, the apple was green. But, it was still the substrate-apple. The turning red signifies the ripening of the substrate-apple, but, now it has taken on a different mode, or condition, of existence. All this is saying is that the material causes of things can be further modified without necessarily changing their substantial being-ness. That is, before, IT was unripened and green, afterwards, the same IT is ripe and red. IT is the same substrate.
The potential for perfection obviously says something about perfection. But that is begging the question. There is much “potential” which cannot be measured merely by “perfection”, because perfection cannot be quantified in some kind of mathematic calculation or metric.
We say that the “possession of form” is the “perfection” of primary, or secondary, matter. We could say, without form, the matter would either not be known to us, or known to us imperfectly. We could say that as merely a lump of clay, the appearance of the lump is bland. It is of no particular interest to our senses, and, in fact, may even be repulsive. (Although, some might take pleasure looking at a lump of clay, if I may take an example from art again). However, once the lump of clay takes on the form of Venus, or Adonis, or Clifford, for example, the clay takes on a perfection that it did not have before, and might not have ever had were it not for the artist (the efficient cause). I added Clifford to the mix as I didn’t want to have you necessarily think that the “perfection” had to be colored by it representing beautiful men or women. On the other hand, the “perfection” that the statue represents is how it affects the sensibilities of various onlookers. But that is a different meaning.
Mere variety or diversity of options doesn’t say anything about perfection.
True.
There might be two guitar pieces out there that are equally perfect, or two paintings that are equally perfect.
In the ears or eyes of the beholders, that is correct.
They are qualitatively different, but when it comes to perfection, they are quantitively equal.
Again, correct - if this was what was meant by “perfection”, in our example. To sum up, “perfection” is a word used analogously, to help us to intelligibilise matter in combination with form. It is perfection, in this case, only in the sense that not having possession of something is less perfect than having possession of said thing.

Sorry it took so long for me to get back.:o

jd
 
Thanks for your reply. But I still don’t feel that you quite answered this question, in a short and simple manner:

Why is potentiality imperfection?

And please both provide an answer as well as define both terms, potentiality and imperfection.
 
Thanks for your reply. But I still don’t feel that you quite answered this question, in a short and simple manner:

Why is potentiality imperfection?

And please both provide an answer as well as define both terms, potentiality and imperfection.
OK, let’s give it a try.

In one sense, probably the sense you are thinking about, to say someone “has great potential” is a good thing. But, what does the statement mean? It may mean, for example, that a young MD, having just received his degree, may have been so smart, in class, and scored so well on exams, that everyone believes he will make a great doctor. Of course, he, as well, may not. But, if test scores and brilliance are any measure, the statement is complimentary.

In another sense, potential, or the active case, potency, may also mean that an object is without something needed to complete, or perfect it. An example of this is that of a house at the beginning of construction. The materials supplier brings in all of the material and places it in the front yard. Everything is there: the roofing, the lumber and sheet rock for the walls, the greenfield for electricity, the copper and PVC for water, the nails for putting the lumber together, the concrete base and flooring, etc., etc. It’s all there. As materials, it may be nice stuff, thus the parts have a certain “perfection” of their own, in the first sense. But, in this sense that’s not their intended purpose - to be left in the front yard in piles.

Since they are there for the purpose of becoming a house, their non-possession of the form “house” is their imperfection. Now, all of that stuff, together with the lot, driveway and front roadway have, in their aggregate, the potential to be a house. The materials are present, but, the form is not. In this sense, the pile-of-materials-that-is-to-be-a-house is exhibiting the imperfection of not-house. Once the builders build the house, it will have the perfection of house.

Did this help?

jd
 
“Creating” is not the same thing as “creation.” Even if God is always and eternally identical with his act of creating (or is eternally the Creator), that does not make Him identical with creation.

Hence, no pantheism is implied.
 
In one sense, probably the sense you are thinking about, to say someone “has great potential” is a good thing. But, what does the statement mean? It may mean, for example, that a young MD, having just received his degree, may have been so smart, in class, and scored so well on exams, that everyone believes he will make a great doctor. Of course, he, as well, may not. But, if test scores and brilliance are any measure, the statement is complimentary.
**
In another sense, potential, or the active case, potency, may also mean that an object is without something needed to complete, or perfect it. **
Yes, but then you are speaking of “potential for perfection”. Or “potential for finishing a goal”.

So the point, I guess, is that God has “already” finished the goal? He has already achieved the perfection? There is nothing unrealised in him, because if there was, he would be without it, and he couldn’t be, since he is unchanging and perfect?
 
Yes, but then you are speaking of “potential for perfection”. Or “potential for finishing a goal”.

So the point, I guess, is that God has “already” finished the goal? He has already achieved the perfection? There is nothing unrealised in him, because if there was, he would be without it, and he couldn’t be, since he is unchanging and perfect?
Can anyone confirm or debunk this? It is only my flawed and limited understanding, of course. So I have no idea if I am totally wrong or totally right. If I’m right, I’d like some elaboration on why and where I’m right though.
 
I think I understand actus purus how it is meant to be understood now. Neither as the equation of God with the potential he realises, but rather as the realising agent of the potential - nor as the limit of his potency or the potentials of his act, but simply as the the actualisation of all those possibilities. I have understood now that potentiality and actuality is to be understood not as a limit of the possibilities of God, but rather as the source of all the realisations of possibilities.

God actually is, he is not just potentially, because it is everything that follows from his act of creation which is potentially. Remove his act and the potential would not be realised. Creation is a potential which only exists inseparably from Gods act. Everything other than Gods act is itself the potential of his act, and he is the actuality which realises that potential.

Here are some quotes.

Concerning potentiality versus actuality:
That in God there is no Passive Potentiality
EVERYTHING that has in its substance an admixture of potentiality, to the extent that it has potentiality is liable not to be: because what can be, can also not be. But God in Himself cannot not be, seeing that He is everlasting; therefore there is in God no potentiality.
  1. Although in order of time that which is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in actuality, is in potentiality before it is in actuality, yet, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality,* because potentiality does not bring itself into actuality, but is brought into actuality by something which is already in actuality.* Everything therefore that is any way in potentiality has something else prior to it. But God is the First Being and the First Cause, and therefore has not in Himself any admixture of potentiality.
  1. Everything acts inasmuch as it is in actuality.* Whatever then is not all actuality, does not act by its whole self, but by something of itself. But what does not act by its whole self, is not a prime agent; for it acts by participation in something else, not by its own essence. The prime agent then, which is God, has no admixture of potentiality, but is pure actuality.
    **
  2. We see that there is that in the world which passes from potentiality to actuality. But it does not educe itself from potentiality to actuality, because what is in potentiality is not as yet, and therefore cannot act. Therefore there must be some other prior thing, whereby this thing may be brought out from potentiality to actuality. And again, if this further thing is going out from potentiality to actuality, there must be posited before it yet some other thing, whereby it may be reduced to actuality. But this process cannot go on for ever: therefore we must come to something that is only in actuality, and nowise in potentiality; and that we call God.**
Concerning Gods potency:
Aquinas was not enthralled with the sheer limitlessness of the possibilities of divine activity that so captivated the Nominalists’ attentions. Thomas admitted that God had countless possibilities before him in creation. God could have made other worlds or things than those that he actually has made. Thomas said that the “divine wisdom is not limited to one fixed system in such a manner that no other course of things could flow from it.” (1.25.5). So to speak of this as the “best of all possible worlds,” as Leibniz did later, would have seemed painfully absurd to Aquinas. It is meaningless to speak of a “best possible world” in a universe that is infinitely** open to the myriad possibilities** of God’s grace and love (1.25.6).
And here Aquinas explains how we know that Gods choices, and acts, out of the myriad of possibilities, are actually “genuine”, making for a theology which doesn’t allow the possibility of a “deceiving” God:
In Aquinas’s theology, …] the distinction between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata served almost the opposite function—it established a unity between God’s nature in se and God’s actions as made known in his revelation. While asserting that God is capable of doing other things than those he has actually done or will do, Aquinas insisted that whatever God has done or could do is and must be a true revelation of his character. Thus, “nothing can be within divine power which is not held in the wisdom and justice of God’s mind and will.” (1.25.5). The distinction between absolute and ordained power illustrated this point. Aquinas put it this way:
Code:
We conceive of understanding and wisdom as directing, will as commanding and power as executing; as for that which lies within power as such, God is said to be able to do it by his absolute power (secundum potentian absolutan). As for what lies within his power as carrying out the command of his just will, he is said to be able to do it by his ordinate power (de potentia ordinata). (1.25.5 ad 1).
 
Yes, but then you are speaking of “potential for perfection”. Or “potential for finishing a goal”.

So the point, I guess, is that God has “already” finished the goal? He has already achieved the perfection? There is nothing unrealised in him, because if there was, he would be without it, and he couldn’t be, since he is unchanging and perfect?
Exactly.

God has always been, always possessed perfection, always been act, always been realized, always been unchanging. He is unconditional.

jd
 
I think I understand actus purus how it is meant to be understood now. Neither as the equation of God with the potential he realises, but rather as the realising agent of the potential - nor as the limit of his potency or the potentials of his act, but simply as the the actualisation of all those possibilities. I have understood now that potentiality and actuality is to be understood not as a limit of the possibilities of God, but rather as the source of all the realisations of possibilities.

God actually is, he is not just potentially, because it is everything that follows from his act of creation which is potentially. Remove his act and the potential would not be realised. Creation is a potential which only exists inseparably from Gods act. Everything other than Gods act is itself the potential of his act, and he is the actuality which realises that potential.

And here Aquinas explains how we know that Gods choices, and acts, out of the myriad of possibilities, are actually “genuine”, making for a theology which doesn’t allow the possibility of a “deceiving” God:
Again, exactly correct. A current German Philosopher speaks about the two, perhaps, most essential attributes of God, His ABSOLUTE POWER and ABSOLUTE GOODNESS. It is interesting that he says, that rarely are these two attributes in affinity with one another in any other thing(s) we talk about or consider. They come relatively close together when we consider a benevolent dictator (leader). But, even in this case, as much power as a dictator may wield, it is not the same as the absolute power of God.

Think of a child holding a hamster. As fascinated as the child is towards the hamster, he may hold it a little too tightly, in an effort to not let it fall from his hands and hit the floor. Or, he may hold it too tightly because he is incredibly intrigued by the hamster’s softness. In either case, the very life of the animal is on the brink of disaster; and, it often happens that the animal winds up dead. As adults, we possess that same power. Our decisions may make life wonderful or horrible for some other creature. Michael Vick is a good example of someone with extreme power, not only over the animals themselves, but also, over the entire environment within which the animals were made to live. Thus, he had the power, but, not the goodness. At least, not to the same extent as his power.

On the other hand, no matter how good a leader might be, in order to protect his charges to the utmost, he may have to go to war. If he is too good, he may be seen as wimpish and his charges may suffer greatly. If he is so good that he is want to punish criminals, then his population will suffer, and it will most likely suffer at an exponentially increasing rate.

What would we be at the hands of an All Powerful God who was not simultaneously All Good? Our very finite and imperfect natures would lead to this existence being the very embodiment of Hell. Now, in what other being could Absolute Power and Absolute Goodness reside in perfect harmony, especially when you consider that, to God, the afterlife may hold more meaning than this life? Thus, in terms of the two most dreadfully terrifying attributes of God of all of them, there can be no potentiality whatsoever.

jd
 
Exactly.

God has always been, always possessed perfection, always been act, always been realized, always been unchanging. He is unconditional.

jd
Heres a riddle for you J Daniel;

If no people existed, would God know?
 
I could be wrong (I didn’t look this up), but I think “people” implies humans. A clearer way to state the riddle, I think, would be: If no persons existed, would God know?
 
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